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This dissertation argues that Maximus conceives the logic of creation from nothing as the 
logic of the divine Word’s historical Incarnation. It first studies the peculiar features of 
Maximus’s Neochalcedonian christology in order to understand what he means by 
“Incarnation” (Chapter 1). It then discovers this same logic operative in Maximus’s 
protology (Chapter 2) and eschatology (Chapter 3). I therefore conclude that Maximus’s 
declaration, “The Word of God, very God, wills that the mystery of his Incarnation be 






























Nicht jedwedem ist gegeben, das Ende zu wissen, wenigen, die Uranfänge des Lebens zu 
sehen, noch wenigeren, das Ganze vom Ersten bis zum Letzten der Dinge zu 
durchdenken. 
 
~ F.W.J. von Schelling, Die Weltalter 
 
 
In hac autem consideratione est perfectio illuminationis mentis, dum quasi in sexta die 
videt hominem factum ad imaginem Dei. Si enim imago est similitudo expressiva, dum 
mens nostra contemplatur in Christo Filio Dei, qui est imago Dei invisibilis per naturam, 
humanitatem nostram tam mirabiliter exaltatem, tam ineffabiliter unitam, videndo simul 
in unum primum et ultimum, summum et imum, circumferentiam et centrum, alpha et 
omega, causatum et causam, Creatorem et creaturam, librum sciliet scriptum intus et 
extra; iam pervenit ad quandam rem perfectam, ut cum Deo ad perfectionem suarum 
illuminationum in sexto gradu quasi in sexta die perveniat, nec aliquid iam amplius restet 
nisi dies requiei, in qua per mentis excessum requiescat humanae mentis perspicacitas ab 
omni opere, quod patrarat. 
 
~ St Bonaventure, Itinerarium mentis in Deum VI.7 
 
 
ἀπεκρὶθη αὐτοῖς ὁ Ἰησοῦς· Οὐκ ἔστιν γεγραμμὲνον ἐν τῷ νόμῳ ὑμῶν ὅτι Ἐγὼ εἶπα· Θεοὶ 
ἐστε; εἰ ἐκεὶνους εἶπεν θεοὺς πρὸς οὓς ὁ λόγος τοῦ θεοῦ ἐγένετο, καὶ οὐ δύναται λυθῆναι 
ἡ γραφὴ, ὃν ὁ πατὴρ ἡγὶασεν καὶ ἀπέστειλεν εἰς τὸν κόσμον ὑμεῖς λὲγετε ὅτι 
Βλασφημεῖς, ὅτι εἶπον· Υἱὸς τοῦ θεοῦ εἰμι; 
~ John 10.34-6 
 
 
αὐτου γὰρ ἐσμεν ποὶημα, κτισθέντες ἐν Χριστῷ Ἰησοῦ ἐπὶ ἔργοις ἀγαθοῖς οἷς 
προητοίμασεν ὁ θεὸς ἵνα ἐν αὐτοῖς περιπατήσωμεν. 
~ Ephesians 2.10 
 
 
Βούλεται γὰρ ἀεὶ καὶ ἐν πᾶσιν ὁ τοῦ Θεοῦ Λόγος καὶ Θεὸς τῆς αὐτοῦ ἐνσωματώσεως 
ἐνεργεῖσθαι τὸ μυστήριον. 
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Incredible how something so mean as a dissertation can reveal so much about weighty 
matters like divine munificence. That’s evident enough when I try to recall all those who 
have instructed, chided, and cheered me throughout my theological formation—all to my 
gain. Their mostly unsung succor is for that very reason more the Lord’s. Here I 
acknowledge those more or less directly linked to this project and leave the rest to their 
reward. 
 Thanks first to my committee. John Betz, one of those rare interlocutors in 
academic theology whose generosity and intelligence actually allows iron to sharpen iron. 
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stand on. Andrew Prevot, a fearless Catholic thinker. Fr. Gary Gurtler, SJ, master of 
Plotinus’s thought and a philosopher himself. And Fr. Maximos Constas, my introduction 
to Maximus, the best English translator of Greek patristic texts, and involuntary catalyst 
for exploring Maximus’s speculative genius. 
 Fr. John Behr and Aristotle Papanikolaou have read parts or versions of this 
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of God’s goodness, the infinite mystery of personhood, and the love God is. 
 To my wife and greatest friend, Alexis. With you I’ve experienced the truth of 
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 And it’s to the Church, my Mother, that I give this meager offering. You’ve 
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Topic & Thesis 
John Scotus Eriugena attributes many insights to Maximus Confessor, above all insight 
into the riddle of the world’s procession from God. So Eriugena writes in the preface to 
his versio Latina of Maximus’s Ambigua ad Johannem: 
to mention a few of many points, [Maximus most lucidly explains] in what way 
the Cause of all things, who is God, be both a simple and manifold One: what sort 
of procession there be—and here I mean the multiplication of divine Goodness 
through all things that are—which descends from the summit all the way down, 
first through the general essence of all things, then through the most general 
genera, then through less general genera, still further through more specific 
species right into the most specific species, even into differentia and properties. 
And again, concerning the same divinity, we see what sort of reversion of 
Goodness there be—I mean the gathering together, through those same grades, 
from the things that exist in infinite diversity and multiplicity right up to that 
simplest unity of all things, which is in God and which God is. So [we see] that 
God is all things and all things are God. And [we understand] indeed in what way 
this divine procession into all things is called ἀναλυτικὴ, that is, unraveling, but 
reversion [is called] θέωσις—deification.1 
 
Maximus taught Eriugena how the sheen of God’s ineffable transcendence most glisters 
when we see that and how God and world are “one and the same.”2 And to see this you 
need the crucial lens Maximus cuts: the “primordial reasons” of all things not only find 
                                                 
1 Eriugena, JOANNIS SCOTI VERSIO AMBIGUORUM S. MAXIMI, praef., my translation; CCSG 
18, 3-4, ll.25-37: “Exempli gratia, ut pauca de pluribus dicam, quomodo causa omnium, quae Deus est, una 
sit simplex et multiplex; qualis sit processio, id est multiplicatio divinae bonitatis per omnia quae sunt, a 
summo usque deorsum, per generalem omnium essentiam primo, deinceps per genera generalissima, deinde 
per genera generaliora, inde per species specialiores usque ad species specialissimas per differentias 
proprietatesque descendens; et iterum ejusdem divinae videlicet, bonitatis qualis sit reversio, id est 
congregatio, per eosdem gradus ab infinita eorum quae sunt variaque multiplicatione usque ad 
simplicissimam omnium unitatem, quae in Deo est et Deus est, ita ut et Deus omnia sit et omnia Deus sint. 
Et quomodo praedicta quidem divina in omnia processio ΑΝΑΛΥΤΙΚΗ dicitur, hoc est resolutio, reversio 
vero ΘΕΩΣΙΣ, hoc est deificatio.” 
2 Eriugena, Periphyseon, III.17, O’Meara 161-3: “Proinde non duo a se ipsis distantia debemus 




their eternal ground in the Word of God, they “are the very [Word] Himself.”3 God and 
world are identical because the one Word is both. 
 I share Eriugena’s conviction that with Maximus dawned what may be the 
profoundest insight of the patristic tradition into the peculiar role the Word plays in 
God’s creative act, the Word who remains consubstantial with Father and Spirit even as 
he descends into and as the generation of all things. I stand with Eriugena too when he 
says of the God-world relation—more exactly, how God and world are identical and 
distinct in the Word—that “there is no more profound question than this that seekers after 
the truth should investigate.”4 I sympathize still more when Eriugena, dumb before “the 
manner and reason of the establishment of all things in the Word,” finally sighs, “let the 
one speak who can; myself, I confess I do not know.”5 In yet a final way I follow 
Eriugena: just here, where the trail runs cold, I look to Maximus. 
 A broad and systematic question animates my study: does the historical 
Incarnation of the Word disclose anything about the fundamental God-world relation, and 
if yes, what? I pose this question to Maximus, who, if the genre of ἐρωταπόκρισεις much 
of his oeuvre assumes offers any indication, would not glibly eschew this ζήτημα.6 That 
this question motivates the study does not mean the study can resolve it, of course. But it 
might make a start. I take up another of Maximus’s practices, though without his 
ingenuity, in hunt of his answer: I comment texts in Maximus which are, I think, misread, 
                                                 
3 Eriugena, Periphyseon, III.7, O’Meara 76-7: “omnia in verbo dei non solum aeterna verum etiam 
ipsum {verbum} esse.” Surely significant, Eriugena overtly credits this precise insight to Maximus’s 
Ambiguum 7. 
4 Eriugena, Periphyseon, III.7, O’Meara 70-1. 
5 Eriugena, Periphyseon, III.16, O’Meara 144-5. 
6 On this genre in Maximus, see Paul M. Blowers, Exegesis and Spiritual Pedagogy in Maximus 
the Confessor: An Investigation of the Questiones ad Thalassium (Notre Dame: UNDP, 1991) and Peter 
Van Deun, “Maximus the Confessor’s Use of Literary Genres,” in The Oxford Handbook of Maximus the 




or at least read shallow. So the systematic question becomes an exegetical one too. I ask 
it thus: what is the relation between creation and Incarnation in Maximus? 
 I argue that Maximus conceives creation as divine Incarnation. More precisely, 
creation and Incarnation are identified in Maximus because they bear the same logic. To 
those familiar with Maximus or his modern commentators, this may appear a prosaic 
thesis. Many have spoken of the intimate link in Maximus’s theology between his 
Neochalcedonian christology and his conception of the world.7 Who among those who’ve 
read it could forget that breathtaking declaration, this dissertation’s epigraph: “The Word 
of God, very God, wills that the mystery of his Incarnation be actualized always and in all 
things”?8 And yet I contend that not only has recent scholarship on Maximus moved 
noticeably away from taking this cosmic Incarnation as literal Incarnation—where literal 
means in the technical sense of christology proper, i.e. according to the very logic of the 
Incarnate Word—but that Maximus’s readers have seldom taken him literally here, even 




                                                 
7 Already in 1915 Sergei Leontevich Epifanovich, the first major modern scholar of Maximus, 
identified Maximus’s unique genius in his application of the Incarnation to virtually every other dimension 
of existence; see the discussion in Joshua Lollar, “Reception of Maximian Thought in the Modern Era,” in 
TOHMC, eds. Pauline Allen and Bronwen Neil (Oxford: OUP, 2015), 565-7. 
8 Amb 7.22, PG 91, 1084c-d: “Βούλεται γὰρ ἀεὶ καὶ ἐν πᾶσιν ὁ τοῦ Θεοῦ Λόγος καὶ Θεὸς τῆς 
αὐτοῦ ἐνσωματώσεως ἐνεργεῖσθαι τὸ μυστήριον.” 
9 So Eric D. Perl, “Metaphysics and Christology in Maximus Confessor and Eriugena,” in 
Eriugena: East and West – Papers of the Eighth International Colloquium of the Society for the Promotion 
of Eriugenian Studies, eds. Bernard McGinn and Willemien Otten (Notre Dame: UNDP, 1994), 253-79. 
And rightly so, since Eriugena openly denies the similarity of creation and the historical Incarnation 




Status huius quaestionis10 
I begin with one exception, and this I call “the Perl phenomenon.” Eric Perl’s 1991 
dissertation on Maximus at Yale was never published and yet is often cited, still today.11 
A very brief distillation of his argument appears, in published form, in just the first half a 
25-page essay.12 
 What makes Perl a phenomenon, though, is his actual argument. His study 
examines the philosophical dimensions of “participation” (μέθεξις) in Maximus. 
Participation—basically the ancient problem of the One and the Many (hence Perl begins 
with a meditation on Plato’s Parmenides)—is the philosophical locus classicus of the 
God-world relation. And yet Perl’s avowed self-restriction to matters philosophical does 
not prevent his careful reading of Maximus to lead where Maximus always leads—to the 
Incarnate Word. Having surveyed “participation” in thinkers like Plotinus, Proclus, 
Gregory of Nyssa, and Dionysius, Perl elucidates Maximus’s Neochalcedonian 
christology and its conceptual convergence with and transfiguration of the metaphysical 
doctrine of participation.13 Perl discerns in Maximus’s technical use of enhypostasia or 
“enhypostatization” the christological equivalent to and warrant for “perfect 
                                                 
10 This section unfolds strictly in light of my own thesis. It is no generic survey of modern 
scholarship, of which there are several adequate reports. In chronological order: Polycarp Sherwood, 
“Survey of Recent Work on St. Maximus the Confessor,” Traditio 20 (1964): 428-37; the tendentious one 
from Marcel Doucet, “Vues récentes sur les ‘métamorphoses’ de la pensée de saint Maxime le Confesseur,” 
Science et Esprit 31.3 (1979): 269-302; Aidan Nichols, O.P. Byzantine Gospel: Maximus the Confessor in 
Modern Scholarship (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1993), esp. the “Appendix: The Rediscovery of Maximus: A 
Brief History of Maximian Scholarship,” 221-52; Andrew Louth, “Recent Research on St Maximus the 
Confessor: A Survey,” St Vladimir’s Theological Quarterly 42 (1998): 67-84; Peter van Deun, “Maxime le 
Confesseur: état de la question et bibliographie exhaustive,” Sacris Erudiri 38 (1999): 485-573; idem, 
“Développements récents des recherches sur Maxime le Confesseur (1998-2009),” Sacris Erudiri 48 
(2009): 97-167; and now Lollar, “Reception,” 564-90, and Élie Ayroulet, “La réception de Maxime le 
Confesseur à l’époque contemporaine,” Théophilyon 21.1 (2016): 71-90. 
11 Eric D. Perl, “Methexis: Creation, Incarnation, and Deification in Saint Maximus Confessor,” 
(unpublished Ph.D. diss., Yale, 1991). See Louth’s cautious but eager anticipation of Perl’s doctoral thesis 
(Louth “Recent Research,” 81-2).  
12 Perl, “Metaphysics and Christology,” cited at n.9.  




participation.”14 A provocative upshot: “perfect participation” in God, since this describes 
the ultimate telos of human deification, means that the destiny of created being is to 
become enhypostasized in the Word: 
This hypostatic union of God and creation, the identity of identity and difference, 
is the one mystery precisely because, as the uttermost explanation of all reality, it 
cannot itself be explained in terms of anything else.... The distinction between 
hypostasis and nature enables [Maximus] to accept the perfect identity and perfect 
difference of God and the world, and the perfect identity of these. Thus in 
ontology enhypostasization allows him to avoid both the monist and the dualist 
tendencies of the theory of participation, just as in Christology it allows him to 
avoid both monophysitism and Nestorianism. Instead of undermining the 
metaphysical theory in attempting discursively to escape the paradox, Maximus 
exalts it as the supreme mystery.15 
 
 Perl’s view reaffirms Balthasar’s that Maximus makes Neochalcedonian 
christology “a fundamental law of metaphysics.”16 But the claim that the Word 
enhypostasizes the world moves well beyond Balthasar. Perl himself seems not to have 
seen this, and indeed I sense a certain ambiguity for just this reason. Perl exceeds 
Balthasar precisely where he thinks himself at one with Balthasar. Enhypostatization or, 
to drop the barbarism for now, Incarnation, is actually not “perfect participation,” at least 
if participation here is conceived (Neo)platonically. Christ’s human nature did not 
participate his hypostasis, not even perfectly. The relation between Christ’s person and 
either of his natures surpasses participatory (Perl) and analogical (Balthasar) logic. So 
Perl does follow Balthasar in two ways: he sees that Neochalcedonianism and its 
flowering in Maximus opens new metaphysical logic—the logic of “person” and 
“perichoresis” (taken from trinitarian theology and applied to the God-world relation) 
                                                 
14 Perl, “Methexis,” 205. 
15 Perl, “Methexis,” 210-11. 
16 Hans Urs von Balthasar, Cosmic Liturgy: The Universe According to Maximus the Confessor, 




rather than that of “essence” or “nature”17—and he makes of this logic a cosmological 
principle. “Perfect participation,” Perl thinks, codifies Maximus’s achievement, first 
discerned by Balthasar. But Perl also edges toward a more direct application, something 
like a formal one, of Christo-logic to the whole God-world relation. Only thus can he 
pronounce what never lights upon Balthasar’s tongue: that God and world should enjoy 
“hypostatic union.” 
 Modern Maximus scholars often cite but never follow Perl’s work in its core 
claim.18 In fact modern Maximus scholarship has moved conspicuously away from Perl 
during the two and a half decades since. Take for instance Törönen’s opening argument, 
endorsed by Louth, that far too much has been made of the “Neochalcedonian logic” of 
“union” and “distinction” in Maximus, since, of course, these were perennial topoi in 
both Greek philosophy and Christian theology long before Chalcedon.19 And yet the 
scholarly consensus contra Perl has never, as far as I know, offered a direct engagement 
and refutation of his principal thesis. How then to explain the phenomenon that Perl’s 
audacious thesis has both commanded the attention of scholars to such a degree that it’s 
still cited in its unpublished form, and yet the essential theme of its melody has 
apparently fallen on deaf ears? Maximus studies have played three other notes and these, 
I think, compose a harmony dissonant with Perl’s and my own. Surveying these situates 
this dissertation among the scholarly literature. 
                                                 
17 See Balthasar, Cosmic Liturgy, 64, 113, and esp. 153f. 
18 Nor do scholars who cite Perl do so mainly in demurral.  The only monograph in the past 
several decades to treat my specific topic agrees that Perl’s dissertation “represents a major contribution to 
the Maximus literature”; see Torstein Theodore Tollefsen, The Christocentric Cosmology of St Maximus 
the Confessor (Oxford: OUP, 2008), 17. 
19 Melchisedec Törönen, Union and Distinction in the Thought of St Maximus the Confessor 
(Oxford: OUP, 2007), 1-6; and Andrew Louth, “St Maximos’ Doctrine of the logoi of Creation,” Studia 




 1. Analogizing Maximus: Balthasar recruits Maximus for the analogy of being. In 
both its 1941 and 1961 recensions Balthasar’s crowning patristic achievement, 
Kosmische Liturgie, dons a double laurel: it remains “a fountainhead and continuing 
inspiration of modern Maximus scholarship,”20 and many consider it perhaps the decisive 
moment of retrieval for Balthasar’s own constructive theology.21 Below I say more about 
Balthasar’s general approach to Maximus and why I share it. Here I want to suggest that 
Balthasar retrieved Maximus to discover in him the definitive justification for the 
analogia entis between God and world, where “definitive” means, to meet Barth’s 
obsessive concern, “christological.”22 He also needed to dissipate that great spectral 
nimbus hovering about so much modern theology, the harrowing shade of German 
idealism, Hegel’s above all. It’s no accident that Balthasar opens his book on Maximus 
with reference to Franz Anton Staudenmaier’s attempt to recruit elements of Eriugena’s 
thought to contend with “the pantheism of Hegel.”23 Balthasar chooses Maximus. And he 
                                                 
20 Daley, “Translator’s Foreward,” Cosmic Liturgy, 15; similarly Ayroulet, “La réception,” 72-3. 
21 So Cyril O’Regan, “Von Balthasar and Thick Retrieval: Post-Chalcedonian Symphonic 
Theology,” Gregorianum 77.2 (1996), 237: “Balthasar remains perfectly clear that Maximus is without 
equal. Maximus does not simply repeat; he fundamentally exceeds, both in the specific historical domain of 
post-Chalcedonian theology, as well as in his potential as a contemporary critical resource”; see too Mark 
A. MacIntosh, Christology from Within: Spirituality and the Incarnation in Hans Urs von Balthasar (Notre 
Dame: UNDP, 1996). 
22 It’s now pretty well acknowledged that Barth’s rejection was of a piece with his wider 
repudiation of natural theology, which explains the accompanying vehemence in both the rejection of 
analogy in the Dogmatics and the acerbic contrapuntal tract against Brunner’s natural theology, called 
Nein!. That Barth was chiefly exercised about theological epistemology (faith and reason) also explains his 
acceptance of both Balthasar’s and Söhngen’s concession that the analogia entis must find final epistemic 
justification in an analogia fidei; see Hans Urs von Balthasar, The Theology of Karl Barth: Exposition and 
Interpretation. Transl. Edward T. Oakes (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1992 [1951]) 31, 37, passim; and 
Gottlieb Söhngen, “Analogia fidei: Gottähnlichkeit allein aus Glauben?” Catholica 3 (1934): 113-36; idem, 
“Analogia fidei: Die Einheit in der Glaubenswissenschaft,” Catholica 4 (1934): 176-208. For Barth’s 
acceptance of these proposals see his “Gespräche in Princeton I,” 499, cited in Kenneth Oakes, “The 
Question of Nature and Grace in Karl Barth: Humanity as Creature and as Covenant-Partner,” Modern 
Theology 23.4 (2007): 615. And for an updated and charitable account of these and related matters, see 
John R. Betz, “Translator’s Introduction,” in Analogia Entis: Metaphysics: Original Structure and 
Universal Rhythm. Translated by John R. Betz and David Bentley Hart (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2014 
[1932]), 74f. 




does so for the same reason that makes Maximus a fitting riposte to Barth: “Maximus 
looks straight into the eye of Hegel,” recognizes a kindred christological instinct to 
synthesize created contraries, but outstrips Hegel by insisting that Chalcedon’s Definition 
govern every synthesis. Indeed, any reader of Maximus “recognizes that his ontology and 
cosmology are extensions of his Christology, in that the synthesis of Christ’s concrete 
person is not only God’s final thought for the world, but also his original plan.”24 
 And so Maximus’s maxim, the watchword that speaks always the final word in 
Christian metaphysics, is “unconfused” (ἀσύγχυτος).25 That natures human and divine, 
created and uncreated, coalesce in the “unconfused union” achieved by and in the person 
of Christ—this for Balthasar constitutes the dogmatic justification for the analogia entis 
between God and world. It justifies, I mean, what often falls to doubt (particularly when 
the “Asiatic” religious mood predominates): that the finitude of the world, its infinite 
difference from God, must forever perdure in all its individuality and diversity, even and 
especially in its apical union with the one God. In Christ Creator became creature and yet 
remained Creator; therefore creature will remain creature when it becomes, in a sense, 
Creator. Sublation need not spell obliteration. Hypostatic union justifies, indeed 
valorizes, the analogy of being. And I say “justifies” deliberately. One way I disagree 
with Balthasar emerges precisely here: for Balthasar, despite momentary lapses, 
Maximus derives from Chalcedonian Christology the epistemic justification for the true 
God-world relation, an analogical concinnity of the two natures in Christ; for me 
Maximus there divines the peculiar, metaphysical form of creation itself, a logic that 
                                                 
24 Balthasar, Cosmic Liturgy, 207. 




insists an analogy between infinitely incommensurable natures holds only within a deeper 
identity of those natures in and as a divine hypostasis, in and as the Word.  
 Balthasar flatly denies that any “higher” or “deeper” identity obtains in the God-
world relation, and again recruits Maximus’s authority for the point.26 Maximus becomes 
the most valiant defender of analogy because he found a way to speak of the permanent 
integrities of God and world in an atmosphere threatening their collapse, beset as it was 
by Neoplatonism, Origenism, and the ascetic flight from the world. Christ unites without 
confusion—behold the definitive truth that gives the lie to every illicit elision, every 
seduction toward the “original sin” of metaphysical identity!27 Incarnation verifies that 
analogia entis is the one inviolable rule of Christian metaphysics.28 Balthasar’s 
recruitment of Maximus cannot but cast a long shadow over any kind of identity thesis 
when seeking Maximus’s deepest insight into the God-world relation.29 
 2. Platonizing Maximus: Sherwood calls for study of “participation” in Maximus. 
Balthasar made substantial revisions to the first edition of his Maximus opus (1941), 
largely in response to criticisms from the other great Maximus scholar of the era, the 
Benedictine monk Polycarp Sherwood. The gap between the two lay mostly in method. 
On essentials they were at one.30 They also agreed on what required closer scrutiny in 
Maximus: his reliance on the Cappadocians and Dionysius, the exact nature of sixth-
century “Neochalcedonianism” and Maximus’s use of it, and so on. Sherwood’s 
                                                 
26 Hans Urs von Balthasar, Theo-Drama: Theological Dramatic Theory: Volume III: Dramatis 
Personae: Persons in Christ, transl. Graham Harrison (San Francisco: Ignatius, 1992 [1978]), 221-22. 
27 Hans Urs von Balthasar, “Retrieving the Tradition: The Fathers, the Scholastics and Ourselves,” 
Communio 24 (1997): 347-96 (transl. Edward T. Oakes, S.J. [Orig: 1939]), 354. 
28 Balthasar, Theo-Logic: Theological Logical Theory: Volume II: Truth of God. Translated by 
Adrian J. Walker (San Francisco: Ignatius, 2004 [1985]), 315-16. 
29 I have not included here the important work of Lars Thunberg, whose basic vantage is that of 
Balthasar’s. See his Microcosm and Mediator: The Theological Anthropology of Maximus the Confessor, 
2nd ed. (Chicago: Open Court, 1995). 




important 1964 review essay pled for a more pressing task: “A study on ‘participation’,” 
he wrote, 
would serve to clarify what is, perhaps, the acutest problem in Byzantine 
theology: the relation of the finite to the infinite, of the created to the uncreated, 
not so much in the moment of creation as in the moment of deification.31 
 
Here he commended Dalmais’s concern to investigate “participation” in Maximus with 
the express aim to define “divinization by grace...without falling into pantheism.”32 
 This was wise counsel. Notice, though, the parameters fixed from the outset: to 
grasp the God-world relation in Maximus you should analyze the concept of 
“participation”—a concept whose lineage reaches deep into times past and extends 
widely across various thought worlds— and you should focus on eschatological union, 
and you should do so taking care to avoid “pantheism,” a term that apparently requires no 
exact definition.33 Sherwood’s call, whatever its limitations from my vantage, has 
certainly borne fruit. An interesting and lively debate about whether “participation” is 
even a proper concept in Maximus, and if so, what it means, has transpired for the good 
of all in the Maximus guild. I don’t rehearse it here.34 Rather, I take issue with what 
appears to be a governing assumption within the debate and without: you must seek the 
                                                 
31 Sherwood, “Survey of Recent Work,” 435. 
32 Sherwood, “Survey of Recent Work,” 436, citing Dalmais’s notice on Balthasar’s second 
edition in Vie Spirituelle 107 (1962): 318. 
33 Douglas Hedley, “Pantheism, Trinitarian Theism and the Idea of Unity: Reflections on the 
Christian Concept of God,” Religious Studies 32.1 (1996): 61-77. It’s striking to recall, though Hedley does 
not, that Schelling had already diagnosed and lamented this tendency already in 1809; see F.W.J. Schelling, 
Philosophical Investigations into the Essence of Human Freedom. Translated with an introduction by Jeff 
Love and Johannes Schmidt (New York: State University of New York Press, 2006 [1809]), 11: “It is an 
undeniably excellent invention that with such labels [as ‘pantheism’] entire viewpoints are described all at 
once. If one has found the right label for a system, the rest falls into place of itself, and one is spared the 
effort of examining what is characteristic about it more meticulously. As soon as such labels are given, with 
their help even one who is ignorant can pass judgment on the most thought-through matters.” 
34 Torstein Tollefsen, “Did St Maximus the Confessor have a Concept of Participation?” Studia 
Patristica 37 (2001): 618-25, which is a retort to Larchet’s view that Maximus lacks a proper concept of 
“participation”; see his La divinisation de l’homme selon saint Maxime le Confesseur (Paris: Cerf, 1996), 




essential contours of the God-world relation in Maximus under the horizon of 
“participation.” At first blush this seems a promising way forward. This, not only because 
the relation of God and world restates the classic question about how the Many 
participates the One—a problem Plato’s Parmenides articulates in its acutest form, as the 
Neoplatonists knew35—but also because participation is of course a partly biblical 
concept (2 Pet 1.4: ἵνα...γένησθε θείας κοινωνοὶ φύσεως).36 
 Participation as such is not the problem. The problem arises when we imagine that 
participation exhausts the God-world relation. More than anyone, Maximus challenges 
this assumption precisely because he always discovers that the contours of the cosmos are 
those of Christ. This dissertation tries to follow him in that identification. Said 
differently, Maximus problematizes the final adequacy of “participation” because if 
creation itself is divine Incarnation, then we must find a way to understand that and how 
Maximus’s proper christology really is his metaphysics or cosmology. Christ, I mean, 
must be the paradigm of creation, the perfect microcosm of the world. And prima facie 
this identification means that the truth of the doctrine of Christ must be the truth of the 
doctrine of creation.  
 Hence the question becomes: does participation describe the peculiar logic of the 
Incarnate Word? No. Many have appreciated, and appreciate anew today, that the period 
of christological debates before and after Chalcedon straight through Maximus’s time 
needed to forge new theological and philosophical concepts.37 Concepts like person or 
                                                 
35 Carlos Steel, “Beyond the Principle of Contradiction? Proclus’ ‘Parmenides’ and the Origin of 
Negative Theology,” in Die Logik des Transzendentalen: Festschrift für Jan A. Aertsen, ed. Martin Pickavé 
(Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2003), 594-99. 
36 See Norman Russell, The Doctrine of Deification in the Greek Patristic Tradition (Oxford: 
OUP, 2004). 
37 Balthasar himself often mentions these developments, Cosmic Liturgy, 64, 113, 153, etc. Some 




hypostasis, enhypostasia, and Maximus’s original use of perichoresis in technical 
Christology pose significant problems for any facile claim that christology and 
cosmology converge in a concept like participation. We have only to ask, as I did before: 
Do we say that Christ’s human nature participated his person? Certainly not. Not only 
would that insinuate a species of Nestorianism or adoptionism (since it implies natural 
separation between Christ’s humanity and his hypostasis), but it makes little 
(Neoplatonic) sense to say a nature participates a hypostasis: the latter just is the concrete 
instance of the former.38 Or clearer still: Does perichoresis mean participation? Not if it 
will remain orthodox in any historical and systematic sense: contra Origen, the Son (and 
the Spirit) does not participate the Father.39 
 And yet the drift of Maximus’s thought moves the reader to posit the most direct 
correspondence between the Neochalcedonian logic of Christology and the logic of 
creation—the logic of God’s relation to the world he spoke into existence. We’ve already 
seen Balthasar do so. Nearly everyone does. Two more examples, though, nicely 
illustrate the problem with making participation the governing concept for the God-world 
relation on the one hand, and then making Christ the paradigm of that relation on the 
other. 
 Torstein Tollefsen’s The Christocentric Cosmology of St. Maximus the Confessor 
is the most recent monograph-length treatment of this study’s topic. There he agrees with 
                                                                                                                                                 
Chalcedon and the Transformation of the Philosophical Tradition: Reflections on a Neglected Topic,” in 
The Ways of Byzantine Theology, ed. Mikonja Knezevic (Alhambra: Sebastian Press, 2015), 89-110. 
38 Tollefsen, Christocentric Cosmology, 216, is therefore right to say that in Christology proper the 
hypostatic identification of human and divine natures “makes participation possible.” That’s to say, 
“participation” is not the sufficient or whole description of created and uncreated natures in the domain of 
technical christology. 
39 Origen, Comm. in Jo., 2.17-18; see David L. Balas, “The Idea of Participation in the Structure of 
Origen’s Thought: Christian Transposition of a Theme of the Platonic Tradition,” in Origeniana: premier 
colloque international des études origéniennes, eds. Henri Crouzel, Gennaro Lomiento, and Josep Rius-




Balthasar and Thunberg (against Törönen and Louth, it seems) that the presence of the 
four famous Chalcedonian adverbs in Maximian metaphysics, especially “unconfused” 
(ἀσυγχύτως), flows from Maximus’s original insight that “the same ontological 
logic...governs the relation between the uncreated and the created being in incarnation as 
well as in participation.”40 Recall, though, that these adverbs refer to the relations 
between Christ’s two natures: united but unconfused, distinct but inseparable. 
Chalcedonian adverbs describe an essential or natural logic, a logic that obtains within 
and among metaphysical natures. This is why, I think, Tollefsen relaxes his initial claim 
that Christ is the paradigm of creation.41 The mystery of Christ is not the same as that of 
creation after all. Hypostatic union is “the mystery par excellence” because it is “not a 
nature-union”—unlike participation, where higher and lower beings share the content of 
natures to different degrees of intensity and determination, that is, in different modes: a 
man, an angel, and the divine Logos are all rational by nature. Just how they are is what 
differs. (And the Son is rational to an infinitely higher degree exactly because he is by 
nature reason itself). A telling passage near the end of Tollefsen’s chapter on 
participation in Maximus: 
In His historical Incarnation as Jesus Christ, the Logos becomes immanent, but 
He does not become participated by His human nature, nor does He, as God, 
participate His own humanity. On the other hand, the Incarnation makes 
participation possible. Therefore, the human nature of Christ is deified by 
participation in the divine activity.42 
 
 But how is that divine activity participated by Christ’s humanity? Spy the 
sequence here: in the historical Incarnation (christology proper) the person of the Word 
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becomes immanent in a mode that exceeds participatory logic (creation proper), since 
here humanity does not participate the divine person, nor does divinity participate 
humanity; indeed the deeper identification of both natures in the one hypostasis is the 
very condition of any participation between the two natures; therefore, he concludes, 
Christ’s human nature is deified by participating the divine activity. But isn’t everything 
that preceded this conclusion the whole condition of deification here? Wouldn’t it be 
more correct to say that Christ’s human nature is deified given two conditions, [1] by 
participating the divine activity, and that this very participation is only possible because 
[2] this same human nature is identical to the divine person? And isn’t it precisely this 
final and deepest condition—hypostatic identity—that makes this participation peculiarly 
Christo-logical? I can see only one way to comprehend Tollefsen’s affirmation that for 
Maximus Christ is “the paradigm” of creation, and it’s Balthasar’s too: he must mean 
(and we’ll soon see that he does), that Christ only verifies or confirms or gives epistemic 
credence to an idea already articulated in basic Platonic metaphysics. Balthasar calls this 
idea “analogy of being,” Tollefsen calls it “participation.” Neither means that Maximus’s 
Neochalcedonian christology describes the very same logic of the God-world relation.43 I 
will. 
 As a final example I return to Perl. I have already implied that his concept of 
“perfect participation” retains the parameters set by the classical concept of metaphysical 
“participation.” Perl differs from Balthasar, Tollefsen, and others because he accents the 
identity-pole of participation while they the difference. Now, he does deny that this 
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results in mere identity, since, for instance, he thinks perfect participation does not entail 
the obliteration of created nature as such. That constitutes his sole reply to the charge of 
pantheism.44 But what happens to created hypostases?45 Are they preserved in the 
consummation of “perfect participation”? Their absence in Perl’s account of Maximus’s 
eschatology suggests their final absence too, at least qua created hypostases. Perhaps they 
return to God the Word, are enhypostatized in him, and so persist only as primordial 
powers or logoi. Then the Logos alone (with the other divine persons) would remain in 
actu, a divine hypostasis now also the sole instantiation of a generic “created nature”—a 
rather vexing abstraction, and one that rings more Evagrian.46 But that’s to speculate, 
since Perl says no more. We have only the lingering suspicion Perl’s intuitions might be 
better served by parting with participation, at least where its Neoplatonic strictures prove 
too strict: precisely in christological thought. 
 3. Minimizing Maximus: the tendency to subject Maximus to Thomas Aquinas. A 
final cacophonous note sounds from the 1970s. Comparison of Maximus to Thomas dates 
(in the modern period) from the start of the twentieth century,47 but the seventies saw a 
concerted effort to bring the two into accord on all essentials. This démarche, led by the 
                                                 
44 Perl, “Metaphysics and Christology,” esp. 260-1. So he rightly characterizes deification as the 
“enhypostatization” of creature in the Word, as when “the creature receives God the Word as its 
hypostasis” (260). He also calls this “perfect participation in God” (260). Since participation is the natural 
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45 That Maximus emphasizes the deification of human persons or hypostases rather than just 
human nature was especially pressed by W. Völker, Maximus Confessor als Meister des geistlichen Lebens 
(Wiesbaden: Fisteiner, 1965); see Lollar, “Reception,” 573; and Ayroulet, “La réception,” 78. 
46 Evagrius, Ep. fidei (the Great Letter to Melania) 5, on which see Ch. 3, sec. 3.4. 
47 H. Straubinger, “Die Lehre des Patriarchen Sophronius von Jerusalem über die Trinität, die 
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Dominican Juan-Miguel Garrigues, had some merit.48 It became controversial due to the 
grandiose claims these Dominicans championed. Garrigues put it this way: 
A dire vrai, l’un est le précurseur de l’autre: tout aussi bien, le second a rejoint et 
systématisé les vues les plus fondamentales du premier et l’intelligence 
théologique de son oeuvre présuppose l’arrière-plan patristique, plus spécialement 
maximien, retrouvé à travers et par-delà saint Jean Damascene.49 
 
We’ve no reason to detail the many contentious points this judgement evokes. Larchet 
and Thunberg have done that well enough.50 Important here is how this rapprochement 
strategy dictates what is possible, or impossible, for Maximus to say about the God-world 
relation. 
 An example. In recent years, Antoine Lévy undertook the Dominican charge. He 
is significant both because he carries on the Thomist negotiation with Maximus, and also 
because he does so over the heart of the matter: the relation between “created” and 
“uncreated.”51 Lévy’s work has much to commend it. He puts Thomas in direct 
conversation with Maximus rather than, say, with Palamas’s Maximus.52 This allows him 
to embed Maximus within the Greek patristic and Greek philosophical contexts of his 
own day, a move that revitalizes the possible exchange between the two estranged 
luminaries.53 For Lévy this reveals a Maximus very favorable to Thomism. Maximus and 
                                                 
48 Alain Riou’s work, for example, is quite useful. See his Le monde et l’Église selon Maxime le 
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49 Juan-Miguel Garrigues, Maxime le Confesseur: la charité, avenir divin de l’homme (Paris: 
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51 Antoine Lévy, O.P., Le créé et l’incréé: Maxime le Confesseur et Thomas d’Aquin (Paris: Vrin, 
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Palamas (Oxford: OUP, 1999). 
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Thomas differ only in perspective, not in content. Between them there is a “coïncidence 
doctrinale parfaite,”54 and “le rapport créé / incréé se déclinait identiquement” in each’s 
system. The two systems are “isomorphiques.”55 True, Maximus surveys the God-world 
relation from a “ktizo-centric” lookout, whence he sees only a mysterious energy pouring 
forth into (and as) creation from an utterly ineffable divine essence; and Thomas takes a 
“ktisto-centric” vantage, ever attentive to the created intellect’s strain to apprehend 
anything that exceeds its own laws. Different viewpoints demand different articulations, 
though the thing seen—God’s totally free, totally supernatural relation to the world—
remains the very same.56 
 Lévy claims that Maximus’s logoi-talk amounts to Neoplatonic talk of energeia 
(activity) and skhesis (relation). So when Maximus says God creates the world through 
the Logos’s condescension as and in the world’s logoi, he repeats the Neoplatonist 
Simplicius’s doctrine that the One (or any higher principle) “proceeds into external 
realities by means of relation.” And so, 
Nous comprenons que, tout en restant incréé, l’energeia de Dieu est ici saisie 
comme une conséquence de l’être-en-relation du monde, de la skhesis de toutes 
choses à un Dieu qui reste là visé selon son energeia simple et absolue.57 
 
That’s to say, Maximus conceives the essence-energy distinction in God in terms of 
Neoplatonic emanation, specifically the doctrine of double activity. On this view 
                                                                                                                                                 
Maximus to Thomas the West only betrays a palpable unfamiliarity with Maximus’s own spirit and genius. 
See Lévy, Le créé et l’incréé, 120-3. 
54 Lévy, Le créé et l’incréé, 422. 
55 Lévy, Le créé et l’incréé, 280. 
56 Lévy, Le créé et l’incréé, 422. He even goes as far as denying, with Garrigues, that Maximus 
thinks the historical Incarnation was predestined regardless of sin (430-1). In other words, just where 
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57 Lévy, Le créé et l’incréé, 181. The immediate context is deification by grace, but Lévy’s whole 
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causality comprises two distinct, inseparable acts, an interior and an exterior.58 A higher 
principle “first” is what and how it alone is, and only “then,” simply by being what it is, 
does it emanate the creative energy that becomes the ground and cause of lower effects. 
Maximus, Lévy argues, construes God’s “essence” as the first act, his energy the 
second.59 Since therefore Thomas tends to view the God-world relation more in terms of 
the second act—and how else given his starting point “from below”?—while Maximus 
more the first (or both), then the two merely pronounce the same thing in different 
registers. And what they say is clear enough: the created and the uncreated are related as 
effect to cause, as more limited natural power (esse determinatum) to the less determinate 
act of its causal principle, as participating to participated, as at once (graciously) alike 
and infinitely different—as analogous. 
 4. Metaphorizing Maximus: obvious speculative perils. The three preceding notes, 
though different in provenance, compose one melody. They share a bass clef as old as 
Eriugena’s lyrical praise of Maximus. Together they replay the assumption that Maximus 
cannot mean what he often says. For his part, Eriugena never says Maximus did not, for 
                                                 
58 For the classic statement of Neoplatonic “double act,” see Plotinus, Enn. V.4 [7] 2; cf. Eyjólfur 
Kjalar Emilsson, “Remarks on the Relation between the One and Intellect in Plotinus,” in Traditions of 
Platonism: Essays in Honour of John Dillon (Aldershot: Ashgate, 1999), esp. 278-81; and Christian Rutten, 
“La doctrine des deux actes dans la philosophie de Plotin,” Revue Philosophique de la France et de 
l’Étranger 146 (1956): 100-106. 
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instance, literally mean that creation is Incarnation. But Eriugena himself makes a point 
to deny the identification in his own speculative thought.60 Cyril O’Regan rightly says 
that Balthasar is forced to take all talk of “becoming God” in Maximus “to be 
metaphorical.”61 Tollefsen insists that when Maximus says creation is “Incarnation” 
(ἐνσάρκωσις, ἐνσωμάτωσις, etc) we have a “metaphorical usage of the term.”62 And yet 
Maximus himself never makes such qualifications. Our reasons for doing so must 
therefore lie elsewhere, something beyond simple exegesis. To cite an interested 
bystander: 
Although...in an extravagant moment, Maximus does seem to claim that 
deification causes such a fundamental change of status, the logical and theological 
problems entailed in such a claim are enormous – unless, of course, it is taken as 
hyperbolic doxology to the sanctifying power of the Almighty.63 
 
 Anna Williams here articulates the only two options when faced with Maximus’s 
identification of creation and Incarnation, and also the deciding factor. We either take 
Maximus’s “extravagant” moments as nothing more than “hyperbolic doxology” or we 
take him at his word and see where that leads. Almost everyone, I’ve tried to show, has 
taken the former road. And the deciding factor has often been exactly “the logical and 
theological problems entailed.” They are indeed “enormous.” I myself have already 
raised some with respect to Perl’s view, though I broadly endorse it. If the world is 
destined to be enhypostasized in the Word as was Christ’s human nature, what becomes 
of created hypostases as such? Or, as Louth once objected to Perl, if we take Maximus’s 
claims of a God-world identity in too straightforward a manner (as, say, the way we do in 
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christology), wouldn’t this number him among the Origenist isochristoi?64 Are we really 
all Christ? 
 Even so, this study takes the second path. Yes, the speculative worries must and 
will be addressed, and this in concert with a thorough reading of Maximus’s entire 
oeuvre. It’s a path Maximus scholarship has in many ways abandoned. Some openly 
eschew the relevance of technical Christo-logic in Maximus’s cosmology (Törönen, 
Louth). Some permit it only as epistemic validation of and metaphorical expression for 
some otherwise self-standing participatory metaphysics (all the rest). These are but 
different forms of evading the seriousness of Maximus’s own words. Few if any today 
take Maximus at his word that “The Word of God, very God, wills that the mystery of his 
Incarnation be actualized always and in all things” (Amb 7.22). 
 But, I ask, is this not a worthwhile undertaking? Don’t Maximus’s own 
pronouncements invite such a risk? Is it really so obvious a metaphor when Maximus 
says Adam’s original, natural vocation was to show that God and man are “one and the 
same [ἕν καὶ ταὐτὸν δείξειε] by the state of grace, the whole man wholly pervading the 
whole God [ὅλος ὅλῳ περιχωρήσας ὁλικῶς τῷ Θεῷ], and becoming everything that God 
is, without, however, identity in essence [κατ’ οὐσίαν ταὐτότητος]”?65 Or when Maximus 
ceaselessly stresses the perfect symmetry between God’s Incarnation and our deification? 
To the same extent “God by condescension is and is called man,”66 He makes “humans 
gods and sons of God.”67 And this because God wills to be “united with those who 
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become Gods, and by His goodness makes all things His own.”68 Is Maximus indulging 
metaphor or pious hyperbole when he extols Melchizedek as the paradigm of our final 
unification with God in the most extravagant terms? Melchizedek “was deemed worthy to 
transcend time and nature and to become like the Son of God,” so that “he became by 
grace what the Giver of grace is by nature.”69 Benign so far, but then he explains what 
“by grace” entails for Melchizedek’s union: 
[Melchizedek] was begotten of God through the Word in the Spirit by grace, so 
that he now bears within himself, unblemished and fully realized, the likeness of 
God [τοῦ...Θεοῦ τὴν ὁμοίωσιν], for birth creates identity between the begetter and 




he becomes without beginning or end [cf. Heb. 7.3] [γέγονε καὶ ἄναρχος καὶ 
ἀτελεύτητος] ...but possesses only the divine and eternal life of the Word dwelling 
within him [μόνην δὲ τὴν θείαν τοῦ ἐνοικήσαντος Λόγου], which is in no way 
bounded by death.71 
 
So deification “by grace” is supernatural indeed, but only because Melchizedek’s ascent 
into God is also the Word’s descent into him, and the Word comes bearing divine 
properties. No wonder, then, that Maximus also says of the deified: “the Word...gazes out 
from within them.”72 No surprise either that he dares to outstrip the classic image-to-
likeness schema for deification: when we in “in reception of the archetype” become 
“images of Christ,” we further “become one with Him through grace (rather than being a 
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mere simulacrum), or even, perhaps, become the Lord Himself, if such an idea is not too 
onerous for some to bear.”73 That might well sound “isochrist” tones, but there it is.74 
 Maximus can say all this about our end because of what he says about the God-
world relation as a whole: creation is Incarnation. That’s why creation’s final union with 
God requires both our ascent and God’s descent. 
For they say that God and man are paradigms of each other, so that as much as 
[τοσοῦτον] man, enabled by love, has divinized himself for God, to that same 
extent [ὅσον] God is humanized for man by His love for mankind.75 
 
Creation is Incarnation first and last and betwixt. Maximus calls this “the whole mystery 
of Christ” (τὸ κατὰ Χριστὸν μυστήριον), known and willed by God from before the 
foundation of the world: “all the ages as well as the things in these very same ages have 
received in Christ their ground and goal of being.”76 He calls this “the principle of 
condescension” (συγκαταβάσεως λόγῳ) and formulates it thus: “Just to the extent that he 
contracted us for himself into union with himself, to that same extent he himself 
expanded his very self for us through the principle of condescension.”77 
 This short spate of passages, though dense, justify the suspicion that “creation is 
divine Incarnation” moves beyond metaphor. And if more than metaphor, then God’s 
creative act is also an act of self-identification with that creation–indeed, his becoming 
the world is the world’s very generation while he yet retains the full integrity of his 
divinity. And if God in the Word identifies himself with the world, then the God-world 
relation bears a deeper and different identity than whichever unity obtains between 
                                                 
73 Amb 21.15, slight modification: “καὶ ταὐτὸν αὐτῷ μᾶλλον κατὰ τὴν χάριν ἢ ἀφομοίωμα, τυχὸν 
δὲ καὶ αὐτὸς ὁ Κύριος, εἰ μὴ φορτικὸς ὁ λόγος τισὶν εἶναι δοκεῖ....” 
74 On all this, cf. Ch. 3, sec. 3.2. 
75 Amb 10.9, PG 91, 1113b. 
76 QThal 60, CCSG 22, 75, my translation: “ἐν Χριστῷ τὴν ἀρχὴν τοῦ εἶναι καὶ τὸ τέλος 
εἰλήφασιν”; cf. Amb 41.9. 
77 Amb 33.2, my translation: “τοσοῦτον ἡμᾶς δι’ ἑαυτὸν πρὸς ἕνωσιν ἑαυτοῦ συστείλας, ὅσον 




created and uncreated natures (like analogy or participation or the limitation of act by 
power). What kind of identity? Just here the “enormous” systematic problems return. But 
if we take Maximus seriously that creation is Incarnation, even the specter of crude 
pantheism starts to fade. 
 Consider one point, which both terminates the status quaestionis and commences 
this study’s attempt to follow the second path mentioned above. Maximus’s polemic 
against Origenism contains a slew of arguments, most of which scholars have long 
known.78 I find it extremely significant that none notice just how Maximus describes the 
Origenist “henad” preexisting in union with God. Though Origenists like Evagrius did 
get the metaphysics of motion wrong, that being created necessarily entails being moved, 
I think Maximus divines a deeper flaw in the way Origenists conceive the whole God-
world relation, beginning to end. He opens his famous refutation of Origenism with a 
concise description of Origenist protology: we rational beings were once “a unity of 
rational beings, by virtue of which we were connatural with God [τῶν λογικῶν ἑνάδα 
καθ’ ἣν συμφυεῖς ὄντες Θεῷ].”79  
 Maximus’s fundamental issue with Origenists cannot simply be that they posit a 
primordial and illicit God-world identity. We have seen, and this study lays out in further 
detail, that Maximus too conceives a God-world identity.80 No, it’s not the fact that 
Origenists conceive an identity, but how they do. And I suspect Maximus sees too that 
Origenism fails to grasp in metaphysics what every heresy fails to grasp in christology. In 
all cases the essential mistake is to misconceive the precise sort of identity that underlies 
                                                 
78 Polycarp, Sherwood, O.S.B. The Earlier Ambigua of Saint Maximus the Confessor and His 
Refutation of Origenism (Romae: Orbis Catholicus, Herder, 1955); Pascal Mueller-Jordan, “The 
Foundation of Origenist Metaphysics,” in TOHMC, 149-63. 
79 Amb 7.2, PG 91, 1069a. 




all difference. And in all cases the sole antidote becomes that logic disclosed only in a 
rigorous and faithful apprehension of the Incarnate Logos. And so Maximus, about thirty 
paragraphs after his indication that Origenists conceive a natural identity between God 
and their “henad,” announces his own version of that God-world identity (here seen from 
its final perfection): “When this happens, God will be all things in everything [1 Cor 
15.28], encompassing all things and enhypostasizing them in Himself [πάντα περιλαβὼν 
καὶ ἐνυποστήσας ἑαυτῷ].”81 
 Maybe Maximus’s intensely technical christology is also his intensely technical 
cosmology after all. Maybe his idiosyncratic emphasis in christology about how the 
historical Incarnation, understood by Chalcedon’s lights, reveals an entirely new and 
previously inconceivable kind of identity called “hypostatic” between created and 
uncreated natures82— maybe this really is the very same way he conceives the God-world 
relation. Maybe for Maximus creation is Incarnation, and Incarnation, creation. Maybe 
creatio ex nihilo is creatio ex deo, and that because creatio is Deus ex Deo. If this 
selective survey of the scholarly literature has shown anything, it’s that such a thesis 
cannot rest solely on the level of textual exegesis. Past exegesis of Maximus has never 





                                                 
81 Amb 7.31, PG 91, 1092c. Perl, “Metaphysics and Christology,” 260-1; idem, “Methexis,” 209, 
rightly emphasizes the striking usage here of the technical enhypostasia in an expansive metaphysical 
context. Louth, “Recent Research,” 82, registers a bizarre reticence to take this passage very seriously.  




Method and related matters: historical theology 
 Theology is the noun “historical” modifies. “Historical theology,” if it be 
anything other than history or systematic (or moral, or fundamental, etc.) theology, 
cannot forget that theology is its substance, history its quality. My focus on Maximus, 
one of the brightest luminaries in the Greek patristic era, surely makes this study 
historical. It will therefore traffic in word studies, intertextual connections (patristic and 
philosophical), liturgical context, the Greek monastic lifestyle, and all the rest as they 
seem relevant. The noun “theology” does not justify shoddy analysis of the sources in 
their infinitely complex settings. But neither does understanding a text historically 
amount to theology, even if the text speaks theologically.  
 Bernard Lonergan puts it thus: the historian aims to comprehend “texts,” not 
necessarily the “objects” these texts refer to. The “objects” themselves belong to 
systematic theology.83 The difference here, as Lonergan also knows, is not that history 
merely reports while theology (or philosophy) constructs or comprehends.84 True, the rise 
of historical consciousness in the modern era initially induced a decidedly von Rankean, 
positivist outlook in academic history—“wie es eigentlich gewesen!”85 Positivists meant 
for history to replicate the method of the natural sciences in order to replicate their 
putative success too. That view died, and not simply under the knife of postmodern 
                                                 
83 Bernard Lonergan, Method in Theology (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1990 [1971]), 
168. 
84 Whether you move in the discipline of history from experience (research), to understanding 
(interpretation), to judging (history), to deciding (dialectics), or go back in theology proper from deciding 
(foundations), to judging (doctrines), to understanding (systematics), and again to experience 
(communications) – you are always taken up into the “spiral” of a “self-correcting process” that derives 
from our natural desire to know. That is, when we try to understanding anything – whether “texts” in 
history or their “objects” in theology – we’re always spinning round the hermeneutical circle of parts to 
whole to parts to whole (Method, 159, 191-4, 208f., passim). 
85 See the nice summary of Elizabeth A. Clark, History, Theory, Text: Historians and the 




philosophy and critical theory. The hard sciences themselves know better than to indulge 
any simplistic subject-object partition. In his 1957 Gifford lectures, Werner Heisenberg 
found occasion to ramify quantum theory into broader realms, a theory he had discovered 
nearly thirty years prior. His ten theses, apparently forgotten in many university halls 
today, say plainly: “Natural science does not simply describe and explain nature; it is a 
part of the interplay between nature and ourselves; it describes nature as exposed to our 
method of questioning.”86 Since “methods and object can no longer be separated from 
each other,” Heisenberg concludes thus: “the scientific world-view has ceased to be a 
scientific view in the true sense of the word.”87 And if so in natural science, certainly in 
history.88 
 Still more in historical theology. I seek more than Maximus’s meaning; I seek the 
truth he means. Historical theology cannot limit itself to simple repetition or observation. 
It can suspect an author of inconsistency. It can ask whether an author’s view is true or 
false, even more or less true than the author herself did or could know. Theology wants 
divine truth. And divine truth, who is the frolicsome Word playing in ten thousand places 
(to pair Maximus with Gerard Manley Hopkins), can always surface in words whose 
original intent was not the fullness of that infinite Word—for words were first the Word’s 
before they were any author’s.  
 We must permit historical theology to ask luminaries a question they might not 
have asked themselves, or at least not in precisely the same terms. I think O’Regan means 
                                                 
86 John Lukacs, “History and Physics, or the End of the Modern Age,” in Historical 
Consciousness: The Remembered Past (New York: Routledge, 2017 [1994]), 273-315. 
87 Lukacs, 287; Heisenberg’s emphasis. 
88 This is why Thomas Kuhn’s book has become a classic in the humanities; see his The Structure 




this by calling Balthasar’s method “thick retrieval.”89 To retrieve, you must first listen to 
the author in his or her own voice. That’s just good conversation etiquette.90 But the 
retrieval, the conversation, is thick, admittedly saddled with the questioner’s own worries 
and wonders. It’s thick too because what the questioner thinks she hears from her bygone 
interlocutor she must herself comprehend, judge, and communicate in today’s idiom. 
There’s nothing light or blithe about this enterprise. Nor is it unworthy or impertinent.  
 Happily Balthasar’s method appears to have made a comeback in Maximus 
studies today. Paul Blowers make free use of Balthasar’s “theodramatic” categories in his 
recent and impressive presentation of Maximus.91 Some younger scholars have even 
offered defenses of the kinds of questions Balthasar asked. Many once worried that 
Balthasar’s method transgresses by anachronism. Can you really ask Hegel’s questions of 
Maximus? Ayroulet takes a convincing and optimistic view: “Mais plutôt que d’accuser 
la lecture balthasarienne d’être anachronique, ne peut-on pas voir en elle la preuve de la 
force d’inspiration et de créativité dont est porteuse la pensée maximienne?”92 Lollar (and 
Ayroulet) concedes the obvious perils involved in bringing modern concerns to 
Maximus’s feet, but also warns that we “be equally cautious with ready dismissals and 
charges of anachronism lest we miss an essential component of von Balthasar’s 
interpretation of Maximus, namely, his performance of him.”93 I confess accord with 
these. And so I characterize this dissertation’s basic approach with Ayroulet’s words: 
Entretenir avec les textes de Maxime une relation vivante, se laisser inspirer par 
eux et progresser ainsi à son tour dans sa propre intelligence de la foi. Voilà 
                                                 
89 O’Regan, “Thick Retrieval,” 237, 258. 
90 Here I’m influenced by Marc Bloch’s “observe” vs. “relay” distinction; see his The Historian’s 
Craft: Reflections on the Nature and Uses of History and the Techniques and Methods of Those Who Write 
It (Toronto: Random House, 1953 [1944]), esp. 141f. 
91 Blowers, Maximus the Confessor. 
92 Ayroulet, “La réception,” 74. 




l’objectif de cette méthode, que l’on souhaiterait être celle d’une théologie 
spéculative et systématique pour Maxime le Confesseur.94 
 
Structure and argument 
My method also dictates the presentation of this study. Its superstructure initiates a three-
part conversation, though, of course, I converse implicitly at every step and moment. The 
three macro-level movements are: my question (introduction), Maximus’s answer 
(chapters 1-3), my systematic reflection on that answer in the context certain trends in 
modern theology (Conclusion and later study). 
 Really this study begins a three-way conversation more than a dialogue. Besides 
Maximus, I’ve chosen to make Balthasar an ongoing interlocutor. This for four reasons. 
First, Balthasar himself placed Maximus at the center of Catholic systematic theology last 
century. The survey above gave some details of that recruitment, but there’s much more 
to say. Second, Balthasar’s questions are mine. He too sought a peculiarly Christian 
metaphysics, and did so by trying to make christology cosmology. Third, Balthasar’s 
influence on Catholic theology remains to this day rivaled by few. And last, I share his 
method. If then I can contribute anything to modern systematic theology through 
historical retrieval of Maximus, Balthasar (and his sympathizers) seems an obvious 
interlocutor on the modern landscape. 
 Chapter 1 begins my presentation of Maximus’s answer to the question of the 
God-world relation. Maximus calls Christ (not just God, as in Dionysius) “the beginning, 
the middle, and the end” of the world.95 We must first go to the middle where that 
beginning and end have come upon us, to Jesus of Nazareth. This chapter reviews the 
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95 QThal 22.2. With Dionysius he calls God the “beginning, middle, and end” of creation (DN 5.8; 




many important contributions to an understanding of Maximus’s Neochalcedonian 
Christology, but does so with an eye to what exactly “divine Incarnation” means for 
Maximus and how it comes to describe cosmology. Its main question is: why and how 
does Maximus stress the copula in the statement that the person of Christ is the two 
natures? A rubric emerges by which we might better perceive Maximus’s Incarnation-
talk elsewhere, what it means for him to say God is world. Put curtly, my argument 
reduces to a basic syllogism:  
Major premise: three distinctive elements of Maximus’s “Christo-logic” properly 
define “Incarnation” (chapter 1);  
 
Minor premise: these three elements properly define his cosmo-logic too—both 
his protology (chapter 2) and eschatology (chapter 3);  
 
Conclusion: therefore “Incarnation” means in cosmology what it means in 
christology. 
 
 Next comes the beginning. Chapter 2 comprises the first of two treatments of the 
Maximus’s famous logoi doctrine. Save Perl, no one has tried to read the logoi in a 
straightforward application of Neochalcedonian logic to metaphysics proper. This I do 
here in protology. I take interest in how Maximus conceives of God’s emanation or 
movement of condescension into and as creation. I put his own originality in relief by 
showing how he differs from John of Scythopolis, Neoplatonism generally and Dionysius 
in particular, and Alexandrian-mediated Stoicism—and yet all the while he retains the 
essentials of each. How he does so states this chapter’s task. Its conclusion is that 
creation’s subsistence is the Word’s own hypostasis, the Word kenotically given as the 




 My second run at the logoi doctrine comes from the other direction, from 
eschatology. So Chapter 3 treats the role of the logoi in Maximian deification. The 
governing question here is: what does Maximus mean when he saws we “become God by 
grace”? Most subject Maximus either to Thomas or earlier patristic precedents on this 
point, as even Balthasar did, to imply that becoming God “by grace” somehow means 
we’re less divine than Christ is, since he is God by nature. Indeed  many of Maximus’s 
statements about our final union with God verge far nearer to Origenist views than to that 
of Thomas. But if Maximus means to claim that our eschatological identity with God is 
also God’s kenotic and personal identity with us, how can he avoid the Origenist sin of 
finally obliterating created hypostases? I assay a retort in this chapter too, and conclude 
that Maximus’s cosmology follows Pauline ecclesiology—since, for Maximus, Christ’s 
Body is (potentially) both Church and world. Here “analogy” takes on altogether jarring 
and different senses than we’re used to encountering in much modern theology. Here it 
implies a symmetry between God and the world grounded in hypostatic identity (like 
Christ’s natures). 
 I organize these chapters around this dissertation’s main epigraph, Amb 7.22: 
“Βούλεται γὰρ ἀεὶ καὶ ἐν πᾶσιν ὁ τοῦ Θεοῦ Λόγος καὶ Θεὸς τῆς αὐτοῦ ἐνσωματώσεως 
ἐνεργεῖσθαι τὸ μυστήριον.” The “mystery” the Word wills to achieve in all things and in 
all times is not something other than the historical Incarnation, the hypostatic union, 
where the created and the uncreated become and concretely are “one and the same.” 
Maximus speaks of the “mystery according to Christ” as the goal and even the very 
ground of all creation.96 Nowhere does he qualify it or make a distinction between 
                                                 
96 QThal 60.2-4, CCSG 22, 73-7. Other instances where Maximus uses “mystery” to mean 




different kinds of “mystery,” as if, when it comes to the Word’s presence in and identity 
with all creatures, we’re talking about something qualitatively different from the mystery 
of the Word’s human life. And indeed, as I seek to show in the coming chapters, we have 
sufficient reason to think the contrary. The “mystery” God the Word wills to actualize in 
all creation is just what Maximus says it is: “his Incarnation.” 
 Hence my entire dissertation can be read as an attempt to interpret this one 
statement, in all its starkness. I can put it down thus, where the italicized portion of the 
epigraph corresponds to what the respective chapter tries to interpret at length and in 
detail: 
Chapter 1 seeks what the “mystery” means: 
“The Word of God, very God, wills that the mystery of his Incarnation be actualized 
always and in all things.” 
 
Chapter 2 seeks what the Word “in all things,” the Logos’s creative procession, means: 
“The Word of God, very God, wills that the mystery of his Incarnation be actualized 
always and in all things.” 
 
Chapter 3 seeks what sort of actualization of the Word is to come about in creation’s 
perfection:  
“The Word of God, very God, wills that the mystery of his Incarnation be actualized 
always and in all things.” 
 
 I conclude the study with a recapitulation of the argument and my initial 
responses to two objections (one historical, one systematic). Mostly I can but promise 
further exploration of what the results presented here might mean for Maximus studies in 
particular and Christian theology in general. In many ways this dissertation’s main 
success, if any success it achieve, is to clear the exegetical ground for Maximus’s more 
arresting insights to bud forth for careful scrutiny by modern theologians—many of the 
                                                                                                                                                 
deification); Amb 41.2 (also the primordial plan for humanity); Amb 42.5 (explicitly mixed with our origin 
and end), 17, 25, 29; Amb 71.3; QThal 22.3, CCSG 7, 137 and 22.8, CCSG 7, 143 (also our deification); 
QThal 42.4, CCSG 7, 289 (also a mystery “about me”); QThal 59.6, CCSG 22, 51; QThal 61.11, CCSG 22, 




very insights that so captivated Eriugena centuries ago. At least in the West, these have 
fallen on deaf ears or on no ears at all. My contention is that Eriugena and Balthasar were 
right to perceive in Maximus an especially illuminating contemplative of the God-world 








Introduction (1.1) – Neochalcedonianism and its discontents (1.2) – Maximus’s fine 
point: hypostatic identity (1.3) – Hypostatic identity generates natural difference (1.4) – 
Perichoresis in christology: a new mode of unifying natures in act (1.5) – Incarnation: 




In Maximus the logic of Incarnation emerges solely from the fact of the Incarnation; the 
logic’s source and applicability are just as peculiar as the logic itself. Any logic other 
than this is not properly a divine “Incarnation” at all. 
 And so this chapter attempts to interpret: “The Word of God, very God, wills that 
the mystery of his Incarnation be actualized always and in all things.”  
 
1.1 – Introduction 
This chapter has three goals. Principal is [1] to define what Maximus means by 
“Incarnation” in christology proper. What counts as a divine Incarnation? What are the 
criteria? Doing so introduces a subordinate goal: [2] I catalog and emphasize three 
original features of Maximus’s christology, each of which scholars have remarked but 
have never to my knowledge explicated as a coherent whole. These three signature 
characteristics, I mean, form and disclose a deep, logical development of the 
Neochalcedonian doctrine of Christ. Together they form one signature. And yet tracing 
and reading this signature does more than clarify Maximus’s christology; it also [3] 
reveals why and how this christology proves relevant to cosmology. Clearer: Maximus’s 




my view from mere “Christo-centrism”) that immediately implicates cosmology, 
specifically the doctrine of creation from nothing. His precisions about God’s Incarnation 
in the middle of history elucidate God’s act of creation at history’s beginning, middle, 
and end.  
 Most of this chapter performs [2] in order to achieve [1], with [3] indicated along 
the way when germane. In fact this chapter only prepares the soil for the fuller harvest of 
[3], which occurs in the following two chapters. 
 
1.2 – Neochalcedonianism and its discontents 
It’s fairly certain that “Neochalcedonianism” names a real and identifiable development 
in the history of christology.1 It’s certain too that the exact criteria which made a 
“Neochalcedonian” thinker in the late patristic era required further precision over the past 
century since the label first surfaced in scholarship. When Joseph Lebon proposed the 
term “Neochalcedonian,” he appended two general criteria: first, that a Neochalcedonian 
interpret Chalcedon through Cyril of Alexandria; second, that he employ a sophisticated 
“scholastic” conceptual apparatus derived from the philosophical schools in order to 
construct a coherent science of Christ.2 These have since been refined.3 And there’s yet 
another certainty: Maximus too merits the title “Neochalcedonian,” even if cautiously.4 
                                                 
1 So Alois Grillmeier, S.J., “Der Neu-Chalkedonismus: Um die Berechtigung eines neuen Kapitels 
in der Dogmengeschichte,” in Mit ihm und in ihm: Christologische Forschungen und Perspektiven 
(Freiburg: Herder, 1975), 374 (cf. 382): there are “so viele unterscheidende Merkmale” that prove 
“Neochalcedonianism” designates a distinct reality; so too Brian E. Daley, S.J., Leontius of Byzantium: 
Complete Works (Oxford: OUP, 2017), 2-3. 
2 Joseph Lebon, Le monophysisme sévérien (Louvain, 1909), 522. 
3 Marcel Richard, “Le néochalcédonisme,” Mélanges de sciences religieuses 3 (1946), 156-61, 
intervened to question the utility of these overly broad criteria. He observed, for instance, that recourse to 
Cyril was possible for known “strict Chalcedonians” like Hypatia at the synod of 532 (159), and partly 
because Cyril’s own thought was mediated through Chalcedon’s judicious sanctioning of certain Cyrillian 




 I do not here rehearse the history of Neochalcedonian christology and its crucial 
players. That’s well-worn terrain.5 Nor do I chart all the points where Maximus 
converges with other Neochalcedonians.6 Instead I focus on what seems to be the single 
solid criterion everyone agrees qualifies “Neochalcedonianism,” for good or ill: the 
conscious attempt to define or précis a distinct logic of Chalcedon’s “one hypostasis or 
person.”7 After a brief survey of this development, I underline important criticisms of 
Neochalcedonianism. These criticisms, though issuing from concerns perhaps particular 
to an earlier generation of scholars, remain mostly unacknowledged even as their ripples 
eddy in Neochalcedonian and Maximian waters today. They exercise notable influence 
on how Maximus is and has been read, I think, and indeed pose fundamental challenges 
to this dissertation’s argument at its ground-zero—in christology proper. Such criticisms 
appear still more significant, too, when we realize that it’s precisely the tendencies they 
worry at that Maximus exacerbates with his own signature contributions to christology. 
 1. Defining “hypostasis”. It was far from evident that Cyril’s christology had any 
chance at concinnity with Chalcedon’s. Among several apparent divergences, an obvious 
                                                                                                                                                 
criteria’s boundaries fall so wide that they demarcate nothing more than simple “Chalcedonianism” (160). 
Richard’s own proposed criterion was that a Neochalcedonian insists on the dialectical use of both 
“miaphysite” and “diphysite” formulae as the only secure method to express Chalcedon’s true meaning. 
This too has been qualified: Grillmeier applies Richard’s criterion only to “extreme neo-Chalcedonians,” 
while “moderate neo-Chalcedonians” like Leontius of Jerusalem and the Emperor Justinian seek only to 
“supplement” Chalcedon’s Definition with Cyril’s uncompromising statements (esp. the twelfth anathema 
appended to his Third Letter to Nestorius) without making an absolute injunction to use the mia physis 
formula; cf. Grillmeier, Christ, II/2, 434. 
4 Cyril Hovorun, “Maximus, a Cautious Neo-Chalcedonian,” in TOHMC, 106-24; Demetrios 
Bathrellos, The Byzantine Christ: Person, Nature, and Will in the Christology of Saint Maximus the 
Confessor (Oxford: OUP, 2004), 112-14, invokes Grillmeier’s “extreme Neochalcedonianism,” which 
seems right. 
5 See esp. Siegried Helmer, Der Neuchalkedonismus: Geschichte, Berechtigung, und Bedeutung 
eines dogmengeschichtlichen Begriffes (unpublished dissertation: Bonn, 1962). 
6 Lars Thunberg, Microcosm and Mediator: The Theological Anthopology of Maximus the 
Confessor (Chicago: Open Court, 1995), 36-48. 




one was that while Cyril could sometimes use physis and hypostasis as synonyms,8 
Chalcedon’s Definition demanded their conceptual distinction: 
we all with one voice teach the confession of one and the same Son, our Lord 
Jesus Christ: the same perfect in divinity and perfect in humanity, the same truly 
God and truly man, of a rational soul and a body; consubstantial with the Father 
as regards his divinity, and the same consubstantial with us as regards his 
humanity; like us in all respects except for sin; begotten before the ages from the 
Father as regards his divinity, and in the last days the same for us and for our 
salvation from Mary, the virgin Mother of God, as regards his humanity; one and 
the same Christ, Son, Lord, only-begotten, acknowledged in two natures which 
undergo no confusion, no change, no division, no separation; at no point was the 
difference between the natures taken away through the union, but rather the 
property of both natures is preserved and comes together into a single person and 
a single hypostasis...9  
 
Hypostasis alone is “one” in Christ, the natures “two.” Nature and hypostasis therefore 
differ. How? Chalcedon merely intimated the ways. What it did say, though, was enough 
to identify at least one salient feature of each distinct logic: Cyril’s restive insistence on 
Christ’s subjective singularity (“one and the same Son, our Lord Jesus Christ”) is 
calibrated to the one person or hypostasis; Christ’s perfect and natural symmetry 
(“consubstantial with the Father...consubstantial with us”), to the two natures or essences.  
 This distinction worked well enough in Cappadocian trinitarian theology, where 
the divine essence names “the common” or “universal” and the divine hypostasis “the 
                                                 
8 Cyril of Alexandria, third anathema of his Third Letter to Nestorius (“two hypostases”?)—
though Grillmeier thinks this wrongly interpreted by John Grammaticus (Christ, II/2, 59) 
9 Tanner 85-6, slightly modified: “ἕνα καὶ τὸν αὐτὸν ὁμολογεῖν υἱὸν τὸν κύριον ἡμῶν Ἰησοῦν 
Χριστὸν συμφώνως ἅπαντες ἐκδιδάσκομεν, τέλειον τὸν αὐτὸν ἐν θεότητι καὶ τέλειον τὸν αὐτὸν ἐν 
ἀνθρωπότητι, θεὸν ἀληθῶς καὶ ἄνθρωπον ἀληθως τὸν αὐτὸν, ἐκ ψυχῆς λογικῆς καὶ σώματος, ὁμοούσιον 
τῷ πατρὶ κατὰ τὴν θεότητα καὶ ὁμοούσιον ἡμῖν τὸν αὐτὸν κατὰ τὴν ἀνθρωπότητα, κατὰ πάντα ὅμοιον ἡμῖν 
χωρὶς ἁμαρτίας, πρὸ αἰώνων μὲν ἐκ τοῦ πατρὸς γεννηθέντα κατὰ τὴν θεότητα, ἐπ’ ἐσχάτων δὲ τῶν ἡμερῶν 
τὸν αὐτὸν δι’ ἡμᾶς καὶ διὰ τὴν ἡμετέραν σωτηρίαν ἐκ Μαρίας τῆς παρθένου τῆς θεοτόκου κατὰ τὴν 
ἀνθρωπότητα ἕνα καὶ τὸν αὐτὸν Χριστὸν υἱὸν κύριον μονογενῆ, ἐν δύο φύσεσιν ἀσυγχύτως, ἀτρέπτως, 
ἀδιαιρέτως, ἀχωρίστως γνωριζόμενον, οὐδαμοῦ τῆς τῶν φύσεων διαφορᾶς ἀνῃρημένης διὰ τὴν ἕνωσιν, 





particular” or “proper.”10 That last constitutes the first definition of “hypostasis.” But can 
we really just transfer those conceptual correlations to the Son’s economy? Replicating 
this distinction in christology became the great challenge for pro-Chalcedonians, just as 
undermining it became the chief concern for anti-Chalcedonians like Severus of 
Antioch.11 
 Consider one of Severus’s more penetrating attempts.12 Defenders of Chalcedon 
claim Christ had two natures, divine and human. But is, say, Christ’s human nature 
“specific” or “individual”?13 If specific—that is, “universal” in the sense that it appears 
wholly and equally as the essence of many individuals—then the reality of Christ’s 
human nature just is the whole of human nature along with every individual human; 
indeed, “the Holy Trinity itself is [therefore] incarnate in the whole of humanity, that is 
                                                 
10 So Basil the Great’s Ep 214 (Ad Terentium Comitem 4; PG 32, 789a-b), a favorite among 
Neochalcedonians: “If we must also say what seems right to us, we will say this: essence has the same 
relationship to hypostasis that the universal has to the particular [ὅτι ὃν ἔχει λόγον τὸ κοινὸν πρὸς τὸ ἴδιον, 
τοῦτον ἔχει ἡ οὐσία πρὸς τὴν ὑπόστασιν]. For each of us participates being through the common principle 
of essence, and are this or that particular being by the characteristics what cling to it [τοῖς περὶ αὐτὸν 
ἰδιώμασιν ὁ δεῖνά ἐστιν καὶ ὁ δεῖνα]”; cited (for instance) at Leontius of Byzantium, CNE (florilegium), 
Test. 1 (Daley 180-1, his translation modified).  
Grillmeier, Christ, II/2, 54-61 discusses the use of this and other Cappadocian texts by John 
Grammaticus. For the successes and problems consequent upon the development of the Cappadocian 
“classical theory” of how to relate universal and particular being, see Johannes Zachhuber, Human Nature 
in Gregory of Nyssa: Philosophical Background and Theological Significance (Leiden: Brill, 1999). And 
for a nice overview of the philosophical issues animating the patristic reception of Porphyry’s 
understanding of “individual” and “essence,” see Christophe Erismann, “L’Individualité expliquée par les 
accidents: Remarques sur la destinée ‘chrétienne’ de Porphyre,” in Compléments de substance. Etudes sur 
les propriétés accidentelles offertes à Alain de Libera, eds. C. Erismann and A. Schniewind (Paris: Vrin, 
2008), 51-66. 
11 So Leontius of Byzantium, CNE, prol.; PG 86, 1276cd (Daley 128-131); Epil. 3; PG 86, 1921c-
1925b (Daley 276-83); passim. For Severus this distinction is illicit only in christology. He was perfectly 
content to deploy it in theology proper (Trinity); cf. Grillmeier, Christ, II/2, 146. 
12 The following narration owes much to Johannes Zachhuber, “Christology after Chalcedon and 
the Transformation of the Philosophical Tradition: Reflections on a Neglected Topic,” in Mikonja 
Knezevic (ed.), The Ways of Byzantine Philosophy (Alhambra: Sebastian Press, 2015), 98-106; see also 
Charles Moeller, “Le Chalcédonisme et le néo-chalcédonisme en Orient de 451 à la fin du VIe siècle,” in 
Das Konzil von Chalkedon: Geschichte und Gegenwart, vol. 1, eds. Alois Grillmeier, S.J., and Heinrich 
Bacht (Würzburg, 1951),  642, 694-8. 
13 Leontius’s Severan opponent states it like this: “When the Logos assumed human nature, did he 
assume it as understood generically, or as in an individual [Φύσιν ὁ Λόγος ἀναλαβὼν ἀνθρωπίνην, τήν ἐν 
τῷ εἴδει θεωρουμένην ἢ τὴν ἐν ἀτόμῳ ἀνέλαβεν;]?” (PG 86, 1916d-1917a; Daley 270-1); and later: “Did he 




the human race.”14 If individual—that is, the “concrete particular” who is that human—
then that human nature just is its own hypostasis (recall here the Cappadocian correlation 
of hypostasis to particular): a regress to Nestorianism. Since Neochalcedonians promoted 
the complete and real integrity of two natures in Christ, Severus here asks after the 
principle that allows Christ to be at once really two and really one. Doesn’t maintaining 
Chalcedonian’s strict symmetry of real natures imply Christ’s human nature is itself 
individuated (and so concrete—lest we toy with an abstract, merely conceptual human 
essence15)—has, that is, its own particular reality that is not the one subject, One of the 
Holy Trinity? For, as every party agrees, “there is no [real] nature without a 
hypostasis.”16 Two real natures = two hypostases. Whatever the shortcomings of 
Severus’s own christology,17 his incisive interrogation here raises a problem not often 
detected even by those deftly at work on its resolution18: how do Christ’s two natures 
                                                 
14 Severus of Antioch, quoted at John Grammaticus, Apol. 14.8 (Richard). 
15 Hence Leontius of Byzantium, CNE, prol., PG 86, 1276a, Daley 128-9, quotes Nonnus, who 
calls both Nestorians and miaphysites “opposite kinds of docetist [Ἐναντιοδοκήτας]” (which is also a part 
of this work’s fuller title). 
16 Leontius of Byzantium, CNE 1, PG 86, 1277b (Daley 132); cp. Maximus, Opusc 16, PG 91, 
205a-c. 
17 Zachhuber, “Christology after Chalcedon,” 102-3, notes (following John Grammaticus) how 
Severus’s stress on the “particular” pole of the ontological continuum of (abstract) universal to (concrete) 
particular implied Christ’s divinity along with his humanity might be so particularized that it implied tri-
theism on the side of divinity—a move a later miaphysite, John Philoponus, seems to have made.  
18 Leontius of Byzantium, Epil. 1, PG 86, 1917a-d, does not appear to grasp the fundamental issue. 
He is content to reply that the human nature “in” Christ “is the same as the species,” and so presents no 
special difficulty as regards his individual distinction from other human beings. This simply assumes that 
hypostasis is different from species (or the universal essence) rather than argues for it; it ignores, for 
instance, whether or not the universal species is somehow changed or qualified as that particular individual. 
Zachhuber, “Christology after Chalcedon,” 99, flags other pro-Chalcedonians who take a similar line (John 
Grammaticus and Anastasius of Antioch).  
Leontius of Jerusalem’s a still more provocative case: he can use the very same objection against 
Severan miaphysites (Adv. Mon. [Aporiae] 53 [cf. 61], PG 86, 1797d; Gray 212-13), and yet quite clearly 
affirms—as Maximus will too—that Christ’s two natures were both universal (“from two natures”) and 
particular or individual (“in two natures”)—though he never explains how this is so; cf. Adv. Mon. 
[Aporiae] 58, PG 86, 1800d-1801c; Gray 216-19. His polemic underscores the Severan indulgence of the 
phrase “out of two natures,” and turns their own attack back on them: are these two “prior” natures 
universal or particular? If the former, then (at least) the humanity whence Christ came was merely 




attain concrete particularity or individuality if Christ’s hypostasis remain one? What is 
the principle of individuation operative in the Incarnation? 
 A second definition of “hypostasis” arose among the Neochalcedonians, and with 
it some promising ways to navigate Severus’s dilemma. Quite early they adopted the first 
(Cappadocian)19 definition, “the distinguishing properties” characterizing an individual. 
Now they added another: “that which exists in itself” (τὸ καθ’ ἑαυτὸ ὑπάρχον, or other 
variants). A fairly seismic metaphysical tremor, not least because of its obvious move 
away from Platonic realism where more universal species and genera like “man” and “the 
intelligible” came ever prior in actu before their individual instances.20 The two 
definitions often appear together. So Leontius of Jerusalem, 
And this sort of “hypostasis” is said more directly and properly than all the 
previous: as if, with respect to the determinate combination [i.e. bundle of 
properties], it is also what has been marked off by a recognized property from all 
those of the same species and of different species, [what] manifests the individual 
subject which is in itself a certain separation and distinction of indistinct essences 
in order to [constitute] the number of each person.21 
 
 There’s more: this second definition of hypostasis moves beyond (the Porphyry-
mediated) Aristotle, too. In that tradition it is the “bundle of characteristics,” and for 
                                                 
19 For an early, effortless implementation of Cappadocian trinitarian definitions in christology, cf. 
(a text attributed to) Eulogius of Alexandria, Frag. Dogm., 2944d-2945a; Charles Moeller, “Textes 
‘monophysites’ de Léonce de Jérusalem,” Ephemerides theologicae lovanienses 27 (1951): 470, assigns 
this fragment to John Grammaticus. 
20 See ch. 2, sec. 2.3; cf. Grillmeier, Christ, II/2, 203. Think of Plotinus’s Three Hypostases (En. 
V.1). We might see the second definition, therefore, as one viable development of the Cappadocian 
rejection of (Neo)Platonic “particular natures”; see Gregory of Nyssa, Ad Graecos III/1, 23 (cited at 
Zachhuber, “Christology after Chalcedon,” 96); cf. too Leontius of Jerusalem, Adv. Mon. [Aporiae] 53, PG 
86, 1797d (Gray 212-13), whose commitment to the idea that “particular natures” are only achieved or 
perfected in concrete existence makes him scoff at the thought of Christ’s natures “as vainly having in 
potentiality what they’ll never achieve in actuality [καὶ νοοοῖντ’ ἂν οὑτωσὶ ἀεί τε ἀτελεῖς καὶ μάτην 
ἔχουσαι τοῦτο δυνάμει, εἰς ὃ οὔποτε ἥξουσιν ἐνεργείᾳ].” 
21 Leontius of Jerusalem, Adv. Nest. II, PG 86, 1529d, my emphasis: “Λέγεται δὲ κυριώτερον καὶ 
οἰκειότερον πάντων ἡ τοιαύτη ὑπόστασις, ἅτε πρὸς τῇ συστάσει καὶ ἐκ τοῦ πάντων τῶν τε ὁμοειδῶν καὶ 
τῶν ἑτεροειδῶν κατὰ τὸ ἰδικὸν γνωριστήριον, κεχωρισμένον δεικνύειν τὸ ὑποκείμενον ἄτομον, τόδε τι 





many the bundle of accidents, that “characterize” or “distinguish” an individual.22 Hence 
the first definition. That made sense because it preserved the universal essence of, say, 
the shared divinity between Father and Son, or of the Son’s shared humanity with us. 
Accidents particularize, but they don’t tinker with essences as such.23 But neither do 
hypostases qua hypostases—the entire burden of the Neochalcedonian articulation of the 
two logics (of nature and of hypostasis) in christology. The second definition, I mean, 
now sees the hypostasis itself—here the eternally singular, divine Son—as what grounds 
the concrete existence, and so the particularity or individuality, of the nature assumed; for 
while that nature did not preexist, he did. As the other Leontius (from Byzantium) put it: 
“the hypostasis does not simply or even primarily signify that which is complete, but that 
which exists for itself, and secondly that which is complete; while the nature signifies 
what never exists for itself, but most properly that which is [formally] complete.” And the 
second definition includes the first: it is into this “principle of hypostasis” (τὸν τῆς 
ὑποστάσεως λόγον) that the distinguishing “characteristics” of that hypostasis are 
assumed.24 Both definitions of hypostasis comprise its two metaphysical functions, which 
are necessary and proper to it: hypostasis [1] grounds and [2] individualizes. These are 
necessary at least in Christo-logic, since Christ’s particular human nature only “had its 
hypostasis in the Logos,” was real solely as his reality, and his reality is his very person 
constituted from eternity by the Father’s generation.25 
                                                 
22 Erismann, “L’Individualité expliquée par les accidents,” 51-66. 
23 Erismann, “L’Individualité expliqué par les accidents,” 57, of Gregory of Nyssa: “Il est donc 
nécessaire que leur [the divine hypostases’] individualité s’explique par un élément non essentiel, en 
l’occurence des propriétés. Le modèle porphyrien offre un explication valable...L’adoption du modèle 
porphyrien est la contrepartie nécessaire et fondamentale de l’interprétation de l’ousia comme une entité 
commune. La fameuse distinction ousia/hypostasis requiert un élément exogène.” 
24 Leontius of Byzantium, Epil. 8, PG 86, 1945a; Daley 308-9. 
25 Leontius of Byzantium, Epil. 8, PG 86, 1944c, slightly modified: “ἀλλ’ ἐν τῷ Λόγῳ ὑποστῆναι.” 




 So then, Neochalcedonians retained the first definition of “hypostasis” (“the 
particular, characterizing properties”) and appended the second (“what exists in itself”). 
And this latter not only differs from Platonic but also from Aristotelian metaphysics, 
since the “hypostasis” that exists in itself, here the Son, is definitely not individuated by 
accidents or matter. But now we have introduced a new metaphysical principle of the 
subject; we require, that is, a principle of the subject that makes this subject the most 
fundamental, positive metaphysical fact, and yet is neither a more contracted instance of 
universal nature nor any sort of spatio-temporal bundle of accidents. According to this bit 
of Christo-logic, we require a positive principle that individuates and particularizes, 
which is utterly indifferent to—and so completes and actualizes—the universal (nature) 
and particular (idioms) in and of every real being. If, that is, we want to follow the 
Neochalcedonians, and Maximus too, and make the individuating principle of Christ’s 
flesh the same as that of every individual; make Christo-logic, cosmo-logic.26 
 2. Criticisms. Important scholars have openly lamented the conflation of 
hypostasis’s two definitions. Charles Moeller, and Grillmeier too, discerned here an illicit 
and “dangerous unification” of what had been kept judiciously discrete up until the end of 
                                                                                                                                                 
something like the concept of in-subsistence, does not account for the precise principle of individuation in 
the Incarnation; see his, “Individual Natures in the Christology of Leontius of Byzantium,” JECS 10.2 
(2002): 245-65, esp. 256-8. But, of course, for Leontius (as for most) the Son’s singular property comes 
already and only through his eternal generation from the Father, not through any set of accidents; e.g. CNE 
4, PG 86, 1285d; Daley 144. I do not mean to deny that Christ’s humanity had accidents in the proper sense 
(time, place, skin color, bodily figure, even style of human thinking and communicating), only that these 
caused or achieved his individuality. They expressed it. 
26 Leontius of Byzantium, Epil. 8, PG 86, 1940b, Daley 300-1: “I am so far from saying that God 
the Word is united to our [manhood] by the law of nature, that I am not even prepared to say that the union 
of the human soul with its own body is experienced naturally [τὴν πρὸς τὸ ἑαυτῆς σῶμα συνάφειαν 
φυσικῶς].” Then follows a striking declaration still about every human soul: in all cases “the mode of 
union [which is the same as the Word’s with his own humanity] rather than the principle of nature [οὐκ ὁ 




the fifth century: theologia (Trinity) and oikonomia (Incarnation).27 Christological 
infelicities aside, Moeller lauds Cyril and Severus of Antioch for at least grasping that 
concepts or terms in these separate domains must also retain separate definitions.28 
Chalcedon indeed forced reflection on the difference between nature and hypostasis in 
christology proper, but the misstep many took— however understandable prima facie—
was to flee to Cappadocian trinitarian terminology for uncritical succor.29 Moeller means 
principally Nyssen’s definition of hypostasis, “distinguishing characteristics,” more than 
the second definition, “that which exists according/in itself.” He contends that only the 
second was necessary and that the first should have been abandoned “résolument.”30 
 Why? Recall Severus’s dilemma: was Christ’s human nature universal or 
particular? This trap springs only if you define hypostasis as the “distinguishing 
characteristics” that constitute a concrete, particular instance of a nature or essence (it 
doesn’t yet matter whether this “essence” is Aristotelian or Neoplatonic). So if Christ’s 
human nature is universal, then it lacks particularity and must simply comprise the whole 
lump of humanity; Christ would have assumed every human being. If his human nature is 
particular, then it bore a hypostasis after all that made it the concrete “this” that it was. 
Neochalcedonians, Cyrillian at heart, had to reject this latter option as plain 
Nestorianism, while the first was sufficiently strange and therefore void. But now, warn 
Moeller and others, Neochalcedonians were beguiled by a seductive resolution. They 
                                                 
27 Already at Moeller, “Le Chalcédonisme et le neo-chalcédonisme,” 644, 676, but cf. esp. idem, 
“Textes ‘monophysites’,” which blames the “monophysite contamination” on Leontius of Jerusalem; see 
Grillmeier, “Der Neu-Chalkedonismus,” 377-8. Prestige had already decried an “exaggerated assimilation 
of the theory of the Trinity to that of the Incarnation” (226), but for quite different reasons than Moeller and 
Grillmeier. And he too located the mistake in sixth-century thinkers like the two Leontii, and views 
Maximus as subsequently and similarly errant (233); see G.L. Prestige, God in Patristic Thought. 
28 Moeller, “Textes ‘monophysites’,” 468 n. 3. 
29 Moeller, “Textes ‘monophysites’,” 470, identifies John Grammaticus as the first violator. 




were led to say—and Leontius of Jerusalem here appears first and worst of the 
perpetrators31—that the human nature’s individuating characteristics or “hypostasis” just 
are the very properties of the Word’s eternal hypostasis.32 The Word’s very person makes 
his humanity both real and particular. Behold the “monophysite virus” injected into 
Neochalcedonian christology: now Christ’s humanity cannot even be conceived apart 
from the distinguishing characteristics that make the Word who and how He is divinity. 
For Moeller, putatively inspired by Thomas Aquinas, this whole line of thought collapses 
the individual integrity of Christ’s humanity, since it is no longer a formal whole in itself 
thought apart from the Word’s singularity: 
Autrement dit encore, sans le savoir peut-être, au lieu de limiter strictement le rôle 
de l’union hypostatique à la subsistance de la nature humaine conçue comme un 
tout, Léonce [of Jerusalem] frôle le mélange de l’humain et du divin: les 
propriétés concrètes, particularisantes (Ιδιώματα άφωρίστικα) qui font de la 
nature humaine du Christ une réalité vivante, douée d’une vie psychologique qui 
est réelle et non point un trompe-l’oeil, ne subsistent pas directement dans 
l’hypostase du Verbe, mais dans la nature humaine concrète du Christ. C’est la 
nature qui subsiste. Si elle n’a pas d’hypostase humaine, ce n’est pas parce 
qu’elle serait dépourvue de caractères individuants, mais parce qu’elle ne peut un 
seul instant subsister à part, ‘par elle-même’. Elle subsiste ontologiquement dans 
l’hypostase divine. C’est par l’intermédiaire de cette subsistance de la nature que 
les propriétés existent dans le Christ homme.33 
 
 It was the “awkward,” unreflective use of the Cappadocian trinitarian definition of 
“hypostasis” in christology that inflicted monophysitism upon Neochalcedonianism.34 
Abandon the first definition (“individuating properties”) and retain the first 
                                                 
31 Moeller, “Textes ‘monophysites’,” 471-4, takes special issue with Leontius’s precision that it 
was the Word’s property, not just his hypostasis, that became “most composed” in the historical 
Incarnation. 
32 Moeller, “Chalcédonisme,” 701: “on a l’impression que les propriétés concrètes de la nature 
humaine de Jésus se combinent avec les propriétés concrètes de l’hypostase du Verbe au sein de la Trinité.” 
33 Moeller, “Textes ‘monophysites’,” 475, his emphasis, my embossing; cf. idem, 
“Chalcédonisme,” 703. 
34 So Grillmeier, “Der Neu-Chalkedonismus,” 378 n. 34: “Dieser Monophysitismus ist freilich 
mehr aus der Hilflosigkeit in dem Gebrauch der Definition des Gregor von Nyssa las aus wirklich 




(“subsistence” or “that which exists in itself”)—that is Moeller’s antidote. But notice 
how his proposal already indulges the very language Neochalcedonians meant to resist: 
when we rightly conceive Christ’s humanity apart from his person, then we see that it is 
itself “a whole” before it is Christ. The Word’s hypostasis, as mere “subsistence,” flips 
the existential switch that grants concrete being to an already conceived, distinct whole. 
More, for Moeller it’s the nature as a whole that initially subsists, as it were, in the 
Word, and only “then” do its particular properties (again, already and separately 
conceived) subsist in the Word’s own subsistence. Last comes the astounding claim any 
Neochalcedonian, Maximus above all, would have abhorred: the “subsistence” of 
Christ’s whole humanity is “the intermediary” of its particular properties. The concrete 
person and the concrete humanity of Christ are so distinct, at least formally or 
conceptually, that they must now relate through an intermediary—the phantom 
“subsistence” of the whole or abstract human nature as opposed to or different from the 
subsistence the Word is. Here arises precisely the kind of hidden Nestorianism 
Neochalcedonians suspected and loathed. 
 Why palaver over an obscure scholarly trend? Because, obscure though it be, 
what is decided (or undecided) about these more conspicuous Neochalcedonian trends 
fixes the parameters for what’s possible or desirable to say about the fundamental relation 
between creation and Incarnation. A fault line already divides: conceptually and formally, 
the fact that Christ takes up even this human nature, his, I mean, cannot in any way 
qualify or define or characterize its metaphysical content—what it is in power and how it 
will be in act. That’s to say, even the possibility (and certainly the actual creation) of 




Incarnating into and as that human nature. That creation is not Incarnation takes 
precedence here over the potentiality and actuality of Christ’s very flesh. Already the two 
tiers (nature and grace) of a certain Thomism,35 or, deeper still, the “real distinction” 
between esse and essentia adopted in the high Middle Ages, emerge as the absolutely 
inviolable Grundprinzip of all creation, even of Christ’s self-creation in Mary’s womb.36 
But if we wish to grasp Maximus, this won’t do. 
 
 
                                                 
35 Karl Rahner, “Jesus Christ—The Meaning of Life,” Theological Investigations, vol. 21, 214: 
“Pure Chalcedonism was always suspicious that the other soteriology [Neochalcedonianism’s] would 
covertly evolve from a communication of properties (of the two natures) into an identity of properties (of 
both).” Neochalcedonian christology has borne its most bitter fruit in modern soteriology, where the 
proposition that “God suffers” is taken “in such a way that this affirmation forges an identity between 
subject and predicate, the eternity of the divinity and the suffering of the humanity” (214). Death and 
finitude, Rahner reminds, “belong only to the created reality of Jesus; they are located on this side of the 
infinite distance between God and what is created” (214, my emphasis). Rahner’s critique fails to 
distinguish properly between the logic of nature as opposed to that of hypostasis. Perhaps some modern 
theologians say what Rahner styles the Neochalcedonian “interpretation” of Christ’s work—that suffering 
and death apply “to the divinity itself.” But no actual Neochalcedonian said that. The innovation demanded 
by the fact of Christ is precisely one of conceiving new relations between subject and predicate, since in 
christology the “subject” is not primarily logical; he is rather the most fundamental ontological fact of both 
sets of predicates, the very positivity that enables that dual, otherwise contradictory predication. See 
Leontius of Byzantium, Epil. 8, PG 86, 1944b, Daley 306-7: “For the one hypostasis and one persona can 
receive opposite and contradictory predicates [τὰ ἐναντία καὶ τὰ ἀντικείμενα κατηγορήματα δέχεσθαι] 
together and in the same subject; but the one nature, as we have said, which can produce contraries [τὰ 
ἐναντία], cannot at one time come to be contradictory to itself [τὰ ἀντικείμενα ἑαυτῇ].” Mere talk about 
“this side” of an “infinite distance” between Christ’s two natures does not yet register what makes the 
mystery of Christ mysterious: the fact that Christ’s own singular subjectivity is not only indifferent to such 
“distance,” but is its very condition. Cf. too Maximus, Amb 2.4. 
36 Balthasar consistently reads Maximus’s christology as anticipating but never quite attaining 
Thomas’s “real distinction.” He detects some troubling ambivalence just where Moeller and Grillmeier did: 
when Maximus retains the trinitarian definition of “hypostasis” alongside the more appropriate one, 
“subsistence.” See Hans Urs von Balthasar, Cosmic Liturgy: The Universe According to Maximus the 
Confessor. Translated by Brian E. Daley, S.J. (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2003 [1961]), 64, 113. Aaron 
Riches, Ecce Homo: On the Divine Unity of Christ (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2016), 13, also suggestively 
links the twentieth-century longing for an “orthodox Nestorianism” in some circles (e.g. Rahner) with the 
“modern Latin doctrine of natura pura” (e.g. Steven A. Long, Lawrence Feingold): “The integrity of 
nature, on this latter view, is safeguarded by its natural perfectibility in se, and so in a manner essentially 
separable from the order of grace. The convertibility of the doctrine of natura pura with a quasi-Nestorian 
logic of separatio lies in the way proponents of natura pura insist on deriving the ‘species’ of the human 
creature wholly from the ‘proximate, proportionate, natural end’ of a ‘purely natural’ human nature, fully 
divested from the history of salvation” (my emphasis). That is, the desire to conceive the entirety of human 
nature apart from any fact—even in christology—at least formally parallels broader conceptions of a strict, 




1.3 – Maximus’s fine point: hypostatic identity 
I discern in Maximus three features proper to “hypostasis” as it relates to nature. A 
hypostasis is irreducible to, inseparable from, and indifferent to the nature it is.37 This 
section lingers over the first and last features; the second comes more so in the next on 
the concept of “the enhypostatic” (sec. 1.4). Together these help describe just what sort of 
identity obtains between different natures in a single hypostasis—in Christ, the identity of 
infinitely different natures, the created and the uncreated. 
 1. Irreducibility (or positivity). Like all Neochalcedonians Maximus insisted on 
the convertibility of terms in matters trinitarian and christological.38 This univocity spans 
the two mysteries and reinforces the Chalcedonian distinction between οὐσία-φύσις and 
ὑπόστασις-πρόσωπον. The former pair predicates the common or universal, the latter the 
proper or particular. That’s a bit of tried traditional wisdom, of mainly Cappadocian 
deposit: 
On the one hand, according to the Fathers the essence and the nature (for they say 
that these are the same thing) are common and universal, i.e. generic. On the 
other, the hypostasis and the person (for these too, they say, come to the same) are 
proper and particular.39 
 
That partition came hewn from solid dogmatic stone: were there no strict correlation of 
nature to commonality and hypostasis to property, the Christian doctrine of God as 
Trinity would implode. “My account,” Maximus declares, “will dare to speak of the 
greatest: even with respect to the first, anarchic, efficient Cause of all beings, we do not 
                                                 
37 See “An Analytic Appendix” for a more concise schematic. 
38 Pyr 201-2; Opusc 13, PG 91, 145a-149a.  
39 Ep 15, PG 91, 545a (cp. 548d): “Κοινὸν μὲν οὗν ἐστι καὶ καθολικὸν, ἤγουν γενικὸν, κατὰ τοὺς 
Πατέρας, ἡ οὐσία καὶ ἡ φύσις· ταυτὸν γὰρ ἀλλήλαις ταύτας ὑπάρχειν φασίν. Ἴδιον δὲ καὶ μερικὸν, ἡ 
ὑπόστασις καὶ τὸ πρόσωπόν· ταυτὸν γὰρ ἀλλήλοις κατ’ αὐτοὺς ταῦτα τυγχάνουσιν.” Maximus then cites 




contemplate the nature and the hypostasis as identical to one another.”40 God’s very being 
proves and determines that these two logics of nature and hypostasis—and they are 
logics, they bear distinctive principles (logoi)41—are inseparable yet irreducible to one 
another.42 
 So follows a familiar deduction: if a person in the Trinity differs by hypostasis 
alone, and if a hypostasis is always what makes proper or individuates43 (or, as the first 
definition had it, “characterizes”), then the Son’s hypostasis exists by an ineffable 
principle, an ineffable act of the Father.44 The Son is who he is, is himself in all his 
personal distinctiveness, right there in the heart of the eternal Trinity. Few would deny 
this: vintage post-Constantinople (381) orthodoxy. But again, as with the earlier 
Neochalcedonians, fewer still grasp the fairly massive implications this holds for the 
concept of individuation in the Incarnation. The Son is already the singular hypostasis he 
is “prior” to his personal human existence in the historical Incarnation. And this divine, 
personal identity was certainly no product of some descending, generic-to-specific 
“contraction,”45 i.e. an individual among other roots of Porphyry’s tree. Divinity is 
common, but it is no genus. Still less could Aristotle’s individuation by accidents apply, 
                                                 
40 Ep 15, PG 91, 549cd. The Three differ by the idioms ingenerate (Father), generated (Son), and 
procession (Spirit). 
41 This will be evident across Maximus’s texts, but consider one of his terser formulations (though 
some doubt its authenticity) at Opusc 26, PG 91, 264b: “Ὅτι ἡ μὲν φύσις εἴδους λόγον μόνον ἐπέχει, ἡ δὲ 
ὑπόστασις καὶ τοῦ τινός ἐστι δηλωτική.” 
42 Amb 1.3; cf. CC 2.29. So Piret, Le Christ et la Trinité, e.g. 45-6: “la pensée de Maxime le 
Confesseur, concernant le Christ Jésus et la Sainte Trinité, s’exerce selon les rapports logiques de l’union et 
de la différence comme de l’identité et de l’altérité, qu’elle se réfère aux réalités de l’hypostase et de 
l’ousie, comprenant la volonté raisonnable et l’opération volontaire, et qu’elle témoigne de la 
correspondance des dogmes trinitaire et christologique de l’Eglise.” 
43 See “An Analytic Appendix.” 
44 Opusc 21, PG 91, 249c. 
45 Amb 1.3: “For the Monad is truly a Monad: it is not the origin of the things that come after it, as 
if it had expanded after a state of contraction, like something naturally poured out and proliferating into a 





for the rather sane reason that God has no accidents at all.46 The person of the Son, that 
man Jesus, the hypostasis he is, subsists by some other principle of individuation. If he is 
“not an individual” in Porphyry’s sense, as Maximus reads Cyril to say,47 this is exactly 
because “being individual” is for the Son an intra-trinitarian act which bears its own 
unique principle (rather than the species-principle of genus plus differentiae, or some 
variety of the bundle principle). Yet this is also the very principle of Christ’s human 
subsistence, lest it be not the very Son in flesh. And so in the Incarnation the divine 
principle of individuation extends to the created order itself: what alone is one in Christ, 
hypostasis, subsists in (and indeed grounds) his telluric life by a hitherto unconceived 
individuating principle, one irreducible to the principle of either of his natures48 and yet, 
of course, also inseparable from them. In the Trinity and in Christ—or, in God ad intra 
and ad extra—Maximus divines the surest warrant for distinguishing and describing the 
                                                 
46 Amb 17.12; Opusc 21, PG 91, 249a; et al. 
47 Opusc 16, PG 91, 204a. Jean-Claude Larchet, “Hypostase, personne, et individu selon saint 
Maxime le Confesseur,” Revue d’histoire ecclésiastique 109 (2014): 52, while right to deny that this text 
implies any absolute opposition between “individual” and “person,” nevertheless wrongly infers that “il est 
question de l’hypostase composée du Christ qui constitue un cas unique d’une hypostase qui unit deux 
natures. En tant que Dieu-homme, le Christ n’est pas un membre d’une essence ou d’une nature, ou encore 
un genre uniques qui comporteraient une multiplicité d’individus.” For Maximus, that Christ’s composed 
person is not properly an individual derives from the way he is person, not, as Larchet claims, “du fait 
précisement qu’elle est composée” (55). If the fact of being a composed hypostasis excludes that hypostasis 
from individuality, then every human person, which is also a composed hypostasis (since body and soul are 
“homo-hypostatic” essences in man; cf. Opusc 14, PG 91, 152a-b), would likewise not be an individual. 
The point is rather that when Christ makes himself the identity of natural extremes, he is individual in a 
way more fundamental than any logical determination of species and differentiae, since, of course, he was a 
hypostasis already “before” he was human, and indeed, divinity is neither a genus nor species. Every 
hypostasis, in fact, is in itself more fundamental than the way it is individual, since individuality (in a 
Porphyrian schema) properly “refers back” to the species it is by nature, as Maximus indicates here. That’s 
why he can define “hypostasis” or “person” as what possesses “the delimitation of individuality in 
themselves [i.e. hypostasis and person], but not [possessing] by nature the predication among many [i.e. 
hypostasis and person do not have the ‘common idioms’ of nature or essence],” Opusc 14, PG 91, 152a, my 
translation. 
48 Nature and hypostasis are so clearly irreducible to each other that Maximus can even say that 




two logics of nature and hypostasis. In fact, he contends, failure to do so constitutes 
precisely the rotten root of otherwise opposed christological heresies—no small matter.49 
 In christological controversy, everything comes down to the “mode of union.”50 
Here you must discriminate the two logics. It’s here too that Maximus perceived basic 
agreement between Nestorians and monophysites of every sort. Whether two natures 
require two hypostases, or one hypostasis one nature, a tight correspondence between 
nature and hypostasis assumes that the mode (and so product) of the Incarnation must 
bend to “natural laws,” to how any concrete synthesis supposedly occurs in nature.51 
Neither party sufficiently conceived hypostasis in its own positivity, as bearing a logic 
distinct from nature. Especially flagrant was the miaphysite concept of Christ’s 
“composed nature,” “the acropolis of Severus’s reasonings.”52 For Severus Christ’s one 
nature still retained something of a human “quality,” and so is rightly considered 
“composed.”53  
 Maximus tenders three arguments to the contrary.54 First, the union of Christ’s 
two natures becomes involuntary. It would have occurred, that is, with just as little intent 
involved as, say, the union of my body and soul: neither willed union with the other. 
Second, this union is simultaneous. Since neither “part” of Christ’s one composed nature 
could really be what it is outside of that concrete whole (again, think human body and 
soul), either Christ’s flesh must enjoy co-eternity with the Word, or the very Word did 
not exist until birthed by the Virgin. Last and most significant, this union would complete 
                                                 
49 Ep 12, PG 91, 493c. 
50 Grillmeier, Christ, II/2, 200-211; Balthasar, Cosmic Liturgy, 209, 245-6. 
51 Ep 13, PG 91, 300; cf. n. 48. 
52 Ep 13, PG 91, 296; Ponsoye 154-5. 
53 Opusc 21, PG 91, 256a-b; Ep 13, PG 91, 516d-524b. 




or perfect both parts united. Christ would need both parts to achieve the whole he is, by 
nature. His becoming would therefore be subject to a law or logos greater than either of 
his parts on their own, a logos corresponding to the perfected whole as such. Maximus 
defies all three necessary features of Severus’s single “composed nature,” and thereby 
denies “Christ” names any kind of natural “whole” at all. And yet he is indeed the whole 
of these parts. More, “this very one is the limit, the principle [λόγος], and the law of 
every composed nature.”55 
 A composed hypostasis, not a composed nature—this is Maximus’s line.56 Not 
without controversy.57 Much of the worry, I think, comes from a failure to think through 
the two distinct logics of hypostasis and nature and then their peculiar relation (total 
indifference). The idea of a “composed hypostasis” is clear enough: it signifies that 
concrete whole apart from which its proper parts [or natures] could not subsist, and 
therefore a whole irreducible to yet and constituted by its parts.58 Here we come upon a 
metaphysical axiom in Maximus, one grounded, we’ve seen, in the Trinity and now 
Christ: because both hypostasis and nature name positive features of all being—that is, 
distinct logics or dimensions of being in their own right—they also act as the necessary, 
reciprocal condition for one another (this will become clearer in sec. 1.4).59 Christ the 
hypostatic “whole” is the sole and fundamentally positive oneness of divine and human 
natures. Their oneness, their identity, just is their existential fact in this instance, in 
                                                 
55 Ep 13, PG 91, 517b, my translation: “Οὗτος γὰρ πάσης συνθέτου φύσεως ὅρος τε καὶ λόγος και’ 
νόμος.” 
56 First proposed by Leontius of Jerusalem; see Nicholas Madden, OCD, “Composite Hypostasis 
in Maximus Confessor,” Studia Patristica (1993): 186. 
57 Bathrellos, Byzantine Christ, 105, says Balthasar squirmed about it. 
58 Ep 12, PG 91, 484b, my translation: “For [this one rightly] confesses with the Fathers that the 
unconfused [natures] from which Christ is composed remained on account of the difference preserved. 
Apart from the one hypostasis, these realities that differ from each other in their natural principle could 
never exist, and you could never in any way know them separately [from the hypostasis].” 




Christ. But the instance or hypostasis as such presents nothing natural, no formal or 
essential content of its own, which is precisely why it avoids all the absurdities of 
Severus’s “composed nature.”60 Christ qua hypostasis contains absolutely no natural 
content that might in any sense stand in tension with another nature (still less any 
contrast): as nature’s condition, hypostasis pretends no natural relation to nature at all, 
necessarily so. “Behold the paradox,” says Maximus, “to contemplate a composed 
hypostasis without thereby predicating a composed nature of that hypostasis, as if of a 
species.”61 
 2. Indifference. Hence Maximus’s answer to Severus’s dilemma. Are Christ’s two 
natures universal or particular? For Maximus, both.62 How? Recall hypostasis’s two 
definitions or functions.63 Hypostasis is the “this” which [1] grounds and [2] individuates 
what it is. The composed hypostasis of the Word, then, makes his natures simultaneously 
real and particular. In Christ divinity and humanity are single and factual—indeed, are a 
single fact or event (not a nature, which apart from its fact is nothing at all). Again, the 
singularity of a hypostasis bears its own positive principle, and yet this principle is 
decidedly not natural. The Son’s hypostasis is therefore an existential fact which stands in 
no tension with nature, and for this very reason it can receive utterly different natures 
without diminishing them (hypostasis in itself possesses nothing to oppose any nature). 
                                                 
60 So Ep 15, PG 91, 552c, where Maximus claims even the body-soul analogy supports the point 
that the hypostatic “idiom,” the individuality of a particular instance of something, is exactly where and 
how essential different realities attain “mutual identity”: “...καθ’ ὃν τὰ διαιροῦντα θάτερον τῆς κατ’ οὐσίαν 
οἰκείας καινότητος ἰδιώματα, κατὰ τὴν ἅμα τῷ εἶναι πρὸς ἄλληλα σύνοδον, ποιεῖται χαρακτηριστικὰ τῆς ἐξ 
αὐτῶν συμπληρουμένης μίας ὑποστάσεως· καθ’ ἣν ἡ πρὸς ἄλληλα θεωρεῖται ταυτότης, τὴν οἱανοῦν μή 
δεχομένη διαφοράν.” 
61 Ep 13, PG 91, 517c, my translation: “ὃ καὶ παράδοξον, ὑπόστασιν σύνθετον θεᾶσθαι, χωρὶς τῆς 
κατ’ εἶδος αὐτῆς κατηγορουμένης συνθέτου φύσεως.” 
62 Ep 15, PG 91, 557c, my translation: “Hence Christ possessed both the common and the 
particular of those parts from which he was composed [Οὐκοῦν ἑκατέρου τῶν ἐξ ὧν συνετέθη μερῶν ὁ 
Χριστὸς εἶχε, τό τε κοινὸν καὶ τὸ ἰδικόν].” 




The Word’s reception of these natures is their very subsistence,64 but it is indeed his 
reception; he, I mean, receives divine and human natures in his own distinctive way, his 
individual style, in the very concreteness of his own hypostasis—in his “this,” if you will. 
Their “personal identity” in him just is their concrete particularity.65 
 Now reappears that principal worry over Neochalcedonian christology, that the 
Son’s own eternal property individuates his human flesh. But this point proves essential 
for Maximus. It discloses the Incarnation’s very logic, its very possibility: 
All this announces the true principle (logos) of the divine economy, of the 
Incarnation. For the idioms by which his flesh differed, distinguishing him from 
us—by these his flesh possessed identity with the Word according to hypostasis. 
And the idioms by which the Word differed from the Father and Spirit, distinct as 
Son—by these he preserved the monadic identity with the flesh according to 
hypostasis. No principle (logos) whatever divides him.66 
 
The point here, not entirely unique to Maximus,67 is that the only thing the Son “has” that 
can be one with a nature infinitely different from his divinity is himself, his hypostasis; 
for his hypostasis certainly differs from the Father’s and from divinity as such. This 
hypostasis is already “individualized” by his unique generation, already a distinct person 
in the Godhead. Therefore the Son, who is very God, becomes one with human nature 
                                                 
64 Ep 15, PG 91, 553d: “He made Himself a perfect man, assuming a rational and noetic flesh that 
took nature and hypostasis in Him, that is, being and subsistence, accordingly simultaneous with the 
Word’s very conception [ἐν αὐτῷ τήν τε φύσιν λαβούσης καὶ τὴν ὑπόστασιν· τουτέστι, τὸ εἶναι τε καὶ τὸ 
ὑφεστᾶναι, κατ’ αὐτὴν ἅμα τοῦ Λόγου τὴν σύλληψιν]”; Ep 12, PG 91, 468a: “From her [i.e. Mary] He 
united flesh to Himself according to hypostasis, consubstantial with us, animated by a rational and noetic 
soul, not pre-hypostasized for even the twinkling of an eye, but in Himself, God and Word, that flesh 
received both ‘to be’ and ‘to subsist’ [ἀλλ’ ἐν αὐτῷ τῷ Θεῷ καὶ Λόγῳ, καὶ τὸ εἶναι καὶ τὸ ὑποστῆναι 
λαβοῦσαν].” See sec. 1.4. 
65 Ep 15, PG 91, 556b, my translation: “he revealed himself in the unicity of his person absolutely 
without difference, unified to the supreme degree by the personal identity of His own parts among them [ἐν 
τῇ πρὸς ἄλληλα κατ’ ἄκρον προσωπικῇ ταυτότητι τῶν οἰκείων μερῶν διαπαντὸς ἑνιζόμενον].” Notice that 
the “personal identity” is not some third thing, as if the “parts” were identical by the law of transference. It 
is their identity, where they are completely and invariably one thing. 
66 Ep 15, PG 91, 560ab; my translation. 
67 Leontius of Byzantium, Epil. 25, PG 86, 1909c-d (Daley 327-9): “for by the distinguishing 
characteristics which divides him from the Father, he is joined to the flesh, just as by the natural property 
which joins him to the Father he experiences difference from the flesh; and as he is one nature with the 
Father because of the sameness of nature, so he is not one nature with the flesh, because of its natural and 




only by instancing it in and as himself—by becoming the existential fact or event of both 
natures at once and as one. So while his divinity unites him to the Father and his 
humanity to us (by nature), he only receives these two natural unities, Chalcedon’s two 
“consubstantialities,” because of and in his hypostatic distinction from hypostases of both 
divine and human natures.68 That hypostatic determination stands indifferent to nature is 
precisely what makes it wholly hospitable to nature. 
 A proper discrimination of the two logics, then, produces this clever 
circumvention of Severus’s dilemma: since it belongs to a hypostasis’s principle to 
characterize and particularize, and to a nature’s principle to communize and 
universalize—an “individual nature” names a nature’s power and actuality in a personal 
mode. A nature in that mode is no mere abstraction. That particular mode still bears the 
mode and quality proper to the nature as such.69 That’s to say, nature in a personal mode 
remains a universal nature; it really actualizes and so displays properties common to all 
other individuals of the same kind (e.g. rationality in Paul is still the same essential 
rationality in me—however modally dimmer in me!). And yet the very mode that 
concretizes these universal features is itself always individual, always of a certain 
person.70 The positivity and total indifference of person to nature—its distinctive logic—
makes it possible for Christ to possess both a universal and particular human nature.  
                                                 
68 Eric D. Perl, “Metaphysics and Christology in Maximus Confessor and Eriugena,” in Eriugena: 
East and West – Papers of the Eighth International Colloquium of the Society for the Promotion of 
Eriugenian Studies, eds. Bernard McGinn and Willemien Otten (Notre Dame: UNDP, 1994), 258-9. 
69 Opusc 21, PG 91, 248c-249a. 
70 Bathrellos, Byzantine Christ, 102-3, rightly observes that “the personal” and “mode” are 
crucially linked but not identical. Maximus’s resolution of the universal-vs.-particular flesh dilemma 
intimates his broader metaphysical view, inspired by Nemesius and perhaps Theophrastus, that both 
particulars and universals are created in time (Amb 7.16; 10.83, 101; Constas, vol. 1, 489, n. 57)—a view 
Tollefsen notes “seems strange” against “the background of Neoplatonic thought” (Christocentric, 87). 
Perhaps this strange view finds its more immediate background in christology proper. I discuss the 




 Maximus helpfully clarifies all this when he confronts a monenergist proposal 
meant to mollify strict dyenergists like him. Since, they argue, an activity belongs 
properly to a person qua agent, and since Christ was undoubtedly one person, he 
therefore possessed only one “hypostatic activity.” Maximus thinks not. He responds to 
Theodore of Raithu’s version: 
For [Theodore] obscured and in a certain sense destroyed the principle for these 
things [i.e. hypostasis and nature] by assigning to the person qua person the 
activity that characterizes the nature, rather than [assigning to the person] the 
‘how’ and the ‘what sort of mode’ of its [i.e. nature’s] fulfillment [οὐχὶ τὸν πῶς 
καὶ ὁποῖον τῆς κατ’ αὑτὴν ἐκβάσεως τρόπον]. In this way one recognizes the 
difference between those acting and those acted upon, possessing these with or 
against nature. For each of us acts principally as what we are rather than as who—
that is, [we act] as man. And as someone, say Paul or Peter, he gives expression to 
the mode of the activity typified by him through impartation, perhaps, or by 
progress in this way or that according to his dispositive judgment. Hence, on the 
one hand, one recognizes difference among persons in the mode of conduct [ἐν 
μὲν τῷ τρόπῳ...κατὰ τὴν πρᾶξιν], and on the other, invariability in the logos of the 
natural activity. For one is not more or less endowed with activity or reason 
[ἐνεργὴς ἢ λογικός], but we all have the same logos and its natural activity.71 
 
Positivity and indifference of person: positive, and so it determines (“expresses” and 
“typifies”) the peculiar mode of its nature; indifferent, so it perfectly preserves its 
nature’s universal principle (“one is not more or less,” “we all have the same logos and 
its natural activity”). 
 The person of Christ is the principle of individuation.72 Just because his 
hypostasis relates indifferently to nature, it can welcome his human universality and 
particularity: it asserts no natural determination that then qualifies either pole of nature’s 
modal determination, universal or particular, as if it were itself some principle of nature 
                                                 
71 Opusc 10; PG 91, 136d-137a; my translation. 
72 Madden, “Composite Hypostasis in Maximus Confessor,” 188: “This gives us an astonishing 
insight into the mystery of the Incarnation; the flesh is truly the flesh of the only-begotten son of God; all 
its individual traits are determined by his eternal personality and they reveal it. This extends to every 
dimension of his being and life as man. It marks his style...the subsistence of the Logos is the principle of 




legislating one mode in place of the another. So he grounds and determines his own 
humanity; he must therefore precede both its universal and particular dimensions. Now 
consider this: in Christ’s case, at least (for now), Maximus sees no need for some other 
grounding and individuating principle—to take sides, as it were, on the great debate over 
immanent and transcendent universals.73 Christo-logic relieves that sort of pressure. It 
must. 
 At length we arrive at an anticipated claim: Maximus openly denies that any 
Porphyrian principle of individuation, either Neoplatonic or Peripatetic, applies in the 
Incarnation.74 Curiously enough, he suspects Severus of just this. 
And if he does not confess these [two natures], but really confesses the qualities 
alone, it is clear that, obliterating the natures, he teaches that Christ is an 
assemblage of qualities [ποιοτήτων ἄθροισμα τὸν Χριστὸν] just as we know the 
natures of material things to be: really established in a material substrate 
[ὑποκειμένῳ μέντοι τῆς ὕλης συνισταμένας], yet not contemplated in the sole and 
simple qualities, as indeed he depicts Christ. And that’s why he calls him a 
composed nature—that, obviously, and does not conceive another fashioned and 
composed from simple qualities. For, out of whatever things he says the 
difference is, of these plainly is the union too. For the difference is not of those 
things while the union is of others, but [both] are of the very same things and not 
of others.75 
 
A somewhat elliptical passage, but the basic claim’s clear enough: it is wrong to conceive 
the “compositeness” of Christ in terms of nature or quality (itself of a concrete nature). 
Either fails to the degree that it virtually reduces Christ’s “unity” to an assemblage of 
qualities around one material substrate. That is, Christ would be “one” and so 
                                                 
73 See Richard Sorabji, The Philosophy of the Commentators, 200-600 AD: A Sourcebook: Volume 
3: Logic and Metaphysics (New York: Cornell University Press, 2005), 128-63. 
74 Cf. Opusc 21, PG 91, 248b-c, my translation: Here Maximus argues that, “for the divine 
Fathers,” the concepts of “quality,” “property,” and “difference” do “not rest upon being received by a 
certain substrate [οὺκ ἐπί τινος ὑποκειμένου λαμβανομένη], that is, by an essence or nature but upon those 
things contemplated in the essence, and indeed really those things in the hypostasis [καὶ μέντοι γε τῶν τῇ 
ὑποστάσει θεωρουμένων].” Just before this he ascribes such a view to “those outside,” an allusion that, 
along with the vague description of the position, is sufficiently broad to encompass the whole Porphyrian-
inspired tradition.  




“individuated” by matter, such that we really only have one concrete nature (“that’s why 
he calls him a composed nature”) modified by the addition of accidents or qualities in the 
way a material substrate suffers alteration of its various qualities. Thus the subtle polemic 
of the last lines: whatever differs—for Severus, merely qualities—is also what is united 
in Christ; and if the qualities alone differ, then the qualities alone can be united, and that 
in the only conceivable way an “assemblage of qualities” is ever united—in a material 
substrate. But a material substrate, as is clear (and as Maximus affirms in the next 
paragraph), is among the most divided unities. Maximus argues this is the best sort of 
unity Severus can conceive and remain consistent.76  
 Successful or not, this argument nicely illustrates Maximus’s rejection of the 
Porphyrian principle. A positive principle of hypostasis, Christ himself, and not some 
posterior assemblage of characteristics, grounds and individuates Christ’s created 
nature.77 He makes himself two.78 In fact, to state the deeper insight, only such a principle 
proves Christ truly one.  
 3. Identity. In Christo-logic “hypostasis” names an individual positivity whose 
principle stands in a relation of utter indifference to the nature(s) it is. Its positivity and 
indifference are the exact properties that permit it to exist as the single, concrete fact of 
                                                 
76 Or else, if “quality” works differently, as Maximus agrees “nature” does as it relates to 
hypostasis, he awaits to be stupefied by the explanation! Cf. Opusc 21, PG 91, 256b. 
77 This becomes in Maximus a general metaphysical rule for every concrete, individual existence; 
cf. Amb 17.5, and ch. 2, sec. 2.3. 
78 If one were to posit another principle of individuation besides the Son’s very self—say, 
individuation by accidents or a particular nature (or some combination of both)— that principle would be 
just as constitutive or causal for Christ’s flesh as Christ himself. This co-causal principle would not only 
co-determine the esse reale of Christ’s flesh, but its particularity too. It would therefore cease to be true 
that the Son alone determines his own real and individual flesh. And if his flesh derives from elsewhere, 
even ever so slightly, then we might rightly wonder whether it at least partially “subsists” as or attains 
subsistence by another reality—that is, hastily put, in a sense derives from another hypostasis. Here we 
have, I think, a major reason Neochalcedonians, and Maximus in particular, saw any attempt even to 
“conceive” of Christ’s flesh apart from Christ himself as capitulating to Nestorian “scission”; cf. Opusc 14, 




two incommensurable natures—to be their identity. Hypostasis is a mode of union, to 
reprise the Neochalcedonian conviction. 
 Maximus (like Leontius) thinks this true even in the case of the human person.79 
The body-soul analogy, it’s true, had by Maximus’s time a somewhat fraught legacy. 
Apollinarius made much of it, as did Cyril. It was a miaphysite favorite.80 Quite obvious 
why: a human person is a synthesis of two distinct natures, body and soul, and yet 
completes one nature, the human. So too in Christ. Divine and human natures, though 
two, attain concrete identity as one composite nature. Maximus confronts the analogy’s 
force in a way that seems, prima facie, counter-intuitive. Rather than, say, stress the 
inevitable dissimilarity to Christ’s case, an exceptional one, Maximus extends the logic of 
Christ to the anthropological analogy itself. Even the body-soul unity in an individual 
human person does not yet constitute their true identity.81 They remain—even right there 
in that person—essentially distinct in principle, that is, by nature, a fact anyone “grasps 
clearly enough.”82 True, once they subsist and converge in a concrete person, they enjoy 
relative commonality even on the level of nature: both are temporal, both mutually 
affecting,83 and both are, of course, natures.84 Theirs is no absolute difference, as with 
                                                 
79 Ep 12, PG 91, 277; Ponsoye 136-7: “Hypostatic unity is just as valid for Christ as it is for man.” 
For Leontius of Byzantium see n. 26. 
80 Severus of Antioch, Ep 10, PO XIII, 202-3. 
81 Madden, “Composite Hypostasis in Maximus Confessor,” 176-7, though he misses that the 
“achievement” was not just Maximus’s, but had already been advanced, for instance, by Leontius of 
Byzantium, CNE 4, PG 86, 1285d-1288a; see Daley, “‘A Richer Union,’” 250-8, 262. 
82 Ep 12, PG 91, 277; soul’s nature, for instance, comprises invisibility, incorporeality, relative 
transcendence of space, even (perhaps) everlastingness—none of which belongs to the principle of body. 
And the reverse: corruptibility, mortality, visibility, material complexity, irreducible spatiality—these are 
natural to body, not soul.  
83 Soul acts through body as through “an instrument,” say, to perceive and receive sensations (Pyrr 
187); soul unifies body (Amb 7.37); soul partially mediates virtue to body (Amb 10.2); body can restrain 
soul (Opusc 5, PG 91, 64c). 
84 Ep 12, PG 91, 277: again, together body and soul constitute one nature, “human.” Though this 




qualities (which are “mutually-eliminating”: triangular excludes circular, death negates 
life, etc.). Theirs is difference by “antinomy,” a difference that “accepts separation” but 
only within a more fundamental community.85 
 Once, I said, body and soul unite in an individual, then they achieve relative union 
in distinction. Only when real and really united, when they are brought into permanent 
“reciprocal relation” (τὴν εἰς τὸ πρός τι ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἀναφορὰν δέχεται) by the singular 
event of a person’s historical birth (notice the anti-Origenism here)—only then do they 
receive each other in asymmetrical, essential union.86 And so even in the case of a human 
person, two natures find relation, actuality, and identity in hypostasis alone. More 
exactly: because their identity lies solely in the person, therefore they retain their natural 
difference in principle.87 Conceiving the human “whole” this way releases nature from 
having to achieve real identity between differing natures. Neither my soul nor my body, 
nor some kind of natural mediation between them, generates me—the concrete “I” who 
just is this body and this soul in this unity. Precisely here the analogy between 
anthropology and christology truly obtains88: the singular identity of hypostasis, the only 
positivity that exists for itself (hypostasis’s second definition), makes possible and actual 
the concrete union of my body and soul (first definition)—and because of hypostasis’s 
absolute indifference as the real identity of each, these natures, relieved of that burden (of 
achieving their own mutual identity), can preserve the universal principle that makes 
                                                                                                                                                 
only in its individuals, in, that’s to say, instances that themselves presuppose a prior subject, i.e. a 
hypostasis.  
85 Opusc 17, PG 91, 115; Ponsoye 231. We might say they are analogous. 
86 Amb 7.40; 10.57; Opusc 5, PG 91, 64c. 
87 Amb 7.43: because the “whole” of a human individual is the hypostasis alone, it “reveals that 
both come into being simultaneously, and demonstrates their essential difference from each other, without 
violating in any way whatsoever the principles (logoi) of their respective substances.” 
88 Cf. Karl-Heinz Uthemann, “Das Anthropologische Modell der Hypostatischen Union bei 
Maximus Confessor,” in Felix Heinzer and Christoph Schönborn, Maximus Confessor: Actes du symposium 




them what they are. The hypostasis itself is a mode of union that grants absolute identity 
to essentially different realities. Only here, only in this way, do they receive “identity 
with one another.”89 
 And if this be so in the human case, a fortiori in Christ’s. A human body and soul, 
once generated, still relate to one another naturally. They fit together qua nature(s). They 
form one nature, the human. But Christ qua hypostasis—indeed, any hypostasis qua 
hypostasis, we’ve seen—is no genus, no species, no nature at all. In fact he’s no mere 
individual for the same reason, if, that is, “individual” signify the formal relations of the 
nature a hypostasis instances. 
I hasten to add that Christ’s composed person is not properly an individual [οὐδὲ 
ἄτομον κυρίως]. For [his composed person] possesses no relation to the division 
that goes from the most generic genus down through other subaltern genera all the 
way to the most specific species, finally proceeding into him, to that property 
defining [him]. Whence and for this reason, according to the most wise Cyril, the 
name ‘Christ’ does not carry the power of definition, since it is not a species 
[εἶδός] predicated of many differing in number, nor obviously is it the essence of 
something. For he is not an individual referring back to a species or genus; nor is 
he circumscribed by these according to essence. Rather, [he is] a composed 
hypostasis making identical to a supreme degree, in himself, the natural 
distinction of the extremes, even leading [these] into one by the union of [his] 
proper parts.90 
 
Mark how the passage ends: with Christ’s hypostasis as the identity “to a supreme 
degree” of “the extremes,” his two utterly incommensurable natures. That last part is 
crucial. Christ’s case differs from the body-soul analogy not because in the latter the 
                                                 
89 Ep 15, PG 91, 552c: “ἡ πρὸς ἄλληλα θεωρεῖται ταυτότης.” Cf. n. 60 for full quotation. This 
insight about hypostasis as nature’s sole concrete identity is for Maximus a general law of metaphysics 
derived, so I think, from Christo-logic. Hypostasis (again, not a material substrate or an assemblage of 
properties as such) alone names the concrete identity of differing natures. Maximus often formulates this 
precisely as a principle: “homo-hypostatic” realities (e.g. body and soul) must differ in essence/nature, 
while “hetero-hypostatic” realities (e.g. individual humans) can be united in essence/nature (Opusc 14, PG 
91, 152a; Ep 15, PG 91, 552b-c); or, “union according to hypostasis” applies to “realities of differing 
essences,” while “union according to essence” applies to “realities of differing hypostases” (Opusc 18, PG 
91, 216a). 




natures form parts of a one hypostatic whole; it differs because his parts are absolutely 
different from each other. Created and uncreated natures share nothing by nature.91 In 
fact, because they attain identity only in Christ’s person, they remain entirely different by 
nature.92 
 Now we’ve come to the final and most urgent reason Christo-logic distinguishes 
the two logics of hypostasis and nature. Hypostatic logic, as the only licit logic of 
mediation between created and uncreated natures, becomes the logic of salvation (cf. Eph 
2.16). Christ’s person is the only place where divinity and humanity can be really, 
positively, invariably one: “it is therefore clear that, according to the one hypostasis that 
these [natures] achieve, the parts absolutely do not differ in any way.”93 He is not simply 
their “conjunction” or “composed nature” (Severus’s natural fusion); he is their identity 
(ταυτότης). And it’s not muddled thinking to say so.94 It would be muddled, indeed 
heretical, not to, as Cyril knew.95 (After all, Nestorius was anything but unclear in his 
thinking; his fault lay not in clarity of thought, but in failure to conform that thought to 
the matter itself, the fact of Christ). Anything less than concrete identity is less than true 
union, less than our salvation. He, as the determinate positivity that is also utterly 
                                                 
91 Amb 10.58; Pyr 29. 
92 A subtle point Maximus makes, for instance, before Pyrrhus, who was himself quite stunned by 
it: “PYRRHUS: There is nothing, then, which the natures and natural properties have in common [κοινόν]? 
MAXIMUS: Nothing, save only the hypostasis of these same natures. For, just in this way a hypostasis was 
the very same, unconfusedly, of these same natural properties [Ὥσπερ γὰρ ὑπόστασις ἦν ὁ αὐτὸς 
ἀσυγχύτως τῶν αὐτῶν φυσικῶν]”; see too Amb 4.8. 
93 Ep 15, PG 91, 324; Ponsoye 181. 
94 Balthasar, Cosmic Liturgy, 234-5, and Thunberg, Microcosm and Mediator, 36, hesitate 
translate ταὐτότης as an unqualified “identity.” But Eric D. Perl, Methexis: Creation, Incarnation, and 
Deification in Saint Maximus Confessor (unpublished Ph.D. diss, Yale, 1991), 190-1, rightly resists: 
“Maximus is not content to speak of hypostatic ‘union’ (ἕνωσις) in Christ, which could suggest a mere co-
presence of two natures ‘in’ a single hypostasis, but rather insists on the hypostatic and personal identity 
(ταυτότης) of the two natures…. True union demands not a mere juxtaposition or joining of two things; 
rather, in a union there must actually be one of something, one same thing which each of the terms united 
is” (190-1). 




indifferent (and so totally hospitable) to uncreated and created nature alike—he alone 
mediates between them exactly as the impossible possibility of their real identity: “So in 
this way he is mediator, according to hypostasis, for those parts from which he is 
composed: he comprises the interval of the extremes in himself [ἵνα ᾗ καθ’ ὑπόστασιν 
μεσίτης τοῖς ἐξ ὧν συνετέθη μέρεσι· τὴν τῶν ἄκρων ἐν αὐτῷ συνάπτων διάστασιν].”96 
 Christo-logic in Maximus, then, comes to this: total symmetry of natures, total 
identity of person, and the total indifference of identity and symmetry which Christ is. 
Any other logic fails to describe the peculiarity of Christ. Bathrellos, for instance, 
inspired by Florovsky’s idea of a christological “asymmetry” between Christ’s divine 
person and his two natures in union,97 finds Maximus’s talk of Christ’s “composite 
hypostasis” slightly disturbing: this, along with “the exceedingly symmetrical parallelism 
between Christ and man...seems to contradict the insistence that in Christ the hypostasis 
is divine.”98 If, Bathrellos worries, we stress the symmetry of natures and then identify 
Christ’s very person with both natures (“composite” = natures, “hypostasis” = person), as 
Maximus often does, then we might stumble unawares into Nestorianism. Bathrellos 
labors to save the concept by distinguishing the dimensions, as it were, of Christ’s one 
hypostasis: the “material” aspect designates Christ’s in his two natures, and here it’s 
proper to call his hypostasis “composite”; but the “personal” aspect is the preexistent 
                                                 
96 Ep 15, PG 91, 556a; my translation and emphasis. The acute eye accustomed to reading Gregory 
of Nyssa will notice the striking use of diastasis here. Though its christological use appears already in 
Leontius of Jerusalem, CN II.14, PG 98, 1568b: “...πῶς μετὰ τὸ ληφθῆναι, ἤγουν ἐν ἀλλήλοις μεῖναι τό τε 
ληφθὲν καὶ τὸ λαβὸν, παραμένειν ἐν αὐτοῖς δύναται, καὶ σώζεσθαι ἀπ’ ἀλλήλων ἐκατέρου διάστασις, ὅπερ 
συνίστησι τὴν ὑπόστασιν;” 
97 Georges Florovsky, Collected Works, vol. 9: The Byzantine Fathers of the Sixth to the Eighth 
Century, ed. Richard s. Haugh, trans. Raymond Miller, Anne-Marie Döllinger-Labriolle, and Helmut 
Wilhelm Schmiedel (Vaduz: Büchervertriebsanstalt, 1987), 231. 
98 Bathrellos, Byzantine Christ, 115. He thinks this a problem endemic to Neochalcedonianism 
itself. His worries are those of Moeller, Grillmeier, et al. (cf. sec. 1.2), which is especially evident in his 
hesitations over and criticisms of the Neochalcedonian identification of Christ himself as individuating 




Logos himself, improperly called “composite.”99 Now, the thesis runs, Maximus 
distinguishes (in practice—he lacks these categories) these aspects of Christ’s hypostasis, 
and so we need not suspect him of compromising the Son’s true oneness when speaking 
of the Son’s “compositeness” with regard to his two natures. His truest oneness lies in 
“the personal” dimension of his—well, person.100 
 Something’s amiss in all this. Bathrellos appears to make a distinction within the 
hypostasis itself. Viewed as “the end-product of the union of the two extremes,” he 
assures us, “‘hypostasis’ does not mean, strictly speaking, the ‘person’ (which is identical 
with the Logos), but the one reality in which the two natures are united.”101 What exactly 
is this “one reality” that differs from the very “person” of the Son—from the Son 
himself? It’s as if the “material” hypostasis (qua two natures) is somehow in tension with 
the “personal” hypostasis, the true Word. Bathrellos concludes just so: “Maximus has 
rightly been very careful to keep these two aspects of the mystery of the hypostasis of 
Christ in complementary tension.”102 How could these two aspects of Christ’s one 
hypostasis stand in any relation at all? Any relation, and certainly any tension, necessarily 
implies “two” somethings or someones related. To avoid one alleged Nestorianism, must 
we risk another? 
                                                 
99 Bathrellos, Byzantine Christ, 105-7. He also speaks of the “formal” aspect, which indicates the 
fact that the hypostasis its particular idioms to both natures and so makes them, as it were, the same qua 
particular. Bathrellos claims inspiration for these categories from Heinzer (Gottes Sohn, 81-2), though he 
admits to altering them. A major, and I think significant difference, is that Heinzer makes no special aspect 
for “the personal” in Christ. 
100 Bathrellos, Byzantine Christ, 106: “Maximus integrates successfully the asymmetry on the 
level of ‘personal’ hypostasis (which is divine) with the symmetry on the level of the two (divine and 
human) natures, whose unity constitutes the ‘material’ hypostasis.” 
101 Bathrellos, Byzantine Christ, 105, my emphasis. 




 The governing assumption, I fear, is not altogether uncommon.103 It is that Christ 
the Logos, because he preexists in his divinity, is somehow more divine than human—as 
if what preexists is more his than what he becomes. Bathrellos finds support in this 
passage from Maximus: 
Thus even though we say ‘one and two’ of the same, we do not say these in the 
same way of this ‘one and the same.’ In one way, according to the principle of 
nature, [we say] ‘two’ of those things from which the union occurred. For we do 
not know God the Word as identical to His own flesh by nature [κατὰ τὴν φύσιν]. 
Yet in another way, according to the principle of hypostasis, we say ‘one.’ For we 
have known God the Word as identical to His own flesh by hypostasis [κατὰ τὴν 
ὑπόστασιν]. Therefore we do not mindlessly fuse the natures into one hypostasis 
by refusing to speak of Christ’s natural difference, lest we introduce mutual 
alteration between the Word and the flesh. Nor again do we insanely divide 
[Christ] into two self-subsistences, assigning difference to the very principle of 
hypostasis, lest we refuse our own salvation.104 
 
Bathrellos rightly notes that Maximus here targets Apollinarian christology. While the 
Son is God “according to nature,” he is man “according to hypostasis,” not nature. But 
we should unlearn Bathrellos’s lesson—“there is a dissimilarity between Christ and man 
[i.e. the body-soul analogy] due to the fact that the person in Christ is identical only to 
the Logos, who exists prior to his humanity”105—for, as we saw, Maximus senses the 
force of the anthropological analogy to lie in just the opposite point: even a human 
hypostasis qua hypostasis is no more or less identical to either of its natures, body or 
soul. Hypostasis’s indifference removes any need to distinguish its different “aspects.” It 
suffers no tension with any nature, certainly not with its own natures, and even less with 
itself. More serious still, “assigning difference to the very principle of hypostasis,” as the 
                                                 
103 See, for instance, Richard Cross, “Homo Assumptus in the Christology of Hugh of St Victor: 
Some Historical and Theological Revisions,” JTS 65.1 (2014): 62-77, esp. 74-77, for Duns Scotus’s 
criticisms of Hugh’s strong emphasis on the “identity” (not just sameness) of the Word with his flesh: since 
Christ came to be and the Word did not, “Christ and the Word are not identical” (Cross, “Homo 
Assumptus,” 77).  
104 Ep 12, PG 91, 493b-c, my translation; cf. Opusc 24, PG 91, 147, which makes the same point. 




last line here warns, seems to deny that Christ himself—that divine Son from eternity—is 
ever truly one with his humanity. Very God must be just as identical to his human nature 
as he is to his divine, “lest we refuse our own salvation.” 
 The mode of union is not simply its product.106 When Maximus denies the Word 
is human “according to nature” and yet is so united to his divinity, he means to deny 
identity with humanity occurs by a natural mode, not that the product itself is somehow 
less naturally human. The Word Incarnate is human by nature. Maximus very often calls 
Christ “double-natured,”107 and thinks his unqualified identity with both is salvation.108 
This states the entire mystery of hypostatic identity, of the economy: “Christ is each 
according to nature.”109 In Christ the divine Son is no more divine than he is human, no 
more God than man, no more uncreated than created. 
 The tendency to think Christ’s “person” (or an “aspect” of it) as some prior or 
deeper reality than his human nature actually explains, I think, one of Maximus’s 
signatures: to the Neochalcedonian confession of Christ “out of two natures” (ἐκ δύο 
φύσεων) and “in two natures” (ἐν δύο φύσεσιν), he frequently appends the Antiochene 
phrase, “is two natures” (αἱ φυσεῖς ἐστιν ὁ Χριστός).110 By now we see why. In Christo-
                                                 
106 More properly, the Son’s own hypostasis is both mode and product. A supernatural mode of 
union (hypostatic union) generates a product, in and as concrete reality, which is nothing other than the 
mode that generated it. Again, this is possible only because the hypostasis, though positive (irreducible to 
nature), is still not, as some conceive it, “something alongside its own proper parts [ἄλλο τι τὸ ὅλον εἶναι 
παρὰ τὰ αὐτοῦ οἰκεῖα μέρη], from which and in which it consists” (Opusc 9; PG 91, 117c; my translation). 
107 Ep 12, PG 91, 468c;  Opusc 21, PG 91, 252b; Amb 5.24; 10.57. 
108 Ep 12, PG 91, 468a-c, my translation: “the same is consubstantial with the Father according to 
divinity, and the same is consubstantial with us according to humanity, double in nature or essence. Thus 
He is mediator of God and human beings, and so it is necessary for Him to preserve the natural properties 
of the things mediated, to exist as both [τῷ ὑπάρχειν ἀμφότερα].” 
109 Opusc 9, PG 91, 117d, my translation.  
110 Pierre Piret, S.J., “Christologie et théologie trinitaire chez Maxime le Confesseur, d’après sa 
formule des natures «desquelles, en lesquelle et lesquelles est le Christ»,” in Maximus Confessor: Actes du 
Symposium sur Maxime le Confesseur, Fribourg, 2-5 septembre 1980, eds. Felix Heinzer and Christoph 
Schönborn (Fribourg: Éditions universitaires, 1982), 215-22.; Madden, “Composite Hypostasis in Maximus 




logic you cannot have absolute identity apart from absolute difference. Divine and human 
nature stand in no essential relation to one another, no tension or asymmetry; they have 
nothing natural in common at all. To effect their unqualified union, they must not. 
Hypostasis, itself a positivity which bears no natural relation to either nature—since it is 
itself no nature, of course, apart from its nature(s)!—is sufficiently indifferent to become 
their concrete identity while exerting not a modicum of pressure on either nature in the 
process. Failure to speak of the Word’s simultaneous, unqualified identity as and of both 
natures—(NB: He is both, but not as some third “thing.”111 The Incarnation is not a case 
of transitive identity: it’s not “A=B, B=C, therefore A=C,” but “A [hypostasis]=B/C 
[natures]” where the “/” itself only obtains because there’s nothing transferable in “A” as 
such to either “B” or “C” as such: therefore as both in this way, he is their “is” in a way 
transitivity simply cannot conceive)—this spells failure to speak most “properly” of the 
mystery of Incarnation.112 
 Natural and hypostatic logics enable each other. Nature never needs to answer for 
identity between different natures (especially absolutely different ones); hypostasis never 
for identity between concrete individuals (as with a crass “mixture”). Their ineffable 
discrimination within God himself—to come full circle—grounds the Son’s ability, in his 
own hypostasis, to become the very ground of both concrete identity and essential 
difference between what he eternally is and what he becomes. So Christ is the ground, 
                                                                                                                                                 
that Maximus was the very first to formulate these three together into one phrase—it was Leontius of 
Byzantium—but notes too that Maximus was the first to make this “formula an oft-repeated way of 
referring to Christ.” 
111 Cf. n. 106. 
112 Ep 15, PG 91, 573a; my translation: “For we recognize Him after the union as a whole of the 
parts that compose Him. For Christ has nothing else to show that He is than what He preserves and what we 
call Him—than the perdurance after the union of the parts that compose Him in His being. For not only is 
Christ out of these, but He is also in these, and what’s still more proper to say, He is these [Οὐ μόνον γὰρ 




possibility, and actuality (in the historical Incarnation) of three identities at once: [1] 
natural identity with Father and Spirit (divinity); [2] natural identity with human persons 
(humanity); [3] hypostatic identity in himself (second definition of hypostasis).113 
Hypostatic logic, properly distinguished from natural logic, emerges as the condition for 
the possibility of natural difference to exist at all. In his economy the Son himself “made 
the union and distinction of the extremes [οἷς τὴν πρὸς τὰ ἄκρα ἐποιεῖτο ἕνωσιν καὶ 
διάκρισιν].” The Son proved to be more himself, more one, exactly to the extent that he 
preserved natural difference as their singular identity: “By preserving [the natures]” his 
hypostasis “preserved itself, and by conserving them it conserves itself...if one ceases, the 
other is effaced in confusion.”114 
 Balthasar called Maximus’s Christ the (suppostedly Hegelian) “identity of 
identity and nonidentity.”115 We can be more precise (and likely more Hegelian): Christ 
is the hypostatic identity of natural identity and natural difference. He himself, his very 
person, became an “is” otherwise unthinkable between created and uncreated nature, and 
yet his becoming that “is” is the ground and possibility of the most absolute natural 
difference. We might say that the Incarnation makes absolute natural difference thinkable 
for the first time in human thought. Hypostatic identity names the actuality, the fact of the 
very difference between God and man. If we were to get hasty and extend Christo-logic 
to creation itself, we might even say this: the Son’s hypostatic identity manifests, is, the 
very mode of creatio ex nihilo. 
                                                 
113 Opusc 7, PG 91, 36-7: “In such a way that by this double nature, He is congenital by essence to 
the extremes and conserves the natural difference of His parts one from the other: by the unicity of the 
person, He has a perfect identity in His parts and possesses the hypostatic difference for His parts as single 
and unique, and, finally, He is perfect in both respects by natural and essential invariance, flawless 
regarding them, I mean [the parts that make up] the extremes; the Same at once God and man.” 
114 Opusc 8, PG 91, 49-50, Ponsoye 160-1. 




1.4 – Hypostatic identity generates natural difference 
That bit of speculative haste invokes an exegetical dispute, albeit indirectly. The dispute 
concerns a concept, a single term, even, present in Maximus too: τὸ ἐνυπόστατος.116 
Behind the term lies a long and labyrinthine history, and a primarily theological one.117 It 
first emerges, it seems, “in Christian circles in Origen’s time or shortly before,” chiefly in 
trinitarian controversy to emphasize the concrete reality or distinct subsistence of the Son 
and Spirit.118 In the early development of trinitarian thought ἐνυπόστατος, ὑπόστασις, 
ἐνουσία, and οὐσία “were absolutely convertible”119: all meant to deny (against 
modalists) that the second and third divine persons qua distinct persons were “without 
hypostasis” (ἀνυπόστατος). At length the Word is described not merely as a λόγος 
προφορικός (“an expressed word”) or λόγος ἐνδιάθετος (“an inner word”), but the 
ἐνυπόστατος Λόγος (“the really subsistent Word”).120 
 Problems arise when pro-Chalcedonians, heirs to the Cappadocian-Chalcedonian 
legacy that distinguishes ousia and hypostasis, begin to employ the term ἐνυπόστατος to 
describe the metaphysical status of Christ’s human nature. They did so to dissolve an 
already familiar objection raised by both Severans and Nestorians: since there is “no 
nature without hypostasis [ἀνυπόστατος],” Chalcedon’s “two natures” entail two 
                                                 
116 See “An Analytic Appendix.” 
117 Benjamin Gleede, The Development of the Term ἐνυπόστατος from Origen to John of 
Damascus (Leiden: Brill, 2012), 183. 
118 Gleede, Development, 17-19, who also notes that these earlier sources (esp. Origen) tend to link 
enhypostatos with certain christological passages in the NT (1 Cor 1.24, 30; Jn 1, 14.6; Heb 1.3) in order to 
combat modalism. U.M. Lang, “Anhypostatos-Enhypostatos: Church Fathers, Protestant Orthodoxy and 
Karl Barth,” JTS 49.2 (1998): 635, sees that enhypostatos (as later in John Damascene), while never 
predicated of the Father, could be of both Son and Spirit (e.g. the spurious epistle of Pope Felix, Collectio 
Sabbaitica VIII, Ep Felicis altera; ACO III, 21.12-16); hence he wonders if even here a “locative” sense to 
the prefix intimated that Son and Spirit originate from Father—subsist “in” the Father, as it were—whereas 
the Father in no other. 
119 Gleede, Development, 41. For instance, Athanasius, Ep ad Afros 4.3 (AW II/8, 329): “Ἡ δὲ 
ὑπόστασις οὐσία ἐστὶ, καὶ οὐδὲν ἄλλο σημαινόμενον ἔχει ἢ αὐτὸ τὸ ὄν”—later an important passage for 
those denouncing the Chalcedonian discretion of hypostasis and ousia; cf. Gleede, Development, 54. 




hypostases.121 From John Grammaticus on,122 Neochalcedonians countered that since 
Christ’s humanity never had “subsistence” (τὸ ὑφεστηκέναι) or “distinct existence” (ἡ 
ὑπόστασις) apart from the Word, the Word’s own hypostasis just is his humanity’s. His 
humanity is indeed “not without hypostasis,” but neither does it have its own (separate) 
hypostasis. It is ἐνυπόστατος to the degree it subsists in the Word’s hypostasis, but 
ἀνυπόστατος in itself.123 
 But now enhypostatos means quite the contrary of what it meant in earlier 
trinitarian theology: then it signified a hypostasis, a distinct subsistence in its own right 
(Son and Spirit), here a nature or essence that has no distinct subsistence in itself, but in 
another (Christ’s human nature in his person). The dispute arises with this last claim. 
Friedrich Loofs argued in 1887 that Leontius of Byzantium distinguished a hypostasis 
from an enhypostatized essence in a novel way, namely in Aristotelian terms124: as 
“second substance” is to “first substance,” so stands the enhypostasized essence to its 
hypostasis.125 This implied that Christ’s human nature, as enhypostatos (second ousia), 
possessed a quasi-accidental ontological relation to Christ’s person akin to an “essential 
                                                 
121 For the Severan use of this polemic, see Severus of Antioch, Or. 2 ad Nephalium, CSCO 119 
[120], 16.11-15 [13.1-5], and Lang, “Anhypostatos-Enhypostatos,” 636. A Nestorian can wield it the same 
way: cf. Leontius of Jerusalem, Contra Nestorianos II.14, PG 86, 1568a. 
122 John Grammaticus, Apol. IV.3-6, CCG 1, 55. 
123 Justinian, Edictum rectae fidei, Amelotti 144.29-146.12; idem,  Adv. Tria Capitula, PG 86, 
997b; and esp. the remarkable passage from Leontius of Jerusalem, CN II.14, PG 86, 1568a-c, for instance, 
ll.3-7: “καὶ γὰρ οὐκ ἐν ἰδιαζουσῃ ὑποστῆναι, ἀλλ’ ἐν τῇ τοῦ Λόγου ὑποστάσει ὑφεστηκέναι τὸ ἀνθρώπινόν 
φαμεν τοῦ Σωτῆρος ἐξ ἀρχῆς· οὕτε μὴν ἁπλῶς τὴν τοῦ Λόγου νῦν ὑπόστασιν, ὡς Λόγου μόνον οὗσαν 
ὑπόστασιν νῦν οἴδαμεν· ἐπειδὴ σὺν τῷ ἀνθρωπίνῳ συνυφέστηκεν ἐν αὐτῇ τῶν ὁμουσίων ὁ Λόγος μετὰ τὴν 
ἄφραστον αὐτοῦ ἕνωσιν.” Cf. too Grillmeier, Christ, II/2, 436. These texts do not explicitly link 
ἐνυπόστατος with the idea that Christ’s humanity subsisted only in his hypostasis. That’s to say, the in-
subsistence principle Loofs ascribes to Leontius of Byzantium is present here indeed, but not described 
with the precise term ἐνύποστατος (cf. Gleede, Development, 1). 
124 The locus classicus is Leontius of Byzantium, CNE 1, especially as (uncritically) paired with 
Epil. 8. 
125 Friedrich Loofs, Leontius von Byzanz und die gleichnamigen Schriftsteller der griechischen 




quality.”126 It also implied that the activity of Christ’s human nature, its existential 
integrity, was somehow “absorbed” (aufnimmt) into the divine, since its concrete 
actuality was dominated by the divine hypostasis as its sole primary substance.127 
 “One can hardly interpret Leontius worse than Loofs did”—thus thundered 
Grillmeier.128 Inspired by Brian Daley,129 and, as far as I can see, by a worry over a 
creeping monophysitism similar to what motivated earlier criticisms of 
Neochalcedonianism, Grillmeier proposes that enhypostatos as applied to Christ’s flesh 
means simply “real” or “subsistent.” Leontius and others, they argue, do not with this 
word proffer an account of how Christ’s human nature subsisted, just that it did so, and 
never apart from Christ himself. The etymology of the prefix en- indicates (solely?) the 
contrary of the an-prefix, an alpha-privative, so that, say, while accidents are 
anhypostata—not really subsistent in themselves—the flesh of Christ is enhypostatos—
concrete, real, subsistent.130 
                                                 
126 Loofs, Leontius von Byzanz, 68: “so wird hier offenbar, dass schon bei Aristoteles die 
ποιότητες οὐσιώδεις eine Mittelstellung einnehmen zwischen den Substanzen und Qualitäten.... An diesen 
Fehler [of judging essential qualities as still quasi-Platonic, self-subsisting “essences” only partially present 
in an individual] knüpft die Theologie unserers Verfassers an....” 
127 Cf. Loofs, Leontius von Byzanz, 67, who, though unable to detect in Leontius’s own 
illustrations which of Christ’s two natures is ἐνυπόστατον, seems nevertheless to expect that one has to be, 
and that this one would therefore be absorbed by the other. 
128 Grillmeier, Christ, II/2, 198. 
129 Grillmeier, Christ, II/2, 194-5. Daley gave a communication on the topic in 1979, which he’s 
yet to publish. He does, though tender the thesis in “‘A Richer Union,’ 241-3, and recently in the 
introduction to Leontius of Byzantium, 73-5. 
130 An awkward aspect of Grillmeier’s and Daley’s position comes in precisely this contrast, 
though, especially as it relates to Leontius: per earlier usage, anhypostatos names realities not subsistent in 
themselves, like accidents, and enhypostatos those that do subsist in themselves, like the Son and Spirit. But 
Leontius explicitly denies that enhypostatic natures—here Christ’s humanity—subsists in itself, and 
reserves this definition exclusively for hypostasis as opposed to enhypostatic nature (CNE 1, PG 86, 
1277d, Daley 132; Epil. 8, PG 86, 1945a-b, Daley 308). In other words, as already with the long 
philosophical tradition debating the in-subsistence of accidents and species in individuals, it’s hard here to 
imagine that Leontius is not also intimating modes of subsistence; so Gleede, Development, 69-99. In fact, 
it’s not entirely without warrant to read this very passage from Leontius as at least implying some sort of 
in-subsistence theory, since the major parallel evoked just after is the relation of figure to body: body is 
never “without figure,” but that does not mean it’s reducible to figure; it only means that figure is always 




 I said this whole dispute concerns Maximus really but “indirectly.” For two 
reasons. First, more recent scholarship has shown, decisively to my mind, that Daley’s 
etymological argument about what the prefix en- must always mean is certainly 
overstated.131 The single and magisterial monograph on the subject by Benjamin Gleede 
proves that Leontius did instigate the crucial change—a clear distinction between 
enhypostatos and hypostasis—which issued in what he calls the “distinction tradition.” 
This tradition self-consciously linked the in-subsistence of Christ’s humanity—that it 
began to exist only in his hypostasis—with the concept (and term) of that nature’s 
enhypostatic existence. And, second, Maximus stands firmly in, indeed exemplifies, 
precisely this tradition. In this tradition “a translation [of ἐνυπόστατος] as ‘hypostatically 
realised’, ‘enhypostatic’ or ‘enhypostasized’ (as adopted especially by Maximus-
scholars) would be preferable to the rather misleading ‘hypostatical’ or, even less precise, 
‘real.’”132 
                                                                                                                                                 
nature, the enhypostatos, likewise only occurs in his hypostasis. It’s especially significant that Leontius 
selects figure (τὸ σχῆμα): unlike “forms,” which Platonists conceived  having some sort of self-subsistence 
apart from finite individuals, figures, precisely as essential properties of bodies alone (not, say, of 
intelligible ideas), must subsist only and ever in bodies. 
131 Lang, “Anhypostatos-Enhypostatos,” 633. Lang’s article shows that Loofs’s in-subsistence 
theory, as well as its explicit linkage to enhypostatos, is definitely assumed by John Damascene; see esp. 
Dialectica fus. 45, 17-22, discussed at Lang, op. cit., 649-50. Another reason Daley’s and Grillmeier’s 
thesis fails, one not often noted, is that it would have us believe Leontius and his pro-Chalcedonian 
successors utterly failed to muster a convincing or even relevant argument against their immediate 
opponents: after all, the Nestorian second “hypostasis” that bore a human nature, and even the Severan 
“human quality” that perdured after the union—both of these could just as easily be “real” and “subsistent.” 
That’s to say, the whole point of distinguishing hypostasis from enhypostatos was to specify the mode of 
union and its concrete product, not to make the simple (and earlier) assertion that Christ’s humanity 
possessed mere reality; cf. Leontius, CNE 1, and Maximus, Ep 15; PG 91, 557d-560a. 
132 Gleede, Development, 185. Lang, despite his own bid for John Damascene’s originality here, 
already noticed that Maximus conceives the enhypostatic nature of Christ’s humanity as precisely its 
singular in-subsistence in the Word, and therefore declared (operating under Daley’s/Grillmeier’s thesis 
about Leontius) that Maximus can “even be said to have anticipated the Loofsian misreading” (Lang, 
“Anhypostatos-Enhypostatos,” 643 n. 60). Lang’s and especially Gleede’s work validates earlier Maximus 
scholarship (Perl, Larchet, Riou) against Törönen’s uncritical acceptance of Daley’s thesis, a thesis that, for 
the former, has been “conclusively argued” (101). I find Törönen’s candor refreshing: he perceives that if 




 More significant still, Gleede identifies two novelties in Maximus’s own use of 
the term. The first has to do with its trinitarian meaning. He can occasionally mean it in 
an earlier, more traditional sense: the Word is “really, personally distinct.”133 But he also 
uses it with the same sense it carries in christology: 
For the Monad is truly a Monad: it is not the origin of the things that come after it, 
as if it had expanded after a state of contraction, like something naturally poured 
out and proliferating into a multitude, but is rather the enhypostasized being of the 
consubstantial Trinity [ἀλλ’ ἐνυπόστατος ὀντότης ὁμοουσίου Τριάδος]. And the 
Trinity is truly a Trinity, not the sum of a divisible number....but the 
enessentialized existence of the tri-hypostatic Monad [ἀλλ’ ἐνούσιος ὕπαρξις 
τριυποστάτου μονάδος]. The Trinity is truly a Monad, for such it is [ἐστίν]; and 
the Monad is truly a Trinity, for as such it subsists [ὑφέστηκεν], since there is one 
Godhead that is monadically and subsists trinitarianly [οὖσά τε μοναδικῶς καὶ 
ὑφισταμένη τριαδικῶς].134 
 
Enhypostatos here refers to the divine, monadic, consubstantial essence. A crucial feature 
of the “distinction tradition,” recall, was that the enhypostatos differs from hypostasis 
insofar as the former designates an οὐσία, what is common and universal in the 
hypostasis. So the two terms are “not convertible,” as Maximus (following Leontius) 
said: hypostasis is all that nature is, not the reverse.135 And the “tri-hypostatic Monad” 
has “existence” only as enousios, empowered and enacted as and through the 
consubstantial, divine essence.136 That enhypostatos here responds to enousios: that the 
                                                                                                                                                 
Christ’s self-identification with his own flesh also describes “a universal ontology”—a view Törönen’s 
whole book means to reject. See his Union and Distinction, 101-4. 
133 Amb 7.15: “would he not also know that the many logoi are the one Logos, seeing that all 
things are related to Him without being confused with Him, who is the essential and personally distinct 
Logos of God the Father [ἐνούσιόν τε καὶ ἐνυπόστατον τοῦ Θεοῦ καὶ Πατρὸς Θεὸν Λόγον....” There may 
be  some resonances here of Lang’s point about the possibility intra-trinitarian origin implied in the prefix 
(cf. n. 118), but certainly of the older sense, “personally distinct from/of the Father.” An exhaustive list of 
references at Gleede, Development, 141 n. 497. 
134 Amb 1.3, modified. 
135 Opusc 23, PG 91, 264a-b. 
136 Cp. Opusc 16, PG 91, 205b-c, where in a christological context Maximus says “the 
enhypostasized is clearly the en-existenced, and the en-existenced is what participates essential and natural 
existence [τὸ ἐνυπόστατον δηλοῖ τὸ ἑνύπαρκτον· ἐνύπαρκτον δὲ ἐστι τὸ ούσιώδους καὶ φυσικῆς μετέχον 
ὑπάρξεως].” He means here to refute those who would take Christ’s two activities to imply two actors. No, 




former refers to essence and the latter to hypostasis (three, of course)—just so Maximus 
manages to make christological and trinitarian terms more univocal than they already 
were in Neochalcedonian idiom.137 
 The second novelty constitutes a development of the in-subsistence theory itself. 
Maximus, Gleede observes, has a conspicuous penchant for λαμβάνειν ἐν when 
articulating the in-subsistence formula: Christ’s flesh “takes” or “receives” subsistence or 
hypostasis in the very Word. And not only subsistence, but τὸ εἶναι or τὴν φύσιν: in the 
Word’s hypostasis humanity receives not simply reality, but actualization as the nature it 
is.138 More precisely, Christ’s human nature received concrete existence in the Word’s 
own subsistence, yes, but also its very origin or the principle by which it is what it is. In 
Mary the Word becomes the seed of his own conception and gestation, the existence and 
natural formation of his own humanity.139  
Thus, “though He was beyond being, He came into being,” fashioning within 
nature a principle of generation and a different mode of birth [γενέσεως ἀρχὴν καὶ 
γεννήσεως ἑτέραν [Wis 7:5] τῇ φύσει δημιουργήσας], for He was conceived 
having become the seed of His own flesh, and He was born having become the 
seal of the virginity of the one who bore Him, showing that with respect to her 
mutually contradictory things truly exist together. For she herself is both virgin 
                                                                                                                                                 
inseparable, but still distinct. Because these differ even in their inseparable and indifferent identity as one, 
it is yet possible for one hypostasis to possess two natures—and with these two powers corresponding to 
two activities. In the case of the Trinity the quantities are reversed, but the principle remains unchanged: 
there we have three hypostases that possess (in a unique manner, yes) one nature, and so three actors 
perform one act. In Christ one actor performs two acts. In both cases no actor acts except through nature, 
and no nature subsists except in hypostasis. 
137 Gleede, Development, 142: “This enables Maximus to apply the distinction between ὑπόστασις 
and ἐνυπόστατος also to trinitarian theology and to establish a univocal technical use of it in trinitarian and 
Christological contexts.” 
138 Ep 15, PG 91, 553d; so too Ep 12, PG 91, 468a-b: “From her [i.e. Mary] He united flesh to 
Himself according to hypostasis, consubstantial with us, animated by a rational and noetic soul, not pre-
hypostasized for even the twinkling of an eye, but in Himself, God and Word, that flesh received both ‘to 
be’ and ‘to subsist’ [ἀλλ’ ἐν αὐτῷ τῷ Θεῷ καὶ Λόγῳ, καὶ τὸ εἶναι καὶ τὸ ὑποστῆναι λαβοῦσαν]. cf. Gleede, 
Development, 151. 
139 Amb 2.2: “The Word of God is whole, complete essence (for He is God), and He is whole, 
undiminished hypostasis (for He is the Son). Having emptied Himself, He became the seed of His own 
flesh, and being thus compounded by means of His ineffable conception, He became the hypostasis of the 




and mother, innovating nature by a coincidence of opposites, since virginity and 
childbearing are opposites, and no one would have imagined from nature their 
combination [ὧν ἐκ φύσεως οὐκ ἄν τις ἐπινοηθήσεται σύμβασις].140 
 
The mode of union is the mode of both of the Son’s generations, and both modes simply 
are him. Scarcely was there a starker reprisal of Chalcedonian symmetry. And yet this 
symmetry—of births, modes of existence, natures—as before, prove possible and actual 
only by and because of hypostatic identity. That is, because these attain identity solely in 
the singular hypostasis of the Word, they can therefore retain all their own, natural 
properties undiminished. Nature, and indeed the very origin which births it in both divine 
and human modes, never answers for its own subsistence or actuality: for it is only 
actualized in his hypostasis—only ever enhypostatos. As divine nature subsists in God, so 
human nature subsists in Mary. Rather, because it is so in God, so it is in Mary.141 
 So now we specify two elements of Maximian Christo-logic: in the Incarnation, 
hypostatic identity [1] enables and [2] generates absolute natural difference. There in 
Christ we perceive not just the “conjunction” or even “union” of natural extremes, but in 
fact “the generation of opposites [τῇ τῶν ἐναντίων γενέσει].”142 Were these natures not 
hypostatically identical, neither they nor their opposition would exist at all.143 
                                                 
140 Amb 5.13, modified. 
141 Gleede, Development, 154: “In reinterpreting the ‘property of sonship’ as a mode of existence, 
the identity between Christ qua second hypostasis and qua hypostasis of the two natures becomes much 
more plausible, as it is not so much a second generation, clearly different from the first, which marks off 
Christ’s hypostasis, but the formally divine actualisation of the human natural properties—the very same 
way of actualisation which also applies to the divine ones.... Maximus makes it absolutely clear that 
individuality cannot be constituted by one or several accidents… but only by a biographical process in its 
entirety constituted—according to Cappadocian premises—primarily by its origin.” 
142 Amb 5.14. 
143 It’s even true, though scandalous to some (Gleede, Development, 188; Lang, “Anhypostatos-
Enhypostatos,” 646), that the divine nature itself is anhypostatos. So Opusc 13.7, PG 91: “Just as you say 
one sole essence because of the consubstantiality of the Holy Trinity, and because of hypostatic alterity 
[you say] three hypostases, in the same way because of the essential alterity of the Word and the flesh, you 
say two essences, and by the fact that each lacks its own proper hypostasis, you say one sole hypostasis.” 
Lang thinks the “damaging consequence” of this view (found too in the earlier De sectis, VII.2, PG 86, 




1.5 – Perichoresis in christology: a new mode of unifying natures in act 
But those two elements of Christo-logic remain quite formal. They specify that Christ is 
the generation and preservation of two incommensurable, natural principles, of their 
absolute difference in principle.144 Natural principles, though, are the principles of natural 
activities.145 So Christ’s person possesses two natures, each with its own principle of 
activity. When he acts, doesn’t he unfold two activities? And if two activities, doesn’t 
this imply that Christ is two in actuality? Just here Neochalcedonianism felt a certain 
pressure to stay true to its Cyrillian convictions. Uthemann has rightly argued that 
monenergism and (soon after) monothelitism were understandable (though not inevitable) 
developments of Neochalcedonianism itself.146 Maximus championed another possibility. 
And yet his was no simple rejection of monenergism. Maximus’s alternative, also a 
signature contribution to christology proper, grew, I think, from a deep appreciation for 
what fundamentally motivated the insistence on “one activity.” He, for the first time in 
                                                                                                                                                 
Neochalcedonian commitment to univocity in trinitarian and christological concepts, that’s precisely the 
point: there is no tetrad in the Trinity, therefore the Trinity itself grounds and exemplifies the logics of 
nature and hypostasis. Not even divine nature subsists in itself. 
144 Ep 13, PG 91, 546b-c, where Maximus admits that “certainly according to a certain principle 
and mode, because of the hypostatic identity, that is, the one hypostasis according to which there is no 
possible difference, Christ is one [πάντως κατά τινα λόγον τε καὶ τρόπον, διὰ τὴν ὑποστατικὴν ταυτότητα, 
ἤγουν τὴν μίαν ὑπόστασιν, καθ’ ἢν διαφορὰν οὐ δύναται, ἓν ἐστιν ὁ Χριστός].” But the logos and tropos of 
this oneness are themselves one principle and mode—the Logos’s own hypostasis (which is also a filial 
mode from eternity)—not, against Severans, one natural principle; in Christ abide two natural principles 
(546c-d); cf. Ep 15, PG 91, 572b; Amb 5.11; Amb 10.3; Pyr 35, PG 91, 297d-300a, passim. 
145 Amb 5.2, Hence the sense of a thing’s logos as the natural potential of its actualization, as when 
λόγος responds to ἐνέργεια; cf. Amb 10.90. 
146 Karl-Heinz Uthemann, “Der Neuchalkedonismus als Vorbereitung des Monotheletismus: Ein 
Beitrag zum eigentlichen Anliegen des Neuchalkedonismus,” Studia Patristica 29 (1997), 408, my 
emphasis: “Hier wird das eigentliche Anliegen der Monenergeten deutlich; sie wollen mit dem Begriff der 
ἕνωσις und darum der μία ὑπόστασις mehr als nur einen formalen, unanschaulichen Sinn verbinden. Damit 
stehen sie in der Wirkungsgeschichte des Neuchalkedonismus und seines Ringens um das Auffüllen des 
chalkedonischen Hypostasebegriffs.” Bathrellos, Byzantine Christ, 53, disagrees with Uthemann because 
“there is no necessary connection between accepting that Christ has a divine hypostasis, on the one hand, 
and monothelitism [with monenergism implied] on the other,” but Uthemann’s claim implies only a real 
and conceivable (not a necessary) connection between Neochalcedonian one-hypostasis christology and 




Christian thought, made the peculiar logic of perichoresis the summit of Christo-logic.147 
This has not gone unnoticed.148 What has, it seems, are this innovation’s precise 
metaphysical implications. 
 The monenergist impulse seems clear enough: since Christ is one person, he is 
one agent, and a single agent enacts a single activity uniquely its own. Christ, though two 
in principle, must be one in actu. Here lay Pyrrhus’s concern. After a lengthy dispute 
about Christ’s wills, Pyrrhus, erstwhile patriarch of Constantinople, tenders a thesis about 
the prior question of Christ’s two activities (relevant, of course, since willing is a natural 
activity of rational beings): Christ possessed one “hypostatic activity.”149 One person 
entails one activity. Maximus rejects this, not least because it would require three 
activities of the one Trinity (here again the trinitarian-christological univocity!).150 He 
then offers an alternative proposal outfitted with a venerable analogy: in actu, Christ’s 
activities unite in “their complete interpenetration into each other,” like the burning cut 
and the cutting burn of a red-hot blade.151 Pyrrhus immediately, “But the agent, is it not 
one?” Maximus concurs. A bit later Pyrrhus sharpens his criticism: “It does not 
necessarily follow that since he operates dually, he has two activities.”152 But even in 
union, Maximus follows, an activity must correspond to a nature, so that a single activity 
                                                 
147 An important inspiration for Maximus derives, of course, from the christological use of the 
term at Gregory of Nazianzus, Ep 101, SC 208, 48 (translation from Harris, “Perichoresis in the Greek 
Fathers,” 55, slightly modified): “Just as the natures are mixed, so also the names pass reciprocally 
(περιχωρουσῶν) into each other by the principle of natural co-affinity (συμφυίας).” But see Stermmer, 
“PERICHORESE,” 17: “Zu einem tragenden theologischen Terminus wird περιχωρεῖν erst bei Maximus 
Confessor im 7. Jahrhundert.” 
148 Thunberg, Microcosm and Mediator, 23-36; Garrigues, Maxime le Confesseur, 136-7; 
Stemmer, “PERICHORESE,” 17-19; Harrison, “Perichoresis in the Greek Fathers,” 57-9. 
149 Pyr 162. 
150 Something unthinkable after Gregory of Nyssa’s Ad Ablabium. 
151 Pyr 170, PG 91, 337c-340a; cf. Ep 19, PG 91, 345; Opusc 16, PG 91, 189d. Origen already 
likened the “red-hot sword” to the Word’s Incarnation; cf. Princ 2.6.6. I discuss below how Maximus’s use 
differs. 




“dually” effected still implies a single (if composite) nature—an especially flagrant 
offense with respect to Christ’s two natures, “since in general no mediator exists between 
the created and the uncreated.”153  
 Pyrrhus pivots: “Do you not accept and agree with those who say that the effect of 
Christ’s works is one activity?”154 An evident motive: Pyrrhus wants to ensure that 
Christ’s dual natures yet issue in one concrete reality, one actuality—in “the effect” (τὸ 
ἀποτέλεσμα).155 Is Christ really one after all? Maximus notes a subtle distinction between 
“inner” and “outer” acts that appears to register the force of the underlying concern: “we 
are not discussing,” he clarifies, “things external to Christ, but about things within Christ 
himself, that is, about the natural principle of Christ’s essences, whether he was defective 
from the union or remained without defect.”156 The distinction is akin to Plotinus’s 
doctrine of “double activity.” An interior act perfects the very nature of the agent (or 
hypostasis), like thinking perfects intellectual nature; an exterior act is the separate effect 
issuing forth from that interior act, like walking on a beach presses spoors into the 
sand.157 Maximus stresses the former: he wants to secure the perfect, undiminished 
actuality interior to each of Christ’s natures. Their exterior effects are another matter. 
                                                 
153 Pyr 182, PG 91, 341a, Farrell slightly modified: “ἐπειδὴ μέσον κτιστῆς καὶ ἀκτίστου οὐδεμία 
ὑπάρχει τὸ σύνολον.” 
154 Pyr 183, PG 91, 341b, my emphasis. 
155 Uthemann, “Der Neuchalkedonismus als Vorbereitung,” 399, notes that Anastasius of Antioch 
preferred to conceive Christ’s energeiai in terms of their “effect,” and that this slips toward a monenergist 
emphasis on the (pre)dominance of divine activity in Christ. See too Leontius of Byzantium, CNE 7, PG 
86, 1297c, Daley 162-3: “our dispute is rather about the product of union [τοῦ ἀποτελέσματος τοῦ ἐκ τῆς 
ἑνώσεώς], and whether it is about things themselves [τῶν πραγμάτων αὐτῶν] or simply about the words 
referring to them.” 
156 Pyr 184, PG 91, 341b-c, Farrell modified: “οὐ γὰρ περὶ τῶν ἔξω Χριστοῦ ἐστι ὁ λόγος ἡμῖν, 
ἀλλὰ περὶ τῶν ἐν αὐτῷ τῷ Χριστῷ· τουτέστι περὶ τοῦ φυσικοῦ τῶν οὐσιῶν τοῦ Χριστοῦ λόγου, εἴτε 
ἐλλιπὴς ἐκ τῆς ἑνώσεως, εἴτε ἀνελλιπὴς μεμένηκε.” 
157 Cf. Plotinus, En. V.4 [7] 2. The walking-to-footprint analogy comes from Eyjólfur Kjalar 
Emilsson, “Remarks on the Relation between the One and Intellect in Plotinus,” in Traditions of Platonism: 




 Pyrrhus brandishes a second goad, one Maximus often felt—the putative weight 
of authority. Both Dionysius and Cyril seem to teach one activity in Christ: Dionysius 
speaks of “a certain new theandric activity” of Christ, Cyril of “the single, congenital 
[συγγενῆ] activity made manifest through both [natures].”158 Now Maximus reprises his 
original proposal, that what’s “new,” in Dionysius’s terms, and what effects this 
unprecedented “congenital activity,” in Cyril’s, is precisely the new mode in which 
Christ’s two natures relate in actu, the new way they are qualified in hypostatic union: 
But if this newness [of Christ’s “theandric activity”] is a qualitative one [ποιότης], 
then it does not mean one energy. Instead, it signifies both the new and the 
ineffable mode of the manifestation of Christ’s natural activities—the ineffable 
manner of the perichoresis of Christ’s natures into each other, and that manner of 
life that was proper to His humanity which, being foreign and paradoxical, is 
unknown to the nature of beings, and [signifies] the mode of exchange proper to 
the ineffable union.159 
 
Maximus plainly admits that the perichoresis of Christ’s natures (in context, these 
natures in act) “is unknown to the nature of beings,”—is, he indicates, something utterly 
unthinkable apart from “the ineffable union.” But what exactly is so new about this 
“mode of exchange”? 
 In Opusculum 5, a short but suggestive text, Maximus registers and rejects three 
conciliatory proposals of the monenergists, three ways, that is, to confess Christ’s 
activities were in a certain sense “one and two”160: [1] divine activity overwhelms and 
dominates the human; [2] divine activity uses the human as “an instrument”; [3] there is 
                                                 
158 Pyr 186-9; cf. Opusc 7, PG 91, 85d-88a; Opusc 8, Ponsoye 163-4; Amb 5.19. Cf. Dionysius, Ep 
4 (ad Gaium), Heil and Ritter, 161. 
159 Pyr 192, PG 91, 345d-348a, Farrell modified: “Εἰδὲ ποιότης ἐστὶν ἡ καινότης, οὺ μίαν δηλοῖ 
ἐνέργειαν, ἀλλὰ τὸν καινὸν καὶ ἀπόῤῥητον τρόπον τῆς τῶν φυσικῶν τοῦ Χριστοῦ ἐνεργειῶν ἐκφάνσεως, 
τῷ ἀποῤῥήτῳ τρόπῳ τῆς εἰς ἀλλήλας τῶν Χριστοῦ φύσεων περιχωρήσεως προσφόρως, καὶ τὴν κατὰ 
ἄνθρωπον αὐτοῦ πολιτείαν, ξένην οὖσαν καὶ παράδοξον, καὶ τῇ φύσει τῶν ὄντων ἄγνωστον, καὶ τὸν 
τρόπον τῆς κατὰ τὴν ἀπόῤῥητον ἕνωσιν ἀντιδόσεως.” 





one composite activity, the divine and human functioning as parts. The last first, and 
quickly. Maximus retorts that a “composed activity” carries the same absurdities as a 
“composed nature,” since the former derives from the latter: it would be “simultaneous” 
and “involuntary,” and it would itself be a species of activity that other individuals of that 
same composed nature would perform (“a plethora of Christs”).161 Of the second 
Maximus asks: this instrumental causality, is it natural or fabricated? If natural, then it 
would be “synchronous” (σύγχρονον) “like body and soul.” That is, as with Severus’s 
“composed nature,” we’d have to say that neither agent nor instrument ever existed apart 
from one another.162 If fabricated, Maximus sees only Nestorianism or Apollinarianism: 
if the two activities are not unified naturally, then the agent and instrument either exist in 
relative separation from each other as wholes (Nestorius), or else in a whole where the 
agent assumes the role of superior over the governed and inferior, so that while “this 
[instrument] is not always moved,” it yet “appears to be taken up and moved by the hand 
of the actor” (Apollinarius).163 
 It’s in his rejection of the first proposal, I think, that Maximus betrays his 
fundamental conviction about the unity of Christ’s two activities. Even if the divine 
activity dominated the human in Christ, that divine activity would still itself suffer some 
degree of extrinsic qualification. The relation between the dominating and the dominated, 
Maximus observes, “has to do with things relative to another [τῶν Πρός τι],” and such 
things “always introduce, together, in themselves, things [by nature] mutually implicative 
                                                 
161 Opusc 5, PG 91, 64d-65a. 
162 Opusc 5, PG 91, 64c: “then we ourselves would call divine nature created, or the body 
uncreated.” 




[τὰ ἀντιδιαιρούμενα].”164 This is an Aristotelian point. Aristotle commences his 
disquisition on the category of relation by noting that “all relatives are said having 
correlatives [ἀντιστρέφοντα],”165 and, after discussing a number of examples, concludes 
that such correlatives naturally come into being “simultaneously.”166 The basic issue, 
unremitting here as ever, is that even natural dominance in actu still conceives a natural 
relation, as if the two activities were set in a certain tension, the divine claiming a 
superior degree of being what both at some (specific or generic) level are.167 
Asymmetrical relation is still a natural relation; indeed, it must be if degrees of 
dominance be discerned at all. Once again, Maximus knows no such asymmetry in 
Christ: 
And then, if you speak of one activity according to domination, such that the 
human [activity] is denied because it is dominated, you introduce diminution to 
both [μείωσιν αὐταῖς εἰσάγετε]. For the one that dominates is always also itself 
among suffering things, since it too is dominated by the dominated [καὶ αὐτὸ γὰρ 
κρατεῖται ὑπὸ τοῦ ἐπικρατουμένου]. Even if it’s to a lesser degree, the 
[dominating] is yet certainly dominated, just as gold, for example, dominates the 
silver or the copper alloyed with it: here it is itself dominated, even if to a lesser 
extent... since this has to do with the degree to which it has been mixed [ὅτι κατά 
τὴν ποσότητα τὴν προσμιγεῖσαν].168 
 
 What is new in Christ’s actual existence, then, is this: two incommensurable 
natures (logoi), bearing their proper powers (dynameis) and activities (energeiai), which 
indeed express their proper modes of being (tropoi)—all of these are found in a singular 
and real identity (hypostasis), and in such a manner (perichoresis) that they perdure 
                                                 
164 Opusc 5, PG 91, 64a. 
165 Aristotle, Cat. VII, 6b29. 
166 Aristotle, Cat. VII, 7b15: “τὰ πρός τι ἅμα τῇ φύσει εἶναι.” Cf. Roueché, “Handbook,” 96 
(=262. ll. 178-9). 
167 Hence the passive sense of ἀντιδιαιρέω, here “τὰ ἀντιδιαιρούμενα” or “mutually-implicative,” 
which means “to be opposed as the members of a natural classification” (LSJ, s.v.); see Aristotle, Cat. 
XIV, b34. 




utterly “without diminution,” untarnished and unqualified in se even as they 
interpenetrate in re.  
 This last is perhaps most astonishing against the backdrop of Neoplatonic 
metaphysics. Christo-logic must finally reject one standard account of “vertical causality” 
(which obviously funds the monenergist proposals here), in two ways: in Christ, unlike in 
Neoplatonic emanation, [1] higher and lower modes of activity interpenetrate each other 
in both directions, and yet [2] remain perfectly whole in their natural (interior) power, act, 
and mode.  
 Neoplatonism could never abide such confusion. Plotinus’s doctrine of “double 
activity,” a valiant attempt to combine Aristotelian and Platonic logics of act (horizontal 
and vertical, respectively), proscribes any symmetrical penetration between higher and 
lower level of being.169 Asymmetry, sure. The classic problem of participation just was 
the problem of how distinct existences might ultimately be one, and how that One reality, 
whatever and however it be, could be wholly present to the manifold.170 But as Proclus 
insists near the start of his Elements of Theology, although the One is wholly present to 
all as the very unity of the manifold, each instance of the manifold is itself “both one and 
not-one.”171 Higher beings, superior causes (and certainly the One), are “self-sufficient in 
essence and activity,” and by that very self-sufficiency emanate inferior existences that 
depend on the higher for “completeness.”172 The essence or nature of every effect 
                                                 
169 Cf. Stephen Gersh, From Iamblichus to Eriugena: An Investigation into the Prehistory and 
Evolution of the Pseudo-Dionysian Tradition (Leiden: Brill, 1978), 27-44. 
170 Plato, Parm. 131b-c (the problem of the Sail Cloth); Plotinus, En. VI.4-5 (basically a 
commentary on the Parm., on the One’s undiminished omnipresence to all things, even to body). Cf. A.C. 
Lloyd, The Anatomy of Neoplatonism (Oxford: OUP, 1998), 98-110; and Gurtler M. Gurtler, “Plotinus and 
the Platonic Parmenides,” International Philosophical Quarterly 32.4 (1992): 443-57. 
171 Proclus, El. Theol., prop. 2, Dodds 3. 
172 Proclus, El. Theol., prop. 9, Dodds 10-11: “Πᾶν τὸ αὔταρκες ἢ κατ’ οὐσίαν ἢ ἐνέργειαν 




(pre)exists in its cause “in a primary mode” (πρώτως), and in this effect “in a secondary 
mode” (δευτέρως). Hence no effect—with its proper nature and activity—is ever simply 
identical to the cause, lest there be no discernible procession at all. But, and here lies the 
crucial matter, it’s also impossible that there be “nothing in common or identical in both,” 
lest the effect “not arise from [the cause’s] existence.”173 What makes an effect an effect 
is that it possesses a nature and power identical to its cause, but in a more determinate, 
lesser mode. Hence it is “like” its cause.174 
 So modal asymmetry characterizes the entire structure of vertical causality: the 
whole cause obtains in its effect in the effect’s proper mode (procession), but never is the 
whole effect qua effect in the whole cause—since, of course, the whole effect is always 
in the whole cause “in a primary mode” (remaining), and, should it return to that whole 
cause, would simply be the cause itself, assume its proper mode (reversion).175 Hence 
Iamblichus, in reply to Porphyry’s aversion to the idea that certain gods are assigned 
certain locales or elements, repurposes the asymmetrical structure of participation in 
order to defend theurgical uses of finite media (certain temples, certain words, certain 
materials, etc.). Just as sunlight “proceeds throughout the totality of existence” yet 
                                                 
173 Proclus, El. Theol., prop. 18, Dodds 20-1. So arises Proclus’s famous three moments of 
participation: τὸ ἀμέθεκτον (“the unparticipated,” the superior cause in its proper mode), τὸ μετεχόμενον 
(“the participated,” the whole presence of the superior cause in the effect according to the effect’s proper 
mode), τὸ μετέχον (“the participating,” the effect qua distinct/proceeded from what it has identical to its 
superior cause); cf. Proclus, El. Theol., props. 23-4, Dodds 26-9. See too Gersh, From Iamblichus to 
Eriugena, 150-1, for the necessary “vertical” and “horizontal” orders of existence (hypostases). 
174 Proclus, El. Theol., props. 75, 77, 78; cf. Iamblichus, De myst. I.18; Dionysius, DN 5.2. I refer 
here to an idea already developed in Plotinus, that vertical causation consists in the limitation of a higher, 
interior act by (or in the mode of) a lower power. See Gary M. Gurtler, “Plotinus on the Limitation of Act 
by Potency,” The Saint Anselm Journal 7 (2009): 1-15. 




remains in its own prior mode, so too with the divine nature, which, admittedly, stands in 
“no relation of symmetry” to its participants below.176 More: 
In respect of entities which are homogeneous in essence and potency, or indeed of 
the same species or genus, it is possible to conceive of some type of 
encompassing or direct control; but with regard to such beings as are completely 
and in all respects transcendent, how in this case can one properly conceive of any 
reciprocal interchange, or total interpenetration, or circumscription of 
individuals, or encompassing of localities, or anything of the sort?177 
 
 And yet the Incarnation discloses just this: the divine Son’s hypostatic identity 
with a nature infinitely different from his own divinity generates a lower (human) nature 
with its native powers, and when he acts through both his divine and human natures—
precisely because he is the “is” of both in power and act—these otherwise 
incommensurable activities penetrate one another symmetrically and wholly.178 In fact 
Dionysius, as Maximus reads him, precluded the possibility of understanding the 
Incarnation in terms of vertical causality and so cracked the door onto a deeper 
perception of that event: 
                                                 
176 Iamblichus, De myst. I.9, Dillon 40-1: “εἰ γὰρ οὐδείς ἐστι λόγος οὐδὲ σχέσις συμμετρίας οὐδὲ 
οὐσίας τις κοινωνία οὐδὲ κατὰ δύναμιν ἤ ἐνέργειαν συμπλοκὴ πρὸς τὸ διακοσμοῦν τοῦ 
διακοσμουμένου....” 
177 Iamblichus, De myst. I.9, Dillon 40-1: “Πρὸς μὲν γὰρ τὰ ὁμοφυῆ κατ’ οὐσίαν ἢ δύναμιν ἢ καὶ 
ὁμοειδῆ πως ὄντα ἢ καὶ ὁμογενῆ δύναταί τις περίληψις ἢ διακράτησις ἐπινοεῖσθαι· ὅσα δ’ ἐστὶν ἐξῃρημένα 
τοῖς ὅλοις παντελῶς, τίς ἂν ἐπὶ τούτῶν ἀντιπερίστασις ἢ δι’ ὅλων διέξοδος ἢ μεριστὴ περιγραφὴ ἢ κατὰ 
τόπον περιοχὴ ἢ τι τῶν τοιούτῶν ἐπινοηθείη ποτ’ ἂν ἐν δίκῃ;” Cf. too Plato, Tim. 52c-d, cited at Chapter 2, 
n. 63. 
178 Christians, of course were attracted to the Stoic notion of “interpenetration” or “mixture,” 
which with them was but a strange bit of physics: two bodies can occupy one another in the same space and 
time and still preserve their proper characteristics; so Peter Stemmer, “PERICHORESE: Zur Geschichte 
eines Begriffs,” Archiv für Begriffsgeschichte 27 (1983): 10-13. Neoplatonists, though, appropriated this 
term purely to intelligible realities that enjoy an incorporeal indivisibility; so L. Abramowski, “συνάφεια 
und ἀσύγχυτος ἕνωσις als Bezeichnung für trinitarische und christologische Einheit,” in Drei 
christologische Untersuchungen (1981), 70: “Dies ist also die ‘geziemende’ Weise, von Einheit auf der 
Ebene des Geistigen zu sprechen.” Cf. Proclus, In Parm, Cousin 754; idem, El. Theol., prop. 176 (on 
intellectual forms in intellect), Dodds 154-5: these “all interpenetrate all [φοιτᾷ πάντα διὰ πάντων],” are 
“mutually implicit, interpenetrating one another in their entirety [ὁμοῦ ἐστι καὶ ἐν ἀλλήλοις, ὅλα δι’ ὅλων 
φοιτῶντα ἀδιαστάτως].” Stoics and Neoplatonists alike conceive the logic of perichoresis only among 
entities on the same, horizontal, metaphysical plane; they simply pick different planes. So when Maximus 
(following Nazianzen) applies perichoresis to Christ’s two natures, he’s doing something unparalleled: he 
makes perichoresis a relation between the cause and the effect, the divine and the human, the superior and 




‘How,’ you ask, ‘is Jesus, who is beyond all things, ranked together with all men 
at the same level of essential being?’ But here He is not called ‘man’ insofar as 
He is cause of men, but as being that which in the entirety of its essence is truly 
man.179 
 
Note the stress on entirety of essence (κατ’ οὐσίαν ὅλην). Maximus does, and then takes 
the crucial step from whole essence to whole power and act: “The only valid proof that 
this ‘essence’ is present in its ‘entirety’...is its natural constitutive power, which one 
would not be mistaken in calling a ‘natural activity,’ properly and primarily characteristic 
of the nature in question.”180 
 How does this surpass the logic of vertical causality? Recall: because the Word’s 
hypostasis bears divine nature, power, and activity from eternity; and because this very 
hypostasis is the “is” that generates his own human nature with its own power and 
activity; and because he is both at once—therefore he himself is the downward 
emanation, as it were, that causes or generates the inferior mode proper to his human 
nature in actu. His own higher power (divine) is present to his own lower power (human) 
in a way that requires no natural mediation whatever.181 In Christ divinity and humanity 
each retain its own mode in the same, positive identity of his hypostasis. That hypostasis, 
precisely because it is both positive and yet not a tertium quid alongside the natures, 
relieves both natures of any contrast, any tension, any asymmetrical ratio, any pressure 
for one mode to give way to another in order for distinctive actualities to be. The vertical, 
asymmetrical relation of cause and effect implies “a shallow difference,” not the absolute 
                                                 
179 Dionysius, Ep 4. 
180 Amb 5.2. 
181 Amb 5.20, slightly modified: “If, then, the mode of union [ὁ τῆς ἑνώσεως τρόπος] preserves the 
principle of distinction, the expression of the saint is a circumlocution...since in nature and in quality the 
essential principle of the united natures is in no way diminished [μεμείωται] by the union. Nonetheless it is 
not, as some would have it, ‘by the negation of the two extremes that we arrive at an affirmation’ of 
something in the middle, for there is no kind of intermediary in Christ that could be the positive remainder 
after the negation of two extremes.” Constas, vol. 1, 476 n. 18, provides the citation, which comes from 




natural difference enabled by hypostatic identity.182 The sole mediator of Christ’s natures 
is Christ’s own hypostasis, and since his mediating hypostasis is their mutual identity, 
they are immediately present to and in one another, in each’s entirety.183 Again 
commenting Dionysius: 
“And in a manner beyond man, he truly became man,” since he maintained the 
modes (which are above nature), along with the principles (which are according to 
nature), united and unimpaired. The conjunction of these was beyond what is 
possible, but he for whom nothing is impossible became their true union [ἀληθὴς 
γενόμενος ἕνωσις], and was the hypostasis in neither of them exclusively, in no 
way acting through one of the natures in separation from the other, but in all that 
he did he confirmed the presence of the one through the other, since he is truly 
both.184 
 
1.6 – Incarnation: event discloses logic, logic applies solely to fact 
Daley characterizes Leontius of Byzantium’s distinctive approach to christology: the task 
is not to scrutinize divinity or humanity “in themselves,” unmoored in abstraction, but 
rather “to look at the ‘fact’ of Christ, as faith perceives him—the fact of a single 
                                                 
182 See Ep 12, PG 91, 472d-473b, my translation. Here Maximus openly rejects “the mere mention 
of difference” exactly because it can imply, as vertical causality often does, a simple modal contraction or 
difference of one essence. This passage is worth quoting in full: “Necessarily, however certain things 
differ, there lies every [sort of] difference. And where the possibility of difference is perceived, there 
certainly exists the things that differ. For there are such things that in a certain way indicate one another. 
Thus causes and effects [τὰ αἴτια καὶ τὰ αιτιατὰ] refer to one another as they are perceived to have the same 
essence. For if the differing essence, qua cause, produces in Christ the difference of the natures from which 
He is constituted, then certainly the difference emerges clearly as an effect of the natural otherness of the 
things united, that is, as [if] from a particular cause. Indeed it is natural, as I said, for such things to indicate 
one another, such that if one is referenced, this always confesses by necessity the other too; or one denied, 
the other does not appear either. Therefore it is necessary to say ‘two,’ lest we introduce a shallow 
difference [ἵνα μὴ ψιλὴν τὴν διαφορὰν εἰσάγωμεν]. And it’s for this reason alone that we use number: the 
manifest difference of the things concurring remained preserved after the union, though not [a difference] 
of things divided. In this way [we have] an easier and truer semantic expression for disclosing the 
difference of the concrete realities rather than ‘confirming’ these realities by the mere mention of ‘a 
difference.’” 
183 This explains the subtle but profound way Maximus modifies the comparison of the two 
activities of body and soul to Christ’s divine and human activities. Unlike the monenergist proposal, where 
the soul’s act instrumentalizes the body’s, Maximus specifies that the Son first becomes the power of the 
inferior nature, and then actualizes it in its own right. Again the point is to remove any natural mediation; 
So Amb 5.8 (slightly modified): “And He did these things...moving willingly the assumed nature that truly 
had become and is called His own, in the way that the soul independently and naturally moves the body 
that is native to it [αὐτουργικῶς ψυχῆς δίκην φυσικῶς τὸ συμφυὲς σῶμα κινούσης], or to speak more 
precisely, He Himself, without change, truly became what human nature is, and in actual fact fulfilled the 
economy on our behalf.” 




individual’s being both God and a man—and to reflect on the ‘mode of union’.”185 So too 
for Maximus.186 When Paul Blowers appropriates Jean-Luc Marion’s idea of “the 
saturated phenomenon” in order to describe “the saturating power of revelation,” he 
means, I think, that the concrete event of Christ so overwhelms us with revelatory 
brilliance that only that event could have unraveled the mystery which, in its very 
revelation, proves still darker to our gaze.187 
 Hence a final “feature” of Maximus’s Christo-logic, one, though, that does not 
quite form a last link in the logical chain. It’s more a feature of the whole logic. It is this: 
because we had first to apprehend the peculiarity of Christ’s two activities to glimpse the 
peculiarity of the person behind them—and indeed to perceive the whole “mode of 
union” which was for us “new”188—then the logic derived from this event must be as 
peculiar as the event itself. Maximus thinks that prior to the fact of the historical 
Incarnation very little could have been known about how God might realize the end of 
the universe, which is union with him. Only at the event of Christ’s Transfiguration did 
Moses and Elijah (and so all who came before) first learn not just what and how union 
occurs, but that this very what and how was, prior to the Christ facing them, itself shut up 
in impenetrable mystery: 
[Moses and Elijah learned] that the fulfillment of God’s ineffable plan for the 
universe, contained within His divine dispensations [ἐπ’ αὐτῇ θείων οἰκονομιῶν], 
                                                 
185 Daley, “‘A Richer Union,’” 261 and 245. Cf. Leontius of Byzantium, CNE 7, PG 86, 1297c, 
Daley 162; Epil 8, PG 86, 1940b-c, Daley 300-1. In both texts “product” translates ἀποτέλεσμα—the very 
thing Pyrrhus sought to force into a monenergist framework during his dispute with Maximus. 
186 A major difference between them, I think, comes only in the degree to which each thinker 
applies reflection on the fact of Christ to the fact of the whole world. This I discuss in ch. 2. 
187 Paul M. Blowers, Maximus the Confessor: Jesus Christ and the Transfiguration of the World, 
136-7; see too his, “The Transfiguration of Jesus Christ as ‘Saturated Phenomenon’ and as Key to the 
Dynamics of Biblical Revelation in St. Maximus the Confessor,” in What is the Bible? The Patristic 
Doctrine of Scripture, eds. Matthew Baker and Mark Mourachian (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2016), 83-
101. 




was completely beyond the comprehension of beings. All that could be known 
was His great providence and judgment, through which the universe is led in an 
orderly manner to an end [τέλος] known in advance only to God. No one else 
knew what it would be, or how it would take place, or what form it would take, or 
when it would occur; the only ones who in truth knew simply that it would take 
place were the saints.189 
 
The very incomprehensibility of God’s union with the world was incomprehensible 
before Christ. 
 Christo-logic does not amount to an informed guess about the nature of things, 
their beginning and end. Its necessary source is the event of God’s Incarnation. When, for 
instance, he was seen strolling atop the water, speaking a cure, or, above all, dead and 
resurrected190—only when we behold the peculiar mode of these whole and simultaneous 
and interpenetrating activities proper to incommensurable natures, only then are we 
granted intellectual vision191 into the logic of God’s own identity with what he is 
infinitely not by nature. And so Maximus ceaselessly proclaims revelation of Christ’s 
person comes through his parts: “he revealed himself in the unicity of his person...by the 
personal identity of his own parts.”192 
What and who will He be known to be—He who is not subject to change—if this 
could not be confirmed by the works He performs naturally? And how will He be 
confirmed in His oneness—as out of and in and indeed as [the natures]—if He 
remained motionless and without activity?193 
 
                                                 
189 Amb 10.82; cf. Amb 7.37, Amb 10.49, QThal 22 and 60. See ch. 2. 
190 Amb 4.8. 
191 Faith, I note, is not ultimately separate from intellectual insight, since for Maximus perfected 
faith is “the true knowledge” (γνῶσις ἀληθὴς); cf. CT 1.9, PG 90, 1085c-d (cp. Amb 10.2). See my, “Both 
Mere Man and Naked God,” 125-6. 
192 Ep 15, PG 91, 556b, my translation: “ἐν τῇ πρὸς ἄλληλα κατ’ ἄκρον προσωπικῇ ταυτότητι τῶν 
οἰκείων μερῶν διαπαντὸς ἑνιζόμενον.” See too Ep 12, PG 91, 286: “we know that he is through his parts”; 
Opusc 8, PG 91, 49. 
193 Amb 5.12, slightly modified: “Τί τε καὶ τίς ὑπάρχων γνωσθήσεται, μὴ πιστούμενος οἷς ἐνήργει 
φυσικῶς, ὅπερ ἐστὶ μὴ τρεπόμενον; Πῶς δὲ πιστώσεται καθ’ ἓν τῶν ἐξ ὧν, ἐν οἷς τε καὶ ἅπερ ἐστὶν 




Hypostatic identity is an event. The identity of the Son’s hypostasis with natures 
uncreated and created, that identity lived out in time and space, in concreto—precisely 
there first dawned the real identity and difference of created and uncreated nature. Should 
you want to penetrate the mystery of God’s creation, you must do so by looking upon the 
mystery of God’s Incarnation. (That last implication, at any rate, will occupy us next 
chapter.) 
 The event is the singular “mode of the Lord’s activities,” his earthly existence. 
We perceive Christo-logic through this fact, in this order: activities reveal powers, 
powers reveal natures, natures reveal an ineffable and previously unthought identity 
between two realities that, on the level of nature, remain ever and absolutely different.194 
The concrete “mode of exchange” Christ effects within himself is the very mode he is 
from eternity, and so his historical acts ultimately disclose him, his person.195  
 And, to complete the revolution of Christo-logic, what’s finally dazzling about 
him is that he is and in this event becomes the only real and absolute identity of absolute 
(natural) difference. This is why, even for Maximus the Greek, the interpenetration of 
cross (death) and resurrection (life) reveal the deepest truth about the mystery of God’s 
relation to the world. Precisely there you must say “suffering God,” in the most intensely 
literal sense. Precisely there, on the cross, you must say “God suffered” and “died,” for, 
as Cyril and Gregory Nazianzen knew, just here the truth of the Word’s identity to both 
natures strains most. Here too, at length, is where we learn to differentiate person from 
                                                 
194 Opusc 16, PG 91, 109, Ponsoye 229: “For it is not possible, divine or human nature, to perceive 
a difference outside of their essential activity. For that which defines a reality is properly the logos of its 
essential power. This latter removed, so too vanishes the subject. That’s why we recognize them naturally 
conserved in the incarnate Word. One shows itself through the projection of divine [traits] into the flesh, 
the other [by the projection of the flesh] into His sovereign power. In this way we recognize the natures 
too, out of which the essential activities exist, through these [activities].” 




nature in their respective positivity, inseparability, and indifference—for the divine 
nature did not die, but God did: 
Saint Gregory said these things so that we might not out of ignorance ascribe the 
properties of the person to nature [τὰ τῆς ὑποστάσεως κατηγοροῦντες...τῆς 
φύσεως] and, like the Arians, unwittingly worship a God who by nature is 
susceptible to suffering.196 
 
The basic discretion between hypostasis and nature demanded by Chalcedon was itself 
only revealed in the “fact of Christ,” above all in the event where death and life 
interpenetrated in the one God. And from that discretion the entire logic followed. 
 
1.7 – Conclusion 
“The Incarnation to Maximus means precisely the hypostatic union of divine and human 
nature.”197 Undoubtedly. This chapter tried to specify further what this union means and 
entails. It did so by identifying three elements or moments in Maximus that together 
articulate a “Christo-logic.” They are: 
 1. Hypostatic identity is the only real sameness differing natures can attain. 
 
 2. Generation of created nature and its very difference from the uncreated comes 
in this  hypostatic identity. 
 
 3. Perichoresis is the mode of relation between these incommensurable natures in 
act. 
 
A fourth “feature” is that these three elements form a logic known only from an event. 
That event was the historical Incarnation of the second person of the Trinity, who, in and 
as himself, actualized all three in a single earthly existence. So: 
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 *4. Objective Christo-logic becomes subjectively grasped only through its 
singular actualization, above all in the Son’s death and resurrection. 
 
 On Maximus’s own terms, therefore, I think it misleading to describe an event as 
“an Incarnation” or to call some metaphysical doctrine “christological” unless it actually 
bears the same logic as the very event which disclosed that peculiar logic. If, to take a 
clear example, Tollefsen (or Balthasar) is right that when Maximus describes the cosmos 
as divine Incarnation he’s simply indulging in a bit of “metaphor”198; and if in fact this 
metaphor signifies exactly the vertical causality whose validity Maximus rejects in 
christology proper—then Maximus’s statements depicting creation as Incarnation would 
appear to be not only metaphorical, but quite obfuscating. 
 They might be. It remains for me to argue the contrary. That requires 
investigating whether Maximus’s “Christo-logic” really appears in his cosmology, in his 
understanding of creation. So the following chapters correspond to specific elements in 
the Christo-logic: if Maximus inscribes creation with this logic, the “is” in “God is 
world” must signify [1] the Word’s hypostatic (not natural) identity to created nature, 
which [2] generates the principles (logoi) and corresponding powers of all creatures—so 
chapter 2. Then these creatures would be destined for [3] a perichoretic union of their 
own creaturely modes and activities with that of God’s—so chapter 3. Then, finally, the 
entire logic of creation—protology and eschatology—must be [*4] just as peculiar an 
event as the historical Incarnation itself, or even, perhaps, creation must be that very 
event—so a future study. As a question: does the peculiarity of Christo-logic, disclosed in 
a particular event at history’s middle, really describe the peculiar onto-logic at history’s 
beginning and end? 
                                                 
198 Tollefsen, Christocentric, 67, 80, 135; for Balthasar, see Cyril O’Regan, “Von Balthasar and 






The Beginning: Logoi, pt. 1 — Word Becomes World 
 
Introduction (2.1) – Unqualified descriptions of creation as Incarnation (2.2) – First 
qualification: no natural mediation between God and world (2.3) – Second qualification: 
the Logos becomes logoi, not ideas (2.4) – Third qualification: the logoi of created 




The peculiarities in Maximus’s protology or account of creatio ex nihilo1 correspond to 
the first two elements of Christo-logic. The Word [1] becomes hypostatically identical to 
the causative principles (logoi) of all created nature, and so [2] generates created nature.  
 And so this chapter attempts to interpret: “The Word of God, very God, wills that 
the mystery of his Incarnation be actualized always and in all things.” 
 
2.1 – Introduction 
“The Word of God, very God, wills that the mystery of his Incarnation be actualized 
always and in all things.”2 I aim in this chapter and the next to argue that this assertion 
means what it says. And so I try to trace how it shapes Maximus’s distinctive view of 
God’s creation of the world. I do so by reading Maximus’s doctrine of the logoi—a 
                                                 
1 It’s true that not every protology provides a doctrine of creation from nothing, or, at least, one 
need not imply the other (as they don’t in Origen, for instance, though he has both). For reasons I hope will 
become clear as this chapter progresses, these two cannot be separated in Maximus (cf. Amb 7.16, where 
they intertwine). Not only, I mean, does Maximus’s protology provide a Christian doctrine of creation, but 
creation from nothing itself betrays a distinctive logic. This chapter aims to describe this logic as Christo-
logic, as Maximus himself indicates (inter alia) at QThal 22 (CCSG 7.141): beginning, middle, and end are 
one ultimately because “our Lord Jesus Christ is the beginning, middle, and end of all past, present, and 
future ages.” 
2 Amb 7.22, PG 91, 1084c-d, my translation: “Βούλεται γὰρ ἀεὶ καὶ ἐν πᾶσιν ὁ τοῦ Θεοῦ Λόγος 




doctrine Andrew Louth has called a “lonely meteorite” in the Christian tradition3—as the 
metaphysical inscription of the Christo-logic detailed last chapter. The logoi or 
metaphysical “principles” of all things define, generate, and sustain every conceivable 
difference and identity in creation, from the integral identity and proper difference of an 
individual subject (or hypostasis) to the arboreal network of generic and specific unities 
and differentiae (or natures).4 Of each being and the whole cosmos, then, the logoi 
disclose the beginning and end of God’s creative act. So we can approach the logoi from 
two distinct (though inseparable) vantages: protologically, they describe God’s creation 
of the world from nothing; eschatologically, God’s perfection of the world—its 
deification. This chapter treats the former, the next the latter. 
 I argue this chapter’s contention—that the first two elements of Christo-logic 
explain the (rather peculiar) protological role of the logoi—in three basic steps. First, I 
open with several passages where Maximus describes divine creation as divine 
Incarnation; the identification is not my own (sec. 2.2). Then I challenge the adequacy of 
(especially Platonic) “participation” to do justice to Maximus’s view of creation. 
Maximus does speak of participation, and nearly all modern commentators rest content to 
                                                 
3 Andrew Louth, “The Reception of Dionysius in the Byzantine World,” in Re-Thinking Dionysius 
the Areopagite, 63. Not that Maximus lacked any precedent for the logoi doctrine: Lars Thunberg, 
Microcosm and Mediator The Theological Anthropology of Maximus the Confessor. 2nd ed. (Chicago: Open 
Court, 1995), 73 n. 157, mentions the Stoics, Origen, Augustine (rationes seminales; e.g. De div. quaest. 
83), Evagrius, and Dionysius (and his commentator John of Scythopolis), from whom “Maximus has 
received a more positive influence.” Louth knows these too, but he rightly doubts any of them really 
approximate to the sort of meta-structural principle this doctrine becomes in Maximus. Indeed none, I 
think, evince Maximus’s peculiar emphases as detailed in this chapter and the next. 
4 On the logoi doctrine’s application to Porphyry’s Tree in Maximus, see Amb 41.10; and Torstein 
Theodore Tollefsen, The Christocentric Cosmology of St Maximus the Confessor (Oxford: OUP, 2008), 81-
92; Melchisedec Törönen, Union and Distinction in the Thought of St Maximus the Confessor (Oxford: 
OUP, 2007), 140. That the logoi in a thing bear its efficient, formal, and final cause is clear from texts like 




take it as a basically Neoplatonic way of describing the God-world relation.5 But I 
identify and describe three qualifications of participation-talk that suggest a still more 
fundamental logic at work in his account of creation (secs. 2.3-5). Last, I collate the 
results of these qualifications into an overview of Maximus’s logic of creation (sec. 2.6), 
and conclude that this logic corresponds to what I’ve already identified as Christo-logic 
(sec. 2.7).  
 
 
                                                 
5 Polycarp Sherwood, “Survey of Recent Work on St. Maximus the Confessor,” Traditio 20 
(1964): 435, simply solicited studies of “participation” in Maximus’s thought; Balthasar preferred to stress 
analogy, and often equated this to some version of participation (cf. my Introduction). Some recent 
commentators have tried to answer Sherwood’s call, sometimes with slight provisos: Antoine Lévy, Le créé 
et l’incréé: Maxime le Confesseur et Thomas d’Aquin: Aux sources de la querelle Palamienne (Paris: Vrin, 
2006), 129-32 and esp. 158-191, summons Simplicius’s idea of sunergeia by relation (a refined version of 
Plotinus’s theory of double act); Torstein Tollefsen, “Did St Maximus the Confessor have a Concept of 
Participation?” Studia Patristica 37 (2001): 618-25; idem, Activity and Participation in Late Antique and 
Early Christian Thought (Oxford: OUP, 2012); Marius Portaru, “Gradual participation according to St 
Maximus the Confessor,” Studia patristica 54 (2012): 281-94; Clement Yung Wen, “Maximus the 
Confessor and the Problem of Participation,” The Heythrop Journal 58 (2017): 3-16; Stephen Clarke, 
“‘Christ Plays in Ten Thousand Places’: The Relationship of Logoi and Logos in Plotinus, Maximus, and 
Beyond,” 1-18 (unpublished talk); Jonathan Greig, “Proclus’ Doctrine of Participation in Maximus the 
Confessor’s Centuries of Theology I.48-50,” Studia Patristica 75 (2017): 137-48. 
I say “nearly all” because of three exceptions: [1] Eric D. Perl, Methexis: Creation, Incarnation, 
and Deification in Saint Maximus Confessor (Unpublished Ph.D. diss, Yale, 1999), 195-7 and 205; idem, 
“Metaphysics and Christology in Maximus Confessor and Eriugena,” in Eriugena: East and West – Papers 
of the Eighth International Colloquium of the Society for the Promotion of Eriugenian Studies, eds. Bernard 
McGinn and Willemien Otten. (Notre Dame: UNDP, 1994), 253-79, wants to speak of Maximus’s 
distinctly christological understanding of the God-world relation as “perfect participation.” It’s evident that 
I share many of Perl’s intuitions, but, as I say in the Introduction, I think his commitment to a prior 
philosophically defined idea of “participation” prevents him from seeing his brilliant intuitions through. [2] 
Jean-Claude Larchet, La divinisation de l’homme selon saint Maxime le Confesseur (Paris: Cerf, 1996), 600 
(cited below at n. 62), doubts Maximus had a clear “doctrine” of participation at all; [3] Marius Portaru, 
“The Vocabulary of Participation in the Works of Saint Maximus the Confessor,” in Naboth’s Vineyard, 
eds. Octavian Gordon and Alexandru Mihaila (Cluj-Napoca: Presa Universitara Clujeana, 2012), 295-317, 
offers an “anthropological lecture” of Maximian participation that tries to avoid either a denial of 
participation (Larchet) or a basically Neoplatonic view of it (Perl, Tollefsen—I think Perl’s view especially 
is more complicated; see my Introduction above). 
Many of these scholars do claim important differences between Maximus and Neoplatonists on the 
God-world relation. In general I confess sympathies with the brief remarks of Stephen Clarke, whose 
proximate interlocutor is Balthasar: “I don’t deny that there may be differences. The problem is to locate 
them. I have similar qualms even about Tollefsen’s much better informed account: in saying that Maximus 
manages a Christian alternative to Neo-Platonist metaphysics, he leaves me very uncertain what exactly the 




2.2 – Unqualified descriptions of creation as Incarnation 
That creation is divine Incarnation is a claim Maximus actually makes. We saw it at Amb 
7.22, my epigraph.6 And at first blush he doesn’t appear to mean something different 
from what he means when he speaks of the historical Incarnation. They bear the same 
logic. An initial indicator that this is so: Maximus moves seamlessly between the Word’s 
Incarnation in world and in Mary without the slightest proviso. It’s an important point, 
especially because Maximus’s commentators—from Eriugena to modern scholarship7—
routinely insert qualifications of their own, ones quite absent from Maximus’s texts. 
Sometimes this takes the anodyne form of quotation marks around “Incarnation” when 
applied to the act (beginning and end) of creation.8 Others come cleaner: Maximus’s talk 
of creation as “incarnation” is clearly “metaphorical,” obviously not intended to evoke 
the literal mode of the Word’s personal presence in and as Jesus Christ.9 This section 
treats five passages where Maximus more or less explicitly says creation is Incarnation. 
 1. Amb 33. In a passage as brief as it is celebrated, Maximus offers three 
explanations for Gregory Nazianzen’s remark, “The Logos becomes thick” (Ὁ Λόγος 
παχύνεται).10 It refers, first, to the Word’s historical Incarnation, when he “deemed it 
worthy to ‘become thick’ through His presence in the flesh [διὰ τῆς ἐνσάρκου αὐτοῦ 
                                                 
6 Again, “mystery” in Maximus always refers at least to the historical Incarnation; see my 
Introduction and for more references in Maximus’s corpus see the note at Constas’s introduction to QThal 
49, n. 157. 
7 Cf. my Introduction. 
8 See the more hesitant discussion of Paul M. Blowers, Exegesis and Spiritual Pedagogy: An 
Investigation into the “Questiones ad Thalassium” (Notre Dame: UNDP, 1991) 120-122; and his, Drama 
of the Divine Economy: Creator and Creation in Early Christian Theology and Piety (Oxford: OUP, 2012), 
166, on which see n. 16. 
9 Tollefsen, Christocentric, 67; idem, Activity and Participation, 122. Cf. my Introduction. 




παρουσίας].”11 The Word also “becomes thick” in human words, in language, and that is 
Maximus’s third instance.12 The second occupies us here: 
Or that, having ineffably encrypted Himself in the logoi of beings for our sake, He 
is obliquely signified in a proportionate way through each of the things seen, as if 
through letters—a most complete whole together in the wholes, and a whole 
according to each particular, whole and undiminished, the undifferentiated in the 
differences and always self-same, the simple and uncomposed in the composites, 
the one without origin in the things subject to origin, and the unseen in things 
seen, and the untouchable in things grasped.13 
 
Consider three features. The first is an obvious insistence on the integrity of wholes, both 
of the Word in the logoi and of the beings themselves. A union or synthesis that leaves 
undiminished the nature and mode of the things synthesized—this recalls the third 
element of the Christo-logic discussed last chapter (i.e. perichoresis of modes and acts in 
Christ),14 and it will become more central next chapter on the deification of the world.15 
Second, it is the Word “Himself,” not, say, the divine essence as such or God as the most 
indeterminate power of all things,16 who is encrypted in and as the logoi of created 
beings. It’s his person or hypostasis, you might say; it’s him.17 Hence a final feature: 
                                                 
11 Amb 33.2, PG 91, 1285c, slight modification. 
12 Amb 33.2, PG 91, 1285d-1288a. I treat this aspect more fully and especially as it relates to 
speech about God in my essay, “Both Mere Man and Naked God: The Incarnational Logic of Apophasis in 
St Maximus the Confessor,” in Maximus the Confessor as a European Philosopher, eds. Sotiris Mitralexis, 
Georgios Steiris, Marci Podbielski, and Sebastian Lalla (Eugene, OR: Cascade), 110-30. 
13 Amb 33.2, PG 91, 1285d, my translation: “ἢ ὅτι τοῖς τῶν ὄντων ἑαυτὀν δι’ ἡμᾶς ἀποῤῥήτως 
ἐγκρύψας λόγοις ἀναλόγως δι’ ἑκάστου τῶν ὁρωμένων ὡς διά τινων γραμμάτων ὑποσημαίνεται, ὅλος ἐν 
ὅλοις ἅμα πληρέστατος, καὶ τὸ καθ’ ἕκαστον ὁλόκληρος, ὅλος καὶ ἀνελάττωτος, ἐν τοῖς διαφόροις ὁ 
ἀδιάφορος καὶ ὡσαύτως ἀεὶ ἔχων, ἐν τοῖς συνθέτοις ὁ ἁπλοῦς καὶ ἀσύνθετος, καὶ ἐν τοῖς ὑπὸ ἀρχὴν ὁ 
ἄναρχος καὶ ὁ ἀόρατος ἐν τοῖς ὁρωμένοις καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἁπτοῖς ὁ ἀναφής.” 
14 See sec. 1.5 
15 See sec. 3.4. 
16 As in Plotinus, En. VI. 9 [9] 8. 
17 This point will reappear in sec. 2.4. But here I notice that of Maximus’s many modern 
commentators, Paul Blowers indulges Maximus’s own insistence most lucidly: “the Confessor’s primary 
analogy to convey the condescension of the Word into the logoi of creatures (and of Scripture, and of the 
virtues) is the incarnation in Jesus of Nazareth. In reality this is not an ‘analogy’ at all since it is precisely 
the Logos ‘destined...before the foundation of the world’ to become the incarnate and sacrificial Lamb (1 
Peter 1:19-20) who originally contained the logoi and willingly communicated his presence to creatures 
through them” (Blowers, Drama of the Divine Economy, 166, my emphasis; cf. similarly his “From 




Maximus never qualifies the second and third Incarnations—in world and words—in a 
way that makes them unlike the first, the historical Incarnation. Indeed this ambiguum 
closes with something like the fundamental axiom underwriting each Incarnation, what 
Maximus calls the “principle of condescension” (συγκαταβάσεως λόγῳ)18: “to the degree 
that, for His own sake, He contracted us in view of union with Himself, to that same 
degree He Himself, for our sake, expanded His very self through the principle of 
condescension.”19 Creation’s most fundamental metaphysical principles, then, are 
instances of the Word’s own “expansion”—a theme I take up later (sec. 2.4). 
 2. QThal 60. This passage forms the centerpiece of my final chapter, but I note it 
here because of how striking it is. Thalassius asks Maximus to interpret 1 Peter 1.20, 
which calls Christ “a pure and spotless lamb, who was foreknown before the foundation 
of the world, yet manifested at the end of time for our sake.”20 Who exactly, Thalassius 
                                                                                                                                                 
Confessor,” in Light on creation: Ancient Commentators in Dialogue and Debate on the Origin of the 
World, eds. Geert Roskam and Joseph Verheyden  [Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2017], 177). This remarkable 
observation—that the “analogy” between historical and cosmic Incarnation is no mere analogy—commits 
Blowers to the thesis that for Maximus the Word’s condescension in the logoi of creation, in Jesus, in 
Scripture, and in the deified are “eschatologically simultaneous” (cf. Blowers, Drama of the Divine 
Economy, 163, and his, Maximus the Confessor: Jesus Christ and the Transfiguration of the World 
[Oxford: OUP, 2016], 137-40). But as I noted in the Introduction, analogy—and particularly its denial—
says much less about simultaneity and much more about the mode of Christ’s presence in these 
Incarnations. Anyone who believed in divine omnipresence should not have had a problem with the idea 
that divinity dwelled in the man Jesus, even to a peculiarly concentrated degree, in the same mode that the 
One cause of all things dwells in all its effects. Indeed Athanasius tendered that exact argument ( De 
incarnatione verbi dei 42), which others after him like Gregory of Nyssa would have the keen sense to 
qualify: Gregory reprises Athanasius’s argument that moves from divine omnipresence in creation to his 
presence in the man Jesus, but also admits that “the manner in which God is present in us is not the same as 
it was in that case,” namely in Jesus’ (Or. cat. 25). Christological controversies from Nicaea to Chalcedon 
(and beyond, really) were rather concerned to differentiate the way God was present in Jesus Christ from 
the way he is present elsewhere. And so the truly astounding insight, one Blowers seems to intimate, is that 
Maximus rethinks not just how God is present in Jesus in order to distinguish this presence from God’s 
presence in the cosmos, but that he then reintroduces this mode of presence as the potential mode the Word 
might be present in the cosmos itself. 
18 Synkatabasis often describes the historical Incarnation, both in Maximus and the Cappadocians. 
Cf. Amb 4.4, 7.22, 42.3. 
19 Amb 33.2, PG 91, 1288a: “τοσοῦτον ἡμᾶς δι’ ἑαυτον πρὸς ἕνωσιν ἑαυτοῦ συστείλας, ὅσον 
αὐτὸς δι’ ἡμᾶς ἑαυτὸν συγκαταβάσεως λόγῳ διέστειλεν.” 




wonders, foreknew the Incarnation? The Trinity, that’s who.21 But what is foreknown, 
exactly—that’s more interesting. Maximus pairs this verse with Colossians 1.26, where 
“the great Apostle” mentions “the mystery hidden from before the ages,” which is, 
Maximus declares, “the mystery according to Christ” (τὸ κατὰ Χριστὸν μυστήριον).22 
This mystery refers “clearly” to the historical Incarnation. Maximus recapitulates it with 
characteristic density: 
This [mystery] is clearly the ineffable and inconceivable union of divinity and 
humanity according to hypostasis, which leads the humanity into identity with the 
divinity in every way through the principle of hypostasis, and effects one 
composed hypostasis from both [natures], without thus inducing the slightest 
diminution of their essential difference according to nature....23 
 
 The mystery signifies the Word’s economy, which means precisely that God 
becomes in person and by nature what He is not by nature—and so preserves both natures 
entirely.24 This union “into identity,” he just said, names the very union God foreknew 
and for which He created all things. Notice what Maximus is not saying here. He does not 
mean that creation merely sets the stage for the unrepeatable union between divinity and 
humanity that occurred in first-century Palestine, as if the fullest realization of the 
“mystery according to Christ” were restricted to a single climactic moment in creation’s 
history (though there’s indeed a certain primacy to that event).25 Here and elsewhere 
                                                 
21 QThal 60.7, CCSG 7.79. 
22 QThal 60.2, CCSG 7.73. Blowers and Wilken translate this as “the whole mystery of Christ,” 
which is also apt. And notice that Col 1.27 goes on to state explicitly what this “mystery” is: “Christ in 
you” (ὅ ἐστιν Χριστὸς ἐν ὑμῖν). Maximus never quotes this second half of the sentence. Still I suggest that 
the rest of his response essentially explicates this very idea. 
23 QThal 60.2, CCSG 7.73, my translation: “Τοῦτο προδήλως ἐστὶν ἄρρητός τε καὶ ἀπερινόητος 
θεότητός τε καὶ ἀνθρωπότητος καθ’ ὑπόστασιν ἕνωσις, εἰς ταὐτὸν ἄγουσα τῇ θεότητι κατὰ πάντα τρόπον 
τῷ τῆς ὑποστάσεως λόγῳ τὴν ἀνθρωπότητα καὶ μίαν ἀμφοτέρων ἀποτελοῦσα τὴν ὑπόστασιν σύνθετον, τῆς 
αὐτῶν κατὰ φύσιν οὐσιώδους διαφορᾶς μηδεμίαν καθοτιοῦν ἐπάγουσα μείωσιν.” 
24 QThal 60.3, CCSG 7.73-5: “Ἔπρεπε γὰρ τῷ ποιητῇ τῶν ὅλων καὶ γινομένῳ φύσει κατ’ 
οἰκονομίαν ὅπερ οὐκ ἦν καὶ ἑαυτὸν ὅπερ ἦν κατὰ φύσιν καὶ ὅπερ γέγονε φύσει κατ’ οἰκονομίαν ἄτρεπτον 
διασώσασθαι.” 
25 Pace Tollefsen, Activity and Participation, 122: “Why should we speak of the embodiment of 




Maximus clearly avers that the realization of the “ineffable union” effected in Christ is 
the very same destined for all humanity, for and in every person.26 The claim grows 
stronger still: 
For because of Christ, or rather the mystery according to Christ, all the ages and 
everything in those same ages have received the beginning and the end of their 
existence in Christ.27 
 
Every creature receives the very principle (ἀρχή) and end (τέλος) of its own existence in 
Christ. “Principle,” of course, in both philosophical and patristic literature, signifies a 
metaphysical origin, often the efficient, formal, and final causes (or all at once) of a 
thing.28 Here Maximus locates that metaphysical principle not just in the preexistent 
Logos, but, recalling one of Origen’s more daring moves—in the Word Incarnate.29 The 
                                                                                                                                                 
it this way because the creation and salvation of the world is knit together in one single divine purpose, 
exclusively bound up with the great mystery. The creation of the world is the first step towards the 
fulfilment of God’s plan. Even though the Logos Himself is not hypostatically present in created essences 
or natures, the logoi defining them and delimiting their natural capacity represent Him in relation to them. 
They are His patterns for creatures.” I’ll take issue with equating the logoi and Forms below (secs. 2.4-5). 
Here the problem comes with the qualification—one Maximus never makes—that the Word is not 
“hypostatically present in created essences,” that’s to say, that when Maximus first identifies the “mystery 
according to Christ” with the historical hypostatic union and then applies this to the very principle (ἀρχή) 
and purpose (τέλος) of all creation—he must have surreptitiously modified the meaning of “mystery 
according to Christ” in the latter case. On this reading there’s something like a gradual immanence of the 
Word in creation: creation from nothing is “the first step” and so a lesser degree of immanence, the 
historical Incarnation the perfection (or indeed a qualitatively different mode) of that immanence.— My 
Conclusion flags the abiding question of how the historical Incarnation can at once retain metaphysical 
primacy and yet be actualized (cf. Amb 7.22, cited above) in all creation. 
26 QThal 60.3, CCSG 7.75: the “mystery according to Christ,” the hypostatic identity of humanity 
and divinity, is “the preconceived divine purpose of the beginning of beings [τῆς ἀρχῆς τῶν ὄντων], which, 
were we to define it, we would say it is the preconceived telos for the sake of which all things are, which 
itself is for the sake of nothing else. In view of this end, God introduced the essences of beings.” Elsewhere 
Maximus specifies that “had man united created nature with the uncreated through love...he would have 
shown them to be one and the same by the state of grace” (Amb 41.5, PG 91, 1308b, my emphasis), and 
that the “power” to effect this union “was given to us from the beginning by nature for this purpose [τὴν ἐξ 
ἀρχῆς φυσικῶς ἡμῖν πρὸς τοῦτο δοθεῖσαν δύναμιν]” (Amb 41.9, PG 91, 1309d). See Chapter 3, sec. 3.2. 
27 QThal 60.4, CCSG 7.75, my translation: “Διὰ γὰρ τὸν Χριστόν, ἤγουν τὸ κατὰ Χριστὸν 
μυστήριον, πάντες οἱ αἰῶνες καὶ τὰ ἐν αὐτοῖς αἰῶσιν ἐν Χριστῷ τὴν ἀρχὴν τοῦ εἶναι καὶ τὸ τέλος 
εἰλήφασιν.” 
28 Origen’s Περὶ Ἀρχῶν, of course, constitutes the most obvious patristic example (see citations in 
next note too). Maximus himself very often uses ἀρχή in just this sense: e.g. Amb 5.12; Amb 10.37, 57, 73, 
96; Amb 23.2; Amb 40.3, PG 91, 1304b; Amb 46.4, PG 91, 1357b; Amb 65.2, PG 91, 1392c; Amb 67.4; 
QThal 59, CCSG 7.61-3; CT 1.48-50, passim. 
29 Origen, Hom. in Gen. 1.1; Comm. in Jo. 1.17-19, 22. Cf. Blowers, Drama of the Divine 




very event of the historical Incarnation is in some sense the event that grounds (not just 
perfects) creation itself.30 
 3. CT 1.66-7. These two short “chapters” resolve a set of meditations that portray 
the soul’s gradual deification in terms of Christ’s passion, burial, and resurrection (1.59-
67). Whatever interpretive risks I court by summoning texts of this genre, their intensely 
contemplative character makes them more, not less, interesting for my purposes, since 
it’s precisely the mystery “according to Christ” that is for Maximus the mystery of 
creation, as we just saw.31 Writes Maximus, 
The mystery of the Word’s Incarnation bears the power of all the enigmas and 
types according to Scripture, as well as the science of all created things sensible 
and intelligible. And whoever knows the mystery of the cross and tomb knows the 
logoi of those created beings just mentioned. And whoever is initiated into the 
ineffable power of the resurrection knows the principal purpose for which God 
gave hypostasis to all things.32 
 
 Notice that the principles of the Word’s embodied existence—here the 
Triduum33—just are the principles of creation (as they were at Amb 33). The 
Incarnation’s “power” is actualized at the apex of mystical ascent, where, as Maximus 
                                                 
30 See the preliminary remarks at the Conclusion. 
31 The date and habit of composition confirm that these supposedly more “spiritual” texts are at 
least as relevant for understanding Maximus’s more “speculative” theology. The Centuries on Theology 
and Economy (CT) were likely composed soon after the Ambigua to John and (or at least in tandem with) 
the Questions to Thalassius, perhaps between 632 and the summer of 633; see Jankowiak and Booth, “A 
New Date-List,” 30, and Polycarp Sherwood, O.S.B., The Earlier Ambigua of Saint Maximus the Confessor 
and His Refutation of Origenism (Romae: Orbis Catholicus, Herder, 1955), 106-9, and Salés, 
“Introduction,” 24. Maximus seems to have had a peculiar talent for transposing content he had worked out 
in a more dialectical, question-answer context (erotapokriseis) into the more contemplative mood of the 
chapters or centuries genre; see Salés, “Introduction,” 25, and 26, where he names an especially relevant 
example: the tantum-quantum principle (where human deification and divine Incarnation indicate two 
aspects of the same reality) codified in QThal 22, for instance, undergirds all of Maximus’s works, CT 
included. 
32 CT 1.66, PG 90, 1108a-b, my translation: “Τὸ τῆς ἐνσωματώσεως τοῦ Λόγου μυστήριον, 
πάντων ἔχει τῶν τε κατὰ τὴν Γραφὴν αἰνιγμάτων καὶ τύπων τὴν δύναμιν, καὶ τῶν φαινομένων καὶ 
νοουμένων κτισμάτων τὴν ἐπιστήμην. Καὶ ὁ μὲν γνοὺς σταυροῦ καὶ ταφῆς τὸ μυστήριον, ἔγνω τῶν 
προειρημένων τοὺς λόγους· ὁ δὲ τῆς ἀναστάσεως μυηθεὶς τὴν ἀπόῤῥητον δύναμιν, ἔγνω τὸν ἐφ’ ᾧ τὰ 
πάντα προηγουμένως ὁ Θεὸς ὑπεστήσατο σκοπόν.” 
33 Maximus treated the activities of Christ’s life earlier, identifying them with the “rectification [or 
righteousness] of the commandments” that he enacted and that the human soul must too through virtue, the 




teaches here and elsewhere, the rational soul’s natural motions and activities come to rest 
in their proper limits.34 At that point, he continues, 
Only the Word exists, in Himself, just as He reappeared after He had been raised 
from the dead possessing all the things from Himself according to 
circumscription, since nothing at all possesses familiarity with Him by a natural 
relation. For the salvation of the saved occurs by grace, not by nature.35 
 
Two features. Creation’s culmination—like its “origin” (ἀρχή) and principles (λόγοι)—
bears the logic of Christ. That means the identity between humanity and divinity that 
deification by grace achieves is, just like the Risen Lord, a hypostatic identity (see 
Chapter 3). This broader feature points up a second subtle but utterly crucial mark: 
creaturely perfection realizes no natural relation between God and creature. And yet 
there arises a concrete relation of identity.36 The denial of any natural relation or 
“familiarity” (οἰκειότητα) between God and world (or One and Many) constitutes both a 
distinctive element of Christo-logic and, we’ll see, of Maximus’s view of divine 
creation.37 
                                                 
34 CT 1.47, PG 90, 1100; QThal 22, CCSG 7.141; Opusc 1, PG 91, 33b. 
35 CT 1.67, PG 90, 1108, my translation: “ὁ Λόγος μόνος ἐφ’ ἑαυτὸν ὑπάρχων, ὥσπερ ἐκ νεκρῶν 
ἐγηγερμένος ἀναφαίνεται, πάντα κατὰ περιγραφὴν ἔχων τὰ ἐξ αὐτοῦ, μηδενὸς φυσικῇ σχέσει τὴν πρὸς 
αὐτὸν οἰκειότητα τὸ σύνολον ἔχοντος. Κατὰ χάριν γὰρ, ἀλλ’ οὐ κατὰ φύσιν, ἐστὶν ἡ τῶν σωζομένων 
σωτηρία.” 
36 Again, see Chapter 3, sec. 3.2. But quote here too a key passage I’ll take up there: it was 
Adam’s vocation from the outset to realize in himself the identity between created and uncreated nature, to 
show them “to be one and the same by the state of grace [ἓν καὶ ταὐτὸν δείξειε κατὰ τὴν ἕξιν τῆς χάριτος]” 
(Amb 41.5, PG 91, 1308b). What exactly “by grace” indicates is, of course, the really pressing question, 
which I reserve for the next chapter. 
37 For its role in Christo-logic, see Chapter 1, sec. 1.4; for its relation to divine creation, see below, 
sec. 2.3. The denial of any sort of natural “familiarity” holds particular interest, since both Origen and 
Gregory Nyssen sought to “Christianize” this Stoic doctrine—which is, I add, yet another way of speaking 
about rational beings’ participation in the divine Logos; cf. Ilaria Ramelli, “The Stoic Doctrine of Oikeiosis 
and its Transformation in Christian Platonism,” apeiron 47.1 (2014): 116-140, esp. Origen’s claim that 
those who are “familiar with God” might be called “parts of the Father” (οἰκεῖοί τε ἄνθρωποι οἱ μὲν τῷ 
πατρί, μερίδες ὄντες αὐτοῦ) at Comm. in Jo. 2.3.32 (cited at Ramelli, “The Stoic Doctrine of Oikeiosis,” 
124). Maximus’s logoi doctrine addresses exactly this sort of claim, found too in Gregory Nazianzen, and 
so must explain how we are “portions of God” in a completely non-natural way; see Amb 7.1, and sec. 2.4 
below. And for Maximus, the way such “familiarity” between created and uncreated comes about is 
precisely in the hypostatic union; see Amb 41.9, PG 91, 1312a: “οἷς ὡς μέρεσι καθ’ ἕκαστον τὸ ἑκάστῳ 




 4. Amb 41. I return to this ambiguum in a bit more detail next chapter, but, again, 
it’s too weighty to neglect here. It’s where Maximus explicates his famous five divisions 
of being,38 the first of which is the division of “the uncreated nature from the whole of 
created nature.”39 Early on Maximus makes the odd remark that unlike the other divisions 
(e.g. sensible/intelligible, heaven/earth), this first division between uncreated and created 
natures, though excluding “union in a single essence,” bears no name among the seers 
who contemplate nature. That’s to say, “what it is that distinguishes creation from God” 
is not itself some sort of natural division, not a kind of natural principle or logos that 
clearly demarcates the “created” category from the “uncreated.”40 The very act of 
creation—God’s act of producing a nature or essence in no way common with His own—
demands a mode otherwise inaccessible to natural contemplation or human philosophy. 
 God intended that the very divisions wrought in creation’s beginning be surpassed 
in its perfection, specifically in humanity. Adam was to render even created and 
uncreated natures “one and the same”—a rather provocative point.41 For now observe 
that Maximus then narrates how the Word’s historical Incarnation actualized or 
“recapitulated” (in biblical terms42) this final sublation of every division, which signifies 
both the origin and purpose of creation: Christ initiated “the universal union of all things 
                                                                                                                                                 
through sacrament and liturgy, as at Myst. 17, PG 91, 696a, where “those who are worthy will receive 
intimate familiarity with the Word of God [τὴν πρὸς τὸν Λόγον καὶ Θεὸν οἰκείωσιν],” and Myst. 24, PG 91, 
709c. 
38 So very dear, for instance, to Eriugena, Periphyseon III.1-17. 
39 Amb 41.2, PG 91, 1304d: “τὴν διαιροῦσαν τῆς ἀκτίστου φύσεως τὴν κτιστὴν καθόλου φύσιν.” 
40 Amb 41.2, PG 91, 1305a: “For they say that whereas God in His goodness created the splendid 
orderly arrangement of all beings, it is not immediately self-evident to this orderly arrangement who and 
what God is, and they call ‘division’ the ignorance of what it is that distinguishes God from creation. For to 
that which naturally divides these realities from each other, and which excludes their union in a single 
essence (since it cannot admit of one and the same definition), they did not give a name [Τὴν γὰρ φυσικῶς 
ἀλλήλων ταῦτα διαιροῦσαν, μηδέποτε δεχομένην τὴν εἰς μίαν οὐσίαν ἕνωσιν, ὡς τὸν ἕνα καὶ τὸν αὐτὸν μὴ 
δυναμένην ἐπιδέξασθαι λόγον, εἴασαν ἄῤῤητον].” 
41 Amb 41.5, PG 91, 1308b. See Chapter 3, sec. 3.2. 
42 Eph 1.10, cited at Amb 41.6, PG 91, 1309a; see esp. Amb 7.37, which betrays many of the same 




in Himself.”43 The exposition forms a chiasm: Maximus introduces the five divisions 
from the highest (created/uncreated) to the lowest (male/female), laments Adam’s failure 
to unite them, and then reviews how Christ overcame each in reverse order.44 What’s 
truly remarkable, though—particularly in light of the odd point at the start about how the 
logos of the creative act has gone unnamed—is the immediate conclusion Maximus 
draws from the historical Incarnation: 
And He recapitulated in Himself, in a manner appropriate to God, all things, 
showing that the whole creation is one, just as another human being, completed 
by the mutual coming together of all its members, inclining toward itself in the 
wholeness of its existence, according to one, unique, simple, undefined, and 
unchangeable idea: that it comes from nothing. Accordingly, all creation admits 
of one and the same, absolutely undifferentiated logos: that its existence is 
preceded by nonexistence.45 
 
Incarnation discloses the principle of creatio ex nihilo. Maximus extends Irenaeus and 
even Origen quite a bit further here: like them he maintains that we glimpse creation’s 
purpose in Christ alone, but beyond them he sees too that Christ affords the very principle 
and mode of creation from nothing—creation’s archê, as he put it in QThal 60.46 No 
wonder, then, that when Maximus replays Dionysius’s depiction of creatio ex nihilo as 
creatio ex Deo, he does so while linking the divine ecstasy of creation to the Word’s play 
                                                 
43 Amb 41.7, PG 91, 1309a. 
44 Amb 41.2 (introduction of five divisions), 3-5 (human vocation to unite all five), 6 (Fall), 7-9 
(Christ’s success). 
45 Amb 41.9, PG 91, 1312a-b, slightly modified: “θεοπρεπῶς τὰ πάντα εἰς ἑαυτὸν ἀνεκεθαλαιώσατο 
[Eph 1.10], μίαν ὑπάρχουσαν τὴν ἅπασαν κτίσιν δείξας, καθάπερ ἄνθρωπον ἄλλον, τῇ τῶν μερῶν ἑαυτῆς 
πρὸς ἄλληλα συνόδῳ συμπληρουμένην καὶ πρὸς ἑαυτὴν νεύουσαν τῇ ὁλότητι τῆς ὑπάρξεως, κατὰ τὴν μίαν 
καὶ ἁπλῆν καὶ ἀπροσδιόριστον, τῆς ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος παραγωγῆς καὶ ἀδιάφορον ἔννοιαν, καθ’ ἣν ἕνα καὶ 
τὸν αὐτὸν πᾶσα ἡ κτίσις ἐπιδέξεσθαι δύναται λόγον παντελῶς ἀδιάκριτον, τὸν οὐκ ἦν τοῦ εἶναι 
πρεσβύτερον ἔχουσα.” 





in the historical Incarnation.47 Nor should it surprise that Maximus can quite comfortably 
describe creation itself in eucharistic terms.48 
 5. Amb 6. He also describes creation in Marian terms. Here Maximus braves a 
remark at once profound and unsolicited. He aims principally to explain that and how 
Gregory Nazianzen means something different by “dragging down” and “binding,” that 
these indicate different levels of spiritual progress (of virtue and contemplation). The 
former designates a person who might experience momentary lapses from contemplating 
God, a sort of infrequent backslider. The latter—this person does not merely suffer the 
occasional glance away from the vision of God, but has desisted from even the ascetic 
labors necessary to secure virtue, the very condition of contemplation.49 So far, so 
monastically practical.  
 At one point, though, when Maximus commends the necessary transformation of 
the soul’s “irrational powers” (anger and desire) into the power of love and joy, he 
appears spontaneously moved to offer a short meditation on the conditions of the soul’s 
deification—that is, on the sensible world, how it can guide us through “reason” and 
                                                 
47 Amb 71.2-4 (historical Incarnation as an instance of the Word’s “play”), 6 (citing DN 4.13). See 
below, sec. 2.4. 
48 Amb 35.2, where Maximus interprets Gregory Nazianzen’s claim that creation “was necessary” 
and the “effusion of the Good” as God’s “impartation” of Himself, a word often used to describe the 
distribution of the Eucharistic bread (cf. Lampe, μεταδίδωμι, s.v.): God “uniquely possesses within Himself 
an inconceivable, eternal, infinite, and incomprehensible permanence, from which, by virtue of an ‘ever-
giving effusion’ of goodness, He brought forth beings out of nothing and endowed them with existence, 
and also willed to impart Himself without defilement to them in a manner proportionate to wholes and to 
each, bestowing upon each the power to exist and to remain in existence [ἐξ ἧς ‘κατὰ ἀπειρόδωρον χύσιν’ 
ἀγαθότητος τὰ ὄντα ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος παραγαγεῖν τε καὶ ὑποστήσασθαι, θελῆσαι καὶ ἑαυτὸν ἀναλόγως τοῖς 
ὅλοις καὶ τῷ καθ’ ἕκαστον ἀχράντως μεταδοῦναι τὴν πρὸς τὸ εἶναι καὶ διαμένειν ἑκάστῳ χαριζόμενον 
δύναμιν]”—and again: “Perhaps, then, this, as far as my foolishness allows me to see, is what is meant by 
the ‘effusion of the Good’ and its ‘progress,’ namely, that the one God is multiplied in the impartation of 
good things proportionately to the recipients [τὸ τὸν ἕνα Θεὸν ἀναλόγως πρὸς τὰ δεκτικὰ τῇ μεταδόσει τῶν 
ἀγαθῶν πληθύνεσθαι].” Cf. too QThal 35.—It’s true, though, that Dionysius also uses these terms to 
describe the One-Being’s “self-impartation” and “self-multiplication” to participating beings or effects (DN 
2.11), and yet does not obviously intend a sacramental meaning. See Chapter 3, sec. 3.1. 




“intellect” ultimately into this “joy.” Joy, he recalls, was precisely John the Baptist’s 
reaction when both he and Christ were still in the womb. And in this world, we’re in the 
womb too: 
For many people this may be a jarring and unusual thing to say, though it’s true 
nonetheless: both we ourselves and the Word of God, the Creator and Master of 
the universe, exist in a kind of womb, owing to the present condition of our life. 
In this sensible world, just as if He were enclosed in a womb, the Word of God 
appears only obscurely, and only to those who have the spirit of John the Baptist. 
Human beings, on the other hand, gazing through the womb of the material world, 
catch but a glimpse of the Word who is concealed within beings [τὸν ἐν τοῖς 
οὖσιν ἐγκρυπτόμενον... Λόγον].... For when compared to the ineffable glory and 
splendor of the age to come, and to the kind of life that awaits us there, this 
present life differs in no way from a womb swathed in darkness, in which, for the 
sake of us who were infantile in mind, the perfect and super-perfect Word of God, 
who loves mankind, became an infant.50 
 
 Here again we meet the link between cosmic and historical Incarnation. In the 
former the Word “is concealed” or “encrypted in beings,” quite as He was in the logoi of 
our first text (Amb 33). Now, were the world’s Marian figure an isolated characterization, 
then perhaps we might safely bypass it as a colorful way making a simple point about 
God’s immanence in creation. And yet, as we’ll see later this chapter and in the next, the 
idea proves a common one which takes many forms: the very Logos of God dwells 
within us, whether through reason, “which lives like a child within us”51; or through 
virtue, which is “the natural seed of the Good” in our nature52; or through grace, when 
“Christ Jesus becomes his own proper lamb” for those who are “able to contain and 
                                                 
50 Amb 6.3, PG 91, 1068a-b, modified: “Ἐν μήτρᾳ γάρ (κἂν εἰ τραχὺς ὁ λόγος ὡς ἀτριβὴς τοῖς 
πολλοῖς, ἀλλ’ οὖν ἀληθής), καὶ ἡμεῖς καὶ ὁ Θεὸς Λόγος ἐσμέν, ὁ τοῦ παντὸς ποιητὴς καὶ δεσπότης, ἐν τῇ 
παρούσῃ τῆς ζωῆς καταστάσει, ὁ μὲν ἀμυδρῶς ὡς ἐν μήτρᾳ καὶ μόγις τῷ αἰσθητῷ τούτῳ κόσμῳ 
διαφαινόμενος, καὶ τοῦτο τοῖς κατὰ Ἰωάννην τῷ πνεύματι, οἱ δ’ ἄνθρωποι ὡς ἐκ μήτρας τῆς ὑλικῆς 
περιστάσεως, κἂν ποσῶς τὸν ἐν τοῖς οὖσιν ἐγκρυπτόμενον διαβλέποντες Λόγον.... Πρὸς γὰρ τὴν ἄφατον 
τοῦ μέλλοντος αἰῶνος δόξαν τε καὶ λαμπρότητα καὶ τὴν τῆς κατ’ αὐτὸν ζωῆς ἰδιότητα μήτρας οὐδὲν 
διαφέρει ζόφῳ περικεχυμένης συγκρινομένη ἡ παροῦσα ζωή, ἐν ᾗ δι’ ἡμᾶς τοῦς νηπιάσαντας ταῖς φρεσὶ 
καὶ ὁ Θεὸς Λόγος τέλειος ὢν καὶ ὑπερτελής, ὡς φιλάνθρωπος, ἐνηπίασεν.” 
51 Amb 38.2, PG 91, 1300a: “ἐν ἡμῖν νηπιάζοντος θειοτάτου λόγου,” which he also identifies with 
“the form of Christ” (τὴν χριστοειδῆ κατάστασιν) that is our “state.” 




consume him”53—He who at creation’s beginning “concealed the knowledge of Himself 
in each of the rational substances as their first power,”54 and who is therefore activated 
and indeed born in every deified soul at creation’s end.55 
____ 
 These texts show that Maximus both identifies divine creation as an act of divine 
Incarnation, and that he never qualifies this in a way that would make the mode of the 
Word’s presence in the world’s womb somehow different from His presence in Mary’s.56 
Yet this remains an argument from silence, however much this silence gives pause. And 
it should give us pause. This silence murmurs, if only because, as I tried to show last 
chapter, there is a distinctive—indeed qualitatively different—logic involved in 
Maximus’s christology contrasted with, say, your typical Neoplatonic vertical or 
emanative logic.57 Hypostatic union differs, for instance, from standard versions of 
Platonic participation. So the question becomes: do the distinctive elements of Christo-
logic appear in Maximus’s theology of creation? If Maximus’s unqualified declarations 
are more than metaphor, then Christo-logic determines the entire God-world relation. 
Talk of “participation” (understood Neoplatonically) cannot account for his unique 
protology or eschatology. 
                                                 
53 Amb 47.2, PG 91, 1360d. 
54 Amb 48.2, PG 91, 1361a, modified, emphasis mine: “Ὁ πᾶσαν μετὰ σοφίας φύσιν ὑποστήσας 
Θεὸς καὶ πρώτην ἑκάστῃ τῶν λογικῶν οὐσιῶν δύναμιν τὴν αὐτοῦ γνῶσιν κρυφίως ἐνθέμενος....” That the 
“God” here specifically refers to the Word of God is clear from the rest of the ambiguum, which grapples 
with the sense in which the Word was a “slain Lamb from before the foundation of the world.” 
55 Amb 10.25, PG 91, 1125a, modified: “For to those in whom He is born, the Word of God 
[Πέφυκε γὰρ ὁ τοῦ Θεοῦ λόγος οἷς ἂν ἐγγένηται] naturally nullifies the movements of the flesh, and 
restrains the soul from inclining toward them, filling it with the whole power of true discernment.” 
56 Note that I’ve not here included any passage that contains the tantum-quantum principle, i.e. 
that human deification is just as much and simultaneously a divine Incarnation—even though I think those 
texts comprise some of the most compelling instances of creation as divine Incarnation (viewed from its 
perfection). On that pervasive principle in Maximus, see Larchet, La divinisation, 376-82; and Chapter 3, 
sec. 3.2. 




 Scholars that heed Maximus’s participation language tend to assume its essential 
logic is something very like Neoplatonic participation, as I’ve noted.58 There is of course 
some merit to this. Dionysius weighs heavily on Maximus, as does 1 Peter 2.4 on the 
entire tradition of Christian Platonism, and I do not wish to stave it off as if something 
insidious would thus be injected into otherwise pure Christian marrow.59 
 And yet it must be said that even in the philosophical milieu the logic of 
“participation” was never so monochrome. It could mean quite different things, 
especially beneath different horizons of the God-world relation. Stoics, for instance, who 
outstripped even Aristotle in their rejection of a preexistent realm of Platonic Ideas, still 
spoke of “participation” between particulars and the universal cosmic bond, the Logos.60 
And luminaries in the high Neoplatonic tradition like Proclus know that vertical 
participation is not sufficient to account for the ontological character of at least the 
highest beings, the divine henads: they also are what they are because of their horizontal 
relation among themselves, a relation more like perichoresis than participation.61 
                                                 
58 See n. 5 above. 
59 E.g. Nicholaos Loudovikos, “Being and Essence Revisited: Reciprocal Logoi and Energies in 
Maximus the Confessor and Thomas Aquinas, and the Genesis of the Self-referring Subject,” Revista 
Portuguesa de Filosofia 72.1 (2016): 129, too glibly accuses Aquinas (as opposed to Maximus) of a “non-
biblical metaphysics of participation.” For a convenient critique of the modern (and indeed Enlightenment 
Protestant) tendency to conceive the history of Christian thought as “a series of accommodations” between 
“self-enclosed philosophies and the Gospel,” see Lewis Ayres, Nicaea and Its Legacy: An Approach to 
Fourth-Century Trinitarian Theology (Oxford: OUP, 2004), 390-2. 
60 Strobaeus, I.136, 31-137, 6; SVF 1.65; Long & Sedley 30A, summarizes how Stoics rejected the 
self-subsistence of universals or “common concepts,” as they called them, and repurposed Platonic 
“participation” to make the point: “what we ‘participate in’ is the concepts [καὶ τῶν μὲν ἐννοημάτων 
μετέχειν ἡμᾶς].” And yet Stoic “participation” was not merely nominal. So Plutarch, Comm. not. 1085C-D; 
SVF 2.444; Long & Sedley 47G: “They say that earth and water sustain neither themselves nor other things, 
but preserve their unity by participation in a breathy and fiery power [πνευματικῆς δὲ μετοχῇ καὶ πυρώδους 
τὴν ἑνότητα διαφυλάττειν]; but air and fire because of their tensility can sustain themselves, and by 
blending with the other two provide them with tension and also stability and substantiality [τόνον παρέχειν 
καὶ τὸ μόνιμον καὶ οὐσιῶδες].” For early Stoics, then, what’s “participated” is the divine principle within 
all things rather than some prior, self-subsistence realm of paradigms. 




 It’s even plausible that Plato penned his Parmenides to test the adequacy of his 
own solution to the One-Many dilemma, to expose, that is, the deceptive ease with which 
“participation” might shirk restive problems internal to any monotheistic account of the 
God-world relation.62 And it’s rather striking that just after Plato has the young Socrates 
mock Zeno’s confidence in the concept of “participation” to elucidate the One-Many 
relation—who, after all, really denies that whatever is not the One must be in some sense 
many and one (i.e. participates the One’s oneness)?—he raises a single possibility that 
would seem to him a veritable marvel: “But,” says Socrates, “if [Zeno] demonstrates that 
that which is One is itself many, and in turn that the many is One, then I will be 
astonished at that.”63 Plato himself knew that an instance where the One becomes one of 
the Many (and the reverse) would constitute something quite beyond his account of 
participation. 
                                                 
62 If, after all, you posit several gods or metaphysical first principles for the diversity of things, 
then you sense far less the problem of the One and the Many. But if, as Eriugena later brilliantly exposes 
(Periph. III.14), you reject a Manichaean dualism (or any absolute dualism) and yet hold to creatio ex 
nihilo, it becomes eminently difficult to grasp how real “otherness” can emerge from a single source—
particularly if you’re Christian and you believe this otherness is meant to endure even in the final union of 
all things, where God is “all in all” (1 Cor 15.28), i.e. if true union with the one God occurs through the 
resurrection of the body. In this sense the God-world problem proves far more difficult for Christians and 
Jews than, say, for Neoplatonists like Plotinus, who, though similarly mystified about how any modal 
otherness might have emerged from the one (En. V.1.1-2), nevertheless do not have to confront the more 
prickly point of how this finite (and bodily) otherness could possibly endure in the return to the immaterial, 
simple One.—These kinds of observations rightly lead to the conviction that monotheistic “creation” and 
Neoplatonic “emanation” do not significantly differ from one another, and indeed share many of the same 
seemingly insurmountable problems; cf. Fernand Brunner, “Création et émanation: Fragment de 
philosophie comparée,” esp. 43-7.  
63 Plato, Parm. 129b-c: “ἀλλ’ εἰ ὅ ἒστιν ἕν, αὐτὸ τοῦτο πολλὰ ἀποδείξει καὶ αὖ τὰ πολλὰ δὴ ἕν, 
τοῦτο ἤδη θαυμάσομαι”; cf. too the more general remark about the obscure nature of the world’s 
“receptacle” (the “place” where the icon, Becoming, comes to be and be like the model, Being), at Tim. 
52d: “so long as one thing is one thing, and another something different, neither of the two will ever come 
to exist in the other so that the same thing becomes simultaneously both one and two [ὡς ἕως ἄν τι τὸ μὲν 




 So yes, Maximus employs the language of participation.64 But can we assume he 
simply means what, say, Plotinus or Proclus mean by it? I doubt it.65 The next three 
sections raise three qualifications to the God-world relation in Maximus (secs. 2.3-5). 
The latter two (2.4-5) focus on protology, on features of Maximus’s logoi doctrine that 
exceed standard accounts of participation. Together these qualify participation talk such 
that the logic at work corresponds to Christo-logic. They suggest, I mean, that Maximus 
circumscribes participation logic within a view of divine creation as divine Incarnation. 
And so it’s Christo-logic that ultimately determines the sense of whatever concepts he 
borrows to describe the God-world relation, including the very idea of participation.66  
 
2.3 – First qualification: no natural mediation between God and world 
One of the starker features of Maximus’s Christo-logic is that there obtains absolutely no 
common quality between created and uncreated natures. The Word’s hypostasis alone 
                                                 
64 Portaru, “The Vocabulary of Participation,” 296, notes (against Larchet) that the vast range of 
“participation” language occurs in all but two of Maximus’s works.  
65 And here I think we can appreciate Larchet’s earlier (and unique) judgment about 
“participation” in Maximus: “Maxime parle parfoix assez clairement d’une divinisation par participation, 
avec des expressions diverses et sans développer à ces occasions une doctrine précise de la participation, ou 
du moins sans indiquer comment précisement il conçoit cette notion”; cf. Larchet, La divinisation, 600. 
Tollefsen has challenged this characterization, e.g. at “Did St. Maximus the Confessor have a Concept of 
Participation?,” 624, and yet, other than a few minor additions, I do not see how Tollefsen differs 
significantly from what Larchet already emphasized as the import of Maximus’s participation-talk—that it 
insists on “la distance qui subsiste entre la nature de l’homme divinisé et la nature divine elle-même” (600).  
66 We could of course cite Wittgenstein here: “the meaning of a word is its use.” This approach 
has already been fruitfully performed in a similar context: so C. Kavin Rowe, One True Life: The Stoics 
and Early Christians as Rival Traditions (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2016), 2: “To study the 
Christians and the Stoics is thus to realize that relating their traditions must take account of the fact that 
difference in the meaning of words is tied to difference in life.” Or later, at 249: “To recognize that the 
meaning of words changes with the changes in the wider grammar in which they occur is simultaneously to 
see that the reembedding of words from one interpretative framework into another is not the translation and 
appropriation of insights but transformation or transfiguration. As Wittgenstein might have said, ‘See how 
high the seas of language run here!’” And later again, at 260–261: “Christians have been treasure hunting. 
The treasures they find are the words in the Stoic texts, not the ‘thoughts’ that are somehow independent 
from the Stoic grammar in which thoughts have their shape and meaning—and that can somehow be 
transported from one grammar to the other without a change in meaning. I am committed, that is, to the 
view that we cannot think about language in the same way after Wittgenstein. There is no such thing as a 




links and unifies them in actu.67 It’s significant, then, that Maximus accuses Greek 
philosophy and Origenism of precisely this error: both fail to grasp that God and creation 
share nothing essential or natural whatever. Maximus does grasp it, indeed revels in it as 
the truth of creatio ex nihilo, and this portends a major modification to typical 
understandings of participation. First Maximus’s accusation, then a word on how it 
qualifies participation. 
 Maximus critiques the way (he thinks) Greek philosophy conceives the God-
world relation.68 His charge goes something like this. Only God or “the divine essence” 
brooks no contrary, yet creatures do and must.69 Creatures receive that and all they are. 
God is and is what he is from himself. And “to speak more truly,” Maximus presses, God 
“transcends” the very things he “is,” like existence and goodness and wisdom. Or rather 
he is what he is a completely incomprehensible way, self-subsistently—which is at 
bottom a mere negation: God does not receive what God is.70 Whereas all that creatures 
have, even existence itself, they have “by participation and by grace.”71 But the very fact 
that they receive being means that creaturely being stands in opposition to “not-being.” I 
have being, but I didn’t always. Therefore in fact and in thought non-being negates my 
concrete being. It’s not just my “existence” (ὑπάρξις, nearly like esse), notice, that courts 
                                                 
67 Pyr 28-31; Amb 5.20; Chapter 1, secs. 1.4-5. 
68 CC 4.2, Caresa-Galstaldo 194: “children [or disciples] of the Greeks [Ἑλλὴνων παῖδες].” In his 
translation of CC, Balthasar glosses that the “Greek” views Maximus refutes here might be found in the 
philosopher Ammonius Hermeiou (c.500), whose “Lehre von der Gleichewigkeit der Weltsubstanz mit 
Gott war nochmals...in Alexandrien aufgebracht,” and “von seinen christlichen Schülern Zacharias Rhetor 
(PG 85, 1011-1144) und Johannes Philoponus...widerlegt worden,” and also notes that Evagrius had also 
begun his Kephalaia Gnostica (1.1, 4) with the assertion that nothing stands in opposition to God. See his 
Kosmische Liturgie, 2nd ed., 452-3 n. 2. 
69 CC 3.28, Caresa-Gestaldo 156: “Ἡμεῖς δὲ μόνην λέγομεν τὴν θείαν οὐσίαν μὴ ἔχειν τι 
ἐναντίον.” 
70 CC 3.27, Caresa-Galstaldo 156, cf. Sherwood 178: “Ὁ μὲν Θεὸς ὡς αὐτοΰπαρξις ὢν [note the 
paradox of juxtaposing those two concepts] καὶ αὐτοαγαθότης καὶ αὐτοσοφία, μᾶλλον δὲ ἀληθέστερον 
εἰπεῖν καὶ ὑπὲρ ταῦτα πάντα.” 




a contrary and so fixes a great ontological distance between God and me. My very 
“essence” (οὐσία, essentia)72 also admits of “privation.” No such privation or contrary 
opposes “true essence,” God’s, while contrariety is “proper to being by participation.”73  
 Hence Maximus’s problem with the Greeks. They “maintain that the essence of 
all beings eternally coexists with God and that they have only their qualities from Him,” 
since, in their view, “essence has no contrary” and “contrariety is found only in the 
qualities around the essence.”74 Maximus suspects Greek metaphysics of essential 
monism: “essence” is the very same in all things, only the qualities or modes change—
more or less of this or that property or configuration of properties. And so the world’s 
diversity and vertical, variegated structure (the Many) are but the myriad qualitative 
determinations of a single, truly real essence (the One). Maximus subtly concedes 
something to this view. He agrees that “true essence” admits no contrary. But he refuses 
to grant that this applies to created essence. Here “created” signifies precisely whatever is 
brought to essence and existence from nothing, from the divine will and knowledge.  
 The lesson Maximus draws from creatio ex nihilo is not—as it is for much 
contemporary theology—that God might not have created anything at all. Maximus never 
says that, quite the reverse, actually, here and elsewhere.75 He means rather to insist, as 
the word “coexists” (συνυπάρχειν) implies, that God’s creative power can produce from 
                                                 
72 See “An Analytic Appendix” for a brief survey of Maximus’s use of this term—especially its 
christological transformation. 
73 CC 3.29, Caresa-Galstaldo 156-8, my translation: “οὕτω καὶ τὸ μὴ ὂν στέρησίς ἐστι τοῦ ὄντος, 
οὐ τοῦ κυρίως δὲ ὄντος· οὐκ ἔχει γὰρ ἐναντίον· ἀλλὰ τοῦ κατὰ μέθεξιν τοῦ κυρίως ὄντος.” 
74 CC 3.28, Caresa-Galstaldo 156, Sherwood 178, modified: “Οἱ μὲν Ἕλληνες ἐξ ἀϊδίου λέγοντες 
συνυπάρχειν τῷ Θεῷ τὴν τῶν ὄντων οὐσίαν, τὰς δὲ περὶ αὐτὴν ποιότητας μόνον ἐξ αὐτοῦ ἐσχηκέναι, τῇ 
μὲν οὐσίᾳ οὐδὲν λέγουσιν ἐναντίον, ἐν δὲ ταῖς μόναις τὴν ἐναντίωσιν εἶναι.” 
75 CC 3.29, Caresa-Galstaldo 158, Sherwood 178, lightly altered: “It depends on the power of Him 
who truly is whether the essence of things should ever be or not be; and His gifts are without repentance 
[Rom 11.29]. Therefore it both ever is and will be sustained by His all-powerful might [Καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἔστιν 
ἀεὶ καὶ ἔσται τῇ παντοκρατορικῇ δυνάμει διακρατουμένη], even though, as was said, it has non-being as 




itself an essence or nature utterly other than its own. Or, to reprise earlier concepts, the 
God without contrary creates contrariety itself.76 When God creates he does not simply 
modify himself, his essential being, and thus produce something of himself in a new 
mode or determination. “He is Creator not of the qualities but of the qualified essences,” 
as Maximus puts it.77 God has no counterpart; nothing could complete or compliment or 
even relate in any way to his very essence qua “the true essence.”78 That’s exactly why 
Maximus thinks the Greeks slight “the all-powerful Goodness” of God when they do not 
accept a creation at once from God and essentially nothing like him.79 That he can do it—
at this we’re “astounded.”80 That he unstintingly wills it—just so we perceive “His 
infinite goodness.”81 How can this occur? We’ve only hints here: when God created he 
“sent forth His eternally pre-existent knowledge of beings.” And in fact, creation just is 
that knowledge receiving an essence, which, because received, admits a contrary (not-
being), and because a contrary, is not God’s at all.82 Creation from non-being comes by 
God’s eternal will and knowledge. And these, Maximus later specifies, are the logoi of all 
things. 
                                                 
76 This term, “coexist” (used at both CC 3.28 and 4.6), signifies a metaphysically simultaneous 
relation of two “parts” that together constitute a greater “whole.” When the parts relate naturally, the 
consequent “whole” is a form. Maximus often wields this point against Origenist “preexistence of souls,” 
namely, that since the soul and body of a concrete individual together constitute the individual “whole” or 
“nature” of that individual, then they must share the same origin lest they be subject to essential change and 
destruction (i.e. not really be the parts of that whole)—they must “coexist”; cf. Ep 15, PG 91, 557d;  Amb 
7.40-3, 42.9-13 and 25. 
77 CC 4.6, Caresa-Galstaldo 196, Sherwood 193, slight modification: “Ἡμεῖς δὲ τὸν παντοδύναμον 
ἐγνωκότες Θεόν, οὐ ποιοτήτων, ἀλλ’ οὐσιῶν πεποιωμένων δημιουργὸν αὐτὸν εἶναι φαμεν.” 
78 Maximus makes the same point when he says God essentially “without relation” (ἄσχετος); cf. 
Amb 10.58, 15.9, 20.2, 41.10. 
79 CC 4.2, Sherwood 192. 
80 CC 4.1, Sherwood 192. 
81 CC 4.3, Sherwood 192. 
82 CC 4.4, Caresa-Galstaldo 194, Sherwood 192-3: “Τὴν ἐξ ἀϊδίου ὲν ἑαυτῷ ὁ Δημιουργὸς τῶν 




 Maximus critiques Origenism similarly. Many rightly see that Maximus corrects 
Origenist cosmology by reconfiguring its metaphysical triad.83 Where the Origenist myth 
had rest (stasis), motion (kinesis), and only then becoming (genesis), Maximus reversed 
the sequence to initial genesis, historical kinesis, and final stasis. Origenism’s was a tale 
about how rational beings originally enjoyed perfect unity (henad), suffered a tragic fall 
into bodily multiplicity upon their failure to desire God alone, and, through the Word’s 
economy, will regain their truest (if obscured) desire—oneness “in spirit” with the God 
who is spirit.84 Maximus heartily agrees that God is the highest and most natural object of 
desire for rational creatures. He makes this exact point a premise in some of his most 
biting polemic against a preexistent henad.85 And, frankly, at least compared to Origen 
himself, Maximus’s insistence that whatever receives being cannot be on the same 
metaphysical plane as God constitutes a point of agreement between them.86 
 But Maximus divines a deeper issue than any of this. Beyond and beneath a faulty 
metaphysics of motion, he sees the perennial problem of how, exactly, God can relate to 
what is both from him alone and yet not him.87 So yes, Maximus agrees that God and 
                                                 
83 Sherwood, The Earlier Ambigua, 92-102. 
84 That’s a summary of how Maximus seems to have viewed (contemporary versions of) 
Origenism, as evinced at Amb 7.2-7, 15.10-11, 42.13-14. For a sympathetic survey of the good reasons 
Origen adopted some form of a preexistent henad of rational beings—mostly to do with Christian theodicy 
rather than Platonic poisoning—see Peter W. Martens, “Embodiment, Heresy, and the Hellenization of 
Christianity: The Descent of the Soul in Origen and Plato,” HTR 108.4 (2015): 594-620. 
85 Cf. esp. Amb 7.5. Maximus repeatedly affirms our natural desire for God: Amb 48.2, Pyr 33, 
passim. 
86 Origen, Princ 2.9.2, Görgemanns & Karp 402-4, Butterworth 130: “But since these rational 
beings, which as we said above were made in the beginning, were made when before they did not exist, by 
this very fact that they did not exist and then began to exist they are of necessity subject to change and 
alteration. For whatever may have been the goodness that existed in their being, it existed in them not by 
nature but as a result of their Creator’s beneficence. What they are, therefore, is something neither their 
own nor eternal, but given by God [non naturaliter inerat sed beneficio conditoris effecta. Quod sunt ergo, 
non est proprium nec sempiternum, sed a deo datum].” See too Mueller-Jourdan, “The Foundation of 
Origenist Metaphysics,” 159. 
87 Hence the logical structure of Ambiguum 7 runs as follows. It turns on Maximus’s identification 
of two distinct (though related) features of Origenist protology (Amb 7.2): [1] that it posits a “connatural” 




world do not simply share the same metaphysical plane (in essence or in quality/mode). 
So the question becomes: is their relation in any sense a natural one? Maximus thinks 
Origenism falters here precisely to the extent it does conceive the God-world relation as 
somehow a natural one. That’s how he subtly characterizes Origenist protology when 
disputing an Origenist interpretation of Gregory’s remark that we “are a portion of God 
that has flowed down from above.”88 Such would be a “facile interpretation,” 
which in fact is derived largely from the doctrines of the Greeks. According to the 
opinion of these people, there once existed a unity of rational beings, by virtue of 
which we were connatural with God [τήν τέ ποτε οὖσαν...τῶν λογικῶν ἑνάδα καθ’ 
ἣν συμφεῖς ὄντες Θεῷ], in whom we had our remaining and abode. In addition to 
this they speak of a ‘movement’ that came about....89 
 
Origenism thinks we were (and are) “connatural” with God. This was Maximus’s issue 
with “the Greeks” too.90 Origenist protology, “after the manner of the Greeks...mixed 
together the immiscible.”91 That is, it tends to forge a natural or essential relation 
between, on one side, beings whose very nature (not simply their mode) dictates a limited 
and self-contained process of actualization, and, on the other, God, whose nature not only 
is but transcends infinity itself.92 For Maximus—and we’ll see this in greater relief next 
                                                                                                                                                 
God (kinesis). Most, we’ve seen, focus on the second feature, which does indeed come first in Maximus’s 
response (Amb 7.3-14). But just after this disquisition on the metaphysics of motion comes Maximus’s 
logoi doctrine (Amb 7.15ff.), which is not simply another way of stating the earlier points about genesis and 
motion. Rather it responds most directly to the first and distinct feature of Origenist protology—namely the 
precise relation between God and the world—in such a way that avoids positing a natural relation and yet 
still retains a relation of identity between them (Amb 7.21 and 7.31).  
88 Amb 7.1 = Or. 14.7. 
89 Amb 7.2. 
90 Cf. the note of Constas, vol. 1, 478 n. 2. 
91 Amb 15.10. 
92 Amb 15.8, PG 91, 1220a: the potential and perfection of a creature’s natural movement is 
already given, and so already delimited, in its concrete nature (what Maximus called “qualified substances” 
at CC 4.6). Therefore the actualization of every created nature necessarily terminates in a concrete, finite, 
limited fact or thing done. Take the soul. “Its potentiality [δύναμιν] is the intellect, its motion [κίνησιν] is 
the process of thinking, and its actuality [ἐνέργειαν] is thought [τὸ νόημα], as well as of the thinker and the 
thing thought about, since it [i.e. the concrete fact of the thought] limits and defines the relationship of the 
two poles that frame the entire process.” Thus is the “form of motion that obtains among all beings.” And 
yet created motion’s necessarily dynamic, polarized, and diachronic realization does not finally mean 




chapter—there is absolutely no natural relation between created and uncreated natures 
qua natures.93 
 These passages betray Maximus’s debt to the “closed world” view of creation 
articulated by his Christian forbearers in general and to fourth-century Nicene theology in 
particular.94 For Maximus, Greek metaphysics and Origenism alike seek to relax the 
radical difference between the nature of God and world.95 “May divinity and humanity 
never become essentially identical, so that no created thing might be consubstantial and 
connatural with the divinity [ὁμοφυὲς καὶ ὁμοούσιον]! For we know that only an insane 
mind says these are consubstantial by nature.”96 But, as we saw last chapter, this poses a 
major obstacle for any Neoplatonic version of participation. Proclus, for instance, regards 
it as plain nonsense to say there is “nothing in common or identical in both” participated 
and participant, cause and effect, because that would amount to denying any causal or 
dependent relation between them at all.97 Indeed, it appears that the very heart of 
participation requires some sort of essential or natural commonality between the two, lest 
                                                                                                                                                 
come to an end in the infinity that is around God,” this end is not the divine essence (that would imply, 
once again, some sort of “natural” relation between soul and God), for “infinity is around God, but it is not 
God Himself, for He incomparably transcends even this” (Amb 15.9). 
93 Cf. Amb 20.2, 65.2. The keen reader senses here an unresolved tension in Maximus: he seems to 
maintain that the rational creature simultaneously possesses God as its final, natural object of desire, and 
yet lacks a primordial, natural relation that would foster such a desire; see Chapter 3, sec. 3.3. 
94 Blowers, Drama of the Divine Economy, 54-8.. 
95 So Mueller-Jourdan, “The Foundation of Origenist Metaphysics,” 160: Maximus “radically 
differs from the Origenian system in regard to the conception of created substance (οὐσία)....for Maximus 
the concept of substance depends on this Aristotelian background which radically rejects any form of pre-
existence for rational beings, a characteristic of Platonism.” But Maximus also departs from Aristotle 
because he insists on “the simultaneity of creation of soul and body” (rather than Aristotle’s post-existence 
of soul), so that for Maximus “there is one unique world” (161). 
Is this fair to Origenism? A thorny issue, to be sure, especially while scholars like Casiday and 
Ramelli attempt to salvage Evagrius’s thought from the wreckage wrought by Constantinople II (553). 
However that falls, I note here that Origenist thought suffered similar accusations long before Maximus. 
Pope Theophilus of Alexandria, Festal Letter of 402, warned that Origenists teach that “our soul is thus of 
the same nature with God”; cf. Guillaumont, Les ‘Kephalaia Gnostica’ d’Évagre le Pontique, 100-1. 
Canons 13-15, associated with Constantinople II, similarly target so-called “Isochrist” Origenism; cf. Price, 
vol. 2, 286. 
96 Ep 15, PG 91, 565d, my translation. 




the entire notion of “likeness” among stratified levels derived from the One dissolve 
entirely (a notion, of course, very dear to patristic doctrines of deification).98 Put another 
way, Neoplatonic participation works precisely because higher and lower beings share a 
common essence (or essential property or essential power) and yet differ in mode, that is, 
in how they possess and instantiate that essence.99 If, as Maximus contends, between 
created and uncreated natures no natural link of any sort abides, how could participation 
ever get underway at all? 
 We might imagine Maximus to be among the most extreme advocates of creatio 
ex nihilo in Christian tradition.100 There’s certainly truth to it. And indeed it’s fairly 
typical to characterize patristic conceptions of creation like this: God posits an “outside” 
reality alongside himself, an “other” that, precisely because it is created solely by divine 
will rather than by divine nature (and so unlike the Son’s generation from Father), is 
wholly “dissimilar” to God’s nature.101 At least concerning the divine essence itself, 
Maximus may not even tolerate that much. A similar-dissimilar relation, after all, 
obviously presumes common qualities. How then to bridge the “great chasm” Gregory of 
                                                 
98 Proclus, El. Theol., props. 32, 78-9 (Plotinus’s double-act theory), passim. See Johannes 
Hirschberger, “Ähnlichkeit und Seinsanalogie vom platonischen Parmenides bis Proklos,” in Philomates: 
Studies in the Humanities in Memory of Philip Merlan (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1971), 57-74. 
99 Proclus, El. Theol., prop. 97. This is why even Proclus (prop. 114) will not speak of the henads’ 
“participation” in the One: you can’t say, strictly speaking, that the One has anything in common with 
lower realities (even the henads or Intellect), because, as Plotinus already claimed, the One has nothing at 
all (En. VI.8 [39] 7); so Christian Guérard, “La Théorie des Hénades et La Mystique de Proclus,” Dionysius 
6 (1982): 77. So Neoplatonism too comes to its own qualification of participation-talk. But of course that 
only exacerbates the problem participation meant to resolve, and indeed explains nothing about how the 
One’s very mode (of not “being” any mode at all) comes to produce other modes of being which, unlike the 
One, do possess their own proper and determinate modes (and therefore could never, for instance, cause all 
that the One causes; cf. El. Theol., props. 1-2, 78). 
100 Balthasar, Cosmic Liturgy, 152-3, though he errs in his further claim that Maximus’s 
“predominantly Western style of thought”—an extreme emphasis on ex nihilo—means he “can only 
conceive of final divinization as a perfecting of what has been created finite.” Next chapter shows it’s in 
fact much more than finitude’s perfection, and, oddly, this results precisely from what Balthasar correctly 
observes: “it is Christology that will decide the issue” (153). 




Nazianzus surveys, which “separates the whole of nature that has come into being...from 
that which is uncreated and at rest”?102 When Maximus quotes this passage, he answers it 
with another from Dionysius: God, from the “overflow of His intense love for all things, 
goes out of Himself...to be in all according to an ecstatic and supraessential power which 
is yet inseparable from Himself.”103 That captures Maximus’s conviction too, precisely 
when he brandishes his logoi doctrine against Origenist protology. “We consider” that 
“all things...come into being from God [τῶν ἐκ Θεοῦ γενομένων...ἡ γένεσις].”104 So 
creatio ex nihilo entails an indomitable gap between the nature of God and world, but, 
simultaneously, that the world’s creation is God’s becoming out of himself—creatio ex 
Deo. How both? 
 
2.4 – Second qualification: the Logos becomes logoi, not ideas (the participated) 
If Neoplatonic participation adequately explained the God-world relation, you might 
expect the fundamental creative principles or logoi of all creatures to be the eternal Ideas 
or Forms participated by all things. Then the “procession” from One to Many would 
occur precisely as cascading iterations of more determinate or qualified essences, the 
egressive “limitation of act by power” that establishes every effect’s hypostasis as a 
mixture of the One and not-One (i.e. as a determinate complex of variously participated 
higher principles).105 Maximus’s logoi do generate the species and forms of created 
hypostases as well as the very individuality of each hypostasis. They make all things 
                                                 
102 Gregory Nazianzen, Or. 41.12 ( = Amb 71.6, PG 91, 1413a). 
103 Dionysius, DN 4.13 ( = Amb 71.6, PG 91, 1413a-b), my emphasis. 
104 Amb 7.6, my emphasis. 




“related to” God (though not by a natural relation).106 But they are not themselves Forms 
or Ideas, and not once does Maximus identify them as such.107 
 He might have. John of Scythopolis (sedit 536-c.548) was the first commentator 
of the Dionysian corpus.108 Maximus would later add his own scholia to John’s, which 
led to a long history of conflating the two under Maximus’s name.109 John is also the first 
to identify Dionysius’s logoi and “paradigms” with the preexistent “forms” and “ideas” in 
the mind (or Logos) of God.110 For John a Dionysian logos is “an idea, that is, a 
paradigm,” “an eternal production of the eternal God which is complete in itself.”111 This 
definition points up the precarious station divine ideas occupy. As eternally complete 
productions (ποίησιν αὐτοτελῆ ἀίδιον) they are not the divine essence, but as eternal with 
and internal to God they are not quite creatures either. They are “thoughts of God,” and 
                                                 
106 Amb 7.15, PG 91, 1077c: “τῇ πρὸς αὐτὸν τῶν πάντων ἀναφορᾷ.” It’s hard to miss the 
Eucharistic tones of ἡ ἀναφορά; see Lampe, s.v. 
107 Balthasar, “The Problem of the Scholia to Pseudo-Dionysius,” 376, notices this, though he 
routinely elides the logoi with “ideas”; see e.g., Balthasar, Cosmic Liturgy, 116-21. Maximus does not even 
retain the language of “paradigm,” even when he cites a Dionysian text that does; cf. Amb 7.24 (cp. DN 
5.8) and QThal 13—in both instances Maximus prefers Dionysius’s “divine wills.” It might matter too that 
Gregory Nazianzen had openly maligned “Plato’s Ideas” at Or. 27.10.—This section and the next (secs. 
2.4-5) have appeared in shorter form at Jordan Daniel Wood, “Creation is Incarnation: The Metaphysical 
Peculiarity of the Logoi in Maximus Confessor,” Modern Theology 34.1 (2018): 85-92. 
108 Translation from Paul Rorem and John C. Lamoureaux, John of Scythopolis and the Dionysian 
Corpus: Annotating the Areopagite (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998). Though Sergius of Reshaina likely 
composed his sizeable introduction before John’s more comprehensive edition; see Istvan Perczel, “The 
Earliest Syriac Reception of Dionysius,” Modern Theology 24.4 (2008): 557-71. 
109 This tale of concealment was exposed only last century, principally by Balthasar, “The Problem 
of the Scholia to Pseudo-Dionysius,” translated as an appendix in Cosmic Liturgy. Beate Regina Suchla is 
still in the process of sorting out all the details. See her “Das Scholienwerke des Johannes von Skythopolis 
zu den Areopagitischen Traktaten in seiner Philosophie – und theologiegeschichtlichen Bedeutung,” in 
Denys l’Aréopagite et sa postérité en Orient et en Occident: Actes du Colloque International Paris, 21-4 
septembre 1994, ed. Ysabel de Andia (Paris: Institut d’Études Augustiniennes, 1997), 155-65; eadem, 
Corpus Dionysiacum IV/1, Ioannis Scythopolitani prologus et scholia in Dionysii Areopagitae librum ‘De 
divinis nominibus’ cum additamentis interpretum aliorum. Patristische Texte und Studien 62 (Berlin: De 
Gruyter, 2011); and Rorem & Lamoureaux,  2. 
110 Rorem & Lamoureaux speak of “John’s obsessive linkage of the two words ‘idea’ and 
‘paradigm’,” about 14x in ten different scholia (88). Only once does John specify that these ideas are found 
in Logos (SchDN 353.3), and this because the text at hand concerns why God is called “Logos” (DN 7.4). 
But there’s nothing special about it being the Word who contains these ideas. 




though not worshipped as very God,112 they are nothing other than him. They constitute 
the stuff of God who is “pure mind”: 
Since God is also the creator of beings, he will think them in that which does not 
yet exist. But he is the archetype of this universe. And these things he thinks not 
by receiving types from another, but by himself being the paradigm of beings. 
Thus, he is neither in a place, nor are things in him, as if in a place. But he has 
them, in so far as he has himself and is one with them – since all things, on the 
one hand, exist together and exist in the indivisible in him; and since, on the other 
hand, they are distinguished indivisibly in the indivisible. Accordingly, his 
thoughts are beings, and these beings are forms.113 
 
These forms or ideas are like the “incorporeal matter of the things which participate in 
those ideas.”114 So for John the logoi are the preexistent ideas that result from God’s 
simple act of thinking himself, the Forms participated variously by creatures.115 
 Not for Maximus. “Who,” after contemplating the latent unity undergirding the 
“infinite natural differences” in creation, would “fail to know the one Logos as many 
logoi, indivisibly distinguished amid the differences of created things,” and conversely, 
that “the many logoi are one Logos, seeing that all things are related to Him without 
being confused with Him”?116 The one Logos “is manifested and multiplied 
[πληθυνόμενον]” in and as the logoi of all beings.117 They preexist “in” and “with 
Him,”118 ineffably pre-contained in Him from eternity.119 Through the “creative and 
                                                 
112 John of Scythopolis, SchDN 329.1 and 332.1. 
113 John of Scythopolis, SchDN 320.3 (on DN 5.6); Rorem & Lamoureaux, 220.  
114 John of Scythopolis, SchDN 316.4; Rorem & Lamoureaux, 219. 
115 John even says that the logoi are “a [single] nature” that together have one logos and cause, 
though still in God (SchDN 353.3; Rorem & Lamoureaux, 230). They are like the most common nature of 
which particular creatures are but more determined and circumscribed instances. As we’ll see, this is 
strikingly similar to the Plotinian Intellect. It again confirms that John’s logoi are overwritten by the logic 
of formal causality.  
116 Amb 7.15, PG 91, 1077c: “οὐχι πολλοὺς εἴσεται λόγους τὸν ἕνα Λόγον, τῇ τῶν γεγονότων 
ἀδιαιρέτως συνδιακρινόμενον διαφορᾷ, διὰ τὴν αὐτῶν πρὸς ἄλληλά τε καὶ ἑαυτὰ ἀσύγχητον ιδιότητα; Καὶ 
πάλιν ἕνα τοὺς πολλούς, τῇ πρὸς αὐτὸν τῶν πάντων ἀναφορᾷ δι’ ἑαυτὸν ἀσυγχύτως ὑπάρχοντα, ἐνούσιόν 
τε καὶ ἐνυπόστατον τοῦ θεοῦ καὶ Πατρὸς θεὸν Λόγον, ὡς ἀρχὴν καὶ αἰτίαν τῶν ὅλων, ἐν ᾧ ἐκτίσθη τὰ 
πάντα....” 
117 Amb 7.16. 




sustaining procession [πρόοδον] of the One to individual beings,” “the One is many.” 
And through “the revertive, inductive, and providential return of the many to the One,” 
“the many are the One.”120 So the Logos is the logoi and the logoi the Logos. 
 Plotinus said the same.121 The Intellect, the second of the three primary 
hypostases,122 “is like one great complete logos embracing them all,” embracing, that is, 
the logoi of the highest intelligible realities down to the logoi of particular “living beings” 
(i.e. particular souls). And these logoi are “what the Intellect wills and is [ὅ θέλει νοῦς 
καὶ ἔστι].” Intellect is therefore “one and many.”123 One and many, because intellectual 
power is the power to receive the form of the object known and so become identical to 
that object in actuality.124 So when Intellect contemplates the logoi of all things—
themselves the productive principles issuing from Intellect’s struggle to image the 
                                                                                                                                                 
119 Amb 7.16. 
120 Amb 7.20. 
121 Two reasons to compare Plotinus’s logoi. First, the few scholars open to putting Maximus in 
conversation with Neoplatonic philosophers (a good idea in my view) tend not to discern important 
differences between Maximus and Plotinus, especially their versions of the logoi; see Tollefsen’s remark at 
n. 135. Second, as others have noticed, there’s relatively little to compare when it comes to say, Evagrius’s 
logoi, which already function (at least in “second contemplation” of visible realities) less as the primordial 
and creative foundation of the single world and more as God’s providential means for intellects in a given 
age (aeon) to ascend from number and bodily division and re-identify with the “substantial knowledge” the 
Trinity is; cf., e.g., KG 1.27, 5.16 and 27, 6.75, and Guillaumont, Les ‘Kephalaia Gnostica’, 110. For a 
brief survey of Evagrian logoi, see Luke Dysinger, O.S.B, “The Logoi of Providence and Judgment in the 
Exegetical Writings of Evagrius Ponticus,” Studia Patristica 37 (2001): 462-71. 
122 Plotinus, En. V.1. 
123 Plotinus, En. VI.2 [43] 21. That the Intellect “wills” these logoi is enough to undermine any 
facile claim that Maximus’s (and Dionysius’s) logoi differ from Plotinus’s because the former are 
voluntarily elected principles (pace Tollefsen, Activity and Participation, 114). Plotinus actually has an 
entire treatise on the One’s free will in making all things, where he depicts the One (as did Plato himself at 
Tim 29e-30a) generating intellectual causes “as he himself willed” (En. VI.8 [39] 18). The hackneyed 
contrast between voluntary creation and necessary emanation, astonishingly widespread in its acceptance 
among contemporary Christian thinkers, requires comprehensive reappraisal. Gregory of Nyssa, for 
instance, had no qualms identifying the two: see Harry Wolfson, “The Identification of Ex Nihilo with 
Emanation in Gregory of Nyssa,” HTR 63 (1970): 53-60. See too the helpful remarks of Jean Trouillard, 
“Procession néoplatonicienne et création judéo-chrétienne,” in Néoplatonisme. Mélanges offerts à Jean 
Trouillard. Cahiers de Fontenay, nn. 19-22 (Fontenay-aux-Roses: École Normale Supérieure, 1981), 79-
108, esp. 83-9. 




imageless One125—it becomes identical to them. Intellect’s very nature comprises the 
perfect union of “otherness” (ἑτερότης) and “sameness” (ταυτότης), and that forms the 
ground of all creaturely “difference” (διάφορα).126 Plotinus’s Intellect is the logos that 
generates difference by self-identifying with many logoi. Quite like Maximus, it 
appears.127 
 Recall though that for Plotinus the divine Intellect is not the One. There can be no 
difference in the One, since to be different is to be other than one. The One somehow 
possesses all created beings beforehand, yet “in such a way as not to be distinct [μὴ 
διακεκριμένα]: they are distinguished on the second level, in the logos [ἐν τῷ δευτέρῳ 
διεκέκριτο τῷ λόγῳ].”128 Creatures gain their definitional difference by not being the 
One, that is, in the Intellect’s logoi. Ever since Clement and Origen firmly planted the 
logoi of creatures in the Second Person of the Trinity, the Word and Wisdom,129 
Christians were obliged to waver here. After Proclus’s proliferation of causal 
intermediaries (the henads),130 Dionysius again pressed the Christian point: “the whole 
good processions and the Names of God, celebrated by us, are of one God.”131 If the 
                                                 
125 En. III.8 [30] 6-7. 
126 En. VI.2 [43] 21. The διάφορα of magnitudes, figures, qualities, and material division are 
specified in this text. 
127 This short review of Plotinus’s notion of the logoi as Intellect shows the limitations of 
Larchet’s narration of how Maximus’s logoi differ from Plato’s Ideas: “selon Maxime, le Verbe, qui a créé 
le monde, s’est référé aux logoi qui étaient contenus Lui [sic]; tandis que selon Platon, les Idées que le 
Démiurge a pris comme modèles pour produire le cosmos étaient extérieures à lui”; Larchet, “conception 
maximienne,” 282.  
128 En. V.3 [49] 15, slightly modified. See Asger Ousager, “Sufficient Reason, Identities and 
Discernibles in Plotinus,” Dionysius 21 (2003): 232. 
129 Clement of Alexandria, Strom IV.25; Origen, Princ 1.2.2; Jo 1.22. 
130 El. Th., props. 113-116. Neoplatonists after Proclus largely returned to Plotinus’s simpler 
threefold schema; see Cristina D’ancona, “Plotinus and later Platonic philosophers on the causality of the 
First Principle,” in The Cambridge Companion to Plotinus. Ed. Lloyd P. Gerson (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1996), 377-8. 
131 DN 5.2: “ἑνὸς θεοῦ τὰς ὅλας ἀγαθὰς προόδους καὶ τὰς παρ’ ἡμῶν ἐξυμνουμένας θεωνυμίας” 




Christian Creator is sole cause of the many, he becomes, in the creative act, One and 
many. 
 Maximus identifies God the Logos (not the Father, not the Spirit) with the 
creaturely logoi, so this must mean that the Word is somehow both one and many in such 
a way that it transcends the logic of Neoplatonic procession (which is the logic of 
participation from above, as it were).132 He speaks of the Word’s “procession” (πρόοδον) 
into all beings, true.133 But we should not take this to imply what it must if this were 
Neoplatonic procession, namely, either [1] that this procession somehow diminishes the 
Word (making the Logos essentially subordinate to the One) so that the “identity” of 
Logos and logoi obtains only “by derivation,”134 or [2] that the very Word is not really 
identical to creaturely logoi after all (as Plotinus’s One is not essentially Intellect-
logos).135 No, this procession of One Word to manifold world proves at once a vertical 
                                                 
132 Stephen Gersh, From Iamblichus to Eriugena: An Investigation of the Prehistory and Evolution 
of the Pseudo-Dionysian Tradition (Leiden: Brill, 1978), argues that Maximus “is perhaps the first thinker 
in the Neoplatonic tradition to tackle the problem [of procession] head-on,” though he doesn’t seem to 
think Maximus offers anything more than does Dionysius. 
133 Amb 7.20. 
134 The first instance in Amb 7 of the Logos-logoi copula appears along with a declaration of the 
consubstantiality of Logos and Father (Amb 7.15). Cp. Proclus, El. Th., prop. 18: “Thus the character as it 
pre-exists in the original giver has a higher reality than the character bestowed: it is what the bestowed 
character is, but is not identical with it, since it exists primitively and the other only by derivation [ἀλλ’ οὐ 
ταὐτὸν ἐκείνῳ· πρώτως γὰρ ἔστι, τὸ δὲ δευτέρως]. For it must be that either the two are identical and have a 
common definition [ἕνα λόγον ἀμφοτέρων]; or there is nothing common or identical in both; or the one 
exists primitively and the other by derivation.... It remains, then, that where one thing receives bestowal 
from another in virtue of that other’s mere existence, the giver possesses primitively the character which it 
gives, while the recipient is by derivation what the giver is [τὸ μὲν εἶναι πρώτως ὃ δίδωσι, τὸ δὲ δευτέρως ὃ 
τὸ διδόν ἐστιν]” (Dodds, 20-1). Only an identity by derivation is possible where participation among 
stratified levels of nature—a metaphysics of “more or less” like in kind (e.g. prop. 9)—is the only 
conceivable relation. Maximus too knows that in this way we are “not the same” (Ep. 6; ταὐτόν).  
135 Pace Törönen, 132, who perceives in the “creation song” of C.S. Lewis’s Aslan an apt analogy 
for Maximus’s logoi: “The connection between the creatures and the creator is presented in this figure as 
different musical notes. With the notes everything seems to proceed, as the young observer puts it, ‘out of 
the Lion’s head’. Yet, it is clear that this is not a process of emanation but an act of creation. It is not the 
Lion, as it were, unfolding into creatures.” But for Maximus it is precisely the Lion-Logos who unfolds in 
the “creative and sustaining procession of the One to individual beings” as their logoi (Amb 7.20), who, as 
he says elsewhere, “expanded himself” into all multiplicity (Amb 33.2; PG 91, 1288A: 




and a horizontal one. It’s a vertical descent and yet remains the same hypostasis.136 It’s a 
horizontal multiplication and yet no inner perfection of any hypostasis.137 
 In fact, if we really wish to find philosophical precedent for that type of causal 
procession, let’s look not to Neoplatonism but to Stoicism. Consider one ancient 
summary: 
The Stoics made god out to be intelligent, a designing fire which methodically 
proceeds towards the creation of the world, and encompasses all the seminal 
principles [τοὺς σπερματικοὺς λόγους] according to which everything comes 
about according to fate, and a breath pervading the whole world, which takes on 
different names owing to the alterations of the matter through which it passes.138 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
The same problem besets Maximus’s use of the Neoplatonic center-radii-circle image (Amb 7.20; 
CT 2.4; Myst. 1). Some take this is a straightforward adaptation of Neoplatonic procession, which Maximus 
received from Dionysius (DN 5.5-9); so Perl, Methexis, p. 171, and Torstein T. Tollefsen, “Christocentric 
Cosmology,” in TOHMC, 310-11. But Maximus’s use must differ to the extent that the hypostasis of the 
Logos, unlike, say of the Plotinian One, does not itself simply remain when proceeding, as the center-point 
in the expanding circle. The Word himself expands. 
136 Not only does Maximus specify this at Amb 7.15 (“ἐνούσιόν καὶ ἐνυπόστατον τοῦ Θεοῦ καὶ 
Πατρὸς Θεὸν Λόγον”), but he later adds that this procession is emphatically not that of the ineffable divine 
nature (Amb 7.20: “ὡς ὑπερούσιος, οὐδὲ ὑπό τινος οὐδαμῶς καθ’ ὁτιοῦν μετέχεται”). Again, consider Amb 
61.3, PG 91, 1385d-1388a: “But the tent is also an image of the totality of creation, intelligible and 
sensible, which God the Father as Intellect (Nous) conceived, and which the Son as Word created, and 
which the Holy Spirit brought to completion.” Not only is the Father Intellect here (rather than the Son, as 
required by a Son = Intellect view), but it’s distinctively the Son/Word who executes the creative act—a 
notion that, whatever potential problems, must at least mean that creation “in the Word” is really linked to 
his distinctive personhood.  
137 I therefore cannot agree with Tollefsen, Christocentric, 88 who sees little substantive 
difference between Plotinian and Maximian logoi: “The Plotinian Intellect contemplates the Forms as its 
thoughts, and there is unity because what contemplates (subject) and what is contemplated (object) are the 
same. Of course, this is the case with God and His divine wisdom expressed in the [Maximian] logoi as 
well.” That for the Maximus the logoi in no way complete or actualize the one nature of the Logos 
distinguishes his doctrine quite clearly from Neoplatonic logoi. Again, contrast Syrianus, in Metaph. 106, 
26 – 107,1 (cited at Sorabji, The Philosophy of the Commentators, vol. 3,  146—full citation at n. 170): 
“And, being complete, [Intellect] thinks everything. So nothing that has real being is left out of the essence 
of the Intellect, but it always situates the Forms (eide) in itself. They are not different in it and in its 
essence, but complete its being and bring to everything productive (poietike), paradigmatic and final cause. 
For it creates as Intellect, and the paradigms exist as Forms and are productive through themselves and 
their own goodness.” 
138 Aetius, Plac. I.7; SVF 2.1027; Long & Sedley 46A: “οἱ Στωικοὶ νοερὸν θεὸν ἀποφαίνονται, 
πῦρ τεχνικὸν ὁδῷ βαδίζον ἐπὶ γενέσει κόσμου, ἐμπεριειληφός < τε > πάντας τοὺς σπερματικοὺς λόγους 
καθ’ οὓς ἅπαντα καθ’ εἱμαρμένην γίνεται, καὶ πνεῦμα μὲν ἐνδιῆκον δι’ ὅλου τοῦ κόσμου, τὰς δὲ 





And not only does the Stoic Logos-god contain all “seminal principles within,” but, as 
“the seminal logos of the cosmos,”139 this Logos “brings forth [the world] from 
himself”140 and simultaneously “comes to be in its parts.”141 The Stoic Logos does not 
proceed into the logoi of all things through declension.142 In every logos dwells the same 
Logos whose very identity constitutes both the universal identity and the particular 
difference of all beings.143 
 Now compare all this to an ostensibly odd feature of Maximian protology. 
There’s another “movement” besides procession and return in Maximus, “expansion” and 
“contraction.”144 Maximus knows a “principle and mode of expansion and contraction,” 
the “simple essence” that pervades and binds all genera, species, and individuals into a 
single world.145 We’ve similar ideas in Stoic physics.146 More striking still, the Word 
“expands His very self” into and as the creative logoi.147 And so the Word’s “procession” 
(Amb 7) and “expansion” (Amb 33) ultimately name the same creative movement, the 
way God brings the world from nothing, from himself.148 
                                                 
139 Diogenes Laertius, 7.135-6; SVF 1.102 and 2.580; Long & Sedley 46B; cp. the discussion of 
Amb 6 above at sec. 2.2. 
140 Diogenes Laertius, 7.137: “ἐξ ἑαυτοῦ γεννῶν.” 
141 Origen, Cels. IV.41; SVF 2.1052. I have rendered “ἐπὶ μέρους” in the plural, partly because the 
immediate context implies it: Origen’s critique of the idea that God has a body. For Origen this must mean 
the Stoic god is, among other absurdities, composed of parts: “οὐδὲ γὰρ δεδύνηνται οὗτοι τρανῶσαι τὴν 
φυσικὴν τοῦ θεοῦ ἔννοιαν, ὡς πάντῃ ἀφθάρτου καὶ ἁπλοῦ καὶ ἀσυνθέτου καὶ ἀδιαιρέτου” (ibid.). 
142 Plotinus, En. V.1 [10] 6, for instance, teaches that Intellect’s logos is not Intellect itself, but the 
hypostasis of Soul that derives from Intellect. Plotinus evinces a conspicuous tendency to separate and 
stratify a hypostasis and its logos, so that the logos appears “always as an expression of the preceding level 
respectively.” Indeed, “it would seem that Plotinus is concerned to avoid any expression that might be 
taken as a step” in the direction of equating them; so Graeser, Plotinus and the Stoics, 35 (cf. 41). 
143 Sedley, “The Stoic Theory of Universals,” 89. 
144 Cf.Tollefsen, Christocentic, 78. 
145 Amb 10.89, PG 91, 1177b-c: “κατὰ διαστολὴν καὶ συστολὴν λόγῳ τε καὶ τρόπῳ.” 
146 Cp. Galen, Nat. fac. 106.13-17; SVF 2.406; Long & Sedley 47E; and Philo, Quod deus sit 
immut. 35-6; SVF 2.458; Long & Sedley 47Q. 
147 Amb 33.2, discussed above at sec. 22., text 1. 
148 Maximus notes two wrong ways to understand the expansion of Word into world. [1] It is a real 
multiplication of hypostases and essences, a real “other,” as it were, from God. Thus the Word’s expansion 




 Two crucial features emerge from this comparison. Both distinguish Maximus 
and the Stoics from Neoplatonic participation/procession. First, each retains the order or 
sequence of Neoplatonic procession without a gradual, vertical chain of self-subsistent 
intermediaries. The One Word certainly “preexists” the manifold cosmos.149 And yet, 
unless the very Word becomes the undiminished, immanent, and personal presence in and 
as the principles of everything, there’s no cosmos at all. Second, this more “horizontal” 
creative procession does not preclude some version of a vertical, cosmic hierarchy. The 
point is rather that this hierarchy emerges from within the sole world that subsists—the 
cosmos. In neither Stoicism nor Maximus do we come upon a “world of ideas” akin to 
                                                                                                                                                 
which motion does not imply a different essence from the Father’s. The “Monad,” he says, “is not like the 
origin of the things that come after it, as if it had expanded after a state of contraction, like something 
naturally poured out and proliferating into a multitude” (Amb 1.3, PG 91, 1036b). And this, of course, is 
one way Maximus’s creative Word-expansion diverges from Stoicism. [2] It is not a fragmentation of the 
Word (either in person or in essence): the Word proceeds “without expanding disparately into the infinite 
differences of the beings in which He exists as Being.” And yet, Maximus marvels, the Word truly 
becomes wholly, indivisibly, and personally present as the logos of what’s “common” and “individual” in 
every single thing and in the whole of all things—“truly all things in all [1 Cor 12.6, 15.20; Eph 1.23]” 
(Amb 22.3).  
149 Here we must exercise due care and precision when predicating “preexistence” of the Word. To 
say the Creator Word “preexisted” obviously cannot refer to an existence prior to creation in some sort of 
sequential sense, since creation is the generation of temporal sequence itself. Better to distinguish two uses 
of the suffix “pre-” in talk of the “pre-existent” or “pre-Incarnate Word”—a phrase John Behr confesses he 
has “yet to encounter in the Fathers” (cf. his John the Theologian and His Pascal Gospel, Pref., 4 [pre-pub. 
ms.]). First, there is the straightforward, serial, temporal sense that would signify the Word’s presence and 
activity “before” the first century CE. The Word has indeed “existed” prior to that century; it’s not as if he 
had to wait until his conception in Mary in order to be at all. But this sense immediately implicates and 
indeed gives way to a second, less heeded one: the “beyond,” “transcendent,” or simply “non-” existent 
nature of the Word’s divinity. In this sense the “pre-” in the affirmation, “the Word preexists the world,” in 
no way indicates an episode (or infinite episodes) that preceded his human existence. It means rather that 
the Word’s divine nature is without origin or beginning, and is therefore not subject to temporal existence 
as such (Maximus often simply refers to this as divine “eternity,” or even his being prior to eternity itself; 
e.g. CC 3.28). But both of these predications, note well, are (necessarily) of Christ’s natures. He himself, 
his person or hypostasis, supposes both by nature. Therefore it’s more correct to say: the Word, God by 
nature, exists in every temporal moment (including those before the first century) as the God who does not 
properly “exist” at all; and yet the selfsame Word, man by nature, only exists from the first century 
forward. Still more proper, given the deification of the Word’s humanity that renders even creatures 
“without origin” (Amb 10.48), we must come to say: the very same Word born in the “middle” of time and 
thus marked by the properties acquired in that birth (his Jewishness, his biological DNA inherited from 
Mary, etc.)—through the interpenetration of human and divine nature in himself—that very Word is 




Platonic forms.150 Rather, both envision only the eternal Word and the temporal world, 
which together form a single subsistent cosmos because the Word is both at once.151 The 
Word constructs the very world of ideas from within this world. Stoicism can “combine 
pantheism and cosmic hierarchy”152 precisely because when their Word processes, he 
remains the Word he is, and, being himself in and as the world, he gives “form and figure 
to every particular thing [εἰδοποιεῖν ἕκαστα καὶ σχηματίζειν].”153 Maximus uses these 
exact terms: 
What are these logoi that were first embedded within the subsistence of beings, 
according to which each being is and has its nature, and from which each was 
formed [εἰδοπεποίηται], shaped [ἐσχημάτισται], and structured, and endowed with 
power, the ability to act, and to be acted upon...?154 
 
The logoi are not separately subsistent, participated forms. They are the personal Logos 
crafting all things from within.155    
 So then, the second qualification to participation logic comes from the side of the 
participated. The logoi, which are the Word’s self-willed procession as the “infinite 
identity” of all things156—of their most generic kind to their most individual difference, 
and of the manifold relations among all universals and particulars—are not participated 
                                                 
150 Pace Balthasar, Cosmic Liturgy, 120-1, though he’s correct in his immediate point that there 
exist no “unrealized possibilities” in Maximus’s Word; cf. Tollefsen, Christocentric, 76, 88, passim. 
151 See above, sec. 2.2, text 4. 
152 Thomas Bénatouïl, “How Industrious can Zeus be? The Extent and Objects of Divine Activity 
in Stoicism,” in God and Cosmos in Stoicism, ed. Ricardo Salles (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 
33. 
153 Plutarch, St. rep. 1054B; SVF 2.449; LS 47M, slightly modified; cf. Alexander of Aphrodisias, 
De mixt. 18-27; SVF 2.1044. 
154 Amb 17.7, PG 91, 1228A-B, slightly modified: “Τίνες οἱ ἑκάστῳ τῶν ὄντων τῇ ὑπάρξει πρώτως 
ἐγκαταβληθέντες λόγοι, καθ’ οὓς καὶ ἔστι καὶ πέφυκε τῶν ὄντων ἕκαστον, καὶ εἰδοπεποίηται, καὶ 
ἐσχημάτισται, καὶ συντέθειται, καὶ δύναται, καὶ ἐνεργεῖ, καὶ πάσχει...”; see too Ep 15, PG 91, 561D, where 
Maximus specifies that the divine power causes each being by “emplacing” (ἐνθεμένης) “a logos in each 
creature which is constitutive of being (τοῦ εἶναι συστατικὸν).” 
155 No contradiction arises, therefore, between the fact that the logoi are not themselves forms and 
yet perform the task of formal causality: they are indeed “archetypical logoi” (QThal 55, SC 554, 234), but 
the fully subsistent “archetype of divine and true life” is also “still to come” (Amb 71.10, PG 91, 1416c: 
“τὴν μέλλουσαν...ἀρχετυπίαν).  




forms. They do not subsist in themselves or in some separate realm. They subsist in only 
two realities: eternally, in and as the very hypostasis of the Word; and simultaneously, in 
and as the very principles that cause and sustain the entire world.157 
 
2.5 – Third qualification: the logoi of created hypostases (the participants) 
Now consider participation from the opposite vantage, from the side of the created 
individuals or hypostases—the participants. We meet a qualification from below, as it 
were. You might state it like this: one reason participation, an activity, cannot account for 
the whole creative act (and so the whole God-world relation) is that it cannot explain the 
creation of the positivity of participants as such, the actors. A picture captivates us: 
The creation of the world...is to bring God’s eternal knowledge of beings into a 
temporal dimension. Beings have their design in the logoi, and creation is 
precisely this, that entities are called into the temporal sphere...of participation in 
God’s activity in accordance with these designs.158 
 
But if participation names the “sphere” into which God’s creative act moves the beings 
he has always had in mind, how could the dynamics of that very sphere explain a 
movement into that sphere, into itself? How do you get a participant “before” 
participation? Or how is there participation “before” participants? The movement into 
participating God must itself precede and (and so exceed) participation, lest we coil 
ourselves into a circular argument. The circle would run thus: creation is the transitive 
                                                 
157 Thunberg, Microcosm and Mediator, 77, correctly observes that the logoi “are not identical 
either with the essence of God or with the existence of things in the created world,” but sees in this 
principally (and vaguely) “an apophatic tendency” allied to “an anti-pantheistic tendency.” I suggest more: 
the logoi are both uncreated and the foundation of creation because, as we saw with the historical body of 
Jesus Christ, the Logos himself, in his ineffable economy, proves to be both uncreated and created by 
nature—and indeed, he becomes the concrete identity of both (cf. Chapter 1, sec. 1.4). Again the basic 
distinction (not separation) between the logic of hypostasis and essence, even and especially in the Trinity’s 
case, ought to matter here in protology too, lest it be utter nonsense to speak of the Word’s personal role in 
creating all things (as at Amb 7.15). 




movement from nonbeing into participating God (Tollefsen’s “sphere”); but that very 
movement is itself a participation in God; therefore creation is participation in 
participation—a senseless assertion.159 
 Matters worsen if you believe with Maximus that individual participants qua 
hypostases bear their own distinctive, whole, existential positivity. That idea, we saw, 
results inexorably from the basic distinction between nature and hypostasis in Maximus’s 
Christo-logic.160 But it exacerbates the problem of participation “from below” because 
now a hypostasis, which bears absolutely no formal content as such, still bears some sort 
of positivity that requires a causal act which intends that very individual. Now, for 
Maximus a hypostasis simpliciter is an effect in its own right, with its own integrity, 
rather than just the fleeting residue of ever more contracted, higher, subsistent forms or 
ideas. All this becomes clearer if we return to Maximus’s logoi doctrine, this time from 
the perspective of the participants these logoi ground and effect. 
 A thing’s logos comprises and establishes the whole ontological continuum of its 
nature, power, and activity.161 So there is a logos of each participated nature (one of 
angels, one of human beings, and so on) and a logos of each individual’s way of 
participating its nature(s), and these together constitute an individual creature’s own 
prescribed logos.162 A logos indeed for every branch of Porphyry’s tree: the logos of a 
                                                 
159 This is not a problem for Neoplatonists, at least not with respect to participation in Intellect by 
its lower participants. Lower hypostases are nothing but modified or qualified permutations of Intellect’s 
own essential activity. So Neoplatonists have a perfectly reasonable way of explaining the movement from 
Intellect’s hypostasis to lower participations in it: participants in Intellect were never separate from the 
“sphere” of Intellect’s activity, since they essentially are Intellect. Their departure or procession from 
Intellect is actually a move into lesser activity, not a move from non-activity to activity. Lower hypostases 
= participations. Cf. Proclus, El. Theol., props 1-2.  
160 Chapter 1, sec. 1.3. 
161 Amb 15.5; cf. CT 1.3. 
162 Amb 7.16: through the Word God creates and continues to create “universals as well as 




genus allows it to exist “as a whole indivisibly and really in the whole of those things 
subordinate to it,” while the logos of a particular is contained by the logoi of “what is 
universal and generic.”163 The preexistent logos of an individual creature necessarily 
includes its formal content, what sort of thing it is, up to the most generic level. Its “logos 
of being” makes it the sort of thing that is.164 
 More often Maximus invokes the logoi to secure the integrity of creaturely 
difference. This certainly includes the difference of natural genera and species, and even 
the categorical distinctions embedding a creature in space and time—all of which 
contribute to the unique identity of that creature, something close to Porphyry’s “bundle 
of properties.”165 Close, but not quite. Maximus knows a still deeper individuality, the 
difference of the differing thing itself. For “if we wish to have a complete knowledge of 
things,” he says, “it is not enough to enumerate the multitude of characteristics,” that is, 
“whatever is around the subject.” But it’s “absolutely necessary that we also indicate 
what is the subject of these characteristics, which is the foundation, as it were, upon 
which they stand.”166 No creature simply “coincides in its essence with what is and is 
called the assemblage of characteristics that are recognized and predicated of it.” The 
inmost identity of the individual creature “is something different from these 
characteristics,” something “which holds them all together, but is in no way held together 
                                                                                                                                                 
its simultaneous participation in many levels of being, from its species to its highest genera (“common 
being”): in the concrete individual are wrought “many and sundry unifications of things separated,” like 
many “angles” converging at a single point (QThal 48.17, CCSG 7, 341). 
163 Amb 41.10-11. 
164 Amb 7.22; Amb 41.10, passim. For “being” (οὐσία) as the most universal genus of creatures, as 
well as how this diverges from Aristotelian-Porphyrian conceptions, see Tollefsen, Christocentric, 97, and 
Melchisedec Törönen, Union and Distinction in the Thought of St Maximus the Confessor (Oxford: OUP, 
2007), 140. 
165 Cp. Porphyry, Isag. (CAG 4.1.7) with Amb 17.5-6; cf. Amb 7.15,19 and Amb 22.2. The 
differentiating role of logos is especially clear in Christological discussions; cf. Amb 36.2, and below. 





by them” and so “is not derived from” or “identical with them.”167 The logoi together 
carve out the individual difference of the differing thing—quite Platonic. But Maximus 
also attributes a logos to the difference of the individual as such, what he calls the “logos 
of hypostasis.” Whereas a thing’s “nature” “comprehends the common logos of being,” 
its “hypostasis” “comprehends also the logos of being for that very individual.”168 A 
creature’s preexistent logos grounds its identity as that individual—none of which should 
surprise, given Maximus’s Christo-logic. 
 We can appreciate Maximus’s originality here if we contrast his logoi to 
Plotinus’s particular forms, especially since the two are often equated.169 Richard Sorabji 
has rightly observed that Plotinus’s concept of particular or individual forms “can provide 
no help with the differentiation of persons, since the individuals in question are souls.”170 
A particular soul is a fixed nature, more precisely a preexistent form, which contains as 
logoi the potential for “all the individuals it animates in succession.” These logoi permit 
reincarnation. The same soul can now be Socrates and later Pythagoras.171 It’s true that 
Plotinus cannot conceive the relation between an individual and its form in simply formal 
terms, “as portraits of Socrates are to their original.”172 The logoi of a soul (indeed the 
logoi of the whole world soul) shuffle down, as it were, into the material realm, and by 
their “unequal predominance” together with matter constitute an individual. The mother 
transmits now these logoi, now those, the father these, now those; certain logoi 
                                                 
167 Amb 17.6. 
168 Opusc. 26, PG 91, 264a: “Ὅτι ἡ μὲν φύσις τὸν τοῦ εἶναι λόγον κοινὸν ἐπέχει, ἡ δὲ ὑπόστασις, 
καὶ τὸν τοῦ καθ’ ἑαυτὸ εἶναι.” 
169 Perl, Methexis, 148 n. 2. This appears to be assumed by Tollefsen, Christocentric, 88; 
Balthasar, Cosmic Liturgy, 116-17, et al. 
170 Richard Sorabji, The Philosophy of the Commentators, 200-600 AD: A Sourcebook: Volume 3: 
Logic and Metaphysics (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2005), 362. For what follows see 362-7. 
171 En. V.7 [18] 1; Armstrong, 223. 




predominate during this particular time period, others at another, still others at this place, 
others elsewhere—myriad individual combinations ad infinitum.173 A circuitous route, 
sure, but where individuals are generated by logoi “the difference must [still] be linked 
with the form.”174 An individual preexists only as a potency of its particular form. Just to 
the extent it is an individual, it is not its form. And so, as Proclus insists, it is not known 
by Intellect before the individual comes to be.175 
 Maximus agrees that an individual qua hypostasis is unknowable. A hypostasis 
certainly possesses form, bears a particular nature, but it’s not itself form. No form, no 
intelligible content. Again, a “nature” has to do with “a logos of form,” and while a 
hypostasis as such lacks formal content, it still has a logos of some kind.176 Of what kind? 
Of no kind, for a “logos of hypostasis,” by definition, names no formal principle at all. 
This goes for every creaturely hypostasis. Since “every divine energy indicates through 
itself the whole God, indivisibly present in each individual thing, according to the logos 
through which that thing exists in its own way [ἐν ἑκάστῳ καθ’ ὅνπερ τινὰ λόγον ἐστὶν 
ἰδικῶς],” then no mind can fathom “precisely how God is whole in all things commonly, 
and in each being in an irreducibly singular way [ἐν ἑκάστῳ τῶν ὄντῶν ἰδιαζόντως].” 
Intellects “are incapable of understanding even the lowermost creature in terms of the 
                                                 
173 En. V.7 [18] 2, V.9 [5] 12; cf. Proclus, El. Th., prop. 206. 
174 En. V.7 [18] 3; Armstrong, 229: “συνεζεῦχθαι δεῖ τῷ εἴδει τὸ διάφοραν”; cf. Proclus, El. Th., 
194. 
175 PT 1.21, 98, 16-19, Saffrey-Westerink. Proclus adds two arguments against the preexistent 
potency of an individual qua individual: [1] if an individual’s own preexistent idea is also its cause, and if 
that idea is eternal, then this would imply the eternal fixity of the individual—a manifest absurdity (in 
Parm. 824, 12 f.); [2] if an individual’s own preexistent idea is precisely its paradigm, then this entails it to 
be always a paradigm of the individual. But then the individual must always be so that its idea is always 
paradigm. But the individual is obviously not eternal, ergo etc. (in Parm. 824, 23 ff.). 
176 Opus. 26, PG 91, 264b: “Ὅτι ἡ μὲν φύσις εἴδους λόγον μόνον ἐπέχει, ἡ δὲ ὑπόστασις καὶ τοῦ 




logos of its being and existence.”177 In each thing’s logos God is, as Scripture attests, 
truly “all things in all” (1 Cor 12.6, 15.20; Eph 1.23)—from its most common 
participation (Being itself) to what is most particular (hypostasis).178 Where some saw 
only intelligible dearth Maximus glimpsed the fundamental mystery that every single 
creature is: the logos of what is by definition unintelligible—the hypostasis, the concrete 
participant179—God foreknows “as only he knows how.”180 There, where “the intellect 
finds nothing to grasp,” where formal procession can account for nothing of what’s truly 
subsistent—the individual—there one encounters one phenomenon at its most palpable: 
“divine power.”181 
 All this explains why Maximus never says creatures participate their logoi. A 
creature’s logos is the principle “by which” it participates divine perfections (Being, 
Goodness, Immortality, etc.). It is how a creature participates at all, not what it 
participates.182 More, an individual’s logos of hypostasis not only facilitates participation, 
but, as we’ve seen, establishes the participant herself. Maximus can even say that we 
“receive participation.”183 My logos is the preexistent principle that determines what I 
                                                 
177 Amb 22.3, modified. 
178 Jean-Claude Larchet, “La conception maximienne des énergies divines et des logoi et la théorie 
platonicienne des Idées,” Philotheos 4 (2004): 281: that each existent has its own individual logos “fonde 
en Dieu même la diversité du monde créé et la singularité de chaque être.” 
179 Balthasar too noticed in Maximus this play of the “negative identity” and “positive identity” of 
the individual, but, as far as I can see, he did not expressly link these aspects to the causation of a created 
hypostasis as such: he says only that the “negativity” means every creature comes from nothing and is not 
God, and the “positivity” that every creature is yet held in being by God “through his relationship to them” 
(Cosmic, 68). My point here is that the very negative positivity of a hypostasis evades every metaphysical 
relation, and that this relation, whatever it is, must “keep” a thing in being in an utterly unique and 
mysterious way. Maximus thinks that way – not just that fact – has indeed been revealed in Christ, in all its 
proper mystery. 
180 QThal 2 (SC 529, 158); cf. Amb 7.19. 
181 Amb 17.10. I think this is why Maximus tends to transition straightaway from the creation of 
hypostases to amazement at God’s “power” and “wisdom”; cf. Ep 13, PG 91, 299; Ep 15, PG 91, 325;  Amb 
7.19 (cited below at n. 180); Amb 35.2 (here he cites Dionysius in support; DN 9.2); Amb 48.2. 
182 Amb 15.5. So too Perl, Methexis, 52-9; followed by Tollefsen, Christocentric, 174. 
183 Amb 7.21 (PG 91, 1084A): “εἰληφὼς πρὸς τῷ εἶναι καὶ τὸ κατὰ μέθεξιν φύσει ἀγαθόν”; cp. 




participate and the I that participates.184 It’s God predetermining and pre-establishing the 
power to be me—my nature and my person.185 
 
2.6 – The Word proceeds: one act, two modes of activity 
Participation in Maximus has now received three vital qualifications. [1] The world’s 
essence enjoys no kind of natural mediation with or relation to divine essence; [2] the 
logoi that establish the world’s essence are the Word himself and not participated forms 
or ideas that subsist own their own; [3] participants qua hypostases cannot come to be, 
cannot receive their concrete positivity, through participation (understood 
Neoplatonically as the formal, successively determinate limitation of higher acts by lower 
powers). What then is the divine act of creation? And what can “participation” signify in 
this mightily qualified schema? This penultimate section limns a brief but instructive 
portrait of what sort of ontology emerges from the protology we’ve considered. Doing so, 
I hope, will offer some preliminary answers to these abiding questions. 
 Observe two characteristics of this portrait. First, divine creation is a single and 
inevitable act. Second, this one act generates two infinitely different natural modes (and 
so their very difference, too). 
                                                 
184 Pace Perl, Methexis, 153: “A logos is no more than the presence of the participated in the 
participant,” and 163: “Because the hierarchy is continuous from Being down to the logoi of particulars, 
there is no difference between a creature’s having a logos and its participating in the perfections.” The 
presence of the participated, if what’s participated is an energy or perfection (CT 1.48-50) or even a created 
universal (Amb 7.16), can only be present as that creature’s particular form (cf. Proclus’s “whole-in-part” at 
El. Th., props. 72-4). A Maximian hypostasis and its logos cannot be present as form. However the logos of 
hypostasis be immanent, it’s not simply through the transcendence-immanence dialectic of participated and 
participating forms. 
185 Amb 7.19: “in the wisdom of the Creator, individual things [ἕκαστα] were created at the 
appropriate moment in time, in a manner consistent with their logoi, and thus they received in themselves 
actual existence as beings [τὸ εἶναι τῇ ἐνεργείᾳ λαμβάνῃ]. For God is eternally an active creator, but 
creatures exist first in potential, and only later in actuality [Ἐπειδὴ ὁ μὲν ἀεὶ κατ’ ἐνέργειάν ἐστι 
Δημιουργός, τὰ δὲ δυνάμει μέν ἐστιν, ἐνεργείᾳ δὲ ουκ ἔτι], since it is not possible for the infinite and the 




 1. One inevitable act. Maximus conceives the act of creation in both aorist and 
present tense. Wisdom 9.1 (and Jn 1, Col 1, etc.) say God “created” or “made” all things, 
yet in John 5.17 Jesus says: “My father continues to work even now, and I too am at 
work.”186 Maximus thinks this indicates two moments of a single creative act. God 
“completed” or “fulfilled” the foundational logoi of creatures “all at once” (ἅπαξ),187 and 
these, we already know, constitute the power of every creature to be who and what and at 
all.188 But the actualization of these powers, the arboreal “extension of the ages”—these 
imply that God continues to create at every moment.189 The logoi of identity and 
difference, the very lineaments of created being, show themselves “one in power” though 
they “assume a different and multi-modal activity.”190 Creation is a work of the entire 
Trinity, to be sure, but a work carefully distributed: the Father “approves” (εὐδοκῶν), the 
Son “actualizes it from himself” (αὐτουργῶν), the Holy Spirit “completes” 
(συμπληροῦντος) the roles of both.191 And I must note en passant: Maximus uses exactly 
the same schema to describe the act of the historical Incarnation.192 
 I mentioned above that Maximus thinks divine creation inevitable. He could never 
agree with Florovsky, for example, that “the world could have not existed.”193 Here 
                                                 
186 Jn 5.17 (as cited at QThal 2, SC 529, 158): “ὁ πατὴρ μου ἕως ἄρτι ἐργάζεται, κἀγὼ ἐργάζομαι.” 
187 QThal 2, SC 529, 158. 
188 Amb 7.19, 10.90, 42.14, 65.2. 
189 Amb 46.4, PG 91, 1357a-b, where, once again, this act of creation comes by the Word’s 
condescension to become the very power of each and all: “He deigned to vary the modes of His presence so 
that the good things He planted in beings might ripen to full maturity, until the ages will have reached their 
appointed limit [συγκαταβατικῶς ἐφεῖναι τὰς ἀκτῖνας ἀνεχόμενος, ποικίλαι τοὺς τρόπους ἀξιώσας πρὸς 
τελεσφόρησιν ὧν τοῖς οὖσιν οἰκείων κατέσπειρεν ἀγαθῶν μέχρι τῆς πάντων ἀποπερατώσεως τῶν αἰώνων]. 
At that point He will gather together the fruits of His own sowing....”; cf. too Amb 7.16. 
190 Amb 10.37, modified. 
191 QThal 2, SC 529, 160. 
192 QThal 60, SC, 569, 88; Comm. in Or. dom., CCSG 7, 51. 
193 Florovsky, “Creation and Creaturehood,” 45, 51; again, starkly put at 57: ““In a sense, it would 
be ‘indifferent’ to God whether the world exists or not—herein consists the absolute ‘all-sufficiency’ of 
God, the Divine autarchy.... The might of God and the freedom of God must be defined not only as the 




Maximus’s doctrine appears more or less diametrically opposed to Florovsky’s, since the 
latter confuses creation’s inevitability with its self-sufficiency and then accuses such a 
view of “introducing the world into the intra-Trinitarian life of the Godhead as a co-
determinant principle.”194 Maximus rather thinks a supposed indeterminacy on God’s part 
toward the world would itself introduce another principle into God, a shadow side, as it 
were, to God’s utterly unhinged and aleatoric will. Strange to say it, but Maximus even 
considers this among the most offensive implications of Origenism, and indeed links it to 
Manichaeanism.195 It’s the Origenist myth, Maximus notices, which imagines God 
having to “react” to the downward inclination of the primordial souls and so create 
something he never intended to create—bodies. Not only would this mean attributing to 
sin (as an essential condition) the beauty of the corporeal cosmos, it would imply the 
merest possibility that there might arise logoi or “wills” in God he did not intend from 
eternity, from the goodness of his nature. Maximus doesn’t even consider this line. To 
him one thing’s surest of all: “the purpose of God, who created all things, must be 
changeless concerning them.”196 Ultimately it’s the Word’s Incarnation that defines for us 
God’s unwavering and irrevocable disposition toward creation—that reveals God is 
“truly Creator by nature.”197 And so Maximus upholds a venerable thread of tradition that 
                                                                                                                                                 
His main argument is creation’s inherent instability and lack of self-sufficiency. But to deduce 
pure contingency from instability is to think creation apart from the nature of the Creator. The issue is not 
whether creation depends on God, but whether God is the sort of God who could not but give himself as the 
source of what wholly depends on him. Even the strictest emanationist, after all, admits that finite beings 
depend on higher principles. 
194 Florovsky, “Creation and Creaturehood,” 56. 
195 Amb 42.16. This association was made in a general way at Constantinople II; cf. Evagrius 
Scholasticus, H.E. IV.38. 
196 Amb 42.15; PG 91, 1329C. 
197 QThal 60.8, SC 569, 90: “For it was truly necessary that He who is by nature the Creator of the 
essence of beings Ἔδει γὰρ ὡς ἀληθῶς τὸν κατὰ φύσιν τῆς τῶν ὄντων οὐσίας δημιουργὸν] should have 
also been, through Himself, the Author of the deification of beings by grace. In this way the Giver of well-




affirms the “sublime necessity” of divine creation,198 rarely defended in contemporary 
theology with the exception of another great Russian theologian and Florovsky’s master, 
Fr. Sergius Bulgakov.199 
 2. Two infinitely different natural modes. In CT 1.48-50 we come upon a schema 
of participation that appears obviously Neoplatonic. Any determinate thing (τι) is 
qualified by (at least) the predicate “to be,” and any such thing is a “work of God.”200 
Works of God come under two categories: those that “began” and those that “did not 
begin” or, more precisely, works generated “temporally” (χρονικῶς) and those 
“eternally” (ἀϊδίως). Temporally effected works designate “all participating beings [τὰ 
ὄντα μετέχοντα], such as the different essences of beings.”201 Works produced 
eternally—the second type—are “participated realities” (τα ὄντα μεθεκτά) that 
participants participate “by grace.”202 This latter category of divine works comprises 
participated realities like “all life, immortality, simplicity, immutability, infinity,” and 
                                                 
198 Blowers, Drama of the Divine Economy, 173-8. He cites Irenaeus, Adv. haer. 3.22.3; 
Athanasius, Contra gent. 35; Gregory of Nyssa, Or. catech. (GNO 3.4:17, l. 5-18, l. 4). I add Gregory 
Nazianzus, Or. 38.9, cited at Amb 35.1, PG 91, 1288d: “But since this did not suffice to Goodness—to 
move solely within self-contemplation—it was necessary that the Good should overflow and make 
progress, so that a greater number of beings would benefit.” Maximus comments with no fuss over the talk 
of necessity, and even adds a touch by citing Dionysius’s “ever-giving effusion” of divine goodness that 
proceeds from an “incomprehensible permanence” within God himself; Amb 35.2, cp. DN 9.2. 
199 Sergius Bulgakov, The Lamb of God, transl. Boris Jakim (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2008 
[orig: 1933]), 120: “God needs the world, and it could not have remained uncreated. But God needs the 
world not for himself but for the world itself. God is love, and it is proper for love to love and to expand in 
love…. Otherwise, absoluteness itself becomes a limit for the Absolute, a limit of self-love or self-
affirmation, and that would attest to the limitedness of the Absolute’s omnipotence -- to its impotence, as it 
were…. And if it is in general possible for God’s omnipotence to create the world, it would be improper for 
God’s love not to actualize this possibility, inasmuch as, for love, it is natural to love, exhausting to the end 
all the possibilities of love…. God-Love needs the creation of the world in order to love, no longer only in 
his own life, but also outside himself, in creation.”—Read this alongside Maximus’s remark at Amb 10.119: 
“For it was on the highest logoi of God accessible by man, namely, His goodness and love, that they rightly 
concentrated their vision, and it was from these that they learned that God was moved to give being to all 
the things that exist.” 
200 CT 1.49, PG 90, 1101, Salés 70: “Πᾶν τὰρ εἴ τι τὸν τοῦ εἶναι λόγον ἔχει κατηγορούμενον, 
ἔργον Θεοῦ τυγχάνει.” 
201 CT 1.48, Salés 70-1, slightly modified. 




even “being itself.”203 And the God who works “incomprehensibly eludes infinitely all 
beings, participating and participated.”204 
 Three levels, then: God the unparticipated,205 his eternal works (participated), and 
his temporal works (the participants). A rather neat and apparently straightforward (if 
simplified) appropriation of Neoplatonic participation, Proclus’s in particular.206 But 
notice some oddities. Maximus calls both types of divine works “beings” (τὰ ὄντα). Fine 
enough for participants generated in time, but what to say about “beings” eternally 
wrought? This might recall Proclus’s henads, causal mediators who share a single 
essence but effect different participants. Jonathan Greig has recently given the lie to this 
ostensible parallel, since, of course, Proclus’s henads are whole, “self-subsistent” 
hypostases.207 God’s eternal works, though they have being, are nowhere called 
hypostases, and indeed this would violate Maximus’s first qualification denying any 
natural mediation between created and uncreated essences (sec. 2.3).208 
 Tollefsen argues that the “being” of God’s eternal works puts Maximus in 
opposition to the Dionysian priority of Good over Being: “For Maximus, then, Goodness 
embraces the other activities and is itself embraced by Being.”209 That is, Tollefsen 
conceives the “being” of participated works as itself an instance of participation. I noted 
                                                 
203 CT 1.48, Salés 70-1: “πᾶσα ζωὴ καὶ ἀναθανασία καὶ ἁπλότης καὶ ἀτρεψία καὶ ἀπειρία,” and CT 
1.50, Salés 72: “αὐτὴ ἡ ὀντότης.” 
204 CT 1.49, PG 90, 1101, Salés 70-1: “Πάντων τῶν ὄντων καὶ μετεχόντων καὶ μεθεκτῶν 
ἀπειράκις ἀπείρως, ὁ Θεὸς ὑπερεξῄρηται.” 
205 Cf. Amb 42.15. 
206 Proclus, El. Theol., esp. prop. 63, Dodds 60-1: “Every unparticipated term gives rise to two 
orders of participated terms, the one in contingent participants, the other in things which participate at all 
times and in virtue of their nature.” 
207 Proclus, El. Theol., prop. 64, Dodds 60: “αἱ...αὐτοτελεῖς ὑποστάσεις.” See Greig, “Proclus’ 
Doctrine of Participation,” 12-13.  
208 If eternal works of God were neither Trinitarian nor created hypostases (in time), then would 
seem to form a mediating term that mediates by possessing qualities from both extremes, as it were. As we 
saw at sec. 2.3, though, Maximus faults “the Greeks” for exactly this, that they conceive difference as 
gradual qualification of one primal essence or reality. 




before some metaphysical problems with this line of thought, but here an exegetical point 
suffices: the participated works of God include “being itself.”210 Being itself is. Whatever 
the “is” of being itself, therefore, it cannot derive from participation. For what “being” 
would “participated being itself” participate? All that subsists above, we saw, is “true 
being” never participated—the divine essence.211 So what constitutes the “being” of 
God’s eternal works?212 Or, since the participated works are also the one God,213 
reformulate it thus: how can the imparticipible God become participible in his eternal 
works? 
 A hint: Maximus says here that the participated (eternal) works have “by grace 
been implanted in originated beings [temporal works/participants], as if a kind of 
implanted potentiality, loudly proclaiming that God is in all beings.”214 Once more we 
sense Neoplatonic reverberations. Proclus too teaches that separately participated realities 
are “present to the participant through an inseparable potency which it [i.e. the 
participated] implants.”215 This power subsists in the participant alone, and yet, as the 
transference point of participation between higher act and the lower internal act, it is the 
                                                 
210 CC 1.50, Salés 72: “αὐτὴ ἡ ὀντότης.” Tollefsen, Christocentric, 164, seems to sense the 
tension, but remarks only that this passage (1.50) does not mention the “being” of this list of “works.” But 
surely, as he himself goes on to assume, they belong to the same class as those in CT 1.47-8; indeed, three 
(Goodness, Immortality, Life) appear in both lists. They are therefore also participated beings, and so 
“Being itself” is a participated being. 
211 Mentioned even here at CC 1.49, and at 1.50, Salés 72: “ὑπὲρ οὐσίαν γὰρ πάντων τῶν τε 
νοουμένων καὶ λεγομένων ἐξῄρηται.” See above, sec. 2.3. 
212 Greig, “Proclus’ Doctrine of Participation,” 14 n. 35, seems right to say that the “being” of 
God’s eternal works constitutes “a new ontological category for the partcipated entities, insofar as their 
ontological status is modified from Proclus while still yet distinct from God himself.” 
213 Tollefsen, Christocentric, 161, rightly observes: “If we read Cap. gnost. 1.47 in connection 
with 1.48 it seems a quite reasonable interpretation to hold that the divine works without beginning (1.48) 
are collectively identified as the divine activity (ἡ θεία ἐνέργεια, 1.47).”  
214 CT 1.49, Salés 70-1: “τὸ δὲ κατὰ χάριν τοῖς γεγονόσιν ἐμπέφυκεν, οἷα τις δύναμις ἔμφυτος, τὸν 
ἐν πᾶσι ὄντα Θεὸν διαπρυσίως κηρύττουσα.” It’s obvious from later passages that such “implanted 
powers” are the logoi of beings; see esp. Amb 17.7 and 21.8. 
215 Proclus, El. Theol., prop. 81, Dodds 76-7: “Πᾶν τὸ χωριστῶς διά τινος ἀχωρίστου δυνάμεως, 




“medium” of the two terms.216 But again the comparison is deceptive. Not only are 
Maximus’s “participated realities” not themselves hypostases, but the “power” within 
participants must furnish them the power to be more than what they are; it must also grant 
the power to be who they are, that is, to be hypostases. And hypostases exceed form in 
Maximus, we just saw (sec. 2.5). But Proclus’s implanted “power”—and this is the 
crucial point—rehearses the very mechanism we’ve seen both essential to Neoplatonic 
participation and yet proscribed by Maximian logoi. It’s a power that emanates solely as 
a qualified and more determinate instance of the higher and “more perfect actuality” of its 
cause.217 In other words, this “power” is the cause’s natural activity in a lesser mode. A 
Maximian logos does not emanate by a process of formal modification or participation—
indeed we’ve seen it establishes that very process—but rather in a still more fundamental, 
more mysterious way. 
 All these oddities and divergences make good sense if we make proto-logic 
Christo-logic. This very text (CT 1.49) intimates the way: it begins with the God who 
infinitely transcends both participated and participating works, and then resolves in the 
assertion that this “power” implanted within each participant is both God’s participated 
work and that it heralds God himself in all beings. That’s to say, we have here the divine 
procession into all beings, and this “power” names the term of that procession. God’s 
eternal works dwell within me as my very power to be all I am, and they do so because 
                                                 
216 Proclus, El. Theol., prop. 81, Dodds 76-7. That’s a very compact way of describing the 
Neoplatonic principle of “limitation of [higher] act by [lower] power,” though the isolation of a “medium” 
is Proclus’s touch. 




God himself dwells within.218 Maximus specifies the peculiar character of this procession 
in Amb 7: 
When, however, we exclude the highest form of negative theology concerning the 
Logos—according to which the Logos is neither called, nor considered, nor is, in 
His entirety, anything that can be attributed to anything else, since He is beyond 
all being [ὡς ὑπερούσιος], and is not participated in by any being whatsoever 
[οὐδὲ ὑπό τινος οὐδαμῶς καθ’ ὁτιοῦν μετέχεται]...the one Logos is many logoi 
and the many are One [πολλοὶ λόγοι ὁ εἷς Λόγος ἐστὶ καὶ εἷς οἱ πολλοί]. 
According to the creative and sustaining procession of the One to individual 
beings, which is befitting of divine goodness, the One is many [τὴν ἀγαθοπρεπῆ 
εἰς τὰ ὄντα τοῦ ἑνὸς ποιητικήν τε καὶ συνεκτικὴν πρόοδον πολλοὶ ὁ εἷς]. 
According to the revertive, inductive, and providential return of the many to the 
One [τὴν εἰς τὸν ἕνα τῶν πολλῶν ἐπιστρεπτικήν τε καὶ χειραγωγικὴν ἀναφοράν τε 
καὶ πρόνοιαν]...insofar as the One gathers everything together, the many are 
One.219 
 
 The logoi are and issue from the Logos becoming the causal principles of the 
world. They institute both participant and participated, which is to say they effect a single 
activity in two infinitely different natural modes. And though these modes disclose one 
divine act that constitutes “a single world,” they are themselves infinitely different by 
nature.220 Divine creation, therefore, is a non-natural (or supra-natural) procession of the 
Word that generates an essence utterly different from the divine. And yet these same 
logoi bear within and make accessible to creatures “the infinite divine activities of 
God,”221 which, as CT 1.49 just said, are implanted within us. Here’s the marvel: 
somehow the logoi introduce the eternal works of divine essence (participated) into 
created essence (participants), though the latter enjoys no natural mediation with that 
same divine essence. Somehow the logoi, I mean, make the imparticipable God 
participable in a way that exceeds any natural process. 
                                                 
218 Cf. too Amb 10.102. 
219 Amb 7.20, PG 91, 1081b-c. 
220 Amb 17.8. 




 Wasn’t that exactly the logic of Incarnation? The second person of the Trinity, the 
Word, condescended to make himself identical to human nature, and that act was the very 
creation of that human nature (sec. 1.3). And yet, because created, his human nature bore 
nothing natural in common with his divinity, only the positive identity of his own 
hypostasis (sec. 1.4). Hypostatic identity generated natural difference along with their 
respective powers and modes. And these powers, recall, when reduced to concrete 
actuality in the doings of Christ’s historical life, proved that the proper modes of 
infinitely different natures can interpenetrate one another, whole in whole, in perichoretic 
union (sec. 1.5). His existence revealed that “divine and human activity coincided in a 
single identity.”222 The “mode of exchange” between Christ’s two natures was itself not 
natural for the simple reason that it was his person alone that united them.223 And so, 
though Maximus might indulge participation talk even in a christological context,224 his 
fundamental logic comes ever to this: hypostatic identity generates infinite natural 
difference, and the consequent modes of each nature, when perfected, interpenetrate one 
another symmetrically rather than, say, “by derivation.”225 
 I therefore contend that the “being” attributed to the eternal mode of God’s 
creative activity is the “tri-hypostatic existence” of the divine essence (itself 
imparticipable).226 That explains why eternal works are at once “beings” and not self-
                                                 
222 Amb 5.19, slightly modified. 
223 Amb 5.20. 
224 Amb 36.2, my emphasis: “It was not so amazing...for God to bring into communion with 
Himself, through the infusion of breath, the first formation of human nature...granting to that likeness a 
share of the divine beauty according to His image—as it was for Him to deign to draw near to it after it had 
been stained, and ran from Him....and to enter into intimate communion with it, and to partake of what 
was inferior [καὶ τοῦ χείρονος μετασχεῖν], and to heighten the miracle by means of a paradoxical union 
with things utterly beyond mixture with Him.” 
225 Proclus, El. Theol., prop. 18, quoted above at n. 132. 




subsistent (anhypostatos), namely, because they are hypostasized in the Word.227 It also 
explains how those works can retain their proper mode even while “implanted” in the 
participant’s created nature, which still possesses its own infinitely different mode. These 
modes, that is, are brought into a single subsistence with one another without the slightest 
modal diminishment—without tinkering with their logoi. And those sorts of conditions 
and characteristics only make sense if they bear the very logic which obtained between 
created and uncreated natures in Christ himself. 
 No wonder Maximus dares describe the logoi of created beings as “the body of 
Christ.”228 When he meditates on John 1.14, “the Word became flesh,” and then 
considers other scriptures that speak of Christ’s blood and bones, he begins, as always, at 
the historical Incarnation and then goes cosmic: “The super-essential Word and Creator 
of all beings, wishing to come into [created] essence, bore the natural logoi of every 
sensible and intelligible being along with the inconceivable intellections of his own 
divinity.” Because of this Incarnation, writes Maximus, we must contemplate the logoi of 
                                                 
227 So “virtue,” which Maximus numbers among the “eternal works,” is, a scholiast (not likely 
Maximus) says in one place, “enhypostasized” in the deified, which is how Maximus can say “God 
continually becomes man” in all the deified; cf. QThal 22, schol. 8. This remark also helps elucidate why 
Maximus appeals to the role of virtue in deification to illustrate his logoi doctrine at Amb 7.21-23: because 
the Word (with the Father and Spirit) enhypostasizes God’s “eternal works” (like virtue), and because the 
Word makes himself identical to our logoi, then the actualization of our logoi is simultaneously the Word’s 
actualization of his works—indeed himself—in us. 
— Cp. too Amb 10.41, modified, where the Word is the “is” of creatures: “Through this act of 
contemplation the saints gathered up the aforementioned modes into one, and they shaped within 
themselves, to the extent possible, the absolutely unique principles, which, with the different forms of 
virtues, totally fills the substance of the world of the willing mind, having passed beyond not simply the 
logoi of beings, but also the logoi of the virtues themselves, or rather with these logoi they arrived at the 
One who is beyond them all...to the Word who is beyond being and beyond goodness, out of Whom and 
Who is being for these [being and goodness] [καὶ εἰς ὃν οὗτοι καὶ ἐξ οὗ τὸ εἶναι τούτοις ἐστὶν ὑπερούσιον 
καὶ ὑπεράγαθον Λόγον].” 
228 Amb 54.2, PG 91, 1376c, lightly altered: “The ‘body’ of Christ is either the soul, or its powers, 
or sensations, or the body of each human being, or the members of the body, or the commandments, or the 
virtues, or the logoi of created beings, or, to put it simply and more truthfully, each and all of these things, 
both individually and collectively, are the body of Christ [ἰδίᾳ τε καὶ κοινῇ, ταῦτα πάντα καὶ τούτων 





sensible creatures “as flesh to eat,” and the logoi of intelligible creatures “as blood to 
drink,” and the unbroken bones “the logoi concerning his divinity.”229 In other words, 
once more the logoi of creation—creatio ex nihilo—just are the logic of Christ. It’s the 
Word’s prior act of self-identification with created essence that generates it at all, that 
grounds the participants and makes God’s own activity participable (since it is not by 
essence). After a reflection at length on what it means to consume Christ, Maximus draws 
all these threads together: 
But who would be able to enumerate all the aspects of God our Savior, which 
exist for our sake, and according to which He has made Himself edible and 
participable to all in proportion to the measure of each [καθ’ ἃς ἐδώδιμον ἑαυτὸν 
καὶ μεταληπτὸν ἀναλόγως ἑκάστῳ πεποίηκεν]?.... Proper and profitable 
communion in these is attained by those who assimilate each member in light of 
the spiritual meaning signified by each. In this manner, according to that holy and 
great teacher, the Lamb of God ‘is eaten, and given up to spiritual digestion,’ 
assimilating to Himself, through the Spirit, those who partake of Him [μεταποιῶν 
πρὸς ἑαυτὸν τῷ Πνεύματι τοὺς μεταλαμβάνοντας], for He guides and transposes 
each one to the place in the body that corresponds to the member that was 
spiritually eaten by him, so that in a way befitting His love of mankind the Word 
becomes the essence in concrete wholes, the very Word who alone is above nature 
and reason [ὥστε φιλανθρώπως τὸν ἐν τοῖς ὅλοις Λόγον τοῖς πράγμασιν οὐσίαν 
γίνεσθαι τὸν μόνον ὑπὲρ φύσιν καὶ λόγον].230 
 
2.7 – Conclusion 
I’ve contended in this chapter that Maximus’s logoi doctrine, protologically considered, 
differs in crucial respects from Neoplatonic participation, and that these anomalies 
indicate that the act of divine creation corresponds to the first two elements of Christo-
logic. The anomalies are three: 
1. Creatio ex nihilo means uncreated and created natures share absolutely no 
natural principle, quality, power, or mode, and so their relation cannot be 
described as a natural procession from higher, less determinate to lower, more 
                                                 
229 QThal 35.2, SC 529, 374-5. 




determinate modes of the same essence. 
 
2. And yet there is a procession from one to many, but it’s specifically the Logos 
who makes himself hypostatically identical to the logoi of the created world and 
so generates it. Thus the activity of the essentially imparticipable God becomes 
participable through the only possible medium: the Word’s person. 
 
3. The Word’s procession penetrates deeper than formal principles (the logoi of 
natures) to establish the non-formal identity of creaturely hypostases as such (the 
logoi of hypostases). It grounds, that is, the very participants who then participate 
the eternal works the Word bears in himself, in them. 
 
[1] and [2] match the first two elements of Christo-logic, in reverse order. Christo-logic’s 
first element dictates that the only concrete identity must be hypostatic (not natural)—this 
occurs at anomaly [2]. The second element says that very hypostatic identity is the 
fundamental cause of essential difference, as with the enhypostatization of Christ’s 
humanity—this explains [1].  
 This latter observation is no mere surmise. Maximus says it aloud. If Maximus 
faults Greek philosophy and Origenism for failing to conceive a relation between God 
and world that’s not some sort of natural relation (which would demand a procession 
according to the logic of natures or essences), he himself does not fail to conceive a real 
relation in its place, indeed, a relation of hypostatic identity. 
The aim is that ‘what God is to the soul, the soul might become to the body,’ and 
that the Creator of all might be proven to be One, and through humanity might 
come to reside in all things in a manner appropriate to each, so that the many, 
though separated from each other in nature, might be drawn together around the 
one nature of man [τὰ πολλὰ ἀλλήλων κατὰ τὴν φύσιν διεστηκότα περὶ τὴν μίαν 
τοῦ ἀνθρώπου φύσιν ἀλλήλοις συννεύοντα]. When this happens, God will be all 
things in everything [1 Cor 15.28], encompassing all things and hypostasizing 
them in Himself [πάντα περιλαβὼν καὶ ἐνυποστήσας ἑαυτῷ], for beings will no 
longer possess independent motion or lack any portion of God’s presence [καὶ τῆς 
ἄμοιρον παρουσίας]...we are, and are called, Gods, children of God, the body, 
and members of God [Eph 1.23, 5.30], and, it follows, ‘portions of God,’ and 






 As I said at the outset of this chapter, to verify that Christo-logic is truly 
creation’s logic in Maximus, we have to approach his logoi doctrine from both the 
beginning (protology) and the end (eschatology). Do all the elements of Christo-logic 
play out to the very end of the God-world relation, to the fullness of the creative act? 
We’ve seen hypostatic identity and infinite natural difference in protology, at the 
beginning. If, though, Christo-logic should determine the final form of the God-world 
relation, then it must evince what we saw was the crown of that logic: perichoresis of 
natural modes and activities (already suggested by [3] above). It does, as it happens, and 
it’s next chapter’s task to show how. 
  
                                                 






The End: Logoi, pt. 2 — World Becomes Trinity
 
A longer introduction (3.1) – Human vocation: hypostatic identity of created and 
uncreated natures (3.2) – God by grace: an innate and supra-natural process (3.3) – 




The completion of the creative act, the deification of the world, assumes and showcases 
the third element distinctive of Christo-logic: perichoresis in actu of created and 
uncreated natures/modes. Reading the eschatological script of the logoi according to 
Christo-logic explains extreme features of Maximian deification, and indeed proves them 
necessary. Thus the world’s deification is the actualization and perfection of the Word’s 
cosmic Incarnation, the very Word in whom Father and Spirit dwell entirely. 
 And so this chapter attempts to interpret: “The Word of God, very God, wills that 
the mystery of his Incarnation be actualized always and in all things.” 
  
3.1 – A longer introduction  
Save his contribution to the monothelite controversy, Maximus is perhaps best known for 
his doctrine of deification. It “represents the true climax of the patristic tradition.”1 So it 
makes sense that several scholars have studied this theme in great detail, crafting, as it 
were, veritable compendia of Maximus’s entire thinking on the subject.2 I make no such 
                                                 
1 Norman Russell, The Doctrine of Deification in the Greek Patristic Tradition (Oxford: OUP, 
2004), 8. 
2 Especially Walther Völker, Maximus Confessor als Meister des geistlichen Lebens (Wiesbaden: 
Steiner, 1965); Jean-Claude Larchet, La divinisation de l’homme selon saint Maxime le Confesseur (Paris: 
Cerf, 1996); Elie Ayroulet, De l’image à l’Image: Réflexions sur un concept clef de la doctrine de la 
divinization de saint Maxime le Confesseur (Rome: Institutum patristicum Augustinianum, 2013); and also 




attempt here. I seek rather if and how Maximian deification means what it must if it’s to 
be the perfection of creation as Incarnation.3 The last chapter argued that Maximus’s 
logoi doctrine presents a protology that bears the first two elements of Christo-logic: the 
logoi name [1] the Word’s hypostatic condescension in becoming identical to the creative 
principles of created nature, a self-identification that [2] generates that very nature. Now 
to see if the third element—perichoresis of natural modes and activities—appears in 
Maximus’s eschatology. 
 Before that, a brief review Christo-logic’s three elements and their relations. The 
Word’s hypostasis names the only concrete, positive, and real identity of infinitely 
different natures (created and uncreated), an identity that is itself the condition for the 
possibility of infinite natural difference as such. Next Christo-logic requires a third 
element tailored to meet the monenergist challenge. Suppose we grant one hypostasis and 
two natural principles (or logoi) with their respective powers—what then happens as 
these two natural powers reduce to the activity of a single personal existence? How do 
they remain distinct in natural power and mode and activity and yet describe a single 
unified reality or actuality? Maximus replied with one of his own christological 
signatures—the perichoresis of Christ’s activities. True to its proximate trinitarian 
provenance, perichoresis here has two necessary features. It indicates an interpenetration 
of otherwise infinitely different natural modes and activities, such that (i) the whole 
integrity of each remains undiminished, and (ii) the whole of each utterly pervades the 
                                                 
3 Thus I simply assume but do not linger over the concrete means of human deification—both 
subjective (ascetical discipline, virtuous deeds) and objective (sacraments, especially the Eucharist). I do 
not entirely neglect them. Rather they emerge when directly pertinent to the task at hand. That task is to 
trace the “architecture” or ontological structure, as it were, of the fact and event of creaturely deification. 
Doing that proves creation’s end follows the logic of Christ. For the subjective and objective means of 
human deification, see mainly Lars Thunberg, Microcosm and Mediator: The Theological Anthropology of 
Maximus the Confessor (Chicago: Open Court, 1995), 231-432; Larchet, La divinisation de l’homme, 399-




whole of the other so that there is no sense in which the consequent reality is positively 
and separately two. Perichoresis of activities crowns Christo-logic as its third and final 
element [3], its peculiar mode of actuality.4 And—to recall the truly crucial point—this 
final element assumes the prior two elements as necessary conditions. Because the 
second person of the Trinity, the Word, is himself the “is” of both natures and their 
attendant modes, powers, and acts—only thus do his two natural activities concretely 
exist. And since the selfsame hypostasis just is their concrete existence—so that their sole 
existential mediator is the Word himself—those activities cannot but finally exist as 
essentially distinct yet really one—as “whole in whole” in actuality.5 
 And so this final chapter must establish that Christo-logic’s third element also 
describes the completion of God’s act of creating the world. Does the perichoresis of 
infinitely natural modes and activities characterize the world’s deification? Do the logoi, 
the principles of creation itself, prescribe an eschatological existence in a perichoretic 
mode of actuality?  
 Discerning this third element may in fact prove the most convincing bit of 
evidence that Maximus conceives creation as Incarnation—more persuasive, even, than 
the presence of the first two elements presented last chapter. After all, Neoplatonism in 
general and Dionysius in particular say things that sound very like Maximus’s 
protological descriptions of the Logos-logoi relation.6 An example from Dionysius: 
                                                 
4 Chapter 1, sec. 1.5. 
5 Remember that this “actuality”—the “composite hypostasis” of Christ which is itself the result of 
the economic processs—cannot in principle indicate an actuality that’s in any way natural. It’s neither a 
mere Aristotelian reduction of natural potency to act, nor a mere Neoplatonic declension of higher act to 
lower act in accordance with the lower natural power. The composite Christ’s concrete, historical, positive 
existence includes and exceeds both kinds of activity. See Chapter 1, sec. 1.5 
6 On Dionysius’s language of the One’s self-distribution in creating (or emanating) all things, see 
the remarks of Eric D. Perl, “Hierarchy and Participation,” American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 




God’s mode of “being” is properly “super-essential,” but since that same God gifts being 
“to beings and produces whole essences,” then 
that ‘Being-One’ is said to be multiplied in the production [or derivation] of all 
beings from Itself, remaining no less Itself and One in this multiplication, being 
unified [with all beings] according to this procession and utterly full even in 
division—[all this] due to Its separation from all beings in Its super-essential 
mode, even in Its unitary production of all whole things [or of the universe] and in 
the unstinted effusion of Its undiminished communications.7 
 
As this passage illustrates (“separated from all things in Its super-essential mode”), 
Dionysius indulges “self-multiplication” talk while preserving the more Neoplatonic 
“modal dualism,” if you will. God creates all things from himself, yes, and so in some 
sense “distributes” himself in creation. But as far as I can see this never disposes 
Dionysius to claim that God’s “super-essential” mode of being and a creaturely mode of 
being are simultaneously present to one another as “whole in whole.”8 
 In fact, when Dionysius turns to the matter at hand—to our deification and 
filiation as “sons of God”—he hastens to add that “there is not an exact likeness between 
effects and causes.” Two reasons: “on the one hand, the effects possess potential images 
of the causes,” and on the other, “the causes in themselves remain separate and 
                                                                                                                                                 
N.Y.: State University of New York Press, 2007), 17-34. I discussed similar expressions in Maximus in 
Chapter 2, sec. 2.4. 
7 Dionysius, DN 2.11, Suchla 136, my translation: “Οἷον ἐπειδὴ ὤν ἐστιν [Exod 3.14] ὁ θεὸς 
ὑπερουσίως, δωρεῖται δὲ τὸ εἶναι τοῖς οὗσι καὶ παράγει τὰς ὅλας οὐσίας, πολλαπλασιάζεσθαι λέγεται τὸ ἓν 
ὂν ἐκεῖνο τῇ ἐξ αὑτοῦ παραγωγῇ τῶν πολλῶν ὄντων μένοντος οὐδὲν ἧττον ἐκείνου καὶ ἑνὸς ἐν τῷ 
πληθυσμῷ καὶ ἡγωμένου κατὰ τὴν πρόοδον καὶ πλήρους ἐν τῇ διακρίσει τῷ πάντων εἶναι τῶν ὄντων 
ὑπερουσίως ἐξῃρημένον καὶ τῇ ἑναίᾳ τῶν ὅλων προαγωγῇ καὶ τῇ ἀνελαττώτῳ χύσει τῶν ἀμειώτων αὑτοῦ 
μεταδόσεων.” As De Andia notes at SC 578, 404 n. 2 (following Hadot especially), “Les commentateurs 
néoplatoniciens du Parménide identifient le τὸ ἓν ὄν au νοῦς.” This recalls how Dionysius, even while 
hewing quite closely to Neoplatonic forms here, yet applies Christian pressure by insisting that it is the very 
same God who is at once the super-essential One, the “Being-One” (typically “Nous” for Neoplatonism), 
and the oneness of derived/emanated being (ἓν ὦν)—an equation that seems indeed “paradoxale,” as De 
Andia says (405 n. 6). 
8 Russell, The Doctrine of Deification, 256, applies the following feature of Neoplatonic 
participation to Dionysius too: “for participation (μέθεξις) emphasizes that an inferior cannot possess a 
superior entire,” from Lucas Siovanes, Proclus: Neo-Platonic Philosophy and Science (Edinburgh: 




established above the effects according to the principle of their own origin.”9 Principle or 
logos, itself granted by origin or beginning, determines the inviolable modal boundaries 
of a being’s activity. Those bearing superior principles, and certainly the divine principle 
itself, remain ever in their own mode and interior activity even as they are present to their 
derived effects according to the latter’s own modality. Hence a great Dionysian axiom: 
“For though the Trinity is present to all things, not all things are present to the Trinity.”10 
 I said Dionysius never affirms the simultaneous and whole presence of created 
and uncreated modalities to one another. That’s not entirely true. He acknowledges one 
exception that proves the rule: the Incarnation. Mark again the context. This concession 
comes as he’s rehearsing what we’ve already seen and called “modal dualism,” which is 
of course ingredient to the dynamics of Neoplatonic emanation or participation.11 He 
reprises a standard trope in the long Platonic tradition. The causal “archetype” remains 
one and the same even as it is “imprinted” on its many participants, like a signet ring’s 
                                                 
9 Dionysius, DN 2.8, Suchla 132, my translation and emphasis: “Οὐδὲ γὰρ ἔστιν ἀκριβὴς ἐμφέρεια 
τοῖς αἰτιατοῖς καὶ τοῖς αἰτίοις, ἀλλ’ἔχει μὲν τὰ αἰτιατὰ τὰς τῶν αἰτίων ἐνδεχομένας εἰκόνας, αὐτὰ δὲ τὰ 
αἴτια τῶν αἰτιατῶν ἐξῄρηται καὶ ὑπερίδρυται κατὰ τὸν τῆς οἰκείας ἀρχῆς λόγον.” 
10 Dionysius, DN 3.11, Suchla 138, my translation: “Καὶ γὰρ αὐτὴ [i.e. the Trinity] μὲν ἅπασι 
πάρεστιν, οὐ πάντα δὲ αὐτῇ πάρεστι.” In context, it’s true, Dionysius is commending the necessity of “pure 
prayer,” which, if rightly executed, “then we are present to the Trinity” (Suchla 138). But of course it’s the 
character of that mutual presence that’s in question. Dionysius does not here elaborate on that state, but he 
does appear to proscribe one possibility: “But to say that [the Trinity or the Good] is in all beings is to stand 
removed from the infinity above and embracing all things.” Finite and infinite modes remain separate even 
in prayerful “union.” 
11 Plotinus, En. 1.2 [19] 2, identifies two senses of metaphysical “likeness” (ἡ ὁμοίωσις). [1] There 
is a “likeness” between two things that “derive their likeness equally from the same principle [ὅσα ἐπίσης 
ὡμοίωται ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτοῦ].” Call this the likeness of metaphysically similar effects. [2] Then there is the 
“likeness” where “one thing is like the other, but the other is primary, not reciprocally related to the thing in 
its likeness and not said to be like it [τὸ μὲν ὡμοίωται πρὸς ἕτερον, τὸ δὲ ἕτερόν ἐστι πρῶτον, οὐκ 
ἀντιστρέφον πρὸς ἐκεῖνο οὐδὲ ὅμοιον αὐτοῦ λεγόμενον].” Call this the likeness of metaphysically non-
reciprocal (i.e. different) cause and its effect. In this latter sense, Plotinus warns against understanding 
“likenes” as sharing the same form. Rather, the cause differs (and is not symmetrically related) because the 
cause possesses “another” form than the effect. And, as context makes plain (e.g. the “extended” vs. 
“intelligible” house of the paragraph before this one), this form exists with different properties, less 
determinate qualities, i.e. in a different essential mode. Vertical “likeness” between cause and effect 
therefore comes about “in a different way [κατὰ τὸν ἕτερον τρόπον],” namely in a non-reciprocal way. 




seal pressed upon waxes of varying consistencies. The trope denies that participants 
differ from their archetype because of the archetype itself. That difference is instead a 
modal one: it’s due to what is proper to derived essences, and, of course, to the extent 
these participants actualize their own receptivity to the archetype. So while the seal 
“gives all of its very self to each,” it is “the participants’ own difference that makes those 
imprinted dissimilar to the one, whole, and selfsame archetype.”12  “But there is a 
difference,” Dionysius follows, 
between the divine activity that acts towards us in a manner befitting the Good, 
and the fact that the super-essential Word wholly and truly took became 
essentialized for us, and enacted and suffered many eminent, exceptional things 
from his divine activity in a human manner.13 
 
That’s to say, as Maximus interprets Dionysius to teach elsewhere, because the Word 
became wholly man in a way unlike the way cause “becomes” effect by procession, 
Christ’s divine activity wholly manifests itself in his human activity.14 The difference is 
that Dionysius appears to think this an isolated instance; Maximus does not. 
 On my reading Maximus agrees with Dionysius both that the Incarnation 
introduces something new and that this innovation cannot consist in a sameness or 
                                                 
12 Dionysius, DN 2.6, Suchla 129, my translation: “Τούτου δὲ οὐχ ἡ σφραγὶς αἰτία, πᾶσαν γὰρ 
ἑαυτὴν ἐκείνη καὶ ταὐτὴν καὶ ἑκαστῳ ἐπιδίδωσιν, ἡ δὲ τῶν μετεχόντων διαφορότης ἀνόμοια ποιεῖ τὰ 
ἀπομόργματα τῆς μιᾶς καὶ ὅλης καὶ ταὐτῆς ἀρχετυπίας.” The trope derives, of course, from Plato himself: 
Theat. 191c-d, 194c-e, 196a-b; Tim. 50c. For the law of “all in all, each according to its own mode,” see 
Proclus, El. Theol., prop. 103, and the remarks of Jean Trouillard, “Procession Néoplatonicienne et 
Création Judéo-Chrétienne,” 91. 
13 Dionysius, DN 2.6, Suchla 130, my translation: “Διακέκριται δὲ τῆς ἀγαθοπρεποῦς εἰς ἠμᾶς 
θεουργίας τὸ καθ’ ἡμᾶς ἐξ ἡμῶν ὁλικῶς καὶ ἀληθῶς οὐσιωθῆναι τὸν ὑπερούσιον λόγον καὶ δρᾶσαι καὶ 
παθεῖν, ὅσα τῆς ἀνθρωπικῆς αὐτοῦ θεουργίας ἐστὶν ἔκκριτα κὰ ἐξαίρετα.” 
14 So Dionysius, Ep 4, Heil and Ritter 161—discussed at Amb 5.19. See chapter 1, sec. 1.5. De 
Andia, SC 578, 388 n. 1, suggests that even in the exceptional case of the Word’s Incarnation Dionysius 
tends to conceive the divine activity according to the more familiar logic of the limitation of (higher) act by 
the modality of (lower) power, and that this might differ from Maximus’s later christological concerns: “les 
acta et passa Christi relèvent, selon Denys, de son action divine (théurgie) en tant qu’elle s’exerce d’une 
manière humaine. Denys ne distingue pas deux volontés dans le Christ, comme Maxime le Confesseur, 





confusion at the level of essence or the “logos of origin,” as Dionysius phrased it (DN 
2.6, cited above). Rather the newness disclosed in the Incarnation issues in a perichoresis 
of modal activities grounded in hypostatic identity (as distinct from natural identity). 
Therefore Maximus’s view of the God-world relation does not simply negate Dionysius’s 
(or Neoplatonism’s) but exceeds it according to Christo-logic. If, at the world’s end, the 
Word “embraces and hypostasizes all things in himself,”15 and if enhypostastization 
makes possible a new mode of concrete relation and mediation among differing natures—
between infinitely differing natures, even—then Maximus can conceive cosmo-logic as 
Christo-logic without repudiating Dionysius’s core convictions concerning natural 
metaphysical relations. Hypostatic identity and perichoresis of modes opens upon a new 
horizon, as it were, for Christian metaphysics, and thus a new possibility for 
contemplating the logic of creation as the logic of Christ. 
 And so this chapter completes the task of tracing the three elements of Christo-
logic in Maximus’s cosmo-logic. It demonstrates that and how the third element is 
fundamental to creation’s perfection, its end. Two lines of evidence prove this. The first 
is textual. Maximus explicitly evokes perichoresis and its distinctive features to describe 
creaturely deification—and was indeed the very first to do so.16 But there’s also 
significant conceptual evidence. There are several aporiae or extreme tendencies in 
Maximian deification that we can explain and even expect if we read them by 
christological canons. Three in particular: 
1. Maximian deification aims for the very hypostatic identity between created and 
uncreated natures that Christ’s historical Incarnation accomplished. 
 
                                                 
15 Amb 7.31, modified. 
16 One obviously senses Cappadocian “mixture” language here (e.g. Amb 10.35, 41, etc.), but see 




2. Human deification or becoming “God by grace,” as Maximus often phrases it, 
is both utterly non-natural and yet innate or “implanted” within human nature 
from creation. 
 
3. Deification of individual humans is simultaneously incorporation into Christ’s 
one Body, and this is really what it means to speak of our “analogous” relation to 
Christ (and his to us)—not that we are similar to him within ever greater 
dissimilarity, but that we are him in our own personal ways. 
 
Christo-logic as a whole, perichoresis as its crown, explains all these apparently 
“hyperbolic”17 components of Maximian deification and in fact renders them plain 
sensible.  
 I begin with the first two aporiae, namely that the ground and goal of deification 
is hypostatic identity (3.2) and that it’s a process simultaneously innate and supra-natural 
(3.3). I then linger over passages where Maximus evokes perichoresis as the logic of 
actual or experienced deification—a most reasonable result if creation is Incarnation 
(3.4). At length I return to the third aporia, that the perichoretic logic of deification 
becomes for Maximus the logic of Christ’s own Body, at once individual and cosmic, 
such that perfected creation’s “analogous” relation to its creator actually presupposes its 
hypostatic identity with him (3.5). 
 
3.2 – Human vocation: hypostatic identity of created and uncreated natures 
Maximus never thinks the world’s end apart from the historical Incarnation of the Son, 
apart from Christ.18 That event, and that event alone, has definitively disclosed the “plan” 
                                                 
17 Anna N. Williams, The Ground of Union: Deification in Aquinas and Palamas (Oxford: OUP, 
1999), 89. 
18 Paul M. Blowers, Exegesis and Spiritual Pedagogy: An Investigation into the “Questiones ad 
Thalassium” (Notre Dame: UNDP, 1991), 118: “In Maximus’ thought, however, the transcendent Logos is 
never conceptually separate from the historical Incarnate Christ.” Juan-Miguel Garrigues, “Le dessein 
d’adoption du Créateur dans son rapport au Fils d’après s. Maxime le Confesseur,” MC, esp. 178-9, tried to 
argue that Maximus held to a basically scholastic view of God’s “antecedent will” which did not include 




or “purpose” or “scope” or “end” of God’s creative activity.19 And since that event 
discloses the end of all creatures, it follows that the end of the world is hypostatic identity 
between God and the world. 
 In QThal 60—a locus classicus of Maximus’s supra-lapsarian christology—
Maximus identifies the “mystery hidden from the ages” that “has now been manifested” 
(1 Pet 1.20) with the “pure and spotless lamb, Christ,” who “was foreknown before the 
foundation of the world” (Col 1.26). It’s clear that “Christ” here comprises at once the 
historical (particular) and cosmic (universal) achievement of a single mystery, “the 
mystery according to Christ,” which he defines as “the ineffable and incomprehensible 
union according to hypostasis of divinity and humanity” that brings created and uncreated 
natures “into perfect identity.”20 And it’s in this very identity—the one wrought in history 
from conception in Mary’s womb to cross to resurrection to ascension—that every being 
(not just the man Jesus’) “receives its beginning and end.”21 I quote at length Maximus’s 
                                                                                                                                                 
latter to God’s “consequent will” in response to human sin. This view has been disproved, for instance, in 
the lovely essay by Artemije Radosavljevic, “Le problème du ‘présupposé’ ou du ‘non-présupposé’ de 
l’incarnation de dieu le Verbe,” MC, 193-206, who correctly insists that Maximus constantly makes our 
deification depend specifically on the hypostatic identity between created and uncreated nature achieved in 
the historical Incarnation (200, 204-5), which means that no posterior human action (sinful or not) could 
serve as the presupposition for Christ. It’s quite the reverse. See too Larchet, La divinisation de l’homme, 
221-4; Ayroulet, De l’image à l’Image, 162. 
19 Exp. Orat. Dom. Prol., CCSG 23, 28-9; Amb 7.37; Amb 41.2, 6; Amb 42.29; QThal 22.2-4, 
CCSG 7, 137-9; QThal 60.3, CCSG 22, 75, etc. 
20 QThal 60.2, CCSG 22, 73: “Τοῦτο προδήλως ἐστὶν ἄρρητός τε καὶ ἀπερινόητος θεότητός τε καὶ 
ἀνθρωπότητος καθ’ ὑπόστασιν ἕνωσις, εἰς ταὐτὸν ἄγουσα τῇ θεότητι κατὰ πάντα τρόπον τῷ τῆς 
ὑποστάσεως λόγῳ τὴν ἀνθρωπότητα”.  
21 QThal 60.4, CCSG 22, 75: “Διὰ γὰρ τὸν Χριστόν, ἤγουν τὸ κατὰ Χριστὸν μυστήριον, πάντες οἱ 
αἰῶνες καὶ τὰ ἐν αὐτοῖς τοῖς αἰῶσιν ἐν Χριστῷ τὴν ἀρχὴν τοῦ εἶναι καὶ τὸ τέλος εἰλήφασιν.” That’s to say, I 
do not find in Maximus any grounds for a final union of creation with God that somehow circumvents—or 
ever could have circumvented—the precisely historical identity achieved in Jesus of Nazareth. Indeed the 
scriptural passage under discussion appears to proscribe this: it is “the pure and spotless lamb” who is 
foreknown (1 Pet 1.20), the lamb slain since before the foundation of the world (Rev 13.10). Where and 
when else is the Lord slain if not in that time and place, on first-century Golgotha? What’s really striking is 
that Maximus claims this particular event, “Christ” in whom every conceivable polarity attains hypostatic 
identity, is “the fulfillment of God’s foreknowledge” (QThal 60.4, CCSG 22, 77: “ἥτις ἐν Χριστῷ ἐπ’ 




insistence on this point (that the concrete end of the historical Incarnation and all creation 
is the very same), since its full import often goes unheeded: 
This is the great and hidden mystery. This is the blessed end for which all things 
were brought into existence. This is the divine purpose conceived before the 
beginning of beings, and in defining it we would say that this mystery is the 
preconceived goal for the sake of which everything exists, but which itself exists 
for the sake of nothing, and it was with a view to this end that God created the 
essences of beings. This is, properly speaking, the limit of providence and of the 
things preconceived, according to which occurs the recapitulation into God of the 
things made by God. This is the mystery that circumscribes all the ages, and 
which reveals the grand plan of God, a super-infinite plan infinitely pre-existing 
the ages an infinite number of times. The essential Word of God became a 
messenger of this plan when He became man, and, if I may rightly say so, 
revealed Himself as the innermost depth of the Father’s goodness while also 
displaying in Himself the very goal for which creatures manifestly received the 
beginning of their existence.22 
 
 That “very goal” toward which all things were made reemerges in a passage 
considered last chapter, which serves here as overture for this entire chapter. In Amb 41 
Maximus recounts his five natural divisions of being only to say that it has always been 
humanity’s (Adam’s) vocation to unite these in itself, even the first and highest division 
                                                                                                                                                 
60.8: God did not “foreknow” Christ “as what He was in Himself by nature, but as what He manifested 
when, in the economy of salvation, He later became man on our behalf”).  
This introduces the possibility—one which has grounds, I think, in parts of Maximus’s corpus—of 
a fundamental or primordial reciprocity between God’s eternal self-knowledge (cp. QThal 56.7) and the 
particularities of historical events, yet not in such a way that the former simply determines the latter (lest 
there be no true reciprocity at all). From this vantage the Word himself, through his creative condescension 
as the logoi of creation (cf. CT 1.66-7—historical and cosmic at once!), would be the identity that grounds 
such a reciprocity. Then creation would prove an inevitable “result” of God’s self-knowledge even while it 
does not possess any “simultaneous” or “co-eternal” (that is, natural) relation to the divine essence itself (as 
ruled out by texts like QThal 60.9, CCSG 22, 81; Amb 15.9 and 11; Ep 13, PG 91, 532a-b). I reserve this 
for a chapter I have planned for the book. 
22 QThal 60.3, CCSG 22, 75, slightly modified: “Τοῦτό ἐστι τὸ μέγα καὶ ἀπόκρυφον μυστήριον. 
Τοῦτό ἐστι τὸ μακάριον, δι’ ὃ τὰ πάντα συνέστησαν, τέλος. Τοῦτό ἐστιν ὁ τῆς ἀρχῆς τῶν ὄντων 
προεπινοούμενος θεῖος σκοπός, ὃν ὁριζοντες εἶναί φαμεν προεπινοούμενον τέλος, οὗ ἕνεκα μὲν τὰ πάντα, 
αὐτὸ δὲ οὐδενὸς ἓνεκεν· πρὸς τοῦτο τὸ τέλος ἀφορῶν τὰς τῶν ὄντων ὁ θεὸς παρήγαγεν οὐσίας. Τοῦτο 
κυρίως ἐστὶ τὸ τῆς προνοίας καὶ τῶν προνοουμένων πέρας, καθ’ ὃ εἰς τὸν θεὸν ἡ τῶν ὑπ’ αὐτοῦ 
πεποιημένων  ἐστὶν ἀνακεφαλαίωσις. Τοῦτό ἐστι τὸ πάντας περιγράφον τοὺς αἰῶνας καὶ τὴν ὑπεράπειρον 
καὶ ἀπειράκις ἀπείρως προϋπάρχουσαν τῶν αἰώνων μεγάλην τοῦ θεοῦ βουλὴν ἐκφαῖνον μυστήριον, ἧς 
γέγονεν ἄγγελος αὐτὸς ὁ κατ’ οὐσίαν τοῦ θεοῦ λόγος, γενόμενος ἄνθρωπος καὶ αὐτόν, εἰ θέμις εἰπεῖν, τὸν 
ἐνδότατον πυνθμένα τῆς πατρικῆς ἀγαθότητος φανερὸν καταστήσας καὶ τὸ τέλος ἐν ἑαυτῷ δείξας, δι’ ὃ τὴν 
πρὸς τὸ εἶναι σαφῶς ἀρχὴν ἔλαβον τὰ πεποιημένα.” For the meaning of predicating “pre-existence” of the 




between created and uncreated natures. Indeed man, “like a most efficient workshop 
sustaining all things,” has “by nature the full potential to draw all the extremes into unity” 
because of “his characteristic attribute of being related to the divided extremes through 
his own parts.”23 The human being intrinsically relates to and therefore can unify all five 
divisions. Take the second. Even if malformed or not yet properly actualized, a human 
being is already body and soul (and hence related to the second division between sensible 
and intelligible)—already, that is, potentially greater than either as their unity.24 So too 
was Adam already somehow related to both created and uncreated natures, the first 
division. I return below to what it could possibly mean that Adam “naturally” bore such a 
relation to divinity (sec. 3.3). But we spy a hint in the next line: “Through this potential, 
consistent with the purpose behind the origination of divided beings, man was called to 
achieve within himself the mode of their completion, and so bring to light the great 
mystery of the divine plan.”25 Actualization of the divine mystery occurs in the 
metaphysical field of modes, not in (natural) principle. 
 From this context sounds the overture: 
And finally, in addition to all this, had man united created nature with the 
uncreated through love (oh, the wonder of God’s love for mankind!), he would 
have shown them to be one and the same by the state of grace, the whole man 
pervading the whole God, and becoming everything that God is, without, 
however, identity in essence, and receiving the whole God instead of himself, and 
obtaining as a kind of prize for his ascent to God the absolutely unique God, who 
is the goal of the motion of things that are moved, and the firm and unmoved 
stability of things that are carried along to Him, and the limit (itself limitless and 
                                                 
23 Amb 41.2, PG 91, 1305a-c: “πᾶσαν ἔχων δηλαδὴ φυσικῶς ταῖς τῶν ἄκρων πάντων μεσότησι διὰ 
τῆς πρὸς τὰ ἄκρα πάντα τῶν ἰδίων μερῶν σχετικῆς ἰδιότητος τὴν πρὸς ἕνωσιν δύναμιν. 
24 Hence Basil Studer, OSB, “Zur Soteriologie des Maximus Confessor,” MC, 242, rightly 
comments: “In ähnlicher Weise versteht Maximus die in der Menschwerdung Gottes erfolgte Erneurerung 
der Naturen als Aufhebung von Gegensätzen.” 
25 Amb 41.2, PG 91, 1305b, slight modification and my emphasis: “δι’ ἧς [ref. δύναμις] ὁ κατὰ τὴν 
αἰτίαν τῆς τῶν διῃρημένων γενέσεως συμπληρούμενος τρόπος ἔμελλε τοῦ θείου σκοποῦ τὸ μέγα μυστήριον 




infinite) of every definition, order, and law, whether of mind, intellect, or nature.26 
 
This passage plays four significant themes. First, deified Adam would have achieved an 
identity between created and uncreated natures, would have proved them “one and the 
same” (ἓν καὶ ταὐτὸν). And yet this would be no “identity in essence” (χωρὶς τῆς κατ’ 
οὐσίαν ταὐτότητος)—a qualification Maximus systematically makes,27 and one, of 
course, we should expect from Christo-logic.28 Indeed how could there ever occur natural 
identity with divinity as such, which is, as the end of this passage again affirms, properly 
above “nature” however conceived?29 Second and despite the insistence on non-natural 
identity, the potential for attaining such identity is in some sense innate to the human 
person (here Adam). This passage’s context made this plain.30 Third, the identity in 
deification names a “state” or “condition” brought about by grace (κατὰ τὴν ἕξιν τῆς 
χάριτος). And finally, this non-natural but concrete identity whose potential reverberates 
within human nature like an innate calling or commission realized by grace alone—this 
                                                 
26 Amb 41.5, PG 91, 1308b-c, my emphasis: “Καὶ τέλος ἐπὶ πᾶσι τούτοις, καὶ κτιστὴν φύσιν τῇ 
ἀκτίστῳ δι’ ἀγάπης ἑνώσας (ὢ τοῦ θαύματος τῆς περὶ ἡμᾶς τοῦ Θεοῦ φιλανθρωπίας) ἓν καὶ ταὐτὸν δείξειε 
κατὰ τὴν ἕξιν τῆς χάριτος, ὅλος ὅλῳ περιχωρήσας ὁλικῶς τῷ Θεῷ, καὶ γενόμενος πᾶν εἴ τί πέρ ἐστιν ὁ 
Θεός, χωρὶς τῆς κατ’ οὐσίαν ταὐτότητος, καὶ ὅλον αὐτὸν ἀντιλαβὼν ἑαυτοῦ τὸν Θεόν, καὶ τῆς ἐπ’ αὐτὸν 
τὸν Θεὸν ἀναβάσεως, οἷον ἔπαθλον, αὐτὸν μονώτατον κτησάμενος τὸν Θεόν, ὡς τέλος τῆς τῶν 
κινουμένων κινήσεως, καὶ στάσιν βάσιμόν τε καὶ ἀκίνητον τῶν ἐπ’ αὐτὸν φερομένων, καὶ παντὸς ὅρου καὶ 
θεσμοῦ καὶ νόμου, λόγου τε καὶ νοῦ, καὶ φύσεως ὅρον καὶ πέρας ἀόριστόν τε καὶ ἄπειρον ὄντα.” 
27 Amb 7.9; QThal 22.4, CCSG 7, 139; Opusc 1, PG 91, 57a-d; Ep 6, PG 91, 429a; Ep 15, PG 91, 
565d. 
28 Chapter 1, sec. 1.3; Chapter 2, sec. 2.3. 
29 Pyr 139, PG 91, 325a, for example, states that “nature” is predicated of God only “super-
essentially” (ὑπερουσίως). 
30 I add here two more vocation-statements from this Ambiguum, loose bookends of our passage: 
[1] Amb 41.3, PG 91, 1305b-c, slightly modified: God introduced man “last among beings—like a kind of 
natural bond mediating between the universal extremes through his parts, and bringing into one reality 
through himself things that by nature are separated from each other by a great distance [οἱονεὶ σύνδεσμός 
τις φυσικὸς τοῖς καθόλου διὰ τῶν οἰκείων μερῶν μεσιτεύων ἄκροις, καὶ εἰς ἓν ἄγων ἐν ἑαυτῷ τὰ πολλῷ 
κατὰ τὴν φύσιν ἀλλήλων διεστηκότα τῷ διαστήματι]; [2] Amb 41. 9, PG 91, 1309c-d: Christ, in the 
historical Incarnation, accomplished what Adam was originally meant to, namely “having completed the 
whole plan of God the Father for us, who through our misuse had rendered ineffective the power that was 
given to us from the beginning by nature for this purpose [καὶ τελειώσας πᾶσαν βουλὴν τοῦ Θεοῦ καὶ 





identity, I note,  reduces in actu in the form of a perichoresis of natural activities, divine 
and human (ὅλος ὅλῳ περιχωρήσας ὁλικῶς τῷ Θεῷ, καὶ γενόμενος πᾶν εἴ τί πέρ ἐστιν ὁ 
Θεός).  Those four themes recapitulate the entire logic of Maximian deification: we 
become identical to God in all but essence; we possess the innate power to do so; we 
realize this power through and in grace alone; and we concretely manifest it in and as the 
complete interpenetration of created and uncreated qualities, modes, and activities.  
 The contours of Maximian deification derive from and trace those of the Word’s 
deified humanity. Now, granted, Christ’s flesh did not undergo the process of deification 
in the way ours does and will.31 But that’s a question of deification’s how not that or 
what, a question of process rather than product. It is certainly the case that the humanity 
the Word assumed was deified from its conception, while ours must become deified.32 
And yet even here the two ways of deifying created flesh share a crucial feature: neither 
is natural. I suspend this point until next section (3.3). The main matter for now is that 
Maximus thinks the historical Incarnation, the ground and goal of creation, notates the 
themes of creaturely deification. Maximian deification signifes a non-natural “identity” 
between created and uncreated nature. 
 No surprise, then, that Maximus everywhere keys this identity to Christ, the 
incarnate Word and Son of God. His identity, the one wrought in the historical 
Incarnation, is ours too in deification.33 To become God we must become Christ—for no 
                                                 
31 Opusc 1, PG 91, 36a-b. 
32 Amb 3.3; Amb 42.25. 
33 So QThal 22, schol. 1, CCSG 7, 143 (likely by Maximus himself): “The union according to 
hypostasis of the Word with the flesh revealed the ineffable purpose of the divine counsel in that it did not 
mix the divine essence with the flesh, but rather showed forth one hypostasis of the Word even in His 
becoming flesh, so that the flesh might both remain flesh according to its essence and become divine 
according to the hypostasis [Ἡ πρὸς τὴν σάρκα τοῦ λόγου καθ’ ὑπόστασιν ἕνωσις τὸν ἀπόρρητον τῆς θείας 




other mediator exists between God and man, creator and creation.34 Here we come upon 
some of Maximus’s most provocative expressions, many of which do not just say we 
become “identical” to God in some nondescript sense, but rather that we become Christ 
himself.  
 Actually this identity claim is surprising. It is, I mean, if you draw back a little 
and consider the rather hostile atmosphere surrounding such a doctrine—particularly 
given its possible prominence and fate in the Origenist tradition.35 Whether Origen and 
Evagrius themselves propagated or at least prepared the grounds for the later “isochrist” 
crop of sixth-century Origenism,36 the latter proved particularly toxic to anti-Origenists of 
                                                                                                                                                 
σαρκώσει τοῦ λόγου τὴν ὑπόστασιν, ἵνα καὶ μείνῃ σὰρξ κατὰ τὴν οὐσίαν ἡ σὰρξ καὶ γένηται θεία κατὰ τὴν 
ὑπόστασιν]”; so too QThal 40, schol. 2, CCSG 7, 275 (likely by Maximus himself). 
34 Pyr 182, PG 91, 341a. 
35 See István Perczel, “St Maximus on the Lord’s Prayer: An Inquiry into His Relationship to the 
Origenist Tradition,” in ACMC, 221-78, who convincingly argues that Maximus’s Or. dom. evinces at least 
structural similarities to the so-called “isochrist” strand of Origenism—legitimate similarities that 
Maximus’s later Syriac (Maronite) opponents would interpret (illegitimately) as indices of a dogmatic or 
theological isomorphism between Maximus and condemned Origenism. 
36 Guillaumont, Les ‘Kephalaia Gnostica’ d’Évagre le Pontique, 155, thinks Evagrian Origenism 
led quite naturally to isochristist eschatology: “L’expression ‘égaux du Christ’ ne se rencontre pas dans 
Evagre, mais l’idée correspondante est bien présente” (he cites KG 3.72, 4.51, 5.81, for instance). Recent 
scholars have questioned the adequacy of this line; see, e.g., Augustine M.C. Casiday, “Deification in 
Origen, Evagrius, and Cassian,” in Origeniana Octava: Origen and the Alexandrian Tradition / Origene e 
la tradizione alessandrina: Papers of the 8th International Origen Congress, Pisa, 27-31 August 2001, eds. 
Lorenzo Perrone, P. Bernardino, and D. Marchini (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 2003), 995-1001 (esp. 
999); and his Reconstructing the Theology of Evagrius Ponticus: Beyond Heresy (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2013), esp. Chs. 7 and 8; consult too the scattered remarks of Ilaria L.E. Ramelli in her 
commentary and translation, Evagrius’s Kephalaia Gnostika: A New Translation of the Unreformed Text 
from the Syriac (Atlanta, GA: SBL Press, 2015), esp. the Introduction, lxv, and the comments on KG 6.14, 
where she inserts quotation marks around one statement to make it the position of a phantom interlocutor 
rather than Evagrius’s own. I rather think that both Ramelli and Casiday’s recovery efforts, though laudable 
in places, are often wrong to the extent that they do not appreciate what “catechrestic” predication allows 
Evagrius to say and not say—that is, the sort of “improper” predication that results from standard Platonic 
participation, where what’s proper to the participated (the Logos, say) can improperly be said of the 
participant (Christ, say). Such predication preserves a two-subjects christology while indulging a certain 
elision on occasion (KG 3.1-3). This seems to be exactly the claim at KG 4.18, 6.14, 6.16, 6.18, and 6.79 
especially, and so I think Constantinople II got it right in the eighth canon, which identifies and condemns 
this practice. But I reserve a fuller discussion for another day.—The main point here is that if Origen (esp. 
at Princ 2.6.4) and Evagrius can and were read as dividing “Christ” (a separate soul or intellect) from the 
Word (who is, particularly in Evagrius’s theology, consubstantial with Father and Spirit), then isochrist 
eschatology becomes at once more palatable and more extreme: the former, since our equality with Christ 




the period. We know little more than what the calque suggests: some (not all)37 sixth-
century Origenists held that our eschatological destiny was to become “equal to Christ,” 
united to God as much as he.38 
 In 552, the year before the Fifth Ecumenical Council (Constantinople II) 
convened, Theodore, bishop of Scythopolis, addressed a Libel against Origenist errors to 
the Emperor Justinian and to the four Eastern Patriarchs. It promulgates twelve 
anathemas, nine of which simply restate Justinian’s own from his 543 edict. Three appear 
original to Theodore. These reflect the dawning sense among anti-Origenists that 
Origenism’s enduring appeal, and so its fundamental challenge, lay not simply in its 
speculative protology or eschatology but rather in its compelling christology—especially 
of the “isochrist” variety.39 One of the three added anathemas reads: 
If anyone should say, think, or teach that we will become equal to Christ our 
Savior and God who was born of the holy and ever-virgin Theotokos; and that 
God the Word must be united to us as he was to the animate flesh that he assumed 
from Mary according to essence and hypostasis—let him be anathema.40 
                                                                                                                                                 
fusion of Christ’s intellect with the numberless Trinity implies the dissolution of all hypostases along with 
that one (e.g. KG 2.17; see too can. 14 of Constantinople II, Price, vol. 2, 286). 
37 Guillaumont, Les ‘Kephalaia Gnostica’ d’Évagre le Pontique, 151 n. 91, mentions another 
Origenist faction called “the Protoctists” who, in an effort to “conserver au Christ une certaine supériorité,” 
believed that Christ was “created” (ktistos) before all other intellects (protos); this helped them reject an 
original henad destined for restoration in a final apokatastasis.  
38 Evagrius Scholasticus (6th cent.), H.E. IV.38, PG 86, 2780a (my translation), cites from a 
collection of “blasphemous statements” made by Origenists of the New Laura, not far south of Jerusalem. It 
quotes the bishop of Caesarea and erstwhile confidant of Emperor Justinian, Theodore of Ascidas, as 
saying: “If even now the Apostles and martyrs work wonders and enjoy such high honor, what restoration 
remains for them in the [coming] restoration except to become equal to Christ [Εἰ νῦν οἱ ἀπόστολοι καὶ οἱ 
μάρτυρες θαυματουργοῦσι, καὶ ἐν τῇ τοσαύτῃ τιμῇ ὑπάρχουσιν, ἐν τῇ ἀποκαταστάσει εἰ μὴ ἴσοι γένοιντο 
Χριστῷ, ποία ἀποκατάστασις αὐτοῖς ἐστιν;]?”; cf. Cyril of Scythopolis, Vita Cyriacus 12, 229.32-230.10. 
39 Guillaumont, Les ‘Kephalaia Gnostica’ d’Évagre le Pontique, 119, 147ff. 
40 Theodore of Scythopolis, Libel, Cap. 11, PG 86, 236a, my translation: “Εἰ τις λέγει, ἢ φρονεῖ, ἢ 
διδάσκει ἐξισοῦσθαι ἡμᾶς τῷ Σωτῆρι ἡμῶν Χριστῷ τῷ Θεῷ ἡμῶν τῷ τεχθέντι ἐκ τῆς ἁγίας Θεοτόκου καὶ 
ἀεὶ παρθένου Μαρίας, καὶ μέλλειν καὶ ἡμῖν ἑνοῦσθαι τὸν Θεὸν Λόγον, ὡς τῇ Μαρίας προσληφθείσῃ 
ἐμψυχωμένῃ σαρκὶ κατ’ οὐσίαν καὶ καθ’ ὑπόστασιν· ἀνάθεμα ἔστω.” Cf. Guillaumont, Les ‘Kephalaia 




Nearly a year later, Justinian’s own letter to the Council takes up and even expands a 
little on this charge. He urges the swift condemnation of those who teach that all men, 
dissolute and deified alike, 
will enjoy the same union with God that Christ too enjoys, just as in their 
preexistence, with the result that there will be no difference at all between Christ 
and the remaining rational beings, neither in substance nor in knowledge nor in 
power nor in operation.41 
 
Two of the anti-Origenist canons associated with Constantinople II evince the same 
concern. Anathema be anyone who says all rational beings “will be united to God the 
Word in just the same way as the mind they call Christ” (can. 12), or if “anyone says that 
there will not be a single difference at all between Christ and other rational beings,” 
neither in “substance,” “knowledge,” “power,” nor “operation” (can. 13)!—much as 
Justinian had it.42 
 These constitute powerful witnesses to the growing worry over the isochrist 
eschatology of certain Origenists. They’re anxious about Christ’s uniqueness or primacy 
among rational creatures, which tends to evaporate into sheer oneness at the edges of 
creation, at the beginning and end of all things.43 This anxiety will even linger in later 
Maronite (Syrian monothelite) polemics against Maximus.44 I note here just two relevant 
                                                 
41 Justinian, Ep ad conc. (553), Price, vol. 2, 282-3; Greek text is from Georgius Monachus Chron. 
II, de Boor 631: “...ἀποκαθισταμένου δηλονότι καὶ αὐτοῦ τοῦ διαβόλου καὶ τῶν λοιπῶν δαιμόνων εἰς τὴν 
αὐτὴν ἑνάδα καὶ τῶν ἀσεβῶν καὶ ἀθέων ἀνθρώπων μετὰ τῶν θείων καὶ θεοφόρων ἀνδρῶν καὶ τῶν 
οὐρανίων δυνάμεων καὶ τὴν αὐτὴν ἑξόντων ἕνωσιν πρὸς τὸν θεόν, ὁποίαν ἔχει καὶ ὁ Χριστός, καθὼς καὶ 
προϋπῆρχον, ὡς μηδεμίαν εἶναι διαφορὰν τῷ Χριστῷ πρὸς τὰ λοιπὰ λογικὰ παντελῶς οὔτε τῇ οὐσίᾳ οὔτε 
τῇ γνώσει οὔτε τῇ δυνάμει οὔτε τῇ ἐνεργείᾳ.” 
42 ACO IV.1, 248-9; Price, vol. 2, 286. 
43 Even Leontius of Byzantium, a notorious “Origenist” to detractors like Cyril of Scythopolis 
(Vita Sabas 72, 74, 83-6), wanted to maintain Christ’s uniqueness, as did many “protoctist” Origenists (cf. 
n. 37); see Brian Daley, “The Origenism of Leontius of Byzantium,” JTS 27.2 (1976): 343. 
44 See still Guillaumont, Les ‘Kephalaia Gnostica’ d’Évagre le Pontique, 176-82, for more on 
Simeon of Kennesrin’s anti-Maximus polemic; and Perczel, “St Maximus on the Lord’s Prayer,” esp. 234, 
where a passage from Michael the Syrian’s Chronicle (12th cent.) reads: “[And these monks of the New 
Laura said that] Christ will not be superior to us in anything and, just as he is God, so also we will be 




features common to Justinian and the canons. First, the fundamental concern is one 
familiar to Neochalcedonian orthodoxy—the mode of union. The “way” the Word is 
united to Christ in isochrist thought seems to assume some essential relation or mode, 
since the christology targeted portrays “Christ” as a human “mind” separate from the 
Word, who then becomes that mind only to absorb it in the end (can. 12: “the kingdom of 
Christ will have an end”). Obviously Maximus sides with the canons here: no essential or 
natural identity, ever. Second, although Theodore of Scythopolis had specified a mode of 
union either “according to essence or hypostasis,” the latter is absent in Justinian and the 
canons. Essence, knowledge, power, and activity are said to differ between Christ and the 
saints—but not according to hypostasis. Maximus, I show below (sec. 3.4), actually 
agrees that deification does not imply our absorption into the Word’s hypostasis; we are 
not obliterated for the sake of hypostatic identity. And yet it’s notable that this precision 
(i.e. “according to hypostasis”) disappears in the official condemnations.45 
 Now consider the following passages from Maximus. In Amb 21 Maximus strives 
to resolve what appears to be an evident historical error or rare slip-up in one of Gregory 
of Nazianzus’s orations. Gregory refers to “John, the forerunner of the Word”—naturally 
John the Baptist (Mt 3.1-3; Jn 1.23)—but then attributes to him a line from John the 
Evangelist (Jn 21.25).46 Rather than concede misattribution, Maximus reads Gregory’s 
remark to invite the hearer into Gregory’s own spiritual interpretation of Scripture’s 
literal expression.47 Gregory means what he says, namely that John the Evangelist, “by 
                                                 
45 In fact, it’s the last two forbidden “identities”—namely that by “power” or “activity”—that 
seem to pose the greatest prima facie challenge to Maximian deification, since Maximus openly asserts that 
the “activity” of deification is solely divine—to the point that he later had to clarify that and how this does 
not mean eschatological monenergism. See Amb 7.12 and Opusc 1, PG 91, 33a-36a. 
46 Gregory of Nazianzus, Or. 28.20 = Amb 21.1. 




means of his Gospel, is forerunner of a greater and more mystical Word.”48 Then ensues 
an elaborate meditation on how Scripture, especially the four Gospels (and especially 
John’s), correspond to and coalesce with the four elements that constitute the physical 
cosmos, and how all these together reveal the Word within them.49 The last third of this 
ambiguum pivots to the “inner cosmos,” as it were, the soul seeking union with God. 
Maximus notices how the Word who inhabits things external to us also dwells silently 
within our own souls. There he longs to cooperate, as grace, with our labors in virtue, 
labors by which our soul—in a stunning expression—grants “hypostasis” to the virtues 
themselves.50  
 After another meditation on our deification from this more interior vantage—
above all how love is the greatest unifying power we have51—Maximus culminates his 
lengthy lucubration with a traditional trope: our deification glides along a trajectory of 
increasing intensity from the primordial “image of God” to ever-greater “likeness” to 
him.52 Now, Maximus can comfortably and occasionally wield this trope in its traditional 
                                                 
48 Amb 21.3: “ὅτιπερ καὶ Ἰωάννης ὁ μέγας εὐαγγελιστὴς ἐν τῷ κατ’ Εὐαγγελίῳ πρόδρομός ἐστι 
τοῦ δι’ αὐτοῦ μηνυομένου μυστικωτέρου καὶ μείζονος Λόγου.” 
49 Amb 21.5-8. 
50 Amb 21.8, my emphasis: “Moreover, [the soul] will unite the four general virtues like elements 
in a synthesis, and by means of the intellect will frame a world that will be completed by the spirit, since 
the soul endows each virtue with subsistence through the actualization of its own inner potentials in 
relation to the senses [κατὰ συμπλοκὴν μέντοι τῆς πρὸς τὰς αἰσθήσεις τῶν αὐτῆς δυνάμεων ἐνεργείας 
ἑκάστην ἀρετὴν ὑποστήσασα]”; cf. too Amb 10.3. Stunning, because Maximus defines creation itself in 
very similar terms – QThal 22.2, CCSG 7, 137: “He who brought all visible and invisible creation into 
being solely through the momentum of His will [Ὁ πάσης κτίσεως, ὁρατῆς τε καὶ ἀοράτου, κατὰ μόνην τοῦ 
θελήματος τὴν ῥοπὴν ὑποστήσας τὴν γένεσιν]”; or QThal 51.2, CCSG 7, 395: “Having granted existence to 
the entire visible creation [Τὴν ὁρωμένην ἅπασαν φύσιν ὁ θεὸς ὑποστήσας].”—The point here is that lower 
modes of existence—the circumscribed, finite modes of created effects—are valorized in themselves to 
such a degree that Maximus can view their “completion” and participation in virtue as some sort of positive 
actualization of virtue itself. It’s as if virtue gains something, in some sense (not in any natural sense, 
clearly), by its realization in our finite mode of life. 
51 Amb 21.9. For more on these intervening passages, especially as they touch on analogy and 
perichoresis, cf. below, sec. 3.5. 
52 Gen 1.26-7. So Clement of Alexandria, Protr. 9.87; Evagrius, Letter to Melania 62, Letter to 




sense.53 But not here. Here, inspired by Heb 10.1, he sets it on a more lateral or historical 
trajectory that moves from shadow to image to truth—all of the one Word, of course. He 
assigns the Word’s “shadow” to the Old Testament (represented by John the Baptist), his 
“image” to the New Testament (represented by John the Evangelist), and his “truth” our 
future union with him in deification. “The Gospel,” writes Maximus, “possesses the 
image of true things” to come, 
And it is through this image that those who choose the pure and undefiled life of 
the Gospel, through their strict exercise of the commandments, take possession of 
the likeness of the good things of the age to come, and are made ready by the 
Word through the hope that they will be spiritually vivified by their reception of 
the archetype of these true things, and so become living images of Christ, or 
rather become identical to Him through grace (rather than being a mere 
simulacrum), or even, perhaps, become the Lord Himself, if such an idea is not too 
onerous for some to bear.54 
 
 We’ve seen pretty clearly why this might be “too onerous for some to bear.”55 It 
rings isochrist, and it’s significant that Maximus himself anticipates an unsettling 
effect—as in fact he does on several occasions around this theme.56 But it’s not simply 
that Maximus here trespasses onto Origenist plots. The logic, even the wording, of this 
passage might seem curiously transgressive to those expecting a more Platonic or 
                                                 
53 CC 3.25; Amb 7.21; cf. QThal 53.3 and 6. 
54 Amb 21.15, PG 91, 1253d, my modifications and emphasis: “Τὸ δὲ Εὐγγέλιον εἰκόνα κέκτηται 
τῶν ἀληθῶν...δι’ ἧς τοὺς τὴν εὐαγγελικὴν ἑλομένους ζωὴν ἀκραιφηνῆ καὶ ἀκίβδηλον διὰ τῆς τῶν ἐντολῶν 
ἀκριβοῦς ἐργασίας, τὴν τῶν μελλόντων ἀγαθῶν ὁμοιότητα κτησαμένους, ἑτοίμους ὁ Λόγος δι’ ἐλπίδος 
καθίσησι τῇ παραδοχῇ τῆς τῶν ἀληθῶν ἀρχετυπίας ψυχωθῆναι καὶ γενέσθαι ζώας εἰκόνας Χριστοῦ, καὶ 
ταὐτὸν αὐτῷ μᾶλλον κατὰ τὴν χάριν ἢ ἀφομοίωμα, τυχὸν δὲ καὶ αὐτὸς ὁ Κύριος, εἰ μὴ φορτικὸς ὁ λόγος 
τισὶν εἶναι δοκεῖ.” 
55 Some of Maximus’s greatest predecessors who were not obviously “Origenists” after the 
manner of Evagrius appear noticably reticent about overstating the character of our deification. Gregory of 
Nazianzus, as noted by Russell, The Doctrine of Deification, 224, nowhere quotes 2 Pet 1.4. Even if Russell 
overstates the matter when he says, “For the Cappadocians, deification never went beyond a figure of 
speech” (13), his basic view that the Cappadocian anti-Eunomian polemic applied peculiar pressure on how 
and to what degree they spoke of our theosis seems right, at least for Basil and Gregory of Nazianzus. 
(Gregory of Nyssa is more complicated). Those pressures are much less urgent in Maximus, and this, in 
part, explains why his “realistic” view of deification seems in several respects like a return to Origen’s. 
56 Amb 7.12 (“if I may put it this way,” after saying God perichoretically penetrates the deified); 
Amb 10.9 (“if it be permitted thus [εἰ θέμις τοῦτο εἰπεῖν],” in the midst of stating the tantum-quantum 
principle); QThal 53.3 (“if one may be permitted to put it this way,” while saying we become God’s 




Dionysian description of deification. Consider two features: the archetype’s downward 
motion and the image’s identity that supersedes likeness.  
 [1] At least in this passage the archetype, the Word, does not merely hover in a 
purely ideal modality only to be approximated by its permutations, confined as they are 
to spatio-temporal vicissitudes. No. Union with the archetype is simultaneously the 
archetype’s own advent in the imitator. This downward condescension of archetype to 
image derives, as Élie Ayroulet has recently and cogently shown, from a distinctly 
Aristotelian rather than Platonic conception of the archetype-image relation. Aristotle 
thinks a work of art—a poem  or play, say— achieves its completion solely in its 
reproduction or imitation in the onlooker, so that the archetype-image relation enjoys a 
kind of “existential simultaneity”: the archetype possesses the power of this act in itself, 
to be sure, but attains actuality only in the imitator.57 Clearly Maximus does not mean the 
Word’s divine essence as such is realized only in the image or imitator. But there’s more 
to God, we’ve seen, than the divine essence as such. And this “more”—the person of the 
Word (or any of the Three)—is what allows and even requires if not an essential, still a 
real sense in which the divine archetype must condescend in order to complete the “truth 
that is to come,” the deification and perfection of all creation. In fact Maximus seems to 
detect exactly this concern, and immediately goes on to say: 
For even though He Himself is always the same, and is beyond all change or 
alteration, becoming neither greater nor lesser, He nonetheless becomes all things 
to everyone [1 Cor 9.22, 12.6, 15.28; Eph 1.23] out of His exceeding goodness: 
lowly for the lowly, lofty for the lofty, and, for those who are deified through His 
                                                 
57 Aristotle, Po. 1453b11, for instance, which Ayroulet also correlates with the metaphysics of first 
and second ousia at Cat. 2a 11-23; so Ayroulet, De l’image à l’Image, 42: “Dans le platonisme, les Idées 
archétypales existent en soi et précèdent dans l’existence les images qui en sont les copies, que ce soit dans 
le monde sensible ou dans l’art qui imite le sensible. Chez Aristote, au contraire, il semble que le prototype 
n’existe pas en tant que les mais seulement dans la μίμησις actualisée dans l’image.” She says Aristotle’s 
view implies “une simultanéité existentielle entre le modèle et l’image” (77), and applies this insight to 




grace, He is God by nature, and Deity beyond all knowledge as God beyond 
God.58 
 
Incarnation demands that God, by essence immutable and remaining in himself, can yet 
really, in person, identify himself with lowly creatures in such a way that he who cannot 
be essentially completed by any finite creature is in fact realized in those very creatures.59 
Christo-logic even holds that God shows himself all the more transcendent by nature 
precisely to the extent that he becomes truly identical to created nature in person.60 The 
two distinct yet inseparable logics of nature and hypostasis prove once more to open new 
possibilities, this time for our deification. We don’t just receive the activities or qualities 
of the transcendent archetype according to our natural or finite mode; we receive the 
archetype itself.61 
 [2] The archetype condescends into the imitator to make the two “the same” 
(ταὐτὸν)—a claim already familiar from Amb 41. But the really amazing feature here is 
                                                 
58 Amb 21.16, PG 91, 1256b: “Ὡσαύτως γὰρ ὑπάρχων ἀεὶ δι’ ἑαυτόν, καὶ μηδεμίαν 
παραδεχόμενος ἐξ ἀλλοιώσεως μεταβολήν, οὔτε τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον, πᾶσι πάντα γίνεται δι’ ὑπερβολὴν 
ἀγαθότητος, ταπεινὸς τοῖς ταπεινοῖς, ὑψηλὸς τοῖς ὑψηλοῖς, καὶ τοῖς δι’ αὐτὸν θεουμένοις ὁ φύσει Θεὸς καὶ 
πᾶσαν θεότητος ἐκβεβηκὼς ἔννοιαν ὡς ὑπέρθεος.” 
59 Though, as Maximus says, “by its nature the uncreated cannot be contained by any created 
thing” (Amb 10.78), he also says: “for He knows how to be contained by creation” (Amb 10.59)—both 
affirmations come in the course of Maximus’s meditation on the Transfiguration, which revealed that 
God’s power is such that he can “become a type and symbol of Himself, presenting Himself symbolically 
by means of His own self” (Amb 10.77); see too Myst. 5, CCSG 69, 23-4, discussed below (sec. 3.3), where 
the mutual interpenetration with Christ we enjoy in deification means that “Jesus my God and Savior,” “is 
completed through me who am saved [Ἰησοῦν μὲν τὸν ἐμὸν Θεὸν καὶ Σωτῆρα συμπληρωθέντα δι’ ἑμοῦ 
σωζομένου].” 
60 Amb 5.5. See my, “‘Both Mere Man and Naked God’: The Incarnational Logic of Apophasis in 
St Maximus the Confessor,” in Maximus the Confessor as a European Philosopher, eds. Sotiris Mitralexis, 
Georgios Steiris, Marcin Podbielski, and Sebastian Lalla (Eugene: Cascade, 2017), 110-30. 
61 Constas’s rendering (at Amb 21.15, vol. 1, 445, my emphasis) of “ἑτοίμους ὁ Λόγος δι’ ἐλπίδος 
καθίσησι τῇ παραδοχῇ τῆς τῶν ἀληθῶν ἀρχετυπίας ψυχωθῆναι” as “and are made ready by the Word 
through the hope that they will be spiritually vivified by their union with the archetype”  is imprecise: it 
does not indicate the directionality of the union itself. Certainly Maximus can also employ the Platonic, 
vertical direction of image to archetype (Amb 7.25, where it’s the image that “approaches” the archetype). 
But here he reverses it: the Word prepares the deified for “the reception of the archetype [i.e. the Word 
himself],” where “reception” (ἡ παραδοχή) can mean the “reception of a seed/sperm” (LSJ, s.v.; ref. 
Oribasius, Coll. medic. 22.7.1) or even the “reception of a person” (Lampe, s.v., IV)—both highly relevant 




how Maximus qualifies and presses into this identity: we do not, by grace, remain “a 
mere simulacrum,” but “become the Lord Himself.” Becoming Christ achieves an 
identity that surpasses that of a “simulacrum,” an ἀφομοίωμα. That’s an important word, 
and to exceed it more significant still. Not only does this outstrip Proclus’s henads, 
described in just those terms.62 It even threatens to outdo Dionysius’s own definition of 
deification: “theosis is the likeness [ἀφομοίωσίς] to and union with God, as far as 
possible.”63 
 Since Dionysius’s definition comes from a liturgical and sacramental context, it’s 
fitting that our next set of passages treat the identity with Christ that occurs through the 
sacraments, especially baptism and the Eucharist. In Amb 42 Maximus faces the 
following difficulty. Gregory of Nazianzus identifies three human births—“from bodies, 
from baptism, and from the resurrection”—but later adds a fourth, more mysterious one: 
“the original and vital inbreathing [Gen 2.7; Wisd 15.11].”64 Why? What follows is an 
elaborate theory of humanity’s original becoming (genesis) as distinct in mode from its 
post-lapsarian becoming (gennesis), both of which Christ assumes in his act of becoming 
man. An interesting and relevant disquisition, to be sure,65 but it’s the question Maximus 
himself raises late in this ambiguum that most concerns us here. He notices and asks why 
                                                 
62 Proclus, Theol. Plat. VI.3. 
63 Dionysius, E.H. 1.3, Heil and Ritter 66, ll.12-13, my translation: “ἡ δὲ θέωσις ἐστιν ἡ πρὸς θεὸν 
ὡς ἐφικτὸν ἀφομοίωσίς τε καὶ ἕνωσις.”  
64 Gregory of Nazianzus, Or. 40.2 = Amb 42.1. 
65 This ambiguum, along with QThal 61, raises the acutest questions about how the historical 
Incarnation relates to time itself. So, for example, while Maximus correlates Gregory’s three births to 
Maximus’s own triad of being (=physical birth), well-being (=birth through virtue and baptism), and eternal 
well-being (birth through resurrection), such that they appear to track along with the historical and 
existential life of human beings pretty much in sequence (Amb 42.12), it’s also clear that in Christ these are 
all one event—these along with the fourth primordial “inbreathing.” Hence these births prove to be 
differing “modes,” distinguished only “in thought” (κατ’ ἐπίνοιαν) (Amb 42.33). I must reserve this matter 




Gregory links baptism to the Incarnation.66  He answers by invoking the image-likeness 
trope. But again this quickly takes on a more extreme sense: 
Those who interpret the divine sayings mystically...say that man in the beginning 
was created according to the image of God [Gen 1.27], surely so that he might be 
born of the Spirit in the exercise of his own free choice, and to acquire in addition 
the likeness by the keeping of the divine commandment, so that the same man, 
being by nature a creation of God, might also be Son of God and God through the 
Spirit according to grace [ἵνα ᾖ ὁ αὐτὸς ἄνθρωπος πλάσμα μὲν τοῦ Θεοῦ κατὰ 
φύσιν, Υἱὸς δὲ Θεοῦ καὶ Θεὸς διὰ Πνεύματος κατὰ χάριν].67 
 
 How can Maximus move seamlessly from “likeness” to identity? Consider two 
aspects of Maximus’s reasoning here, both of Irenaean vintage. First there’s the more 
“subjective” concern, you might say, to respect human freedom even when we have to do 
with realizing humanity’s natural vocation. Nearly everywhere Maximus treats baptism 
he stresses its voluntary character—as if birth by baptism surpasses bodily birth to the 
extent that the former is freely elected, the latter not.68 This recalls Irenaeus’s response to 
the question why God did not make us gods from the very beginning: “so that no one 
might think him invidious or less than most excellent,” God “graciously granted a great 
good to human beings, and made them like himself, [that is,] possessing their own 
power.”69 Irenaeus implies that a creature unfree would already be a creature unlike God. 
For Maximus baptismal birth, which makes us God’s adopted children, is how we freely 
answer our vocation; and indeed it’s ultimately how we cooperate in our own primordial 
generation.  
                                                 
66 Gregory of Nazianzus, Or. 40.2 = Amb 42.1: “τὴν δέ, τῇ σαρκώσει καὶ τῷ βαπτίσματι, ὅπερ 
αὐτὸς ἐβαπτίσατο.” 
67 Amb 42.31, slightly modified. 
68 Cf. esp. QThal 61.11. 
69 Irenaeus, Haer. 4.38.4, SC 100/2, my translation: “quamvis secundum simplicitatem bonitatis 
suae hoc fecerit, ne quis eum putet invidiosum aut impraestantem” (ll. 98-100), and “Secundum enim 




 Then there’s the more “objective” theory, Irenaeus’s recapitulation (indebted to 
Eph 1.10), which stipulates that Christ heals and saves (preserves) all things by remaking 
and re-sourcing them in himself.70 But notice what this becomes when combined with the 
Neochalcedonian precisions about “hypostatic identity” detailed in Chapter 1.71 Where 
are all these things “summed up” and stitched together if not in the person of Christ? So 
when Maximus says, as he does soon after this text, that “He who is by God essence and 
the Son of God by nature was baptized for our sake, voluntarily subjecting Himself to the 
spiritual birth of adoption,” he intimates, I think, that all human “adoption” by the Spirit 
(through baptism) subsists directly in the one who recapitulated it in himself—in the 
composed hypostasis of Christ.72 Christ becomes and is, in very principle (logos), the 
identity of human regeneration—the universal principle active in every individual 
adoption by grace: 
On account of my condemnation, the Lord first submitted Himself to Incarnation 
and bodily birth, after which came the birth of baptism received in the Spirit, to 
which He consented for the sake of my salvation and restoration by grace or, to 
put it more precisely, my re-creation [ἀναπλάσεως]. In this way God joined 
together in me the principle of my being and the principle of my well-being, and 
He closed the division and distance between them that I had opened up, and 
through them He wisely drew me to the principle of eternal being, according to 
which man is no longer subject to carrying or being carried along.73 
 
                                                 
70 Irenaeus, Haer. 5.21.3, for instance. On Irenaeus’s idea of recapitulation, see Eric Osborn, 
Irenaeus of Lyons (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 97-116. On Maximus’s programmatic 
or methodological debt to Irenaeus, see Paul M. Blowers, Maximus the Confessor: Jesus Christ and the 
Transfiguration of the World (Oxford: OUP, 2016), 102-8. 
71 Chapter 1, sec. 1.3. 
72 Amb 42.31. 
73 Amb 42.32, my emphasis: “Σάρκωσις οὖν καὶ σωματικὴ πρότερον τῆς ἐμῆς ἕνεκα κατακρίσεως 
ἐπὶ τοῦ Κυρίου παρηκολούθησε γέννησις, καὶ οὕτως ἡ διὰ τοῦ βαπτίσματος ἐν Πνεύματι παραλειφθεῖσα 
ἐπηκολούθησε γέννησις, ὑπὲρ τῆς ἐμῆς κατὰ χάριν σωτηρίας καὶ ἀνακλήσεως ἤ, σαφέστερον εἰπεῖν, 
ἀναπλάσεως· οἱα συνάπτοντος περὶ ἐμὲ τοῦ Θεοῦ τόν τε τοῦ εἶναί μου λόγον καὶ τὸν τοῦ εὖ εἶναι, καὶ τὴν 
γενομένην παρ’ ἐμοῦ τούτων ἑνοποιοῦντος τομὴν καὶ διάστασιν, καὶ διὰ τούτων πρὸς τὸν τοῦ ἀεὶ εἶναι 




 For Maximus the power implanted or nascent in baptism must be nursed to 
fullness by a person’s own deeds.74 And no deed’s more effective than receiving the 
Eucharist. On the two occasions in his Mystagogy Maximus remarks on the “holy 
communion” of the synaxis—however curtly and cryptically75—he makes bold to speak 
of “identity” with God through Christ. After the “Our Father,” which sustains our 
adoption as God’s offspring, we hymn the “One is Holy,” an ancient chant about Jesus 
Christ,76 which makes us “like him by participation in an indivisible identity according to 
each one’s power.”77 Later Maximus warns his readers against laxity in attending the 
divine liturgy exactly because, there and then, the Holy Spirit’s grace is present “in a 
special way,” a grace that “transforms [metapoiousan] and changes [metaskeuazousan] 
each person who is found there and in fact remolds [metaplattousan] him in proportion to 
what is more divine in him and leads him to what is revealed through the mysteries which 
are celebrated”—even if the participant herself “does not feel this” because she’s but an 
infant in Christ, unable to perceive what’s really occurring.78 And what’s occurring is 
this: 
By holy communion of the spotless and life-giving mysteries we receive both 
fellowship with him by participation through likeness, and identity, by which man 
is deemed worthy to become God out of man.79 
 
More precisely, identical to God because identical to Christ: 
                                                 
74 QThal 6.2; QThal 61.11. 
75 Blowers, Maximus the Confessor, 191-3. 
76 See Myst. 21, and the note in Berthold, Maximus Confessor, 223 n. 112. 
77 Myst. 13, CCSG 69, 42, slightly modified: “τῇ χάριτι θεωθέντας, καὶ κατὰ μέθεξιν πρὸς αὐτὴν 
ὁμοιωθέντας τῇ κατὰ δύναμιν ἀδιαιρέτῳ ταυτότητι.” On “analogy” or, here, “according to each one’s 
power,” see below, sec. 3.5. 
78 Myst. 24, CCSG 69, 55-6. 
79 Myst. 24, CCSG 69, 58, slight change: “διὰ δὲ τῆς ἁγίας μεταλήψεως τῶν ἀχράντων καὶ 
ζωοποιῶν μυστηρίων, τὴν πρὸς αὐτὸν κατὰ μέθεξιν ἐνδεχομένην δι’ ὁμοιότητος κοινωνίαν τε καὶ 




Then we shall pass from the grace which is in faith to the grace of vision, when 
our God and Savior Jesus Christ will indeed transform us into himself 
[μεταποιοῦντος ἡμᾶς πρὸς ἑαυτὸν δηλαδὴ τοῦ Θεοῦ καὶ Σωτῆρος ἡμῶν Ἰησοῦ 
Χριστοῦ] by taking away from us the marks of corruption and will bestow on us 
the archetypical mysteries which have been represented for us through sensible 
symbols here below.80 
 
 Maximus’s mention of the “Our Father” (Myst. 13) recalls his formal commentary 
on that prayer. Here again we find identity claims. Maximus’s principal premise is that 
the Lord’s Prayer teaches us to pray for the “good things that are themselves actualized 
from the Word incarnate.”81 There are seven “good things.”82 The second and third 
pertain here. The Incarnation grants humanity “equality in honor with the angels” (third) 
and “adoption in grace” (fourth).83 Adoption and participation in divine life surpasses 
even angelic equality to the extent that it makes us equal to God. This occurs, once more, 
because in the historical Incarnation the Word “makes Himself edible—as He Himself 
knows how,” and thus “mixes with a divine quality those who eat for their deification, 
since He both is and is clearly called Bread of Life and of power.”84  
                                                 
80 Myst. 24, CCSG 69, 59, slightly modified. Cf. too Amb 50.3, where the Eucharist is also 
celebrated “in the future age of the divine promises,” where, “without any mediation we will eat the most 
sublime Word of Wisdom—and being transformed with respect to Him, we will become Gods by grace 
[τὸν ἀκρότατον ἀμέσως ἐσθίοντες τῆς Σοφίας Λόγον, πρὸς ὃν μεταποιηθέντες κατὰ χάριν θεούμεθα].” 
Portaru, “The Vocabulary of Participation in the Works of Saint Maximus the Confessor,” 303, glosses 
Maximus’s language in these texts: “A term that should be noted is the verb μεταποιέω, which designates a 
profound transformation of human being by grace.... Since the context is the receiving of Eucharist, I 
believe these images must be understood literally, not metaphorically” (my emphasis). He doesn’t 
elaborate. 
81 Exp. Orat. Dom. 3 (cf. 1), CCSG 23, 40, slightly modified. 
82 Exp. Orat. Dom. 1, where they’re enumerated: [1] theology (i.e. knowing God as Trinity); [2] 
adoption in grace; [3] equality of honor with the angels; [4] participation in eternal life; [5] the restoration 
of nature; [6] the abolition of sin; [7] the overthrow of evil’s tyranny and deception. There does appear to 
be an order to these that follows a similar logic of the “two ages” of Incarnation and deification in QThal 
22: phenomenologically, as it were, both history and individual biographies unfold from 7 to 1; 
eschatologically, from 1-7; and of course christologically, both directions at once. 
83 Exp. Orat. Dom. 2, CCSG 23, 33: “Ἰσοτίμους δὲ τοῖς ἀγγέλοις τοὺς ἀνθρώπους πεποίηκεν.” An 
idea precious to Evagrius, De orat. 113; Russell, The Doctrine of Deification, 239. 
84 Exp. Orat. Dom. 2, CCSG 23, 34, greatly modified; here’s the fuller citation: “Ζωῆς δὲ θείας 
ποιεῖται μετάδοσιν, ἐδώδιμον ἑαυτὸν ἐργαζόμενος, ὡς οἶδεν αὐτὸς καὶ οἱ παρ’ αὐτοῦ τοιαύτην αἴσθησιν 




 We have here exactly the same logic of participation operative last chapter in 
Maximus’s protology.85 [1] the Word condescends to identify his person with created 
nature, which generates that nature; [2] the Word’s generative self-identification with 
created nature opens to the latter a “new,” non-natural mediation or relation by which to 
participate the “good things” or “eternal works” of the divine nature; [3] and so 
participation through this supra-natural mediator—namely the hypostasis of the Word—
can lead to otherwise inconceivable modes of perfection and real relation between God 
and world: a single perichoretic or a “whole in whole” modality of two infinitely different 
modes and acts. So here: 
 
[1] [Christ] sets in movement in us an insatiable desire for himself who is the 
Bread of Life, wisdom, knowledge, and justice. When we fulfill the Father’s will 
he renders us similar to the angels in their adoration, as we imitate them by 
reflecting the heavenly blessedness in the conduct of our life. [2] From there he 
leads us finally in the supreme ascent in divine realities to the Father of lights 
wherein he makes us sharers in the divine nature by participation in the Spirit 
according to grace, [3] through which we receive the title of God’s children and 
become, ourselves [still] wholes, clothed with the whole and very author of this 
same grace, without limiting or defiling him who is Son of God by nature, from 
whom, by whom, and in whom we have and shall have being, movement, and life 
[cf. Acts 17.28].86 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
κύριος, ποιότητι θείᾳ πρὸς θέωσιν μετακιρνῶν τοὺς ἐσθίοντας, οἷα δὴ σαφῶς ζωῆς καὶ δυνάμεως ἄρτος καὶ 
ὢν καὶ καλούμενος.” Cf. Origen, Hom. in Lev. 16.5; Comm. in Jo. 20.35, passim. 
85 Chapter 2, sec. 2.6. 
86 Exp. Orat. Dom. 5, CCSG 23, 70, my modifications and emphasis: “...καὶ πρὸς ἑαυτόν, ἄρτον 
ὄντα ζωῆς  σοφίας τε καὶ γνώσεως καὶ δικαιοσύνης, κινοῦντος ἡμῶν ἀκορέστως τὴν ὄρεξιν καὶ τῇ 
πληρώσει τοῦ πατρικοῦ θελήματος τοῖς ἀγγέλοις ὁμολάτρας ἡμᾶς καθιστῶντος, τῇ κατὰ τὸν βίον ἀγωγῇ 
τὴν ἐπουράνιον εὐμιμήτως ἐμφαίνοντας εὐαρέστησιν, κἀκεῖθεν πάλιν ἐπὶ τὴν ἀκροτάτην τῶν θείων 
ἀνάβασιν, πρὸς τὸν Πατέρα τῶν φώτων, ἐνάγοντος, καὶ θείας ἀπεργαζομένου φύσεως κοινωνοὺς τῇ κατὰ 
χάριν μεθέξει τοῦ Πνεύματος, καθ’ ἣν τέκνα θεοῦ χρηματίσομεν, αὐτὸν τὸν ταύτης αὐτουργὸν τῆς χάριτος 
καὶ κατὰ φύσιν τοῦ Πατρὸς Υἱὸν ὅλον ὅλοι δίχα περιγραφῆς ἀχράντως περικομίζοντες, ἐξ οὗ καὶ δἰ οὗ καὶ 
ἐν ᾧ τὸ εἶναι τε καὶ κινεῖσθαι καὶ ζῆν ἔχομέν τε καὶ ἕξομεν].” 
—In fact the logic emerges if you simply trace the order of Maximus’s scriptural allusions as they 
appear: 
 [1] The Middle: The Word becomes incarnate 
 i. Christ gives himself as “the Bread of Life” (Jn 6.35, 48)  




So exactly does the logic of our deification conform to the logic of Christ, that Maximus 
can even apply a classic passage on Christ’s kenosis (Php 2.6) directly to the deification 
of our soul, and from there make some incredible claims: 
[The soul] becomes a radiant abode of the Holy Spirit and receives, if one can say 
it, the full power of knowing the divine nature insofar as this is possible. By this 
power there is discarded the origin of what is inferior, to be replaced by that of 
what is superior, while the soul, equal to God [ἶσα θεῳ--Php 2.6] keeps inviolable 
in itself by the grace of its calling the hypostasis of the gifts that have been given. 
By this power [or: “according to this hypostasis”], Christ is always born 
mysteriously and willingly, becoming incarnate through those who are saved. He 
causes the soul which begets him to be a virgin-mother who, to speak briefly, 
does not bear the marks of nature subject to corruption and generation in the 
relationship of male and female.87 
 
 We could adduce several other passages that make identity-claims like those 
canvassed here.88 Instead I terminate this catalogue to consider how Maximus could get 
                                                                                                                                                 
[2] The End: The Word’s Incarnation induces our deification 
 iii. Therefore we’re empowered to become “sharers in the divine nature” itself (2 Pet 1.4) 
 iv. and this takes the specific form of filiation, of receiving the Son through the Spirit as  
  “children of God” (Jn 1.12, 11.52; Rom 8.16, 12, 9.8; Php 2.15; 1 Jn 3.1-2, 10, 5.2) 
[3] The Beginning: The Word Incarnate is thus shown to become the very principles of creation 
 v. since Maximus here substitutes “Christ” and “Son” for the vaguer “in Him” of Acts  
  17.28 
 vi. hence, too, Maximus claimed earlier that “the same divine food” wrought in Christ  
  was available to Adam (Exp. Orat. Dom. 4, CCSG 23, 60). 
87 Exp. Orat. Dom. 4, CCSG 23, 50, slightly modified: “...ὡς Πνεύματος ἁγίου παμφαὲς 
οἰκητήριον, ὅλην δεχόμενον, εἰ θέμις εἰπεῖν, τῆς θείας φύσεως κατὰ τὸ δυνατὸν τὴν ἐξουσίαν τῆς γνώσεως, 
καθ’ ἣν ἡ μὲν τῶν χειρόνων ἀπογίνεσθαι, τῶν δὲ κρειττόνων ὑφίστασθαι πέφυκε γένεσις, ἶσα θεῷ τῆς 
ψυχῆς κατὰ τὴν χάριν τῆς κλήσεως ἄσυλον φυλαττούσης ἐν ἑαυτῇ τῶν δωρηθέντων καλῶν τὴν ὑπόστασιν· 
καθ’ ἣν ἀεὶ θέλων Χριστὸς γεννᾶται μυστικῶς, διὰ τῶν σωζομένον σαρκούμενος καὶ μητέρα παρθένον 
ἀπεργαζόμενος τὴν γεννᾶσαν ψυχήν, οὐκ ἔχουσαν, ἵνα συνελὼν εἴπω, κατὰ τὴν σχέσιν, ὥσπερ ἄρρεν καὶ 
θῆλυ, τὰ γνωρίσματα τῆς ὑπὸ φθορὰν καὶ γένεσιν φύσεως.” I favor the rendering, “according to this 
hypostasis,” as I argue below at sec. 3.3. 
88 QThal 59.8, CCSG 22, 53, explicitly defines the “likeness” of the fully deified as “the received 
[and] actualized identity to the very one who is participated by participants through likeness [ἡ κατ’ 
ἐνέργειαν πρὸς αὐτὸ τὸ μετεχόμενον τῶν μετεχόντων δι’ ὁμοιότητος ἐνδεχομένη ταυτότης]” (modified)—
on which consult Portaru, “The Vocabulary of Participation in the Works of Saint Maximus the Confessor,” 
316; QThal 25.5, CCSG 7, 163, says the human intellect attains “identity with God by grace [τῆς πρὸς θεὸν 
κατὰ χάριν ταὐτότητος],” and indeed identity with “the Divine Intellect,” the Father himself; Amb 20.7, 
claims that in the state of grace we are “like and equal to God [ὅμοιον Θεῷ καὶ ἴσον, ὡς ἐφικτόν, τῇ χάριτι 
κατὰ τὴν ἕξιν]”; Amb 31.4, says the gift of grace makes us “equal in honor to the Father [ἰσότιμον τῷ Πατρὶ 
κατὰ τὴν ἐκ χάριτος δωρεάν]”; and QThal 29.5, especially schol. 4, CCSG 7, 217, which, though probably 
not by Maximus himself, yet dares to say the very thing Theophilus of Scythopolis condemned: that Paul, 
because he “became another Christ,” was indeed “united to Him according to hypostasis [ἑνωθῆναι 




away with such statements, particularly given the deep concern around Origenist 
isochristism. Notice, first, that Maximus had before him other authorities whose writings 
brandished similar convictions, authorities not obviously of the Origenist stock. Take the 
simple but vigorous Christ-devotion of the Macarian homilies—an influence Maximus 
definitely suffered.89 There you read that “the heavenly Image, Jesus Christ, now 
mystically illumines the soul” of the saint from within;90 that “perfect Christians” who by 
grace receive the “heavenly anointing” that makes of them “sons and lords and gods” 
must be “bound and held captive, crucified and consecrated” with Christ91; that we are 
like “burning lamps” lighted from a single flame, “the Son of God,” such that when we’re 
anointed with the same oil and enkindled with the same fire as Christ himself “we should 
become Christs—of the very same essence and of one body, as it were”92; that even as 
one Body there’s no need to think our bodies melt away at the resurrection, since “all are 
being transformed into a divine nature, becoming christs and gods and children of God 
[εἰς θεϊκὴν γὰρ φύσιν ἅπαντες μεταβάλλονται, χρηστοὶ, καὶ θεοὶ, καὶ τέκνα Θεοῦ 
γενόμενοι]”93; and that, reminiscent one of Maximus’s sentiments above, God dispatched 
the Scriptures as letters beckoning human beings to “receive the celestial gift out of the 
hypostasis of God’s divinity,” which is “immortal life,” or simply, “Christ.”94 
                                                 
89 For the Macarian legacy in Maximus, see esp. Marcus Plested, The Macarian Legacy: The 
Place of Macarius-Symeon in the Eastern Christian Tradition (Oxford: OUP, 2004), 213-54; and Russell, 
The Doctrine of Deification, 241-5. 
90 Pseudo-Macarius, Hom. 2.5, PG 34, 468a. 
91 Pseudo-Macarius, Hom. 17.1, PG 34, 624c: “Οὗτοί εἰσι καὶ υἱοὶ, καὶ κύριοι, καὶ θεοὶ, δεδεμένοι, 
ᾐχμαλωτισμένοι, βεβυθισμένοι, ἐσταυρωμένοι, ἀφιερωμένοι”; cf. the Great Letter, Maloney 258-9. 
92 Pseudo-Macarius, Hom. 43.1, PG 34, 772b-c, my translation and slight modification: “ἵνα τῷ 
αὐτῷ ἐλαίῳ, ᾦ αὐτὸς ἐχρίσθη, καὶ ἡμεῖς χρισθέντες γενώμεθα Χριστοὶ, τῆς αὐτῆς, ὡς εἰπεῖν, οὐσίας καὶ 
ἑνὸς σώματος.” 
93 Pseudo-Macarius, Hom. 34.2, PG 34, 745b, my translation. 
94 Pseudo-Macarius, Hom. 39.1, PG 34, 761c-d, my translation: “λάβωσι δωρεὰν οὐράνιον ἐκ τῆς 
ὑποστάσεως τῆς θεότητος αὐτοῦ...ἧς ἄνευ ἀδύνατόν ἐστι ζωῆς ἀθανάτου τυχεῖν, ἣτις ἐστὶν ὁ Χριστός.” Cp. 




 Maximus exemplifies the vitality of this tradition. So too, of course, was he 
shaped by his affinity for the (especially Evagrian) Origenist legacy, both directly and as 
it animated the Cappadocians.95 And yet I think Maximus’s courage about identity 
between the saints and Christ (and so God) is not entirely explicable as a mere 
epiphenomenon of various traditional compounds. He had dogmatic reason for such 
fortitude, too. That’s to say, Maximus’s developments of and extra burnishes to 
Neochalcedonian christology—especially Christo-logic’s discrimination between 
hypostatic and essential logics, and the new modal possibilities this distinction entails—
allowed him (to cop Perczel’s helpful description) to retain a “structural isomorphism” to 
isochrist Origenism even as he infused it with the dogmatic content of (his brand of) 
Neochalcedonianism.96 
 And this constitutes, I suggest, the great significance of Maximus’s celebrated 
tantum-quantum (or τοσοῦτον-ὅσον) principle.97 This principle prescribes that to the 
same degree that God became man in the historical Incarnation, we become God in 
deification. Here we’ve moved beyond the Irenaean-Athanasian axiom that God became 
human that humans might become gods.98 That axiom posits an intimate causal link 
between Incarnation and deification. But the tantum-quantum principle, which Maximus 
                                                 
95 On these Origenist influences see Hans Urs von Balthasar, Cosmic Liturgy: The Universe 
According to Maximus the Confessor, 3rd ed., transl. Brian Daley, S.J. (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2003 
[orig: 1941, 1961, 1988]), 115-136;  Polycarp Sherwood, O.S.B., The Earlier Ambigua of Saint Maximus 
the Confessor and His Refutation of Origenism (Rome: Orbis Catholicus, Herder, 1955); and Paul M. 
Blowers, Maximus the Confessor: Jesus Christ and the Transfiguration of the World (Oxford: OUP, 2016), 
1-3, 67-8, and 222-3, who’s recently suggested that there’s yet more to recognize in Maximus’s debt to 
Origenism. On the Cappadocian influence on Maximus, see George Berthold, “The Cappadocian Roots of 
Maximus the Confessor,” in MC, 51-9. 
96 Perczel, “St Maximus on the Lord’s Prayer,” 239-40, 271. 
97 Larchet, La divinisation de l’homme, 376-82; Thunberg, Microcosm and Mediator, 32-3. 
98 Irenaeus, Haer. 5.pref.; Athanasius, De incarn. Verb. 54.3. Maximus of course began here (cf. 




inherits but forges into a veritable Grundprinzip,99 commends something like a formal 
and even “mutually proportional” relation between them.100 
 Mark two features of this principle. First, it is not an abstract axiom. Axiomatic, 
sure, but it couldn’t be less abstract, really, since one of its terms is precisely the 
historical Incarnation of the Word. Even when Maximus emphasizes the cooperative 
work of the soul in the process of its deification, the referent and measure is the historical 
Christ-event: 
He gives adoption by giving through the Spirit a supernatural birth from on high 
in grace, of which divine birth the guardian and preserver—along with God—is 
the free will of those who are thus born. By a sincere disposition it cherishes the 
grace bestowed and by a careful observation of the commandments it adorns the 
beauty given by grace. And by emptying itself of the passions it takes on divinity 
to the same degree that the Word of God willed to empty himself in the 
incarnation [“economically”] of his own unmixed glory in being reckoned and 
truly becoming human.101 
 
                                                 
99 Gregory of Nazianzus, Or. 29.19 = Amb 3.1: “...because He deigned to take on your thick 
corporeality, consorting with the flesh through the medium of the intellect—and God on earth became man, 
for it (i.e., the flesh) was blended with God, and He became one, because the stronger predominated, so that 
I might be made God to the same extent that He was made man [ἵνα γένωμαι τοσοῦτον Θεὸς ὅσον ἐκαῖνος 
ἄνθρωπος].”—Though not cast in the same technical formal, the central idea tantum-quantum expresses—a 
fundamental reciprocity between creaturely ascent to (and as) God and God’s descent to (and as) 
creature—finds precedent in lesser known crooks of the Alexandrian tradition. Clement of Alexandria, for 
instance, wrote: “For the Word of God is intelligible [νοερός], according to which the image of the mind 
[νοῦς] is seen in the human being alone, by which also the good man is deiform and dei-similar [θεοειδὴς 
καὶ θεοείκελος] in his soul, and God, in turn, is anthropoform [ἀνθρωποειδής]. For the form of both is the 
mind [ὁ νοῦς], by which we are fashioned”; Strom. 6.9.72.2, my emphasis, but translation’s taken from 
David I. Litwa, “‘I will become Him’: Homology and Deification in the Gospel of Thomas,” JBL 133.2 
(2015): 446. Of course Maximus could never brook a natural relation between God and the deified mind 
after the manner of Clement here and Origen at times (Princ 4.4.9), though some of his influences appear to 
have held a similar view; cf. Dirk Krausmüller, “Human Souls as Consubstantial Sons of God: The 
Heterodox Anthropology of Leontius of Jerusalem,” JLARC 4 (2010): 43-67. But this only further 
substantiates my principal point: Maximus’s Neochalcedonian christology allowed him to eschew and 
replace the dogmatic content of these parts of the tradition while retaining and even exacerbating (since 
hypostatic identity is stronger than the formal identity among stratified levels of nature) their structure or 
thought-forms. 
100 Larchet, La divinisation de l’homme, 381, citing François Brune, Pour que l’homme devienne 
Dieu. 2nd Ed (Saint-Jean-de-Braye, 1992), 332. 
101 Exp. Orat. Dom. 2, CCSG 23, 32-3, my modifications and emphasis: “Υἱοθεσίαν δὲ δίδωμι, τὴν 
ὑπὲρ φύσιν ἄνωθεν διὰ Πνεύματος ἐν χάριτι δωρούμενος γέννησιν, ἧς σὺν θεῷ φυλακή τε καὶ τήρησις 
ἐστὶν ἡ τῶν γεννωμένων προαίρεσις, διαθέσει γνησίᾳ τὴν δοθεῖσαν στέργουσα χάριν καὶ τῇ πράξει τῶν 




Little doubt that the final line refers to the historical person of Christ.102 That matters 
because, as Maximus reminds just before another tantum-quantum passage, the only way 
the Word becomes man at all is in his own hypostasis.103 Hypostatic identity remains ever 
the sine qua non of the communicatio idiomatum in Christo-logic.104 You don’t get any 
degree of exchange without the real, factual identity sustaining and indeed generating that 
very created nature whose qualities the Word assumes. You certainly don’t get the 
supreme degree of communication wrought and displayed in the Word’s kenosis unto 
death. If our reception of the fullness of God is in any sense less than God’s assumption 
of the fullness of man in the Word’s historical, hypostatic identity to human nature 
(particular and universal), then this principle, as it’s systematically expressed, falls into 
sheer nonsense.105 
 The second feature: since we become truly and wholly God to the same degree the 
Son became truly and wholly human;106 and since we remain ourselves whole while 
becoming the whole God (see below, sec. 3.4); then the Word still incarnates, still gains 
bodily existence, in the ongoing mutual assimilation between God and man—what 
                                                                                                                                                 
μεταποιουμένη θεότητος, ὅσον ὁ τοῦ θεοῦ Λόγος, τῆς οἰκείας ἀκραιφνοῦς δόξης οἰκονομικῶς ἑαυτὸν κατὰ 
θέλησιν κενώσας, γενόμενος ἀληθῶς κεχρημάτικεν ἄνθρωπος.” 
102 See Larchet, La divinisation de l’homme, 376-7 for others, esp. QThal 64.33, CCSG 22, 237. 
103 Amb 3.3, my emphasis (citing Gregory of Nazianzus, Or. 29.19): “Through the flesh, which by 
nature is passible, He manifested His infinitely immeasurable power, for ‘it’—obviously the flesh—was 
‘blended with God and He became one, the strong side predominating,’ precisely because it was assumed 
by the Word, who deified it by identifying it with His own hypostasis [ὑποστατικῇ ταὐτότητι κυρίως αὐτὴν 
τοῦ προσλαβόντος Λόγου θεώσαντος].” 
104 Chapter 1, sec. 1.5. 
105 So Perczel, “St Maximus on the Lord’s Prayer,” 241: “The measure of appropriation of the 
godhead by men equals the measure of the acquisition of human nature through the self-emptying of the 
Word of God; in fact there is no quantitative difference; men through grace, acquired through their acts of 
free will, become just as much God as God the Word through the free act of his self-emptying had become 
entirely man.” Perczel prefers to explain this by invoking Aristotle’s principle of “substance,” which 
prescribes that “substance does not admit the concept of more or less” (Cat. 5, 3b33-4a9) (240, 247), so 
that Maximian deification requires the Word to dwell within the deified “substantially and not only 
operatively or energetically” (241). This edges very close to my own interpretation (see below, sec. 3.3): 
since the Word’s hypostasis is the very principle for created hypostases (and their natures), then the Word 
is personally present as a supra-natural power in every creature (as their logoi). 




Maximus calls the “ages” of deification.107 Thus emerges a profound characteristic of 
Maximian deification, namely the symmetry and even mutual conditioning or fulfillment 
between God’s becoming creature and the creature’s becoming God. “Au plan mystique 
de l’accomplissement personnel de l’homme,” Larchet writes,  
elles [deification and Incarnation] deviennent même réciproquement dépendantes 
et se conditionennt mutuellement, puisque non seulement l’homme devient dieu 
relativement à l’humanisation de Dieu, mais encore que Dieu, par une 
manifestation suprême de Son amour, devient homme relativement à la 
divinisation de l’homme en tant qu’Il S’incarne mystiquement en chaque 
personne divinisée.108 
 
That this reciprocal fulfillment occurs “mystically” doesn’t make it any less concrete or 
extreme; rather more so, since, of course, the historical Incarnation itself is the greatest 
and source of all mysteries.109 The tantum-quantum principle therefore posits the 
profoundest possible identity between Incarnation and deification—that both achieve the 
complete perichoresis of created and uncreated natures that’s possible solely in the 
Word’s person. He himself becomes the continuity of extremes so that realities infinitely 
different by nature can now, in a totally supra-natural manner, become each other’s terms 
as if they were on the same metaphysical mode of existence. The deified “as wholes,” 
writes Maximus, 
were deemed worthy to be wholly intermingled through the Spirit with the whole 
of God, and thus were clothed (so far as humanly possible) in the whole image of 
the heavenly man [1 Cor 15.49], and to the extent [τοσοῦτο] that they drew to 
themselves the manifestation of God, to that very same degree, if it be permitted 
thus, they were drawn to God and united to Him [εἰ θέμις τοῦτο εἰπεῖν, ὅσον 
ἑλχθέντες αὐτοὶ τῷ Θεῷ συνετέθησαν]. For they say that God and man are 
paradigms of each other, so that as much as man, enabled by love, has divinized 
himself for God, to that same extent God is humanized for man by His love for 
mankind; and as much as man has manifested through the virtues God who is 
                                                 
107 QThal 22.4, CCSG 7, 137-9. 
108 Larchet, La divinisation de l’homme, 381-2. 




invisible by nature, to that same extent man is rapt by God in mind to the 
unknowable.110 
 
But more on the God-world reciprocity in sec. 3.5. 
________ 
I’ve tried to establish two basic points in this section. First, Maximus depicts deification 
as achieving an identity between God and the world, however fraught that idea’s legacy 
was before him. And second, this identity is the very same as that wrought in the 
historical Incarnation, hypostatic identity. Yet everywhere and always Maximus qualifies 
deific identity as a product of grace, as we first heard in the overture (Amb 41). 
Maximus’s own iteration of Dionysius’s definition of deification runs: “the work of 
theological mystagogy is to establish one by grace in a state of being like God and equal 
to God”—where “grace” and “equal,” note well, are Maximus’s.111  
 But doesn’t the former vitiate the latter? If “by the state of grace” I become “one 
and same” as God and “everything that God is, without, however, identity in 
essence”112—then can I really say my eschatological identity with God is identity in any 
meaningful sense? Doesn’t “God by grace” instead of “God by nature” finally just mean 
                                                 
110 Amb 10.9, modified: “καθ’ ὃν ὁλικῶς πρὸς Θεὸν συναχθέντες, ὅλοι ὅλῳ Θεῷ ἐγκραθῆναι διὰ 
τοῦ Πνεύματος ἠξιώθησαν, ὅλην τοῦ ἐπουρανίου κατὰ τὸ δυνατὸν ἀνθρώποις τὴν εἰκόνα φορέσαντες καὶ 
τοσοῦτο ἕλξαντες τῆς θείας ἐμφάσεως, εἰ θέμις τοῦτο εἰπεῖν, ὅσον ἑλχθέντες αὐτοὶ τῷ Θεῷ συνετέθησαν. 
Φασὶ γὰρ ἀλλήλων εἶναι παραδείγματα τὸν Θεὸν καὶ τὸν ἄνθρωπον, καὶ τοσοῦτον τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ τὸν Θεὸν 
διὰ φιλανθρωπίαν ἀνθρωπίζεσθαι, ὅσον ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἑαυτὸν τῷ Θεῷ δι’ ἀγάπης δυνηθεὶς ἀπεθέωσε, καὶ 
τοσοῦτον ὑπὸ Θεοῦ τὸν ἄνθρωπον κατὰ νοῦν ἁρπάζεσθαι πρὸς τὸ ἄγνωστον, ὅσον ὁ ἄνθρωπος τὸν 
ἀόρατον φύσει Θεὸν διὰ τῶν ἀρετῶν ἐφανέρωσεν.” 
111 Amb 20.7, slightly modified: “ἔργον...τῆς δὲ θεολογικῆς μυσταγωγίας ὅμοιον Θεῷ καὶ ἴσον, ὡς 
ἐφικτόν, τῇ χάριτι κατὰ τὴν ἕξιν ποιῆσαι.” 
112 Amb 41.5, cited above at n. 26. Even the great Larchet, La divinisation de l’homme, 487, tends 
to give this sense: “Il y bien alors, appropriées par la personne, communication à la nature qu’elle 
hypostasie, par le biais des vertus, non pas des propriétés essentielles de Dieu...non pas de la nature même 
de Dieu (de sorte que l’homme ne devient pas Dieu Lui-Même, n’acquiert pas avec Dieu l’identité 





“never quite God”? What does grace mean to Maximus? This immediately evokes 
another aporia. Its resolution, I’ll propose, resolves these larger objections too. 
 
3.3 – God by grace: an innate and supra-natural process 
The aporia of deifying grace comes to this: grace is a power primordially present in 
human nature, and yet it activates a completely supra-natural process and state. I study 
both in reverse order and then propose a resolution according to Christo-logic. 
 1. Grace is not a natural power. I hope to have said enough in the previous two 
chapters to make this point evident and expected: if creation’s logic is Christ’s, then there 
is never a question of essential or natural identity (or even relation) between God and 
world. Hypostatic logic completely relieves nature of that burden. And so just as we 
observed Maximus tender some rather unequivocal remarks along those lines in 
protology,113 so here in eschatology. There at the beginning of the God-world relation 
Maximus openly denied any natural relation—however mollified through modal 
declension—between God’s eternal, participated “works” and their historical participants. 
Here at creation’s end, where “actual identity” occurs, no less, no natural mediation exists 
between nature and grace.114 
 At times Maximus expresses this infinite difference in nearly formulaic pairs 
correlated to discrete spheres.115 Or he can distinguish the “three laws”—the natural, the 
                                                 
113 Chapter 2, sec. 2.3 
114 QThal 59.8, cited at n. 88. 
115 CC 3.25, Caresa-Gestaldo, 154: God, because he is extremely goodness, communicates four 
“divine properties” to rational creatures:  “being and ever-being, goodness and wisdom [τὸ ὄν, τὸ ἀεὶ ὄν, 
τὴν ἀγαθότητα καὶ τὴν σοφίαν].” The first two God allots “to the essence [τῇ οὐσίᾳ],” the last two “to the 
gnomic receptivity [τῇ δὲ γνωμικῇ ἐπιτηδειότητι],” or simply, to human progress in freely appropriating the 
virtues. The first two correspond to “to the image” of God in us from the beginning, the last two “to the 




written, and the gracious.116 Still another schema springs from his logoi doctrine, where 
the common logos of all rational beings makes them exist according to three modes: 
“being, well-being, and eternal-being.”117 Each successive mode assumes those prior, 
such that the prior modes bear in potency what the next mode actualizes—sort of. A 
complication arises between the second and third modes, nature (which for rational 
creatures includes a volition faculty) and grace: 
And the first [mode] contains potential, the second activity, and the third, rest 
from activity. This means that the principle of being, which by nature possesses 
only the potential for actualization, cannot in any way possess this potential in its 
fullness without the faculty of free choice. That of well-being, on the other hand, 
possesses the actualization of natural potential only by inclination of the will, for 
it does not possess this potential in its totality separately from nature. That of 
eternal-being, finally, which wholly contains those that precede it (that is, the 
potential of the one, and the activity of the other), absolutely does not exist as a 
natural potential within beings, nor does it at all follow by necessity from the 
willing of free choice. (For how is it possible for things, which by nature have a 
beginning and which by their motion have an end, to possess as an innate part of 
themselves that which exists eternally and which has neither beginning nor 
end?)118 
 
Rational being, a created essence, possesses a power actualized through will; when that 
power is elected, it is. So the first and second modes relate more or less as potency to act. 
They imply each other in principle. Not so with the third mode, eternal well-being, grace. 
                                                                                                                                                 
[i.e. image/essence/being] is by nature, the other [i.e. likeness/freedom/goodness-wisdom] by grace [τοῦ 
κατὰ φύσιν, ὁ κατὰ χάριν].” 
116 QThal 19.2, 64.34, passim; see Blowers, Exegesis and Spiritual Pedagogy, 117-21; 
Karayiannis, Maxime le Confesseur, 290-340; and see the still very good discussion of the natural and 
scriptural laws in Balthasar, Cosmic Liturgy, 291-314. 
117 Much discussed, but see especially the helpful discussion in Alain Riou, Le monde et l’Église 
selon Maxime le Confesseur (Paris: Beauchesne, 1973), 89. Clearly this schema is a protracted version of 
the one at CC 3.25; cf. too Amb 7.10. 
118 Amb 65.2, my slight modifications and emphasis: “Καὶ τὸν μὲν πρῶτον δυνάμεως, τὸν δὲ 
δεύτερον ἐνεργείας, τὸν δὲ τρίτον ἀργίας εἶναι περιεκτικόν. Οἷον, ὁ μὲν τοῦ εἶναι λόγος μόνην φυσικῶς 
ἔχων τὴν πρὸς ἐνέργειαν δύναμιν, αὐτὴν πληρεστάτην δίχα τῆς προαιρέσεως τὴν ἐνέργειαν ἔχειν οὐ 
δύναται παντελῶς· ὁ δὲ τοῦ εὖ εἶναι αὐτὴν μόνην γνωμικῶς ἔχων τῆς φυσικῆς δυνάμεως τὴν ἐνέργειαν, 
αὐτὴν ὁλόκληρον τὴν δύναμιν τὸ σύνολον χωρὶς οὐκ ἔχει τῆς φύσεως· ὁ δὲ τοῦ ἀεὶ εἶναι τῶν πρὸ αὐτοῦ 
καθόλου περιγράφων, τοῦ μὲν τὴν δύναμιν, τοῦ δὲ τὴν ἐνέργειαν, οὔτε φυσικῶς κατὰ δύναμιν τοῖς οὖσιν 
ἐνυπάρχει παντελῶς, οὔτε μὴν ἐξ ἀνάγκης τὸ παράπαν θελήσει προαιρέσεως ἕπεται. (Πῶς γὰρ τοῖς ἀρχὴν 




If rational nature’s concrete end were an automatic outcome of its own power—even of 
the volitional power proper to it—then that end would come by nature and not by grace. 
The end of creation proves just as supra-natural as its beginning. Creation’s edges, as it 
were, cannot by definition be natural. Then they would not be given or created in any 
meaningful sense. And if not natural, then their brute facticity evidently does not 
concretize through any natural relation to the source of that truth, God. The logos of 
divine infinity, as Maximus says near the end of this passage, could never be “an innate 
part” of a rational creature’s logoi.119 
 So severe is Maximus about grace’s supra-natural character, that some of his 
statements might make even the most stolid two-tiered Thomist blush. A creature’s 
ecstasy and “experience” (πεῖρα) in deification, both significant motifs in Maximus,120 
stem precisely from the conviction that our union with God happens by no natural 
medium at all. Certainly not through any potentia obedientialis. Watch how Maximus 
glosses Gregory of Nazianzus’s mention of “the things [Paul] experienced” when rapt to 
the third heaven (2 Cor 12.2): 
a name is indicative of grace when man, who has been obedient to God in all 
things, is named ‘God’ in the Scriptures, as in the phrase, I said, you are Gods [Ps 
81(82).6], for it is not by nature or condition [οὔτε κατὰ φύσιν οὔτε κατὰ σχέσιν] 
that he has become and is called ‘God,’ but he has become God and is so named 
by placement and grace. For the grace of divinization is completely 
unconditioned, because it finds no faculty or capacity of any sort within nature 
that could receive it, for if it did, it would no longer be grace but the manifestation 
of a natural activity latent within the potentiality of nature. And thus, again, what 
takes place would no longer be marvelous if divinization occurred simply in 
accordance with the receptive capacity [εἰ κατὰ δεκτικὴν δύναμιν φύσεως ἡ 
θέωσις ἦν]. Indeed, it would rightly be a work of nature, not a gift of God, and a 
                                                 
119 Cp. CC 1.100. 
120 On “ecstasy” see Polycarp Sherwood, OSB, The Earlier Ambigua of Saint Maximus the 
Confessor and His Refutation of Origenism, 128-54; on “experience” see Pierre Miquel, “Πεῖρα: 
Contribution à l’étude du vocabulaire de l’expérience religieuse dans l’oeuvre de Maxime le Confesseur,” 




person so divinized would be God by nature and would have to be called so in the 
proper sense. For natural potential in each and every being is nothing other than 
the unalterable movement of nature toward complete actuality. How, then, 
divinization could make the divinized person go out of himself [ἐξίστησιν 
ἑαυτοῦ], I fail to see, if it was something that lay within the bounds of his 
nature.121 
 
Becoming God by grace names a process activated neither by nature nor by “condition” 
or “relation” (σχέσις). Not by nature, since then we’d be “God by nature.” And not by 
relation—say, as the simultaneous relation between my body and soul (both essentially 
different) makes them naturally fit for each other.122 In the process and deed of 
deification there’s no natural fit at all.123 
 Nor is there in the “experience” of deification. Maximus knows two kinds of 
knowledge, “relative knowledge” (τὴν...σχετικήν) and experiential or participative 
knowledge. Relative knowledge “is based on reasoning and concepts [ὡς ἐν λόγῳ μόνῳ 
κειμένην καὶ νοήμασιν],” similar to what many would call theoretical today.124 This grace 
is not, and does not provide. Rather, “there is knowledge that is true and properly so 
                                                 
121 Amb 20.2: “...χάριτος δὲ , ὅταν ‘Θεὸς’ ὁ ἄνθρωπος τοῖς λόγοις ὀνομάζηται, ὁ διὰ πάντων 
ὑπήκοος Θεῷ γενόμενος ἄνθρωπος, κατὰ τό, Ἐγὼ εἶπα, Θεοί ἐστε, οὔτε κατὰ φύσιν οὔτε κατὰ σχέσιν ἔχων 
τὸ εἶναι καλεῖσθαι ‘Θεός,’ ἀλλὰ κατὰ θέσιν καὶ χάριν γενόμενός τε καὶ ὀνομαζόμενος· ἡ γὰρ χάρις τῆς 
θέωσεως ἄσεχετός ἐστι παντάπασιν, οὐκ ἔχουσα τὴν οἱανοῦν δεκτικὴν ἑαυτῆς ἐν τῇ φύσει δύναμιν, ἐπεὶ 
οὐκ ἔτι χάρις ἐστίν, ἀλλὰ τῆς κατὰ τὴν φυσικὴν δύναμιν ἐνεργείας φανέρωσις. Καὶ οὕτω γε πάλιν οὐκ 
ἔσται παράδοξον τὸ γινόμενον, εἰ κατὰ δεκτικὴν δύναμιν φύσεως ἡ θέωσις ἦν. Φύσεως γὰρ ἂν εἰκότως 
ἔργον, ἀλλ’ οὐ Θεοῦ δῶρον ἡ θέωσις ἔσται, καὶ δυνήσεται καὶ φύσει Θεὸς ὁ τοιοῦτος εἶναι καὶ κυρίως 
προσαγορεύεσθαι. Οὐδὲν γὰρ ἄλλο καθέσηκεν ἡ κατὰ φύσιν ἑκάστου τῶν ὄντων δύναμις ἢ φύσεως πρὸς 
ἐνέργειαν ἀπαράβατος κίνησις. Πῶς δὲ καὶ ἐξίστησιν ἑαυτοῦ τὸν θεούμενον ἡ θέωσις, εἰ τοῖς ὅροις τῆς 
φύσεως αὐτὴ περιείληπτο, συνιδεῖν οὐκ ἔχω.” 
122 Amb 7.40-3. I flagged in Chapter 1, sec. 1.6, that monenergists proposed something similar for 
the divine-human activity in Christ, and that Maximus rejected it because it would introduce a “mutual 
conditioning” even among inferior and superior modes of existence, such that the consequent “activity” 
would imply a composed power from a composed nature (Opusc 5). 
123 Even in Opusc 1, where Maximus has to clarify what he meant by saying that “the grace of the 
Spirit” conquers the deified soul to the point that “it has God alone acting within it” with “only one sole 
energy, that of God and of those worthy of God, or rather of God alone”—even then he doubles down on 
his denial of any natural power on our part in the work of deification: “But deification does not come about 
from our natural powers; it is not in our control. For in nature exists no logos of the things above nature” 
(Opusc 1, PG 91, 33c, my translation). 
124 QThal 60.6, CCSG 22, 77; here Maximus defines “reasoning about God” (λόγος περὶ θεοῦ) as 
“the use of the analogy of beings in the cognitive contemplation of God [τὴν ἐκ τῶν ὄντων ἀναλογίαν τῆς 




called, which is gained only by actual experience [τὴν...ἀληθινὴν ἐν μόνῃ τῇ πείρᾳ κατ’ 
ἐνέργειαν]—without reason and concepts—and provides, by grace through participation, 
a whole perception of the One who is known [ὅλην τοῦ γνωσθέντος κατὰ χάριν μεθέξει 
παρεχομένην τὴν αἴσθησιν].”125  
 The whole mystery of this passivity, this “suffering of divine things,”126 is that 
what’s suffered is something utterly without relation to our nature, something that occurs 
without any part of our essence—body, soul, intellect—anticipating it. And yet it occurs, 
is a concrete experience, a fact, an event, a most palpable happening wherein the entirely 
impossible transpires: “according to a simple union, without relation and beyond all 
thought, on the basis of a certain unutterable and indefinable logos, which is known only 
to the One who grants this ineffable grace to the worthy, that is, it is known only to God 
and to those who in the future will come to experience it.”127 Experience is immediate. 
Nothing intervenes as arbiter or hybrid or unifying third term of a triad—at least nothing 
related by or within the essential order. 
 God himself is the medium. Therefore and once more, right here at another of 
creation’s edges, its end, the logic exceeds that of Neoplatonic participation or the 
limitation of act by power.128 Consider only three characteristics of deific passivity. First, 
the deifying act is suffered by the saint, not performed by her. And yet, second, that’s 
precisely why her deification is infinite: it happens to and in her according to no natural 
principle of her own that would legislate limits or hew its activity to any determinate 
                                                 
125 QThal 60.5, CCSG 22, 77. 
126 Myst. 5, CCSG 69, 29; cp. DN 2.9, Suchla 134. 
127 Amb 15.9: “κατὰ τὴν ἁπλῆν ὡς ἄσχετον καὶ ὑπὲρ νόησιν ἕνωσιν, καί τινα λόγον ἄῤῥητόν τε καὶ 
ἀνερμήνευτον, ὃν μόνος οἶδεν ὁ τὴν ἄφατον ταύτην χάριν τοῖς ἀξίοις δωρούμενος Θεός, καὶ οἱ ταύτην 
ὕστερον πείσεσθαι μέλλοντες.” 




proportion.129 “And we will become the very thing that is not in any way the outcome of 
our natural capacity.”130 The concrete “that” and “there” of deification—the state of that 
deified person—is itself as restricted by the natural (finite) mode of that person as divine 
infinity. Which is to say, not at all. Here a certain Thomist reading stumbles: 
For no created thing is by its nature what effects deification, since it cannot grasp 
God. For this is the property of divine grace alone, that is, to grant the gift of 
deification proportionately (analogos) to created beings, brightly illumining 
nature by a light that transcends nature, making nature [to be] beyond its own 
proper limits through the excess of divine glory.131 
 
Deification is not a supernatural mode of a creature’s natural activity. It’s not a created 
activity or mode at all. In deification, rather, a person’s natural mode and act receive a 
relation to God’s totally unlike that of mode to act, however high the new heights reached 
by the latter’s proportions.132 Super-natural for Maximus does not mean “some degree 
higher than what’s natural.” It means not natural at all, a mode and state operative above 
nature of whatever level—a process and result for which nature could never answer. 
Deification is a process that occurs according to another logic, Christ’s.133 After all, 
                                                 
129 QThal 22.7, CCSG 7, 141: “For then passivity will transcend nature, having no principle 
(logos) limiting the infinite divinization of those who passively experience it [Ὑπὲρ φύσιν γὰρ τότε τὸ 
πάθος ἐστὶ καὶ μηδένα λόγον ἔχον ὁριστικὸν τῆς ἐπ’ ἄπειρον τῶν τοῦτο πασχόντων θεουργίας].”  
130 QThal 22.7, CCSG 7, 141: “ἐκεῖνο γινόμενοι ὅπερ τῆς κατὰ φύσιν δυνάμεως οὐδαμῶς ὑπάρχει 
κατόρθωμα.” 
131 QThal 22.7, CCSG 7, 141, modified: “Θεώσεως γὰρ οὐδὲν γενητὸν κατὰ φύσιν ἐστὶ ποιητικόν, 
ἐπειδὴ μηδὲ θεοῦ καταληπτικόν. Μόνης γὰρ τῆς θείας χάριτος ἴδιον τοῦτο πέφυκεν εἶναι τὸ ἀναλόγως τοῖς 
οὖσι χαρίζεσθαι θέωσιν, καὶ λαμπρυνούσης τὴν φύσιν τῷ ὑπὲρ φύσιν φωτὶ καὶ τῶν οἰκείων ὅρων αὐτὴν 
ὑπεράνω κατὰ τὴν ὑπερβολὴν τῆς δόξης ποιουμένης.” 
132 “Proportionately” or “analogously” (ἀναλόγως) here carries a peculiar sense; cf. below, sec. 
3.5. 
133 So Amb 5.11, PG 91, 1052b, modified, where Maximus interprets Dionysius’s christological 
sense of “super-nature” in explicitly Neochalcedonian terms: “The coming together of these two natures 
constitutes the great mystery ‘of the Jesus’ natural logic, which is supra-natural’ [DN 2.9], and shows that 
both the difference of the activities and their union are preserved intact, the former understood to be 
‘without division’ in the natural principle of what has been united, while the latter are ‘known without 
confusion’ in the unified mode of the Lord’s activities” [ἡ σύνοδος τὸ μέγα ‘τῆς ὑπερφυοῦς Ἰησοῦ 
φυσιολογίας’ ποιησαμένη μυστήριον, σωζομένην ἔδειξεν ἐν ταυτῷ τὴν διαφορὰν τῶν ἐνεργειῶν καὶ τὴν 
ἕνωσιν, τὴν μὲν ‘ἀδιαιρέτως’ ἐν τῷ φυσικῷ θεωρουμένην λόγῳ τῶν ἡνωμένων, τὴν δὲ ‘ἀσυγχύτως’ ἐν τῷ 
μοναδικῷ ‘γνωριζομένην’ τρόπῳ τῶν γινομένων].” Christ’s “singular mode” is the actualized supernatural 




Maximus also says the Word’s historical Incarnation happened “in a supernatural 
mode.”134 And surely that mode wasn’t a matter of qualifying the degree (in this case to a 
lesser one) of any nature’s mode or activity. That supra-natural mode was him, his very 
hypostasis.135 Indeed, so far is “the whole Christ” from being a state negotiated by any 
natural or modal settlement between created and uncreated natures, that the fact of Christ 
demonstrates how the person of the Word “truly is beyond all humanity and divinity.”136 
 Christo-logic abides no modal hybrid, even when (and indeed because) infinite 
natural modes and acts become one actuality. Nature need never mediate between a 
higher and lower version of itself. This is not because Maximus simply hadn’t yet 
                                                                                                                                                 
distinct natural principles; [3] two wholly interpenetrating activities of those natures (cf. Amb 5.14). There 
is no need for a supernatural habit or mode in Christ’s humanity. His own person, no modal hybrid, 
mediates, identifies, and preserves distinct the two infinitely different natures, both in principle and in 
activity. 
134 Ep 13, PG 91, 532b-c, my translation and emphasis: “But the Word of God did not possess the 
activities and powers proper to the nature he assumed by any principle or mode corresponding to that [i.e. 
to the principle naturally binding body and soul at birth]. For the supra-natural is not measured out to 
nature, nor does there exist in beings any natural capacity at all receptive of it [i.e. the supra-natural]. 
Therefore he is most singular in his assumption of a rationally and intellectually animated flesh, ineffably 
willing to become man; and, qua being and pre-being, possessing the power [to do] all things, he renovated 
the natures by a supra-natural mode so that he might save [preserve] man [Ὁ δὲ Θεοῦ Λόγος, κατ’ οὐδένα 
λόγον ἢ τρόπον ἀναλογούσας ἔχων ταῖς οἰκείαις κατὰ φύσιν ἐνεργείαις τῆς ὑπ’ αὐτοῦ προσληφθείσης 
φύσεως τὰς δυνάμεις· οὐ γὰρ μετραῖται φύσει τὸ ὑπὲρ φύσιν· οὐδὲ τι τὸ παράπαν ἐν τοῖς οὖσίν ἐστι κατὰ 
φύσιν αὐτοῦ δεκτικόν. Ἄρα μονώτατος κατὰ πρόσληψιν σαρκὸς λογικῶς τε καὶ νοερῶς ἐψυχωμένης, 
θέλων ἀῤῥήτως γέγονεν ἄνθρωπος· ὡς ὢν καὶ προὼν, καὶ πάντα δυνάμενος· τῷ ὑπὲρ φύσιν τρόπῳ τὰς 
φύσεις καινοτομήσας, ἴνα σώσῃ τὸν ἄνθρωπον].” The entire logic runs just so: [1] the process (in either 
principle or mode) of Incarnation is in no sense natural; [2] yet the Word himself, in hypostasis, became 
human and in that way possessed powers and activities natural to human nature; [3] and since he possessed 
them thus, in that “supra-natural mode” of assumption, therefore their modality has been preserved and 
renewed; that is, they take on an existential modality that need not pass through their own proper (natural) 
modality. Christo-logic conceives a supra-natural process where “supra-natural” means nature—either 
human or divine (created or uncreated)—is completely relieved of having to achieve the result by its own 
principles or modes.—cf. too Ep 19, PG 91, 593a. 
135 See Chapter 1, sec. 1.2. Thus I agree with Lars Thunberg, “Spirit, Grace, and Human 
Receptivity,” Studia Patristica 37 (2001): 612, that the deified hexis or “state” in Maximus “should not at 
all be identified with supernatural habitus in a Thomistic sense,” since this state comprises no modal 
hybrid, but rather the total, simultaneous actualization of both divine and human modes in the deified 
person. Again, nature never bears the burden of accounting for deification. See too Larchet, La divinisation 
de l’homme, 604. 
136 Amb 37.8, PG 91, 1296c-d, slightly modified. Here’s the whole statement: “Therefore the Word 
in whom the universe is gathered is beyond the truth, and also, insofar as He is man and God, He truly is 
beyond all humanity and divinity [Ὑπερ ἀλήθειαν ἄρα ὁ πρὸς ὃν τὰ πάντα συνάγεται Λόγος, καὶ αὖθις, ὡς 




developed the necessary categories to elucidate grace’s presence in and perfection of 
nature. It’s rather that the logic of Christ does not and cannot permit any mediator but the 
Word.137 Supra-natural modality just is that of divine economy—of Incarnation.138 When 
you behold Christ rightly, you do not perceive created (human) nature outfitted by grace 
with a super-added mode that imbues this nature with the power to attain otherwise 
unnatural (divine) proportions. No, what you behold is far more magnificent because 
simultaneously far more symmetrical and identical: whole humanity and whole divinity, 
each wholly possessed of its natural powers perfected in and manifested through whole 
activities, so completely indifferent to one another that they completely interpenetrate 
exactly as they naturally are—and all this because they are he.139 There exists no supra-
natural mode outside Christ’s hypostasis. 
 Hence a final characteristic of deification’s passivity: the permanence of created 
nature (and mode and activity) in immediate union. The hypostasis, the Word, plays non-
natural mediator between infinitely different natures and therefore establishes a naturally 
immediate identity between them. Hypostatic identity is the only way a finite nature can 
be identical to the infinite without simply being obliterated by it. And so Christo-logic is 
the logic of deific “ecstasy” and “experience”: when the saint suffers immediate union 
with God, the very medium through which such an identity occurs is simultaneously the 
                                                 
137 And so we’ve returned to the critiques of Neochalcedonian christology, namely that it lacks 
“created grace” as a mediator between the person and flesh of Christ; see Chapter 1, sec. 1.2. 
138 Pyr 33, PG 91, 297d-300a: “Καὶ καθόλου φάναι, πᾶν φυσικὸν ἐπὶ Χριστοῦ, συνημμένον ἔχει 
τῷ κατ’ αὐτὸ λόγῳ καὶ τὸν ὑπὲρ φύσιν τρόπον· ἵνα καὶ ἡ φύσις διὰ τοῦ λόγου πιστωθῇ, καὶ ἡ οἰκονομία διὰ 
τοῦ τρόπου.” This is why Maximus conceives the historical Incarnation as the means for every miracle and 
sacrament; see Amb 42.17 and 29. 
139 Ep 15, PG 91, 565b, where Maximus concludes from the fact that the essential principles of 
both Christ’s natures remained totally untouched (ἀναλλοίωτος) “after the union” that this means neither 




medium that preserves the saint’s own created nature.140 That’s why the natural activity 
of the saint’s nature is “not suppressed,” Maximus assures, though it indeed ceases or 
stabilizes in its limit.141 We do not receive the divine activity of grace through our nature 
at all. The “sole, super-essential power capable of deifying” does come to be [true] “of 
those deified.”142 Just here we glimpse grace’s miraculous work. Grace makes divinity’s 
entire and proper activity—including the mode of that activity143—the saints’ very own, 
even as it leaves nature’s proper mode and activity entirely intact. Grace is not nature, 
first and last.144 
 2. Grace is an innate power. And yet somehow this non-natural, deifying power 
(and activity) exists “inscrite dans la nature de l’homme comme une vocation.”145 If two-
tiered Thomists could blush a bit over Maximus’s rigid partition between nature and 
grace, now even the nouveaux théologiens might incline to temper his claim about 
grace’s universal presence in nature. Again contemplating Melchizedek: 
And you must not think that no one else can have a share in this grace simply 
because Scripture speaks of it solely with respect to the great Melchizedek, for in 
all human beings God has placed the same power that leads naturally to salvation 
[Πᾶσι γὰρ ἴσως ὁ Θεὸς τὴν πρὸς σωτηρίαν φυσικῶς ἐνέθηκε δύναμιν], so that 
                                                 
140 Miquel, “Πεῖρα: Contribution à l’étude du vocabulaire de l’expérience religieuse dans l’oeuvre 
de Maxime le Confesseur,” 358, rightly notes that because Maximus clearly distinguishes his sense of 
“experience” or experiential “knowledge” from both typically Aristotelian (episteme, aisthesis) and 
Platonic (logos, noesis) unitive modes, Maximian experience “est donc un mode de connaissance tout à fait 
original.” I suggest the originality derives from Christo-logic, which uniquely furnishes an immediate 
identity beyond and preservative of natural potencies and acts. 
141 Opusc 1, PG 91, 33c-d: “Οὐκ ἀνεῖλον....” 
142 Opusc 1, PG 91, 33d-36a. 
143 Amb 5.14; cf. below, sec. 3.4. 
144 Maximus never qualifies grace as “created.” Indeed he explicitly calls grace “uncreated” at 
Amb 10.44 when commending Melchizedek’s supra-natural birth through grace as the great paradigm of 
human deification: “Therefore the great Melchizedek is said to be without father or mother or genealogy, 
having neither beginning of days nor end of life, just as our God-bearing fathers have truly said, that is, not 
on account of his human nature, which was created out of nothing, and by virtue of which he had both a 
beginning and an end, but on account of divine and uncreated grace [τὴν χάριν τὴν θείαν καὶ ἄκτιστον], 
which exists eternally and is beyond all nature and time, for it is the grace of the eternal God, and it was 
solely by this that he was begotten—wholly and willingly [καθ’ ἣν δι’ ὅλου μόνην ὅλος γνωμικῶς 
γεννηθεὶς]—and solely from this that he can now be known” (slightly modified). 




anyone who wishes is able to lay claim to divine grace, and is not prevented, if he 
so desires, from becoming a Melchizedek, an Abraham, or a Moses, and from 
simply transferring all the saints to himself, not by exchanging names or places, 
but by imitating their manner and way of life.146 
 
Grace is a power equally “implanted” in all. It’s innate, present from the beginning in 
potentia. Given Maximus’s near obsessive discrimination between nature and grace 
above, how can he make of grace a germ so thoroughly inseminated in nature that its 
accessibility proves as universal as human nature itself? In no uncertain terms: Maximus 
is saying that grace, which configures the rational soul through virtue to the point that 
“the Holy Spirit of God naturally becomes its intimate companion, and fashions it into a 
divine image, according to the likeness of the Spirit’s own beauty” so that the soul “lacks 
nothing of the attributes that belong by nature to the Divinity”147—he’s saying that the 
power of this grace lay dormant in nature itself, always and everywhere. 
 Grace and its effects therefore do not come to us from without. At first blush this 
might not seem so. Take baptismal grace. Maximus assigns it a particular moment. 
Baptism is “when each person received the grace of adoption.”148 1 John 3.9 claims the 
one born of God sins no more because “God’s seed remains in him [ὅτι σπέρμα αὐτοῦ ἐν 
αὐτῷ μένει].” Maximus argues that this “seed” takes root at baptism and blooms 
                                                 
146 Amb 10.46: “Μὴ νόμιζε δὲ ταύτης τινὰ ἀμοιρεῖν τῆς χάριτος, ἐπειδὴ περὶ μόνου τοῦ μεγάλου 
Μελχισεδὲκ ὁ λόγος αὐτὴν διωρίσατο. Πᾶσι γὰρ ἴσως ὁ Θεὸς τὴν πρὸς σωτηρίαν φυσικῶς ἐνέθηκε 
δύναμιν, ἵνα ἕκαστος βουλόμενος τῆς θείας μεταποιεῖσθαι χάριτος δύνηται, καὶ θέλων Μελχισεδὲκ 
γενέσθαι καὶ Ἀβραὰμ καὶ Μωϋσῆς, καὶ ἁπλῶς πάντας μεταφέρειν εἰς ἑαυτὸν τοὺς ἁγίους, μὴ κωλύηται, 
οὐκ ὀνόματα καὶ τόπους ἀμείβων, ἀλλὰ τρόπους καὶ πολιτείαν μιμούμενος.” 
147 QThal 1.1.2, CCSG, 7, 9-11, slight modification: “ὃν [i.e. ‘reason,’ logon] καὶ τὸ πνεῦμα τοῦ 
θεοῦ τὸ ἅγιον, καλῶς ταῖς ἀρεταῖς διαπλασθέντα, πρὸς συμβίωσιν πέφυκεν ἄγεσθαι καὶ θεῖον ἄγαλμα τῆς 
καθ’ ὁμοίωσιν ὡραιότητος αὐτοῦ κατασκευάζειν μηδενὶ τῶν προςόντων φυσικῶς τῇ θεότητι κατὰ τὴν 
χάριν λειπόμενον.” 




thereafter through the believer’s voluntary praxis in cooperation with the Spirit.149 It 
would appear, then, that the Spirit does not arrive until the time of baptism. 
 Not so. Elsewhere Maximus tries to reconcile one scriptural passage that says the 
Spirit is present to all things (Wisd 12.1) and another that the Spirit absconds from the 
impure (Wisd 1.4). Here Maximus portrays an unbroken and gradual presence of grace 
within nature. He narrates three stages. If we work backward the thread becomes very 
clear. [3] For those who “through faith have inherited the divine and truly divinizing 
name of Christ,” the Spirit is present “as one creating the adoption given by grace 
through faith.”150 The Spirit is “productive of wisdom” (σοφίας ποιητικὸν), working 
through the pure to induce virtue.151 [2] For those under the Law, the Spirit convicts 
hearts and foretells the coming salve for their soul’s ongoing wounds, the Christ.152 [1] 
But for everyone and all, the Spirit, who providentially permeates “all things with His 
power,”  
stirs into motion the natural inner principle of each [ὅτι θεὸς καὶ θεοῦ πνεῦμα 
κατὰ δύναμιν προνοητικῶς διὰ πάντων χωροῦν καὶ τὸν ἐν ἑκάστῷ κατὰ φύσιν 
λόγον ἀνακινοῦν] through which He leads a man of sense to consciousness of 
whatever he has done contrary to the law of nature, a man who at the same time 
also keeps his free choice pliant to the reception of right thoughts arising from 
nature. And thus we find even some of the most barbarous and uncivilized men 
exhibiting nobility of conduct and rejecting the savage laws that had prevailed 
among them from time immemorial.153 
 
                                                 
149 QThal 6.2. 
150 QThal 15.4, CCSG 7, 101-3: “καὶ ἐν πᾶσι τοῖς τὸ θεῖον καὶ θεοποιὸν ὄντως ὄνομα τοῦ Χριστοῦ 
κληρωσαμένοις διὰ τῆς πίστεως...ἀλλὰ καὶ ὡς δημιουργικὸν τῆς κατὰ χάριν διὰ τῆς πίστεως δοθείσης 
υἱοθεσίας.” 
151 QThal 15.4. 
152 QThal 15.3. 
153 QThal 15.2, CCSG 7, 101. Cf. Constas 127 n. 3, who notes that anakinein (“to stir”) “in the 
Platonic tradition describes the awakening or arousing required for the soul to grasp or recollect innate 




“Consequently,” he goes on, “the Spirit is in all things in a simple way,” awakening and 
succoring powers already universally implanted in every creature.154 Grace’s immanence 
to and actualization within all creation appears rather like the Word’s own birth: by 
Mary’s delighted consent, the Spirit elicits a totally supra-natural power from within the 
Virgin herself in order to conceive and gestate the Lord—but more of that anon. 
 The principal point for now is that grace’s deifying power already indwells 
everything from creation’s dawn. Two more themes everywhere linked to grace further 
substantiate this account. Consider faith first. Faith for Maximus is always a power.155 Its 
end or final deed is “the salvation of souls.”156 It is the root of all union with God—the 
first contact and caress, as it were.157 Through it the Spirit births virtue, actualizes in the 
soul every divine property, indeed “hypostasizes” an immediate unity with God—for 
faith “is the hypostasis of things hoped for,” as Heb 11.1 says.158 That’s why the 
knowledge (of God) faith affords outstrips intellection and dialectic159: its power is the 
subjective condition for that unmediated experiential knowledge we considered before, 
rather like knowing a person, face-to-face recognition. And this power is “an innate 
good” (ἐνδιάθετον ἀγαθὸν), the invisible kingdom of God within (cf. Lk 17.21) that 
assumes form through virtue and practice of Christ’s commandments. Therefore “faith is 
not outside us,” but already given within the intellect, awaiting actualization: 
If, then, the kingdom of God is actualized faith, and if the kingdom of God brings 
about an unmediated union of God and those in His kingdom, faith is clearly 
demonstrated to be a relational power, or a relationship that effectively realizes in 
                                                 
154 QThal 15.5, CCSG 7, 103, modified: “Ἔστιν οὖν ἐν πᾶσι μὲν ἁπλῶς, καθ’ ὃ πάντων ἐστὶ 
συνεκτικὸν καὶ προνοητικὸν καὶ τῶν φυσικῶν σπερμάτων ἀνακινητικόν.” 
155 This is one reason he completely rejects the idea that faith alone can save, namely that faith 
must be actualized in and as works; cf. Lib. ascet. 34, CC 1.39, etc. 
156 QThal 59.8. 
157 QThal 33.3, 54.22-3. 
158 QThal 33.2; cf. 51, schol. 4. 




a manner beyond nature the unmediated, perfect union of the faithful with the 
God in whom they have faith.160 
 
Faith names the supreme subjective power objectively given to all by grace alone,161 
which (always with love’s succor162) opens an immediate relation to divine power in a 
way that once again circumvents Neoplatonic limitation of act by power. God gifts faith 
directly and as God himself, in the very act of creation. Faith is ours to vitalize, to thicken 
by deed. 
 And so it is with virtue, a primary way faith takes flesh. Although “virtue itself” 
(as opposed to its instances) numbers among those “works of God” eternally subsisting in 
him by nature and which we participate by grace,163 Maximus baldy states they are 
“natural things” (φυσικαί) for us too. When he says this to Pyrrhus, the latter wonders 
why then virtue isn’t equally manifest among all humans and why we must undertake 
ascetic struggle to acquire it at all. “Asceticism,” Maximus retorts, 
and the toils that go with it, were devised simply in order to ward off deception, 
which established itself through sensory perception. It is not [as if] the virtues 
have been newly introduced from outside, for they inhere in us from creation.... 
Therefore, when deception is completely expelled, the soul immediately exhibits 
the splendor of its natural virtue.164 
 
In another place Maximus even calls knowledge and virtue “powers of the rational soul” 
(δυνάμεις ὄντας ψυχῆς λογικῆς). But he does so, significantly, only as these arise from 
                                                 
160 QThal 33.2, CCSG 7, 229, slightly modified: “Εἰ δὲ ἡ βασιλεία τοῦ θεοῦ ἐνεργουμένη πίστις 
ἐστίν, ἡ δὲ βασιλεία τοῦ θεοῦ τῶν αὐτὴν βασιλευόντων ἄμεσον πρὸς τὸν θεὸν ποιεῖται τὴν ἕνωσιν, ἡ πίστις 
ἀπεδείχθη σαφῶς ὑπάρχουσα δύναμις σχετικὴ ἢ σχέσις δραστικὴ τῆς ὑπὲρ φύσιν ἀμέσου τοῦ πιστεύοντος 
πρὸς τὸν πιστευόμενον θεὸν τελείας ἑνώσεως.” 
161 QThal 51, schol. 5: “For faith is the beginning of good things among human beings, before 
which we have nothing to offer.” 
162 CC 1.32. 
163 CT 1.50. 
164 Pyr 89, PG 91, 309c: “Ἡ ἄσκησις, καὶ οἱ ταύτῃ ἐπόμενοι πόνοι, πρὸς τὸ μόνον διαχωρίσαι τὴν 
ἐμφυρεῖσαν δι’ αἰσθήσεως ἀπάτην τῇ ψυχῇ ἐπενοήθησαν τοῖς φιλαρέτοις· οὐ πρὸς τὸ ἔξωθεν προσφάτως 
ἐπεισαγαγεῖν τὰς ἀρετάς· ἔγκεινται γὰρ ἡμῖν ἐκ δημιουργίας.... ὅθεν καὶ ἅμα τελείως διακριθῇ ἡ ἀπάτη, 




the logoi planted in nature, the principles according to which knowledge and virtue “exist 
and subsist.165 
 That’s significant because the link to the logoi both exacerbates and begins to 
resolve the restive aporia we’ve been studying. That aporia claims grace is 
simultaneously a supra-natural and innate power in created nature. Virtue, for instance, a 
work of grace, is both “against” (or “over”) nature and “un mouvement inné de la 
nature.”166 The logoi intensify the apparent contradiction because they are divine—
indeed, bear the very divinity within them167—and yet are, just as grace was said to be, 
“implanted” or “placed in” nature in the very act of its creation from nothing.168 Thus 
Maximus glosses the unbroken “bones” of the Word: 
and after the manner of bones, which are constitutive of blood and flesh, the logoi 
of His divinity, which transcend all intellection, exist within beings and create—
in a manner beyond our cognition—the essences of those beings, and preserve 
them in existence, and are constitutive for all knowledge and all virtue.169 
 
 The logoi of creation are how divine and uncreated grace exists as a supra-natural 
power in nature. They establish faith’s first and immediate contact with divine 
knowledge. They are and possess the power that makes God’s eternal works—by essence 
imparticipable—participable by his finite works.170 They institute the mode of deific 
union.171 The general “logos of nature” constitutes the open threshold between a rational 
                                                 
165 Amb 10.3: “λόγους, καθ’ οὓς πᾶσα ἀρετὴ καὶ γνῶσις ἐστι καὶ ὑφέστηκεν, ὡς δυνάμεις ὄντας 
ψυχῆς λογικῆς.” 
166 Amb 10.42 (Τῇ φύσει γὰρ ἡ ἀρετὴ μάχεσθαι πέφυκε), 44; cp. Amb 20.4. Quote from Hausherr, 
Philautie, 141. 
167 Amb 10.102; Amb 21.5 (they bear the “cause of all” in themselves) or 21.8 (the logoi are the 
principles “in which God is concealed and silently proclaimed”). 
168 Pyr 214, PG 91, 352ab: “τὸν δημιουργικῶς αὐτοῖς ἐντεθέντα παρὰ τῆς τὸ πᾶν συστησαμένης 
αἰτίας λόγον”; Amb 17.7: “Τίνες οἱ ἑκάστῳ τῶν ὄντων τῇ ὑπάρξει πρώτως ἐγκαταβληθέντες λόγοι.” 
169 QThal 35.3, CCSG 7, 239-41: “καὶ ὀστέων δίκην συστατικῶν αἵματος καὶ σαρκός, καὶ οἱ 
πάσης ἐπέκεινα νοήσεως περὶ θεότητος λόγοι, τοῖς οὖσιν ἐνυπάρχοντες, τὰς τῶν ὄντων ἀγνώστως καὶ 
ποιοῦσι καὶ πρὸς τὸ εἶναι συνέχουσιν οὐσίας, καὶ πᾶσαν γνῶσιν καὶ πᾶσαν ἀρετὴν συνιστῶσιν.” 
170 Chapter 2, sec. 2.6. 




creature’s finite nature and the infinite works of God; if she would but join her will in 
love to that logos, she would have the Logos himself.172 Nature’s logos is the mediator 
because it is “a law both natural and divine” (ὃς καὶ νόμος ἐστὶ φυσικός τε καὶ θεῖος).173 
And that, I suggest, reveals the logic that explains and even necessitates the anomaly 
grace is. 
 3. Grace is the Logos, as logoi, bearing and immediately presenting divinity from 
within nature.  Christo-logic, I propose, explains why divine grace is a power and activity 
utterly without natural relation to our own essential power and activity, and yet lies 
everywhere as nature’s profoundest depths—the cause of its power and promised 
perfection. The anomaly of grace describes the actualization of the Word within created 
nature, the very Word who has already made himself hypostatically identical to created 
nature’s proper power and thereby generated it at all. The Logos is the logoi.174 
 In the logoi the Logos offers his own person as the immediate link between 
uncreated and created power. That’s why grace’s source and logic are the Logos’s 
historical Incarnation: 
But the Lord set forth the manifest might of His transcendent power, having 
hypostasized an unchanging birth in the nature of the contrary realities by which 
He Himself experienced. For by giving our nature impassibility through His 
Passion, relief through His sufferings, and eternal life through His death, He 
restored our nature, renewing its habitual dispositions by means of what was 
negated in His own flesh, and through His own Incarnation granting it that grace 
which transcends nature, by which I mean divinization.175 
 
                                                 
172 Amb 7.22. 
173 Exp. Orat. Dom. 4, CCSG 23, 65-6. 
174 Chapter 2, sec. 2.4. 
175 QThal 61.6, CCSG 22, 91, modified: “τὴν δὲ τῆς ὑπερβαλλούσης δυνάμεως ἰσχὺν δήλην 
κατέστησεν, τῶν οἷς αὐτὸς ἔπασχεν ἐναντίων ὑποστήσας τῇ φύσει τὴν γένεσιν ἄτρεπτον· διὰ πάθους γὰρ 
τὴν ἀπάθειαν καὶ διὰ πόνων τὴν ἄνεσιν καὶ διὰ θανάτου τὴν ἀΐδιον ζωὴν τῇ φύσει δούς, πάλιν 
ἀποκατέστησεν, ταῖς ἑαυτοῦ κατὰ σάρκα στερήσεσι τὰς ἕξεις ἀνακαινίσας τῆς φύσεως καὶ διὰ τῆς ἰδίας 




Grace inhabits nature as the personal Word. The condition or hexis of the deified soul is 
in fact Christ’s personal stamp, his stability, his character, himself.176 He “hypostasizes” 
what he experiences. Therefore what he experiences—the entire existential range of 
human nature (“the contrary realities,” pleasure and pain, etc.)—simultaneously comes to 
be possible at all and possible to be perfected, by no natural mediation, in identity with 
the divine activity.177 
 Maximian virtue proves once more an illuminating case. Its character makes no 
sense unless the Word condescends to become the immediate and real identity of virtue in 
two infinitely different natural modes.178 Recall that Maximus summons human growth in 
virtue as another way to grasp his logoi doctrine. Just before the famous passage (Amb 
7.22) he repeats what we saw in the Dispute with Pyrrhus, that virtue is natural because it 
is entirely present in all human beings—never “more or less” universally there in 
power.179 Here he specifies why that’s so. It’s worth quoting at length: 
The essence in every virtue is the one Logos of God—and this can hardly be 
doubted since the essence of all the virtues is our Lord, Jesus Christ, as it is 
written: who was made for us by God wisdom, righteousness, holiness, and 
redemption [1 Cor 1.30].... Which is to say that anyone who through fixed habit 
participates in virtue, unquestionably participates in God, who is the substance of 
the virtues. For such a person freely and unfeignedly chooses to cultivate the 
natural seed of the Good, and has shown the end to be the same as the beginning, 
                                                 
176 Ayroulet, De l’image à l’Image, 282-4. 
177 This articulates from an eschatological vantage the very logic we observed last chapter from a 
protological one—namely, that the “edges” of participation cannot themselves by explained by 
participation. There the power to be at all—to be a participant—preceded (ontologically) the actual 
participation between participated and participant. Here the power to be a created nature precedes the 
power of that nature’s proper and actual perfection by grace. In both cases the edges are established by the 
logoi, and in both cases only their identification with the hypostasis of the Logos explains their peculiar 
functions as edges. At the beginning, the Word condescends to make himself identical to what he’s not by 
nature, created, and so generates created nature. At the end, the Word assumes creation’s perfection even 
while remaining what he is by nature, uncreated, and so deifies created nature. At neither edge is it a matter 
of natural mediation. But that’s exactly why both edges completely exceed nature and effect realities 
known to be naturally impossible and even absurd. 
178 See Thunberg, Microcosm and Mediator, 323-30, for a classic overview of Maximus 
statements in this vein 




and the beginning to be the same as the end, or rather that the beginning and the 
end are one and the same [μᾶλλον δὲ ταὐτὸν ἀρχὴν οὖσαν καὶ τέλος]...for it is 
from the beginning that he received being and participation in what is naturally 
good [εἰληφὼς πρὸς τῷ εἶναι καὶ τὸ κατὰ μέθεξιν φύσει ἀγαθόν].... Having 
completed his course, such a person becomes God, receiving from God to be God, 
for to the beautiful nature inherent in the fact that he is God’s image, he freely 
chooses to add the likeness to God by means of the virtues, in a natural movement 
of ascent through which he grows in conformity to his own beginning.180 
 
Track the logic closely. I recount it in reverse order of its appearance in this passage, 
which is the typical order of its phenomenological appearance in human life, if you will. 
Virtue inheres in human nature such that the ascetic ascent from image to likeness reveals 
virtue’s hidden and hitherto buried beauty.181 To cultivate that virtue—to reduce it to 
concrete deed by free choice—is to participate God himself. Indeed, existential, 
historical, horizontal acts of virtue somehow perform what’s normally regarded as the 
more ontological, metaphysical, and vertical act of reverting to one’s beginning (arche), 
which is also one’s end (telos). Thus Origen favored a metaphysical axiom, “the 
beginning is like the end,” which expresses the latter.182 Maximus reprises and actually 
intensifies it here to emphasize the singular identity of beginning and end, the very 
identity ubiquitously latent within nature as the power of virtue—of deification.183 
                                                 
180 Amb 7.21: “Εἰ γὰρ οὐσία τῆς ἐν ἑκάστῳ ἀρετῆς ὁ εἷς ὑπάρχειν Λόγος τοῦ Θεοῦ μὴ 
ἀμφιβέβληται–οὐσία γὰρ πάντων τῶν ἀρετῶν αὐτός ἐστιν ὁ Κύριος ἡμῶν Ἰησοῦς Χριστός, ὡς γέγραπται· 
ὅς ἐγενήθη ἡμῖν ἀπὸ Θεοῦ σοφία, διακαιοσύνη τε καὶ ἁγιασμὸς καὶ ἀπολύτρωσις [1 Cor 1.30].... πᾶς 
δηλονότι ἄνθρωπος ἀρετῆς καθ’ ἕξιν παγίαν μετέχων ἀναμφηρίστως Θεοῦ μετέχει τῆς οὐσίας τῶν ἀρετῶν, 
ὡς τὴν κατὰ φύσιν σπορὰν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ γνησίως κατὰ προαίρεσιν γεωργήσας καὶ ταὐτὸν δείξας τῇ ἀρχῇ τὸ 
τέλος καὶ τὴν ἀρχὴν τῷ τέλει, μᾶλλον δὲ ταὐτὸν ἀρχὴν οὖσαν καὶ τέλος...τὴν μὲν ὡς ἐκεῖθεν εἰληφὼς πρὸς 
τῷ εἶναι καὶ τὸ κατὰ μέθεξιν φύσει ἀγαθόν...ἐξανυσας δρόμον διὰ σπουδῆς, καθ’ ὃν γίνεται Θεός, ἐκ τοῦ 
Θεοῦ τὸ Θεὸς εἶναι λαμβάνων, ὡς τῷ κατ’ εἰκόνα φύσει καλῷ καὶ προαιρέσει τὴν δι’ ἀρετῶν προσθεὶς 
ἐξομοίωσιν διὰ τῆς ἐμφύτου πρὸς τὴν ἰδίαν ἀρχὴν ἀναβάσεώς τε καὶ οἰκειότητος.” Cf. too In Psal. 59, 
Blowers 278. 
181 Cf. Amb 10.8; Amb 42.5; QThal 53.3. An idea especially dear to Athanasius, of course; cf. De 
inc. verb. 41-3. 
182 Origen, Princ 1.6.1. 
183 Polycarp Sherwood, OSB, “Maximus and Origenism: ΑΡΧΗ ΚΑΙ ΤΕΛΟΣ,” Berichte zum XI. 
Internationalen Byzantinisten Kongreß (München, 1958), 5-7, though surely there’s more to say than that 




 This identity is Jesus Christ. How so? Maximus reads the Apostle literally and 
metaphysically: “by God he was made for us wisdom” means for Maximus that the Word 
“was made” universal wisdom and virtue—indeed all the participated works of God—in 
just the way he “was made” at all, that is, by Incarnation,184 by making his hypostasis the 
“is” of what he is not by nature in order to make that nature both be and be his in a single 
creative act. Clearly Maximus has Christo-logic in mind here. In the preceding paragraph 
he explicitly distinguishes the Word’s divine essence from his hypostasis precisely in 
order to claim that the Logos—this hypostasis considered apart from divinity—is 
identical to the logoi.185 The divine essence as such could never become anything, let 
alone created. But Jesus Christ can and did—here “the essence of all the virtues” (οὐσία 
γὰρ πάντων τῶν ἀρετῶν). A truly remarkable claim, especially when you realize what 
Maximus is not saying. He does not mean that Christ “as Word,” say, is the self-
subsistent exemplar participated piecemeal by lesser participants. He might have easily 
taken this route. In this very passage (in the first ellipsis) he evokes the standard 
distinction between “Wisdom itself” (αὐτοσοφία) and specific instances of wisdom, “a 
wise man” (σοφὸς ἄνθρωπος), and initially identifies Christ with the former.186 But then 
“Wisdom itself” appears entirely inherent within the participant, still, mind you, the very 
wisdom and virtue essentially identified with Christ’s person. Wisdom’s vertical, 
                                                                                                                                                 
the Word” (7), since, of course, Maximus has no qualms speaking of the Logos-logoi procession in a 
properly protological sense; cf. Chapter 2, sec. 2.4. 
184 So Larchet, La divinisation, 485, describes the saint’s actualization of virtue in direct 
connection with that virtue as hypostasized in Christ’s flesh: “une véritable appropriation ontologique des 
vertus qu’Il manifeste en plénitude dans Son humanité et qui sont elles-même les propriétés divines dont Il 
a rendu participante, par toute l’oeuvre de Son économie, la nature qu’Il a assumée.” 
185 Amb 7.20: “When, however, we exclude the highest form of negative theology concerning the 
Logos—according to which the Logos is neither called, nor considered, nor is, in His entirety, anything that 
can be attributed to anything else, since He is beyond all being, and is not participated in by any being 
whatsoever—when, I say, we set this way of thinking aside, the one Logos is many logoi and the many are 
One” (my emphasis). See Chapter 2, sec. 2.3. 
186 Amb 7.21. Maximus uses the term προσδιωρισμένως to indicate a qualified, particular kind or 




downward movement into its participants is Christ’s own, and it yields a feature totally 
foreign to standard philosophical models of participation: when the soul consumes the 
“lower members” of Christ’s body, through virtue “it completely forms within it the 
whole Word who became flesh.”187  
 We saw last chapter that God is participable only because the Word deigns to 
bring down his proper (divine) activity with his own person (since divinity is no abstract 
thing), joining that activity to the nature he becomes according to hypostasis. Now here, 
when the lower, finite nature’s own power reduces to act—a human soul’s, say—it 
“mixes” with the divine activity fully present within itself.188 The deified soul participates 
an interior activity whose power is not its own by nature, yet entirely present because it 
belongs by nature to the Word within that soul, the Word who has given himself to be the 
concrete identity of two infinitely different natures—to be their logoi while also 
remaining himself in nature and person. So when that soul actualizes its power in its 
proper (human) mode, the Word assumes that particular mode of created nature too. In 
that sense the Word gains a modal instance or iteration he did not actually possess before, 
since every instance bears a character and modality as individual as the person who 
“typifies” it.189 You “lavishly show forth in yourself,” writes Maximus to Thomas, “by 
means of the marvelous mixture of opposites—God incarnated in the virtues.”190 
 Or consider another individual, Melchizedek. Maximus does intently, we’ve seen, 
and in doing so resplendently illustrates grace’s Christo-logic. He makes his start from 
                                                 
187 Amb 48.6, my emphasis: “καὶ παντάπασιν ἀμόλυντον μετὰ τῆς ψυχῆς τὴν σάρκα διατηρῶν, καὶ 
ὅλον ἀπαραλείπτως αὐτῇ τὸν Λόγον ταῖς ἀρεταῖς διαμορφῶν σάρκα γενόμενον.” 
188 Amb 10.41. 
189 Opusc 10, PG 91, 136d-137a; cf. Chapter 1, sec. 1.3.2 (“Indifference”). 
190 Amb ad Thom., prol. 2, slight modification: “πολυτελῶς τῇ καλῇ μίξει τῶν ἐναντίων ἐν σεαυτῷ 





Scripture itself, which cavalierly asserts that Melchizedek was “without father or mother 
or genealogy, having neither beginning of days nor end of life [Ἀπάτωρ καὶ ἀμήτωρ καὶ 
ἀγενεαλόγητος, μήτε ἀρχὴν ἡμερῶν, μήτε τέλος ζωῆς ἔχων].”191 Maximus thinks this 
indicates Melchizedek’s deified state. God made him “worthy to transcend time and 
nature and to become like the Son of God,” that is, “he became by grace what the very 
Giver of grace is by essence.”192 What Melchizedek, a human person, was by nature of 
course included things like having a temporal beginning and end, wielding dialectic to 
ascertain the truth of creatures, and so on. But what he becomes by grace comprises 
nothing less than the entire set of divine properties, undiminished. Grace, specifically 
“divine and uncreated grace” (τὴν χάριν τὴν θείαν καὶ ἄκτιστον), makes Melchizedek’s 
own what he is not by nature. And it manifestly must be uncreated grace: if grace were 
created it would no longer be divine—at least not modally divine—and Maximus reads 
Scripture and the Word’s economy alike to aim at nothing less. Therefore only that grace 
which exists “eternally and is beyond all nature and time” renders Melchizedek 
“begotten” of God.193 
 Like Father like son: 
And so transcendentally, secretly, silently, and, to put it briefly, in a manner 
beyond knowledge, following the total negation of all beings from thought, he 
entered into God Himself, and was wholly transformed [ὅλος ὅλῳ ποιωθείς τε καὶ 
μεταποιηθείς], receiving all the qualities of God, which we may take as the 
meaning of being likened to the Son of God [ἀφωμοιωμένος δὲ τῷ Υιῷ τοῦ Θεοῦ] 
he remains a priest forever [Heb 7.3]. For every saint who has made exemplary 
progress in beauty is thereby said to be a type of God the giver. Consistent with 
this principle, the great Melchizedek, having been imbued with divine virtue, was 
deemed worthy to become an image of Christ God and His unutterable mysteries, 
for in Him all the saints converge as to an archetype, to the very cause of the 
                                                 
191 Amb 10.42, 44. 
192 Amb 10.42, slight modifications: “χρόνου καὶ φύσεως ὑπεράνω γενέσθαι καὶ ὁμοιωθῆναι τῷ 
Υἱῳ τοῦ Θεοῦ κατηξιώθη,” and “οἷος αὐτὸς ὁ δοτὴρ τῆς χάριτος κατὰ τὴν οὐσίαν ὑπάρχων πιστεύεται.” 




manifestation of the Beautiful that is realized in each of them, and this is 
especially true of this saint, since he bears within himself more prefigurations of 
Christ than all the rest.194 
 
Observe first that Maximus here defines “likeness” (again from ἀφοίωμα) as “receiving 
all the qualities of God.” We’ve already attended to Maximus’s rather strong sense of 
deific likeness (sec. 3.2). There and here you almost get the sense that deific “likeness” 
signifies something closer to the way the Word is “image of God” (Col 1.15) or “the 
exact character of the Father’s hypostasis” (Heb 1.3)—which is to say, not by modal 
qualification.195 This more extreme sense emerges, in fact, in a passage just before the 
one at hand:  
the divine Melchizedek unfolded his intellect to the divine, beginningless, and 
immortal rays of God the Father, and was begotten out of God through the Word 
in the Spirit by grace, so that he now bears within himself, unblemished and fully 
realized, the likeness of God the begetter, for every birth creates identity between 
the begetter and the begotten [ἐπεὶ καὶ πᾶσα γέννησις ταὐτὸν τῷ γεννῶντι 
πέφυκεν ἀποτελεῖν τὸ γεννώμενον].196 
 
Maximus reveals here what “by grace” means: to be born from God, in the Spirit, and 
through the Word, to such a degree that an “identity” obtains between the person become 
God and God. Grace forges an identity with God through the Word.  
                                                 
194 Amb 10.45: “καὶ ὡς ἐξῃμρημένως, κρυφίως τε καὶ σεσιγημένως, καὶ συνελόντα εἰπεῖν, 
ἀγνώστως, μετὰ πᾶσαν τῶν ὄντων ἁπάντων ἀφαίρεσιν κατὰ νοῦν εἰς αὐτὸν εἰσδὺς τὸν Θεόν, καὶ ὅλος ὅλῳ 
ποιωθείς τε καὶ μεταποιηθείς, ὅπερ τό, ἀφωμοιωμένος δὲ τῷ Υἱῳ τοῦ Θεοῦ μένει ἱερεὺς εἰς τὸ διηνεκὲς 
ὑπεμφαίνειν δύναται. Πᾶς γὰρ τις τῶν ἁγίων, οὗτινος κατ’ ἐξαίρετον ἀπήρξατο καλοῦ, κατ’ αὐτὸ καὶ τύπος 
εἶναι τοῦ δοτῆρος Θεοῦ ἀνηγόρευται. Καθ’ ὃ σημαινόμενον καὶ οὗτος ὁ μέγας Μελχισεδὲκ διὰ τὴν 
ἐμποιηθεῖσαν αὐτῷ θείαν ἀρετὴν εἰκὼν κατηξίωται Χριστοῦ τοῦ Θεοῦ, καὶ τῶν ἀποῤῥήτων αὐτοῦ 
μυστηρίων, εἰς ὃν πάντες μὲν οἱ ἅγιοι συνάγονται ὡς ἀρχέτυπον καὶ τῆς ἐν ἑκάστῳ αὐτῶν τοῦ καλοῦ 
ἐμφάσεως αἴτιον, μάλιστα δὲ οὗτος, ὡς τῶν ἄλλων ἁπάντων πλείους ἐν ἑαυτῷ φέρων τοῦ Χριστοῦ τὰς 
ὑποτυπώσεις.” 
195 Cp. Amb 7.38, where being created “similar” to God (ἑαυτῷ ὁμοίους) means we’re imbued 
with “the exact characteristics” (ἀκριβῆ γνωρίσματα) of divine goodness. 
196 Amb 10.44, slightly modified: “ὁ θεῖος Μελχισεδέκ, πρὸς δὲ τὰς θείας καὶ ἀνάρχους καὶ 
ἀθανάτους τοῦ Θεοῦ καὶ Πατρὸς ἀκτίνας τὸν νοῦν ἀνεπέτασεν καὶ ἐκ τοῦ Θεοῦ διὰ τοῦ Λόγου κατὰ χάριν 
ἐν Πνεύματι γεγέννηται, καὶ σῴαν καὶ ἀληθῆ ἐν ἑαυτῷ φέρει τοῦ γεννήσαντος Θεοῦ τὴν ὁμοίωσιν, ἐπεὶ καὶ 




 That this identity comes through the Word explains a second unique feature of 
grace’s logic. It’s another we’ve seen before, at work especially in the tantum-quantum 
principle. Deification names a simultaneous, double movement of our ascent into God 
and God’s into us—indeed, that our ascent is God’s into us and the reverse. The passage 
above (10.45) describes our ascent: all the saints converge on Christ “as to an archetype.” 
But even here you can discern the downward movement: Melchizedek “bears within 
himself”—so that his “self” still endures and indeed houses the manifold “prefigurations” 
of Christ. A few paragraphs later we find that the descent was all along the condition for 
ascent: 
whoever casts aside this present life and its desires for the sake of the better life – 
will acquire the living, and active, and absolutely unique Word of God, who 
through virtue and knowledge penetrates to the division between soul and spirit, 
so that absolutely no part of his existence will remain without a share in His 
presence, and thus he becomes without beginning or end, no longer bearing within 
himself the movement of life subject to time, which has a beginning and an end, 
and which is agitated by many passions, but possesses only the divine and eternal 
life of the Word dwelling within him, which is in no way bounded by death.197 
 
At length we see how Melchizedek won the heights he did—even becoming “without 
beginning” (ἄναρχος), a predicate Maximus usually reserves exclusively for the divine 
essence itself.198 Our ascent cannot occur except as an ascent into the divinity already 
innately present in us. The Word first dwells in us that we might in him. For there is no 
                                                 
197 Amb 10.48: “...τὴν παροῦσαν ζωὴν μετὰ τῶν αὐτῆς θελημάτων τῆς κρείττονος ἕνεκεν 
προϊέμενος, ζῶντα δὲ καὶ ἐνεργοῦντα, μονώτατον τὸν τοῦ Θεοῦ Λόγον κέκτηται, διϊκνούμενον κατ’ ἀρετὴν 
καὶ γνῶσιν ἄχρι μερισμοῦ ψυχῆς καὶ πνεύματος [Heb 4.12], καὶ μηδὲν τὸ παράπαν τῆς αὐτοῦ παρουςίας 
ἄμοιρον ἔχει, γέγονε καὶ ἄναρχος καὶ ἀτελεύτητος, τὴν χρονικὴν μηκέτι φέρων ἐν ἑαυτῷ κινουμένην ζωήν, 
τὴν ἀρχὴν καὶ τέλος ἔχουσαν καὶ πολλοῖς δονουμένην παθήμασι, μόνην δὲ τὴν θείαν τοῦ ἐνοικήσαντος 
Λόγου καὶ ἀΐδιον καὶ μηδενὶ θανάτῳ περατουμένην.” 
198 Amb 7.7; Amb 10.97-8; Pyr 182, PG 91, 341a.—Note that Maximus once again shows himself 
completely willing not only to repeat but to intensify an idea with a controversial legacy (as he was with 
isochrist claims): the cult of Melchizedek knew some significant extremes, which worried many. Here I’m 




divinity, no “divine and eternal life,” that is not precisely “of the Word dwelling within” 
(τοῦ ἐνοικήσαντος Λόγου).199 
 Now too we can glimpse the distinctively Maximian sense of a theme dear to 
Origenism, the birth of the Word in the deified soul.200 It bears the unmistakable marks of 
Christo-logic. Observe its first two elements (hypostatic identity generates infinite natural 
difference): the Logos condescends to identify his person to created nature; he becomes 
the logoi of all and each. That includes the logos of every human being. This generates 
the human being, nature and person. Indeed it’s the “hypostasis of [divine] gifts,”201 the 
person of the Word, that constitutes the (natural) potency of that human person’s being, 
well-being, and eternal well-being—that is, the entire existential continuum of that 
person, beginning, middle, end.202 The Word’s person remains divine by nature even as it 
becomes this human being’s natural power and principle. So now the Word bears two 
principles within that person (the divine and this human’s) along with their respective 
natural modes and activities. Obviously the indwelling Word’s divine nature is always 
and infinitely actualized as such; it awaits no further reduction to act. But the Word’s 
human nature does remain in potency in each human being, indeed is that person’s whole 
potency.203 And since the Word is as much that human nature as he is divine, that human 
                                                 
199 Cp. QThal 15.5, CCSG 7, 103, which the Spirit’s “deifying indwelling” (τῆς αὐτοῦ θεωτικῆς 
ἐνοικήσεως) depends explicitly on those who are “in Christ.” The Spirit is in the deified soul because the 
Spirit is wholly in the Son, and the Son is in that soul. Cf. below, sec. 3.5. 
200 Origen, Hom. in Jer. 9.4, Hom. in Luc. 22.3, Hom. in Num. 23; Evagrius, KG 6.39; cf. A.K. 
Squire, “The Idea of the Soul as Virgin and Mother in Maximus the Confessor,” Studia Patristica (1966): 
456-61, esp. 460. 
201 Exp. Orat. Dom. 4, CCSG 23, 50, slightly modified. 
202 QThal 22.6, CCSG 7, 139. 
203 As created and finite by nature, this must be so: every created thing must move from potency to 





nature’s actualization (its gradual, freely elected perfection through a person’s proper and 
integral activity) is his too. 
 And so we can take Maximus’s statements literally here: “Christ is always born 
mysteriously and willingly, becoming incarnate in those who are saved.”204 This is our 
adoption, how we become God’s children. As it was in the historical Incarnation, the 
Holy Spirit, who dwells perichoretically (wholly) in the Son is “the one creating” 
(δημιουργικὸν) the Son’s birth in and as us.205 In fact, so exactly does our deification hew 
to Christo-logic, the birth of Christ in our soul even retains the basic causal reciprocity 
that obtained between Christ and his mother: 
The mother of the Word is the true and unsullied faith. Just as the Word, who, as 
God, is by nature the creator of His mother who gave birth to Him according to 
the flesh, and made her His mother out of love for mankind, and accepted to be 
born from her as man, so too the Word first creates faith within us, and then 
becomes the son of that faith, from which He is embodied through the practice of 
the virtues. And it is through faith that we accomplish all things, receiving from 
the Word the graces necessary for salvation. For without faith, through which the 
Word is God by nature and a son by grace, we have no boldness of speech to 
address our petitions to Him.206 
 
The very Word becomes “a son by grace” in our adoption. That’s how identical he is to 
us, to our individual finite essences, powers, modes, and activities. He really does 
                                                 
204 Exp. Orat. Dom. 4, CCSG 23, 50; cited above at n. 87. 
205 QThal 15.4, CCSG 7, 101-3: “καὶ ἐν πᾶσι τοῖς τὸ θεῖον καὶ θεοποιὸν ὄντως ὄνομα τοῦ Χριστοῦ 
κληρωσαμένοις διὰ τῆς πίστεως...ἀλλὰ καὶ ὡς δημιουργικὸν τῆς κατὰ χάριν διὰ πίστεως δοθείσης 
υἱοθεσίας.” 
206 QThal 40.8, CCSG 7, 273: “Μήτηρ δὲ τοῦ λόγου καθέστηκεν ἡ ἀληθὴς καὶ ἀμόλυντος πίστις. 
Ὡς γὰρ τῆς τεκούσης αὐτὸν κατὰ σάρκα μητρός, ὡς θεός, ὑπάρχει κατὰ φύσιν δημιουργὸς ὁ λόγος, ἣν 
ἐποιήσατο μητέρα διὰ φιλανθρωπίαν, ἐξ αὐτῆς ὡς ἄνθρωπος γεννηθῆναι καταδεξάμενος, οὕτως ἐν ἡμῖν 
πρότερον τὴν πίστιν δημιουργῶν ὁ λόγος ὕστερον γίνεται τῆς ἐν ἡμῖν πίστεως υἱός, ἐξ αὐτῆς κατὰ τὴν 
πρᾶξιν ταῖς ἀρεταῖς σωματούμενος, δι’ ἧς πάντα διανύομεν, παρὰ τοῦ λόγου λαμβάνοντες τὰ πρὸς 
σωτηρίαν χαρίσματα. Χωρὶς γὰρ τῆς πίστεως, ἧς καὶ θεὸς κατὰ φύσιν ὑπάρχει καὶ υἱὸς κατὰ χάριν ὁ λόγος, 
οὐδεμίαν ἔχομεν παρρησίαν τὰς πρὸς αὐτὸν ποιεῖσθαι δεήσεις.” See too QThal 53.4, CCSG 7, 435, where 





“become flesh” in our virtue (not merely in some abstract realm where “Virtue” lives).207 
One time Maximus praises his addressee for “always conceiving and bearing the pious 
logos of your understanding, which is like a womb made capable by grace of manifesting 
the supra-natural Word.” And the Word manifests because he increases. “By your 
generous dispositions, which were born from your heart,” writes Maximus, 
you nourish the Word in accordance with right praxis and contemplation—as if 
from breasts—and you nurse along the Word to growth in the abundance of pious 
conceptions and modes [of life] so that, paradoxical as it sounds, his own growth 
becomes the deification of the very mind that nourishes him.208 
 
 Just as the Virgin’s own free power to bear and birth the Word was itself a power 
given by the Word, so too is grace’s. When the Mother consented, the Word became his 
own seed in her in an utterly supra-natural way.209 And when I consent to the Word’s 
invitation, coursing as it does through creation’s very veins as the logoi210—mine too—
then the Word realizes himself in me, assumes my own nature and mode in its every 
general and particular dimension. This then names the greatest issue of grace’s Christo-
logic: 
Jesus my God and Savior, who is completed through me who am saved, brings me 
back to himself who is always filled to overflowing with plenitude and who can 
never be exhausted. He restores me in a marvelous way to myself, or rather to 
God from whom I received being and toward whom I am directed, long desirous 
of attaining well-being. Whoever can understand this by having had the 
experience of these things will completely come to know in clearly having 
recognized his own dignity already through experience, how there is rendered to 
the image what is made to the image, how the archetype is honored, what is the 
                                                 
207 CT 2.37, Salés 132-3: “Ἐν μὲν πρακτικῷ τοῖς τῶν ἀρετῶν τρόποις παχυνόμενος ὁ Λόγος 
γίνεται σάρξ”; cf. QThal 1.2.2. 
208 Ep 19, PG 91, 592a-b, my translation: “καὶ κύουσαν ἀεὶ τὸν εὐσεβῆ λόγον καὶ τίκτουςάν σοῦ 
διάνοιαν· ὡς τοῦ ὑπὲρ φύσιν Λόγου κατὰ χάριν κοιλίαν ἀποφανθεῖσαν χωρητικὴν...Καὶ μὴν κατὰ τὰς σὰς 
παγίας ἕξεις τὰς ἐκ τῆς σῆς καρδίας ἐκδιδομένας, αἷς μαστῶν δίκην κατά τε τὴν πρᾶξιν καὶ τὴν θεωρίαν 
διατρέφεις τὸν Λόγον, τῇ χορηγίᾳ τῶν εὐσεβῶν νοημάτων τε καὶ τρόπων συναυξανόμενον· καὶ παραδόξως 
εἰπεῖν, τὴν οἰκείαν αὔξησιν τοῦ διατρέφοντος νοῦ ποιούμενον θέωσιν.” 
209 Ep 19, PG 91, 592c-d (he became his own seed); recall too the description of the logoi as the 
Word’s insemination into the womb of the world at Amb 6, discussed at Chapter 2, sec. 2.2. 




power of the mystery of our salvation, for whom it was that Christ died, and 




 That last opens upon the logic of the actual, deified state—perichoresis. I return to 
that shortly. But I want to terminate this discussion of the aporia of grace as the indelible 
index of its Christo-logic by lingering a bit over one of Maximus’s favorite expressions 
for our deification. He likes to say we become God “by position” (θέσει).212 The 
expression κατὰ θέσιν can refer to adoption, the legal rather than biological mode of 
gaining a child.213 That idea’s certainly present in Maximus, but, as Larchet observes, 
θέσει likely does not take that as its principal sense, not least because Maximus often 
employs another (biblical and technical) term for “adoption.”214 Both, of course, indicate 
a process opposed to nature, something non- or supra-natural: θέσει opposes φύσει, for 
instance.215 
 But θέσει expresses more than the process’s character. When a fact or state results 
from a process that occurs “by position,” it tells you something remarkable about that 
                                                 
211 Myst. 5, CCSG 69, 23-4, my slight modification and emphasis: “Ἰησοῦν μὲν τὸν ἐμὸν θεὸν καὶ 
σωτῆρα συμπληρωθέντα δι’ ἑμοῦ σωζομένου πρὸς ἑαυτὸν ἐπανάγει, τὸν ἀεὶ πληρέστατόν τε καὶ 
ὑπερπληρέστατον μηδέποτε ἑαυτοῦ ἐκστῆναι δυνάμενον, ἐμὲ δὲ τὸν ἄνθρωπον ἐμαυτῷ θαυμαστῶς 
ἀποκαθίστησιν, μᾶλλον δὲ θεῷ, παρ’ οὗ τὸ εἶναι λαβὼν ἔχω, καὶ πρὸς ὃν ἐπείγομαι, πόῤῥωθεν, τὸ εὖ εἶναι 
προσλαβεῖν ἐφιέμενος· ὅπερ ὁ γνῶναι δυνηθεὶς ἐκ τοῦ παθεῖν, τὰ λεγόμενα εἴσεται πάντως, γνωρίσας ἤδη 
κατὰ τὴν πεῖραν ἐναρχῶς τὸ οἰκεῖον ἀξίωμα, πῶς ἀποδίδοται τῇ εἰκόνι τὸ κατ’εἰκόνα, καὶ πῶς τιμᾶται τὸ 
ἀρχέτυπον, καὶ τίς τοῦ μυστηρίου τὴς ἡμῶν σωτηρίας ἡ δύναμις, καὶ ὑπὲρ τίνος Χριστὸς ἀπέθανε, πῶς τε 
πάλιν ἐν αὐτῷ μεῖναι δυνάμεθα καὶ αὐτος ἐν ἡμῖν, καθὼς εἶπεν”; the image and archetype phrases come 
from Gregory of Nazianzus, Or. 1 and 4. 
212 Myst. 5, PG 91, 677; 21, PG 91, 697a; 24, PG 91, 712a; Opusc 1, PG 91, 33c; Amb 20.2, PG 
91, 1237a; cf. Larchet, La divinisation de l’homme, 601-3.  
213 LSJ, ἡ θέσις, s.v., III; Lampe, s.v., IV. 
214 Larchet, La divinisation de l’homme, 602 n. 308: “Certains traducteurs rendent ce terme par 
adoption: mais cette traduction n’est acceptable que pour le composé υἱοθεσία que Maxime utilise par 
ailleurs et qui se réfère à une filialité non pas possédée par nature, mais acquise ou conférée par institution, 
autrement dit qui désigne proprement l’adoption filiale.” 




very state, too. What comes to be “by position” is a state or fact just like the fact that 
comes to be by nature. Becoming God by position, you might say, makes us just as much 
God as God is by nature (i.e. tantum-quantum principle). “By grace,” which also means 
“by position,” does not make us less God just because the process is utterly supra-natural. 
Thus Maximus can gloss the christological claim of Col 2.9: 
In Christ, on the one hand, who is God and Word of the Father, the whole fullness 
of divinity dwells by essence in a bodily manner. But in us the fullness of divinity 
dwells by grace at the moment we gather within ourselves every virtue and 
wisdom—such that, to the extent possible for a human being, nothing in any way 
lacks in the true imitation with respect to the archetype. For it is not unfitting that, 
by the principle of position, the fullness of divinity dwells in us too, a fullness 
consisting in various spiritual contemplations.216 
 
The logos of “position” describes the way grace makes the whole divinity inhabit us just 
as much as Christ. The process is not natural. But the outcome exists in fact just as if it 
were. 
 I think that another, more distant horizon might illumine Maximus’s affinity for 
θέσει: ancient Greek prosody (right pronunciation).217 There we encounter a fairly direct 
replication of Maximus’s use. More evidently than in any other of its contexts, “by 
position” in prosody immediately opposes “by nature.” The Alexandrian grammarian 
Dionysius Thrax (d. 90 BC), whose Ars grammatica marked the first systematic grammar 
treatise and would become “a text-book in the schools of the Roman Empire,”218 allots 
two categories of instances where one must pronounce long syllables. “A long syllable 
may come about in eight ways,” he writes, “three by nature and five by position [Μακρὰ 
                                                 
216 CT 2.21, Salés 120, my translation: “Ἐν μὲν τῷ Χριστῷ, Θεῷ ὄντι καὶ Λόγῳ τοῦ Πατρός, ὅλον 
κατ’ οὐσίαν οἰκεῖ τὸ πλήρωμα τῆς θεότητος σωματικῶς· ἐν ἡμῖν δὲ κατὰ χάριν οἰκεῖ τὸ πλήρωμα τῆς 
θεότητος, ἡνίκα πᾶσαν ἐν ἑαυτοῖς ἀθροίσωμεν ἀρετὴν καὶ σοφίαν, μηδενὶ τρόπῳ, κατὰ τὸ δυνατὸν 
ἀνθρώπῳ, λειπομένην τῆς πρὸς τὸ ἀρχέτυπον ἀληθοῦς ἐκμιμήσεως. Οὐ γὰρ ἀπεικὸς κατὰ τὸν θέσει λόγον 
καὶ ἐν ἡμῖν οἰκῆσαι τὸ πλήρωμα τῆς θεότητος τὸ ἐκ διαφόρων συνεστηκὸς πνευματικῶν θεωρημάτων.” 
217 LSJ, ἡ θέσις, s.v., VII. 




συλλαβὴ γίνεται κατὰ τρόπους ὀκτώ, φύσει μὲν τρεῖς, θέσει δὲ πέντε].”219 You 
pronounce a long syllable “by nature” when, for instance, the syllable contains a long 
vowel or diphthong (these are already long by nature), and “by position” when, say, the 
syllable ends in two consonants or is followed by a double consonant (as with ἕξω—“ξ” a 
result of the palatal stop “χ” before “σ”). In fact, to pronounce “by position” seems not to 
yield any exact, universal rule precisely to the extent that it’s not natural. Or, to put it 
another way, a general rule in prosody condenses by convention rather than by the very 
essence of the syllables themselves. Syllables come arranged, and pronunciation 
introduces yet another level of ordering. Prosody deals with the direct deed wrought and 
performed by the speaker in concert with generations of other speakers. From prosody, 
Dionysius thus teaches, we learn “the art of the reader.”220 
 I don’t claim direct textual dependence here, but the picture conjured proves 
compelling enough to take seriously. Maximus does sometimes evoke θέσει in a prosodic 
register. Those who consume the Eucharist “can be and be called gods by position 
through grace [δύνασθαι εἶναί τε καὶ καλεῖσθαι θέσει κατὰ τὴν χάριν θεοὺς].”221 The 
deified receive the “name” of God,222 and the mysteries to be revealed in that final state 
which transcends every written and spoken word will then sound forth as “a masterly 
articulated speech [ὡς πρὸς τρανὸν λόγον].”223 Deification by grace and “by position,” 
then, delightfully expresses that supra-natural process according to which the very Word 
                                                 
219 Dionysius Thrax, Ars gramm. VIII, Uhlig 17, l.4; Davidson 330. 
220 Dionysius Thrax, Ars. gramm. II, Uhlig 6, l.7-8; Davidson 327: “ἐκ δὲ τῆς προσῳδίας τὴν 
τέχνην.” 
221 Myst. 21, PG 91, 697a, slightly modified. 
222 Amb 20.2. 
223 Amb 21.16; see too In Psal. 59, Blowers 274: the Christ shows “the principles of his deeds to 




who dwells within and takes manifest form in all creatures makes those very creatures in 
fact what they could never be “by nature”—divine.  
 That we become identical to and equal with God through Christ and in the 
Spirit—this describes a literal, actual state of the creature’s being God, though, unlike 
God, that creature certainly had to become him.224 That supra-natural process transpires 
solely by the “art of the reader”: the Word is the reader, and what he reads is himself in 
and as us, in and as the logoi.225 In them he enunciates himself as us by convention, 
utterly free of every natural necessity. Yet what is spoken is no less him. We are short by 
nature, and likely less. But in the logoi, creation’s “scripts,”226 the Word masterfully 
speaks us long and thereby reveals the sublime art he is. We become the Word when we 
willingly give ourselves to be pronounced by, in, and as him.  
Blessed therefore is the one who through wisdom has actively made God man in 
himself, who has brought to fullness the inception of this mystery, and who 
passively experiences becoming God by grace, for this experience will never 
come to an end.227 
  
3.4 – Perichoresis, the logic of deified creation 
Recall that passive experience characterizes the existential state of Maximian deification. 
The meditation on Melchizedek begins: “This, I think, is what that wondrous and great 
                                                 
224 Myst. 24, CCSG 69, 65-66, modified. Here Maximus applies the words of the father from the 
parable of the prodigal son—“Son, you are always with me, and everything I have is yours” (Lk 15.31)—
directly to the deified soul, and concludes: “According to each’s ability, they have become by position in 
grace what God is and is believed [to be] by nature and by cause [Τοῦτο κατὰ τὴν ἐν χάριτι θέσιν 
ἐνδεχομένως ὑπάρχοντες ὅπερ ὁ θεὸς κατὰ τὴν φύσιν καὶ αἰτίαν καὶ ἔστι καὶ πιστεύεται].” 
225 Amb 10.31; Amb 21.7; Amb 33.2. 
226 Blowers, Maximus the Confessor, 113. 
227 QThal 22.8, CCSG 7, 143: “Μακάριος οὖν ὁ μετὰ τὸ ποιῆσαι διὰ σοφίας ἐν ἑαυτῷ τὸν θεὸν 
ἄνθρωπον καὶ τοῦ τοιούτου μυστηρίου πληρώσας τὴν γένεσιν, πάσχων τὸ γενέσθαι τῇ χάριτι θεός, ὅτι τοῦ 




man, Melchizedek...knew and learned through experience [γνοὺς καὶ παθὼν].”228 What 
did he experience? The preceding paragraph strains to depict it: 
Having been wholly united with the whole Word, within the limits of what their 
own inherent natural potency allows...they were imbued with His own qualities, 
like the clearest of mirrors [Wisd 7.26], they are now visible only as reflections of 
the undiminished form of God the Word, who gazes out from within them, for 
they possess the fullness of His divine characteristics, yet none of the original 
attributes that naturally define human beings have been lost, for all things have 
simply yielded to what is better, like air—which in itself is not luminous—
completely mixed with light.229 
 
 The term perichoresis lacks here, but not its logic. In Chapter 1 (sec. 1.5) and in 
the introduction to this chapter (sec. 3.1) I noted two characteristics of perichoresis. First 
it describes a union of two distinct wholes that retain their integral identities even as they 
exist as one and the same reality. This feature betrays perichoresis’s remote provenance 
in the idea of “mixture” in Stoic physics.230 I leave “wholes” ambiguous since of course 
what the two “wholes” are depends on the context. In the Trinity the wholes are 
persons.231 In Christ they refer to his natures or, more exactly, to his natural activities.232 
Second, these wholes interpenetrate every part of each other to the point that a modal and 
actual symmetry emerges. 
 That last characteristic definitely distinguishes perichoretic logic from, say, 
Neoplatonic emanative or participative logic. For the latter, I’ve already remarked, the 
Plotinian doctrine of double activity necessitates a modal asymmetry in order to explain 
                                                 
228 Amb 10.42, slightly modified. 
229 Amb 10.41, PG 91, 1137b-c, modified: “καὶ ὅλοι ὅλῳ κατὰ τὸ ἐφικτὸν τῆς ἐνούσης αὐτοῖς 
φυσικῆς δυνάμεως ἑνωθέντες τοσοῦτον ἐνδεχομένως ὑπ’ αὐτοῦ ἐποιώθησαν, ὥστε καὶ ἀπὸ μόνου 
γνωρίζεσθαι, οἷον ἔσοπτρα διειδέστατα, ὅλου τοῦ ἐνορῶντος Θεοῦ Λόγου τὸ εἶδος ἀπαραλείπτως διὰ τῶν 
θείων αὐτοῦ γνωρισμάτων φαινόμενον ἔχοντες, τῷ ἐλλειφθῆναι μνδένα τῶν παλαιῶν χαρακτήρων, οἷς 
μνηύεσθαι πέφυκε τὸ ἀνθρώπινον, πάντων εἰξάντων τοῖς ἀμείνοσιν, οἷον ἀὴρ ἀφεγγὴς φωτὶ δι’ ὅλου 
μετεγκραθείς.”  
230 Diogenes Laertius, 7.151; SVF 2.479; Stemmer, “PERICHORESE,” 13. 
231 CT 2.1; Exp. Orat. Dom. 2, CCSG 23, 31-2. 
232 August Deneffe, “Perichoresis, circumincessio, circuminsessio: Eine terminologisches 




why anything proceeds at all and yet remains essentially related to its superior, self-
subsistent cause.233 If therefore Christo-logic culminates precisely in an actuality or 
existential reality whose logic is perichoretic; and if that logic is creation’s too; and if 
deification is creation’s actual culmination—then it follows that deification’s logic must 
also prove perichoretic. 
 It does, incontrovertibly. Unlike anyone before him,234 Maximus makes 
perichoresis the intractable and entire logic of a deified creature’s concrete state.235 He 
employs the technical term to describe that state, in both its verbal and noun forms.236 A 
creature’s deification occurs “through the grace of the Spirit” and manifests “God alone 
acting within it”—not, Maximus carefully clarifies, in a way that the creature’s natural 
power and activity vanishes. It’s rather that God “in a manner befitting His goodness 
wholly interpenetrates all who are worthy [ὡς ὅλον ὅλοις τοῖς ἀξίοις ἀγαθοπρεπῶς 
περιχωρήσαντος].”237 “Unconfused union,” sometimes thrown about abstractly in the 
                                                 
233 I treat this at some length at Chapter 1, sec. 1.5, but see too Maximus’s diagnosis of Greek 
metaphysics at Chapter 2, sec. 2.3. 
234 As others rightly notice, Maximus could readily find the broad contours of this move in 
Gregory of Nazianzus, who waxes Stoic in both christology and soteriology; cf. Or. 29.20, and esp. Or. 30 
(esp. 6), which Maximus cites at Amb 2.3 and 3.5; see too Harrison, “Perichoresis in the Greek Fathers,” 
57. I court my own suspicions that Maximus derived much from Gregory of Nyssa’s christological 
polemics against Apollinarianism, but that would require another study. 
235 So Guido Bausenhart, ‘In allem uns gleich außer der Sünde’: Studien zum Beitrag Maximos’ 
des Bekenners zur altkirchlichen Christologie mit einer kommentierten Übersetzung der ‘Disputatio cum 
Pyrrho’ (Mainz: Matthias-Grünewald-Verlag, 1992), 180-1, who describes the actual “identity” achieved in 
the perichoretic state thus: “sie ist keine abstrakt zusammengefügte, sondern eine nur in der konkreten 
Vermittlung als Beziehung vollzogene. So wird der Mensch—in einem wahren geschichtlichen Werden—
er selbst im Selbig-werden mit dem, was er glaubt.” 
236 According to Deneffe, “Perichoresis,” 502, Maximus’s very use of the noun form seems 
strikingly original: “Es ist hier [at Pyr, PG 91, 336d] seit 11 Jahrhunderten wohl das erstemal, daß das 
Hauptwort περιχώρησις wieder bei einem griechischen Schriftsteller erscheint”; cf. QThal 59.8, CCSG 22, 
53, for another use of the nominal form. 




literature,238 retains its exact christological meaning even in our deification. It designates 
actual perichoresis grounded in hypostatic identity: 
In assuming both of these for our sake, God renewed our nature, or to put it more 
accurately, He made our nature new, returning it to its primordial beauty of 
incorruptibility through His holy flesh, taken from us, and animated by a rational 
soul, and on which He lavishly bestowed the gift of deification, from which it is 
absolutely impossible to fall, being united to God made flesh, like the soul united 
to the body, wholly interpenetrating it in an unconfused union [δι’ ὅλου 
περιχωρήσασαν ἀσυγχύτως κατὰ τὴν ἕνωσιν].239 
 
 Perichoresis’s two signature traits crop up again and again. Whether or not the 
technical term appears, the idea that the deific state involves the “whole” God in the 
“whole” creature and the reverse—“whole in whole, wholly”—suffuses Maximus’s 
oeuvre.240 But it’s the modal symmetry, the second trait, which really reveals perichoretic 
logic at work. This symmetry shows us that the deific state consists in two simultaneous, 
vertical movements (both realized horizontally)—God’s descent and our ascent. Both 
transgress Neoplatonic participation. They make it so that the very mode (and act) of 
divinity descends into the finite mode (and act) of the creature just as much as the latter  
ascends into divinity’s; that both modes exist as one reality; and that even in this single 
                                                 
238 Balthasar, Cosmic Liturgy, 63-4, who makes perichoresis into the analogia entis with its 
emphasis on the “ever-greater difference” of Creator and creature. On that, see below, sec. 3.5, n. 315. 
239 Amb 42.5, PG 91, 1320a-b, slight modification. 
240 Pyr 128, PG 91, 320d: “ἡ δι’ ὅλου περιχωρήσασα αὐτοῖς χὰρις τοῦ Πνεύματος”; Amb 7.10: 
“γένηται ὅλον ἐν ὅλῳ τῷ ἐραστῷ καὶ ὑφ’ ὅλου περιληφθῆ, ἑκουσίως ὅλον...ἵν’ ὅλον ὅλῳ ποιωθῇ τῷ 
περιγραφόντι...ὡς ἀὴρ δι’ ὅλου πεφωτισμένος φωτὶ καὶ πυρὶ σίδηρος ὅλος ὅλῳ πεπυρακτωμένος”;Amb 
7.26 (become wholly God in whole body and whole soul); Amb 21.10 (whole soul in whole God); Amb 
22.3 (whole God in common and individual realities); Amb 31.8 (whole God assumes the whole deified 
man); Amb 48.7, PG 91, 1365c (Word in “the essence of concrete wholes”); Amb 65.3, PG 91, 1392c-d 
(whole God abides in whole being of the worthy); QThal 2.2 (whole God contemplated in whole of the 
worthy); Myst. 21, PG 91, 697a (whole God wholly fills those who consume Eucharist, “leaves no part of 





reality both modes perdure entirely undiminished—neither’s natural power limits the 
other’s act.241 
 Consider God’s descent. God does not come to be in a deified person in the way a 
Platonic cause dwells in its effect. Indeed, what would it mean to say such a cause 
“comes to be” in anything, since such a “coming to be” just is the effect—the procession 
“out of” the cause that differentiates effect from cause in the first place?242 If there is any 
sense in speaking of the cause’s “coming to be” in its effect, this would either amount to 
pure metaphor or pure Aristotelian efficient causality (where potency terminates its act in 
the passive recipient). The second cannot by itself explain God’s creative act because 
God’s proper mode and activity naturally precede all effects (divinity’s natural activity 
isn’t completed in created effects, not even in their perfection).243 The first is possible. 
But it would obviously violate Christo-logic. That “God became man”—a finite effect—
is no mere metaphor. And yet Maximus claims God “comes to be” in the deified.  
 Take for instance how he adjudicates two apparently contradictory scriptures. The 
Apostle John says “God is light” (1 Jn 1.5). But two verses later he exhorts, “If we walk 
in the light, as He is in the light” (1 Jn 1.7). What does it mean to say God both is and is 
in light? Maximus answers: 
God, who is truly light according to His essence, is in those who “walk in Him” 
through the virtues, so that they too truly become light. Just as all the saints, who 
on account of their love for God become light by participation in that which is 
light by essence, so too that which is light by essence, on account of its love for 
man, becomes light in those who are light by participation. If, therefore, because 
of virtue and knowledge we are in God as in light, God Himself, as light, is in us 
who are light. For God who is light by nature comes to be in that which is light by 
                                                 
241 In other words, the deific state presumes and actualizes the aporia of grace, which the tantum-
quantum principle claims too.  
242 Proclus, El. Theol., prop. 18; cf. Chapter 1, sec. 1.5. 




imitation, just as the archetype [comes to be] in the image.244 
 
Two important points here. First, Maximus does wield the “by essence” vs. “by 
participation” distinction. We’ve ostensibly to do with vertical, Platonic (or exemplarist) 
causality. But then, second, the archetype does a most un-Platonic thing: it descends or 
“comes to be” or even “becomes” (γίνεται) participated light (i.e. light in a qualified or 
finite mode). There is no hint that this is metaphor. Quite the opposite, really, and for two 
reasons. For one thing, the context of the second scripture (“as He is in the light”) clearly 
refers to Jesus Christ.245 And then Maximus assigns a clear motive to Light’s descent, 
namely “on account of its love for mankind” (διὰ φιλανθρωπίαν)—a motive everywhere 
linked to the Word’s historical Incarnation.246 The logic of descent here is not Platonic. 
Nor is it simply the Aristotelian logic of the archetype’s realization in the imitator—
which we’ve seen before at Amb 21.15.247 It’s both at once. It’s Christo-logic. It’s the 
tantum-quantum principle. It’s a claim that in the deified person God descends and 
“becomes” the very participated mode (and activity) of that person, all while retaining the 
divine mode unmuted and unqualified and unmediated. 
 Maximus underscores that last claim fairly often. I mean the claim that when God 
descends he continues to bear and to be in the complete modality proper to the divine 
essence. Rational creatures are never truly free (or rational) “until the law of nature is 
                                                 
244 QThal 8.2, CCSG 7, 77, modified: “Ὁ κατ’ οὐσίαν ἀληθῶς φῶς ὑπάρχων θεὸς ἐν τοῖς ἐν αὐτῷ 
διὰ τῶν ἀρετῶν περιπατοῦσίν ἐστιν, ἀληθῶς φῶς γενομένοις. Ὥσπερ οὖν τὸ κατὰ μέθεξιν φῶς, ὡς οἱ ἅγιοι 
πάντες διὰ φιλοθεΐαν ἐν τῷ κατ’ οὐσίαν γίνονται φωτί, οὕτω τὸ κατ’ οὐσίαν ἐν τῷ κατὰ μέθεξιν φωτὶ διὰ 
φιλανθρωπίαν γίνεται φῶς. Ἐὰν οὖν ἐσμεν κατὰ τὴν ἀρετὴν καὶ τὴν γνῶσιν ὡς ἐν φῶτι τῷ θεῷ, καὶ αὐτὸς ὁ 
θεός, ὡς φῶς, ἐν φωτί ἐστιν ἐν ἡμῖν. Ὁ γὰρ φύσει φῶς ὁ θεός ἐν τῷ μιμήσει γίνεται φωτί, ὡς ἐν εἰκόνι 
ἀρχέτυπον.” 
245 The whole verse: “Ἐὰν δὲ ἐν τῷ φωτὶ περιπατῶμεν ὡς αὐτὸς ἐστιν ἐν τῷ φωτὶ, κοινωνίαν 
ἔχομεν μετ’ ἀλλήλων καὶ τὸ αἷμα Ἰησοῦ τοῦ υἱοῦ αὐτοῦ καθαρίζει ἡμᾶς ἀπὸ πάσης ἁμαρτίας” (1 Jn 1.7; 
SBLGNT). 
246 Amb 41.5; Amb 48.7; Amb 53.3; QThal 40.8; etc. 




completely swallowed up by the law of the Spirit, just as the death of the wretched flesh 
will be swallowed up by life everlasting, that is, not before the entire image of the 
unoriginate kingdom is clearly revealed, mimetically manifesting in itself the entire form 
of the archetype.”248 Christ’s “form” comes to be in every deified person. And to 
emphasize that it is not limited to finite nature’s mode, Maximus calls it “unvarying.”249 
 Now consider our ascent. In Maximian deification we behold “the whole man 
pervading the whole God” (ὅλος ὅλῳ περιχωρήσας ὁλικῶς τῷ Θεῷ).250 Again in a 
celebrated passage on deification—a kind of catena of its definitions—Maximus makes 
the splendid remark that the “true revelation of the object of one’s faith is the ineffable 
perichoresis with that object according to the proportion of one’s faith.”251 What’s 
remarkable is that he indexes the degree of God’s self-revelation (descent) directly to the 
                                                 
248 QThal 55.18, CCSG 7, 499, my emphasis: “ἕως ἂν καταποθῇ τῷ νόμῳ τοῦ πνεύματος τελείως 
ὁ τῆς φύσεως νόμος, καθάπερ ὑπὸ ζωῆς ἀπείρου σαρκὸς δυστήνου θάνατος, καὶ πᾶσα δειχθῇ καθαρῶς ἡ 
τῆς ἀνάρχου βασιλείας εἰκών, πᾶσαν ἔχουσα τοῦ ἀρχετύπου διὰ μιμήσεως τὴν μορφήν.” Ayroulet, De 
l’image à l’Image, 239, rightly notes that morphe here recalls Php 2, and so “L’idée principale est que le 
Christ a pris notre ‘forme’ pour nous puissions prendre la sienne.” Once more Christo-logic alone permits 
the extreme claim about the descent (and perichoresis) of the divine mode in the deified; cf. also CT 2.21. 
249 Exp. Orat. Dom. 4, CCSG 23, 46-7, modified: “ἵνα γένηται τῆς θείας χαρακτὴρ βασιλείας, ὡς 
ἐφικτόν ἐστιν ἀνθρώπῳ, φέρων ἐν ἑαυτῷ τοῦ φύσει κατ’ ουσίαν ὡς ἀληθῶς μεγάλου βασιλέως Χριστοῦ 
κατὰ τὴν χάριν ἀπαράλλακτον τὴν ἐν Πνεύματι μόρφωσιν”; cf. too Exp. Orat. Dom. 5, CCSG 23, 70, and 
Amb 10.41, cited at this section’s outset. The qualifier “as much as possible for man” might seem to 
contradict my claim about modal limitation. But, given Maximus’s fairly constant insistence on the 
wholeness of the divine mode and activity in deified persons, we should not take this qualification to mean 
that divine activity is limited to the natural human mode as such. I offer two interpretations: [1] given this 
text’s anarticular construction, we could easily read it as referring to the individual human person, “as 
much as is possible for a human person.” This would then refer to the individual expression of the wholly 
present divinity—how, I mean, that deified hypostasis uniquely modalizes (excuse the barbarism) both the 
natures it bears (human and divine). I discuss this a bit more below as “analogy” (sec. 3.5); [2] it could 
refer simply to the limits of human modality as concerns expressing the divine activity. Christ’s human 
deeds, for instance, do not always and in all ways express (to a rational onlooker) what is yet present 
entirely. Not only is this because divinity is infinite in itself (and so not obviously expressible to a finite 
degree), but also because what it means to “express” is itself relative to the one perceiving what’s 
expressed. It may well be, for instance, that there is another way of perceiving divinity’s infinite modality 
as it is really present in deified creation. But that perception would have to transcend every notion of 
perceiving, knowing, and therefore “expressing,” precisely to the extent that the perception transcends 
subject/object limitations. I think Maximian “ecstasy” and “experience” aims at exactly this, but if that’s so 
then such a state would be necessarily inexplicable (as at QThal 9.2). 
250 Amb 41.5, PG 91, 1308b-c. 
251 QThal 59.8, CCSG 22, 53, modified: “ἀληθὴς δὲ τοῦ πιστευθέντος ἐστὶν ἀποκάλυψις ἡ κατὰ 




degree that we—as individual persons—penetrate God (ascent).252 God dwells wholly in 
the deified person because the deified person dwells wholly in God, and the reverse.253 
Chalcedon’s symmetry recurs in the deified state as the latter’s logic. 
 And this is indeed Chalcedon’s symmetry. Which is to say it’s a modal and actual 
symmetry grounded in and made possible by Christo-logic. Modal perichoresis never 
floats free of hypostatic identity. And that’s because only the Word’s hypostasis can be 
and so establish the non-essential identity of realities infinitely different by essence. 
Hypostasis names a non-natural, existential positivity that—precisely because it’s not 
natural in itself—is in no way limited to natural relations or modes in order to bring 
creatures to be at all and to be one with him. Hypostatic identity relieves nature from 
having to achieve such identity. Therefore it circumvents standard philosophical 
negotiations between created and uncreated natures, finite and infinite modalities, how 
these can or must be identical to and distinct from each other. Witness again Maximus’s 
precisions about actual and modal perichoresis in Christ: 
“And in a manner beyond man, He does the things of man,” according to a 
supreme union involving no change, showing that the human energy is conjoined 
with the divine power [συμφυεῖσαν δεικνὺς τῇ θεϊκῇ δυνάμει τὴν ἀνθρωπίνην], 
since the human nature, united without confusion to the divine nature, is 
completely interpenetrated by it [ἡ φύσις ἀσυγχύτως ἑνωθεῖσα τῇ φύσει δ’ ὅλου 
περικεχώρηκε], with absolutely no part of it remaining separate from the divinity 
to which it was united, having been assumed according to hypostasis. For ‘in a 
manner beyond’ us, the ‘Word beyond being truly assumed our being,’ and joined 
together the transcendent negation with the affirmation of our nature and its 
natural properties, and so became man, having united His transcendent mode of 
existence with the principle of His human nature [τὸν ὑπὲρ φύσιν τοῦ πῶς εἶναι 
τρόπον ἔχων συνημμένον τῷ τοῦ εἶναι λόγῳ τῆς φύσεως], so that the ongoing 
existence of that nature might be confirmed by the newness of modes of 
existence, not suffering any change at the level of its inner principle, and thereby 
                                                 
252 So Harrison, “Perichoresis in the Greek Fathers,” 58: “Notice how created beings are said to 
penetrate into the divine, as it were, from below, even though it is brought about from above by God’s 
activity.” 




make known His power that is beyond infinity, recognized in the generation of 
opposites.254 
 
The three italicized parts illustrate the exact Christo-logic of perichoresis: because of 
their hypostatic identity,255 which puts divine and human principles and powers into 
immediate union (so circumventing limitation of act by power), therefore the modes and 
activities of both natures can entirely interpenetrate each other. They’re free from the 
finality of any essential restriction. Christ’s modal and actual perichoresis reveals a new 
existential possibility, what Maximus just before this passage simply calls “the unified 
mode of the Lord’s activities.”256  
 Notice too how Maximus introduces here a deeper trinitarian ground of 
christological perichoresis: since Christ’s person is the second person of the Trinity and 
since he truly identifies himself with the created mode of his human flesh, it’s rightly said 
that the Word “united His transcendent mode of existence” to the very “principle of his 
human nature.” That “mode of existence” is of course the “tri-hypostatic mode” of the 
divine essence itself, namely the personal perichoresis of Father and Son and Spirit.257 
Because Christ reveals himself through the unbroken perichoretic mode of his human and 
divine modes and acts (he walks divinely on water, and heals humanly with the spoken 
word); and because such perichoresis derives solely from Christ’s hypostatic identity as 
both natures; and because hypostatic identity can be distinguished from essential identity 
only if hypostasis and essence bear different logics even in God; and because these logics 
differ in God only as inseparable and essentially one in a single mode of existence that is 
                                                 
254 Amb 5.14, slightly modified and emphasized. 
255 It’s clear enough here that “union” and “being united” happens according to hypostasis, but see 
Amb 5.7 where it’s explicitly stated in a similar context (perichoresis of Christ’s modes). 
256 Amb 5.11, modified. 




three persons—therefore, Maximus concludes, only the economy, Incarnation, could 
have taught true theology, God’s “mode of existence” (τὴν πῶς ὕπαρξιν), the Trinity.258 
__________ 
All this raises a major objection to my thesis, though. If hypostatic identity grounds 
modal perichoresis in our deified state too, doesn’t our deification imply our personal 
obliteration? In Christ, that is, there is but one hypostasis which is the identity of the two 
natures. But in me, say, if the same hypostatically-grounded perichoresis of modes should 
occur, either “I” (my hypostasis) simply becomes “him” (Christ’s hypostasis), or he 
comes actually to reside in me. Not the former, at least not if we wish to avoid the 
Origenist problem of eschatological absorption.259 And not the latter if we’re to maintain 
Neochalcedonian Christo-logic—for then there would be two hypostases in my deific 
state. In that case wouldn’t Maximian deification, precisely to the extent it’s 
christological, prove Nestorian?260 
 Before I reply, I note two historical points in order to intensify the objection. The 
first is that several had flagged and rejected the idea of personal perichoresis between 
created and uncreated hypostases, which a certain Origenism did seem to enjoin in a way 
that entailed the destruction of the former as such.261 Some of Maximus’s traditional 
                                                 
258 Exp. Orat. Dom. 4, CCSG 23, 40-1 and esp. 54, where he refers to this revelation as “the 
understanding of God in the light of Christ” and “the new proclamation of truth” (ἅπερ φεύγων ὁ κατὰ 
Χριστὸν λαμπρύνεται λόγος, λέγω δὲ Χριστοῦ λόγον, τὸ καινὸν κήρυγμα τῆς ἀληθείας). 
259 See Canon 14 of Constantinople II; Price, vol. 2, 286. 
260 Such are the objections that I think Perl’s reading, otherwise right, cannot finally resolve. See 
my Introduction. 
261 Evagrius, Ep. fidei (or Great Letter to Melania) 5: “just as the nature of the human mind will be 
united to the nature of the Father, as it is his body, thus the names ‘soul’ and ‘body’ will be absorbed in the 
persons of the Son and the Spirit, and remain continually one nature and three persons of God and his 
image, as it was before the Incarnation and as it will be again, also after the Incarnation, because of the 
unanimity of wills.” Ramelli, Evagrius’s Kephalaia Gnostika, xxxix, denies that Evagrius intends here the 
obliteration of individuals. She interprets the “unanimity of wills” as indicative of the final state, which 
would seem to suggest individual wills in concert with the Trinity’s. The problem is that Evagrius sees 




authorities repudiated it. Diadochus of Photice, for instance, wrote that the even though 
baptism forges a strong personal link between soul and Spirit, that soul cannot contain 
“two persons” (prosopa) because of its “simple form.”262 And the Macarian homilies 
worry at the status of individuals after the general resurrection: 
All things will become light. All are immersed in light and fire and are indeed 
changed, but are not, as certain people say, dissolved and transformed into fire so 
that nothing of their nature remains. For Peter is Peter, and Paul, Paul, and Philip 
is Philip. Each person in his proper nature and hypostasis remains, yet filled by 
the Spirit.263 
 
Maximus actually agrees with what’s motivating these cautions. He doesn’t desire the 
annihilation of created hypostases any more than they.264 
 And yet the second point is that Maximus does seem to think perichoresis of 
persons characterizes the deific state. Our opening text spoke of “the undiminished form 
of God the Word, who gazes out from within” the saints, and did so, as with the Macarian 
homily, in the context of describing an eschatological oneness wherein all things mix 
with the divine light.265 Or in a passage that drifts in quite a different direction than 
Diadochus’s above, Maximus lauds Dionysius and Gregory of Nazianzus whose 
excessive wisdom showed that they “set aside a life conformed to nature” and “occupied 
themselves with the essence of the soul and so took hold of the living, unique Christ, 
who—to say what is even greater—became the soul of their souls.” Thus identified with 
                                                                                                                                                 
“But in time the body, the soul and the mind, because of the changes of their wills, will become one entity” 
(Ep. fidei 6). Cf. too Timothy of Constantinople (against the Messalians), no. 11, PG 86, 49c; cf. Russell, 
The Doctrine of Deification, 245. 
262 Diadochus of Photice, De perf. 78, PG 65, 1195d (in Latin); cf. Russell, The Doctrine of 
Deification, 246. 
263 Pseudo-Macarius, Hom. 15.10, PG 34, 481c-d, slightly modified: “καὶ ὅλα γίγνονται φωτοειδῆ, 
ὅλα εἰς φῶς καὶ πῦρ βάπτονται, καὶ μεταβάλλονται, ἀλλ’ οὐχ, ὣς τινες λέγουσιν, α’ναλύεται καὶ γίνεται 
πῦρ, καὶ οὐκέτι ὑφέστηκεν ἡ φύσις. Πέτρος γὰρ Πέτρος ἐστὶ, καὶ Παῦλος Παῦλος, καὶ Φίλιππος Φίλλιπος· 
ἕκαστος ἐν τῇ ἰδίᾳ φύσει καὶ ὑποστάσει μένει πεπληρωμένος τοῦ Πνεύματος.” 
264 See esp. Opusc 1, PG 91, 25a-28a, and CT 2.83-4. 




Christ, the words they penned “were authored, not by them, but by Christ, who by grace 
has exchanged places with them.”266  
 In a text flanked on both sides by deific perichoresis, Maximus adduces 
“conjecturally” the character of that state. It eludes all conception and description, of 
course. It’s a state that surpasses our original “participation in goodness” and relies 
directly on the Son’s historical Incarnation to come about. There, at the decisive moment 
of his earthly sojourn and recapitulation of human nature, the Son “typifies our own 
[voluntary subjection] in himself” (αὐτὸς ἐν ἑαυτῷ τυπῶν τὸ ἡμέτερον) when he cries, 
“Yet not as I will, but as you will” (Matt 26.39). The Son’s subjection to the Father 
hypostasizes the full potential of our own subjection to God. We therefore can become by 
grace (as we saw with its aporetic process) what the Son is by nature, but only because he 
first became by nature what we are. Now our nature, unimpeachably united to and 
“characterized” by his personal mode of existence267—personal perichoresis with Father 
and Spirit—possesses the conditions that allow us to receive the Trinity’s existential 
mode, by grace no doubt. I think that’s why Maximus immediately equates the Son’s 
                                                 
266 Amb ad Thom, prol. 3, slightly modified: “καὶ τῇ ἀποθέσει τῆς κατὰ φύσιν ζωῆς ψυχῆς οὐσίαν 
πεποιημένων, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ζῶντα μονώτατον τὸν Χριστὸν ἐσχηκότων, καὶ τὸ δὴ μεῖζον εἰπεῖν, ψυχὴν 
αὐτοῖς τῆς ψυχῆς γεγενημένον καὶ διὰ πάντων ἔργων τε καὶ λόγων καὶ νοημάτων πᾶσιν ἐμφανιζόμενον ὡς 
ἐντεῦθεν ἐκείνων μὲν οὐκ εἶναι πεπεῖσθαι τὰ προταθέντα, Χριστοῦ δέ, τοῦ κατὰ χάριν αὐτοῖς ἑαυτὸν 
ὑπαλλάξαντος.” Cf. Gal 2.20 and Eph 3.17 (as Constas indicates), and Pyr 128, PG 91, 320d. 
267 Ep 44, PG 91, 644b, my translation: “Behold the most mysterious of all mysteries: very God, 
because of love, really became a man according to the assumption of rationally and noetically living flesh, 
unchangeably receiving into himself the passions of nature so that he might save man and give himself as a 
pattern of virtue for us human beings—he, a living icon of benevolence and love for himself and among 
others, capable of baffling everyone with respect to the owed exchange [καὶ τὸ δὴ πάντων μυστηρίων 
μυστηριωδέστατον, αὐτὸς Θεὸς ὑπὲρ ἀγάπης ἀληθῶς κατὰ πρόσληψιν σαρκὸς νοερῶς τε καὶ λογικῶς 
ἐψυχωμένης γενόμενος ἄνθρωπος, καὶ εἰς ἑαυτὸν τὰ πᾶθη τῆς φύσεως ἀτρέπτως καταδεξάμενος, ἵνα σώσῃ 
τὸν ἄνθρωπον, καὶ δῷ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἡμῖν ἑαυτὸν ὑπὲρ ἀρετῆς ὑποτύπωσιν, καὶ τῆς εἰς αὐτόν τε καὶ 
ἀλλήλους εὐνοίας τε καὶ ἀγάπης εἰκόνα ζῶσαν, δυσωπῆσαι πάντας δυναμένην πρὸς ὀφειλομένην 
ἀντίδοσιν]”; the stronger sense of “characterized” for ὑποτύπωσιν comes from and is defended by 




self-offering with the Apostle Paul’s own, citing Gal. 2.20: “It is no longer I who live, but 
Christ who lives in me.”268 
 These texts suggest that Maximus took the same sort of risk by affirming personal 
perichoresis in deification as he did with “isochrist” identity statements. But if any doubt 
lingers, one passage in particular settles the matter. It portrays nearly the contrary to what 
the Macarian homily did above. In Amb 47 Maximus interprets Gregory’s figurative 
reading of the Passover, especially this line: “We need not be suprised that, first and 
foremost, a lamb is required in each and every house [κατ’ οἶκον ἕκαστον].”269 This short 
ambiguum is itself an excellent performance of perichoretic logic, where our ascent 
through Christ—through our incremental ascent to his body, then to his mind, finally into 
his divinity—appears seamlessly and simultaneously as Christ’s descent into us—like an 
immolated “lamb” for each to ingest and so become. Maximus resolves his own 
meditation like this: 
Thus it happens that each of us in his own rank [1 Cor 15.23]...sacrifices the 
Divine Lamb, partakes of its fleshes, and takes his fill of Jesus. For to each person 
Christ Jesus becomes his own proper lamb, to the extent that each is able to 
contain and consume Him. He becomes something proper to Paul, the great 
preacher of the truth, and again, something distinctively proper to Peter, the leader 
of the apostles, and something distinctively proper for each of the saints, 
according to the measure of each one’s faith, and the grace granted to him by the 
Spirit, to one in this way, and to another in that, so that Christ is found to be 
wholly present throughout the whole of each, becoming all things to everyone [1 
Cor 9.22].270 
 
                                                 
268 Amb 7.11: “Καὶ μετ’ αὐτὸν [i.e. Christ in Gesthemane] ὁ θεσπέσιος Παῦλος, ὥσπερ ἑαυτὸν 
ἀρνηςέμενος καὶ ἰδίαν ἔχειν ἔτι ζωὴν μὴ εἰδώς· ζῶ δὲ οὐκ ἔτι ἐγώ· ζῇ δὲ ἐν ἐμοὶ Χριστός.” 
269 Amb 47.1 = Gregory of Nazianzus, Or. 45.14. 
270 Amb 47.2, PG 91, 1360d-1361a: “οὕτως καὶ τὸν θεῖον ἀμνὸν ἕκαστος ἡμῶν...τῷ ἰδίῳ 
τάγματι...θύει τε τὸν ἀμνὸν καὶ μεταλαμβάνει τῶν αὐτοῦ σαρκῶν, καὶ ἐμφορεῖται τοῦ Ἰησοῦ. Ἑκάστου γὰρ 
ἴδιος γίνεται ἀμνὸς Χριστὸς Ἰησοῦς, ὡς ἕκαστος χωρεῖν τε καὶ ἐσθίειν αὐτὸν δύναται· ἴδιος Παύλου τοῦ 
μεγάλου τῆς ἀληθείας κήρυκος, καὶ ἰδιοτρόπως ἴδιος τοῦ ἀκροτάτου τῶν ἀποστόλων Πέτρου, καὶ 
ἰδιοτρόπως ἑκάστου τῶν ἁγίων κατὰ τὸ μέτρον τῆς ἐν ἑκάστῳ πίστεως καὶ τὴν ἐπιχορηγουμένην χάριν τοῦ 




 Here is Maximus’s astounding claim: when the whole God, in and as Christ, 
becomes “the whole of each,” this whole includes the very person of the one deified. His 
language is strong and exact. Christ Jesus “becomes the proper lamb of each,” so that he 
becomes, literally rendered, “a proper of Paul” (ἴδιος Παύλου) and what’s “distinctively 
proper of Peter” (ἰδιοτρόπως ἴδιος τοῦ...Πέτρου) and precisely “in the proper mode of 
each” (ἰδιοτρόπως ἑκάστου). It’s not just that Christ accommodates himself to the 
personal preferences or abilities of each—though deification includes that too (more on 
“analogously” in the next section). He becomes the very “proper” that distinguishes 
Paul’s person from Peter’s, and each from all.271 Christ becomes their very hypostatic 
difference, the property that makes each the person he is. 
 Maximus’s pregnant statements here anticipate my response to the objection 
about obliterating created hypostases. It runs roughly thus. Maximus takes a hard line on 
Platonic ideas. He doesn’t have them.272 He does have eternal “divine works” that are 
participated, but, as we saw last chapter, these are not self-subsistent and are participated 
only within the peculiar conditions of Christo-logic.273 More, Maximus holds the fairly 
idiosyncratic but somewhat predictable view (given his position on Platonic ideas) that 
universals are created and consist and indeed “subsist” in particulars.274 There is no such 
thing in Maximus’s thought as a generic or universal created “nature” existing 
                                                 
271 Recall the first definition of “hypostasis” in Neochalcedonian christology, derived from Basil 
the Great, Ep 214: “essence has the same relationship to hypostasis that the universal has to the particular 
[ὅτι ὃν ἔχει λόγον τὸ κοινὸν πρὸς τὸ ἴδιον, τοῦτον ἔχει ἡ οὐσία πρὸς τὴν ὑπόστασιν]” (cited fully at 
Chapter 1, n. 10); for Maximus’s use of this definition, see Ep 15, PG 91, 545a, and “An Analytic 
Appendix.” 
272 See my, “Creation is Incarnation: The Metaphysical Peculiarity of the Logoi in Maximus 
Confessor,” Modern Theology 34.1 (2018): 82-102. 
273 Chapter 2, sec. 2.6. 
274 Amb 7.16 (particulars and universals created); QThal 48.17, CCSG 7, 341 (universals united in 
individual instances as if “at corners” in a grand edifice); Amb 10.83 (universals and particulars mutually 
causative) and esp. 10.101 (universals “subsist in the particulars [τὰ καθόλου ἐν τοῖς κατὰ μέρος 
ὑφέστηκεν]”). Cf. Torstein T. Tollefsen, “The Concept of the Universal in the Philosophy of St Maximus,” 




somewhere other than in the created hypostases that bear and exemplify it.275 There is no 
world but the historical one. 
 This view of universals has hugely significant soteriological implications. That’s 
because Christ, as Larchet rightly argues, assumed universal human nature just as much 
as a particular one; assuming one is assuming the other, really.276 He therefore assumed 
(and continues to assume) all human particulars, every human person, since universal 
humanity does not exist separately from the sum of human individuals. So Maximus 
reads Gregory’s remark that Christ “bears the whole of me in Himself” to mean “He 
bears the totality of human nature [τὴν ἀνθρωπείαν φύσιν ὁλόκληρον].”277 Indeed Christ 
“as man is the first fruits of our nature in relation to God the Father, and a kind of yeast 
that leavens the whole mass of humanity [Rom 11.16, Maximus adds τοῦ ὅλου],” so that 
his own personal death and resurrection becomes the universal power of humanity’s—
every human being’s—resurrection. Those perfected in Christ are “natural outgrowths of 
His resurrection.”278 
 How does this address the objection? Because universal created nature subsists 
only in particular created hypostases, Christ cannot identify himself with created nature 
                                                 
275 Balthasar, Cosmic Liturgy, 161, deserves credit for recognizing this fundamental reciprocity 
between universal and particular being in Maximus, which is “an original philosophical contribution” 
drawn from Chalcedon. But then Balthasar seems to read this reciprocity as implying the basic contingency 
of the logoi (he calls them “ideas”)—which, however useful this might be against Hegel, cannot be 
Maximus’s meaning here (163). 
276 Larchet, La divinisation de l’homme, 365-74, e.g. 365: “Bon nombre de passages de l’oeuvre 
de Maxime indiquent que pour lui la divinisation de la nature humaine du Christ affecte la nature humaine 
tout entière et atteint immédiatement et concrètement tous les homme.” Bathrellos, The Byzantine Christ, 
103 n. 19 disagrees sharply, but offers no rationale and certainly never explains how his own view—that 
Christ assumed only a particular nature that “laid the foundation” for the rest of humanity’s deification—
coheres with Maximus’s clear articulation of the ontological and existential reciprocity of universals and 
particulars. 
277 Amb 4.4. 
278 Amb 31.9-10, quoting Rom 6.5: “σύμφυτοι γενήσονται καὶ τῆς ἀναστάσεως αὐτοῦ.” Cf. Larchet, 
La divinisation de l’homme, 374, for how Maximus thus subscribes and enhances the traditional, 




without also identifying himself with every individual creature. Maximus’s logoi doctrine 
already taught us as much. In everything there is a “logos of the common [essence or 
nature]” and a “logos of hypostasis.”279 Both condition each other. The logos of a created 
hypostasis constitutes a particularly arresting display of divine power because it is a 
fundamental and immanent causal principle which no process of declension by formal or 
modal qualification can illumine. I am the person I am, but “I” names a non-natural mode 
(hypostasis bears no natural content) that yet instances or “typifies” nature in an utterly 
unrepeatable, inexplicable way.280 My person’s “ability” to typify or affect at all discloses 
the existential positivity of hypostasis as such. A hypostasis, like a black hole, is that 
inconceivable reality whose gravity is yet sensed in the way it pushes and pulls nature, as 
it were. Personal style marks every instance of universal nature. And yet you can’t speak 
of that style without predicating natural qualities (intelligent, loving, hospitable, 
beautiful, well-formed, etc.). You can only speak a proper name: “It’s very Paul to say or 
do this or that.” That distinction, that property, that irrepressible yet inexpressible 
positivity that a person is—it’s exactly this that, since it too is created, has a principle or 
logos as such. And it’s this that God, in Christ, also becomes. The Logos is the logoi—all 
of them.281 
 And if the Logos, Christ, has identified himself with even the principle of a 
created hypostasis as such—and so generated it—then he has become the very power of 
                                                 
279 Chapter 1, sec. 1.3. 
280 Opusc 10, PG 91, 136d-137a. 
281 Amb 17.10: “When endeavoring to look deeply into these logoi of the things mentioned above, 
or even into one of them, one is left feeling completely debilitated and speechless, for the intellect finds 
nothing to grasp, except for the divine power”; Amb 22.2: “for it provides the intellect with no means of 
understanding how God—who is truly none of the things that exist, and who, properly speaking, is all 
things, and at the same time beyond them—is present in the logos of each thing in itself [οὐκ ἔχων νοῆσαι 





that person to become who and how (not just what) she is. As she actualizes her personal 
potency (always through and with her natural potency, of course), which exists in her 
personal logos and which the Logos became, the Logos assimilates her body as his own 
too: “taking a body in a variety of ways, as only he knows, in each of the saved.”282 
Personal perichoresis is the eventual mode of existence that has already been prepared in 
the very act of the Logos becoming the logoi. It’s certainly divine Incarnation, for the 
Word assumes universal created nature. But it must also climax in a state of personal 
perichoresis, for created nature subsists only in created hypostases. When the Word 
became a creature, then, he planted the very mode of his personal existence into the 
principles of all creation—the potential for every creature’s personal interpenetration of 
and by the Three. For the whole Father and the whole Spirit are in the whole Son who is 
Christ, and in Christ alone the logoi live.283 
 
3.5 – Christ’s Body and analogy 
Maximus seems to conceive this entire schema of creation as Incarnation as basically just 
good Pauline theology. You don’t have to rush to Plato or the Stoics for the idea that the 
                                                 
282 Exp. Orat. Dom. 4, CCSG 23, 59: “καὶ δι’ ἑκάστου τῶν σωζομένων ποικίλως, ὡς οἶδεν αὐτός, 
σωματούμενον.” 




world is God’s body.284 Col. 3.11, for example, plainly states that “Christ is all things and 
in all things.”285 The Logos is the logoi, first and last. 
 It’s no accident that Maximus punctuates his logoi treatise (Amb 7) with scriptural 
citations, especially from Paul about the Body of Christ. After a lengthy explication and 
defense of the logoi as the proper way to read Gregory’s remark that we are “portions of 
God,” Maximus repairs to crucial New Testament texts to make some rather amazing 
claims of his own. Watch how Maximus embosses these texts around his bold 
eschatological portrait of all things enhypostasized in Christ. I quoted it near the end of 
last chapter, but we must read it again: 
The aim is that ‘what God is to the soul, the soul might become to the body,’ and 
that the Creator of all might be proven to be One, and through humanity might 
come to reside in all things in a manner appropriate to each, so that the many, 
though separated from each other in nature, might be drawn together around the 
one nature of man. When this happens, God will be all things in everything [1 Cor 
15.28], encompassing all things and enhypostasizing them in Himself, for beings 
will no longer possess independent motion or lack any portion of God’s presence, 
and it is with respect to this presence that we are, and are called, Gods [Jn 10.35], 
children of God [Jn 1.12], the body, and members of God [Eph 1.23, 5.30], and, it 
follows, ‘portions of God,’ and other such things, in the progressive ascent of the 
                                                 
284 Plato, Tim. 30b-d (the world as one Living Creature, “τόνδε τὸν κόσμον ζῶον ἔμψυχον 
ἔννουν”), which is itself a second god “generated” by the highest God called “Father”; cf. Tim. 34b: “θεὸν 
αὐτὸν ἐγεννήσατο.” The Stoic claim is obviously much stronger, since there the God whose body the 
cosmos is, is no second god, but the one divine Logos; see Diogenes Laertius, 7.137; SVF 2.526; LS 44F. 
Maximus’s Logos-cosmology affirms both at once—namely that the one Logos who is himself the logoi of 
the world (Stoic claim) is both a second, generated God (Timaeus claim) and yet essentially the one and 
only God (consubstantial with Father and Spirit). 
285 See Exp. Orat. Dom. 4, CCSG 23, 55 (slightly modified), where Maximus summons Col. 3.11 
in particular even though he’s commenting Gal. 3.28: “‘But Christ is all things and in all things,’ creating 
by what surpasses nature and the Law, the form of the kingdom which has no beginning, a form 
characterized, as has been shown, by humility and meekness of heart. Their concurrence shows forth the 
perfect man created according to Christ [ἀλλὰ πάντα καὶ ἐν πᾶσι Χριστός, διὰ τῶν ὑπὲρ φύσιν καὶ νόμον τὴν 
τῆς ἀνάρχου βασιλείας δημιουργῶν ἐν Πνεύματι μόρφωσιν, ἥν, ὡς ἀποδέδεικται, πέφυκε χαρακτηρίζειν 
καρδίας ταπείνωσις καὶ πραότης, ὧν ἡ σύνοδος τέλειον τὸν κατὰ Χριστὸν κτιζόμενον ἀποδείκνυσιν 
ἄνθρωπον].” Both scriptural passages are similar, and it’s also true that Col. 3.12 mentions two major 
themes Maximus wants to treat here, “humility” and “meekness.” But the Colossians text also makes a 
stronger claim about our oneness than Gal. 3.28. And Col. 3.11 more lucidly presents perichoretic logic: 
Christ is everything and in everything (whole in whole), therefore you are one with each and yourself: “the 




divine plan to its final end.286 
 
Creation’s contours appear ever more like a continuous human nature or Body, the 
personalized bond of all things sundry by nature, whose unifying power is that of a divine 
person who assimilates and “makes all things his own” such that none of what he 
assumes—even other human bodies—suffers violation in principle though it’s certainly 
transposed into (perichoretic) mode.287 The world comes to be like a Seed that generates 
the very womb in which it gestates. It’s born again and again as the particular seed of this 
or that creature, and, because it retains all it has hypostasized, gains in each actualized 
creature a new member of its Body.288 
 At the apex of his reflection on the logoi, Maximus summons scripture once 
more: “the basic argument [proves to] be more persuasive when supported by the inspired 
words of Scripture, in particular those of the holy blessed apostle Paul.”289 He follows by 
quoting Pauline texts extensively, Ephesians especially. He chooses them to link the 
world’s logoi to Christ’s ecclesial Body and his “recapitulation” of every creature into 
that Body. A selective sampling: 
and He has put all things under His feet and has made Him the head over all 
things for the Church, which is His body, the fullness of Him who fills all things in 
                                                 
286 Amb 7.31, modified: “‘ἱν’ ὅπερ ἐστὶ Θεὸς ψυχῇ, τοῦτο ψυχὴ σώματι γένηται,’ καὶ εἷς 
ἀποδειχθῇ τῶν ὅλων Δημιουργός, ἀναλόγως διὰ τῆς ἀνθρωπότητος πᾶσιν ἐπιβατεύων τοῖς οὖσι, καὶ εἰς ἓν 
ἔλθῃ τὰ πολλὰ ἀλλήλων κατὰ τὴν φύσιν διεστηκότα περὶ τὴν μίαν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου φύσιν ἀλλήλοις 
συννεύοντα καὶ γένηται τὰ πάντα ἐν πᾶσιν αὐτὸς ὁ Θεός, πάντα περιλαβὼν καὶ ἐνυποστήσας ἑαυτῷ, διὰ τοῦ 
μηδὲν ἔτι τῶν ὄντων ἄφετον κεκτῆσθαι τὴν κίνησιν καὶ τῆς αὐτοῦ ἄμοιρον παρουσίας, καθ’ ἣν καὶ Θεοὶ 
καὶ τέκνα καὶ σῶμα καὶ μέλη καὶ ‘μοῖρα Θεοῦ’ καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτά ἐσμεν καὶ λεγόμεθα τῇ πρὸς τὸ τέλος 
ἀναφορᾷ τοῦ θείου σκοποῦ.” 
287 So Amb 7.27: “What could be more desirable to those who are worthy of it than deification? 
For through it God is united with those who have become Gods, and by His goodness makes all things His 
own.” But this assimilation comes in a perichoretic mode: “These examples, drawn from nature, 
demonstrate persuasively that there is no higher summit or culmination for created beings [τῶν ὄντῶν 
κεφάλαιον] apart from that in which their natural elements remain inviolate.” 
288 Amb 6.3; treated at Chapter 2, sec. 2.2. 




every way [ends Eph 1.17-23].290 
 
And: 
Rather, speaking the truth in love, we are to grow up in every way into Him who 
is the head, into Christ, from whom the whole body, joined and knit together by 
every joint with which it is supplied, when each part is working properly, makes 
bodily growth and upbuilds itself in love [from Eph 4.11-16].291 
 
Maximus adduces from all these exactly how we become “one and the same” (ἕν καὶ 
ταὐτὸν) with God—the very goal of creation announced in our overture (Amb 41.5): 
[These words show] that we are the members and the body of Christ, and that we 
constitute the fullness of Christ God [Eph 1.23], who fills all things in every way 
according to the plan hidden in God the Father before the ages [Eph 3.9], with the 
result that [or “the skopos being”] we are being recapitulated into Him [Eph 1.10] 
through His Son and our Lord and God Jesus Christ. For the mystery hidden from 
the ages [Col 1.26] and from all generations has now been revealed through the 
true and perfect Incarnation of God the Son, who united our nature to Himself 
according to hypostasis, without division and without confusion. In and through 
His holy flesh—which He took from us, and which is endowed with intellect and 
reason—He has conjoined us to Himself, as a kind of first fruits, making us 
worthy to be one and the same with Him, according to His humanity, since we 
were predestined before the ages [Eph 1.11-12] to be in Him as the members of 
His body. Just as the soul unifies the body, He joined us to Himself and knit us 
together in the Spirit, and He leads us to the stature of the spiritual maturity 
according to His [i.e. Christ’s] own fullness [Eph 4.13].292 
 
 We are “one and the same” with God “according to his humanity” (κατὰ τὴν 
αὐτοῦ ἀνθρωπότητα). For Maximus Paul himself teaches that our deification is God’s 
                                                 
290 Amb 7.36 = Eph 1.17-23: “καὶ πάντα ἔδωκεν ὑπὸ τοῦς πόδας αὐτοῦ, καὶ αὐτὸν ἔδωκε κεφαλὴν 
ὑπὲρ πάντα τῇ ἐκκλησίᾳ, ἥτις ἐστὶ τὸ σῶμα αὐτοῦ, τὸ πλήρωμα τοῦ τὰ πάντα ἐν πᾶσιν πληρουμένου.” 
291 Amb 7.36 = Eph 4.11-16: “ἀληθεύοντες δὲ ἐν ἀγάπῃ αὐξήσωμεν εἰς αὐτὸν τὰ πάντα, ὅς ἐστιν ἡ 
κεφαλὴ ὁ Χριστός, ἐξ οὗ πᾶν τὸ σῶμα συναρμολογούμενον καὶ συμβιβαζόμενον διὰ πάσης ἁφῆς τῆς 
ἐπιχορηγίας κατ’ ἐνέργειαν ἑνὸς ἑκάστου μέλους τὴν αὔξησιν τοῦ σώματος ποιεῖται εἰς οἰκοδομὴν ἑαυτοῦ ἐν 
ἀγάπῃ.” 
292 Amb 7.37: “ὅτι καὶ μέλη καὶ σῶμα καὶ πλήρωμά Χριστοῦ ἐσμεν τοῦ τὰ πάντα ἐν πᾶσι 
πληρουμένου Χριστοῦ τοῦ Θεοῦ, κατὰ τὸν πρὸ τῶν αἰώνων ἐν τῷ Θεῷ καὶ Πατρὶ ἀποκεκρυμμένον σκοπὸν 
ἀνακεφαλαιούμενοι εἰς αὐτὸν διὰ τοῦ Υἱοῦ αὐτοῦ καὶ Κυρίου Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ τοῦ Θεοῦ ἡμῶν. Τὸ γὰρ 
μυστήριον τὸ ἀποκεκρυμμένον μὲν ἀπὸ τῶν αἰώνων καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν γενεῶν, νῦν δὲ φανερωθὲν διὰ τῆς τοῦ 
Υἱοῦ καὶ Θεοῦ ἀληθινῆς καὶ τελείας ἐνανθρωπήσεως, τοῦ ἑνώσαντος ἑαυτῷ καθ’ ὑπόστασιν ἀδιαιρέτως τε 
καὶ ἀσυγχύτως τὴν ἡμετέραν φύσιν, καὶ ἡμᾶς διὰ τῆς ἐξ ἡμῶν καὶ ἡμετέρας νοερῶς τε καὶ λογικῶς 
ἐψυχωμένης ἁγίας αὑτοῦ σαρκός, ὥσπερ δι’ ἀπαρχῆς ἑαυτῷ συμπηξαμένου, καὶ ἓν καὶ ταὐτὸν ἑαυτῷ εἶναι 
κατὰ τὴν αὐτοῦ ἀνθρωπότητα καταξιώσαντος, καθὼς προωρίσθημεν πρὸ τῶν αἰώνων ἐν αὐτῷ εἶναι μέλη 
τοῦ σώματος αὐτοῦ, ψυχῆς τρόπον πρὸς σῶμα ἐν πνεύματι συναρμολογοῦντος ἑαυτῷ καὶ συμβιβάζοντος, 




Incarnation. Last chapter we saw that the Word’s protological condescension in 
identifying his person with the world’s logoi is itself the condition for the possibility of 
any participation in his divine activity. He brings down in person what is imparticipable 
in essence. But since hypostatic identity alone establishes creation’s power to participate 
God, it must also and simultaneously reveal a necessary condition in the other direction, 
as it were: God grants “hypostasis” to creation by identifying himself with it in the 
Word’s hypostasis.293 God creates by assuming a Body. Therefore the Body he assumes 
is creation—its process (logoi) and perfection (modal perichoresis). And since he 
identifies himself in person with what he creates by nature, and since what’s created is 
necessarily in motion (Amb 7.3-14), then creation’s existential movement into ever more 
perfect actuality is the Word’s too. That the world is literally Christ’s Body is the deepest 
ground for Maximus’s bold, systematic insistence on the God-world reciprocity.294 
For inasmuch as He came to be below for our sakes...it follows that we too, 
thanks to Him, will come to be in the world above, and become gods according to 
Him through the mystery of grace, undergoing no change whatsoever in our 
nature...the world above will again be filled, with the members of the body being 
gathered together with their head...filling the body of Him who fills all in all, 
which fills and is filled from all things.295 
 
 Christ’s Body grows, is knitted together, gains modal iterations, precisely through 
and as every member of the cosmos. His own person lies at the base of every creature as 
its individual and generic logoi, and yet he never relinquishes the individual body he 
assumed from Mary and is. Here we approach admittedly bizarre and nearly 
incomprehensible claims. That’s as it should be, of course, and it’s why we saw Maximus 
                                                 
293 See above, n. 50. 
294 Thunberg, Microcosm and Mediator, everywhere assumes and celebrates this reciprocity. I’ve 
tried to root it firmly and precisely in Christo-logic. 
295 Amb 31.9. So too Amb 31.10, slightly modified: “In fact, [the world above] has already been 
filled in Christ, and will be filled again in those who become according to Christ, when they, who have 
already shared in the likeness of His death through their sufferings, shall come to be natural outgrowths of 




press the point that the final deific state can really only be known by experience. 
Obviously the same might have been said for the very idea that God became man—and 
yet we’re forced to say something about it, even if with a strained voice speaking cracked 
words and concepts. Bear that in mind now at the world’s end. Its logic is just as 
enduringly mysterious and necessarily articulated as Christ’s at the middle. 
The body of Christ is either the soul, or its powers, or sensations, or the body of 
each human being, or the members of the body, or the commandments, or the 
virtues, or the logoi of created beings, or, to put it simply and more truthfully, 
each and all of these things, both individually and collectively, are the body of 
Christ [ἰδίᾳ τε καὶ κοινῇ, ταῦτα πάντα καὶ τούτων ἕκαστόν ἐστι τὸ σῶμα τοῦ 
Χριστοῦ].296 
 
Everything is his Body. Even “the body of each human being” is Christ’s Body. “Every 
man,” Maximus resumes just after this passage, “who possesses an addition of faith and 
knowledge, and who is augmented by the modes of virtue.....is a spiritual Joseph [of 
Arimathea], able to receive the body of Christ and bury it properly, placing it in the niche 
that faith has hewn in his heart, by grace making his own body as the body of Christ [τὸ 
τε σῶμα τὸ ἑαυτοῦ ὡς Χριστοῦ σῶμα διὰ τὴν χὰριν].” So grows “the mystical body of 
Christ.”297 
 Christ’s actual recapitulation of the entire world into and as his Body reveals “that 
the whole creation is one, just as another human being, completed by the mutual coming 
together of all its members.”298 Maximus frequently evokes the whole human person to 
depict the world’s deification.299 He likes to say God will become to us as the soul is to 
                                                 
296 Amb 54.2, PG 91, 1376c, slightly modified. 
297 Amb 54.2, PG 91, 1376d-1377a, my emphasis. 
298 Amb 41.9, slightly modified: “θεοπρεπῶς τὰ πάντα εἰς ἑαυτὸν ἀνεκεθαλαιώσατο [Eph 1.10], 
μίαν ὑπάρχουσαν τὴν ἅπασαν κτίσιν δείξας, καθάπερ ἄνθρωπον ἄλλον, τῇ τῶν μερῶν ἑαυτῆς πρὸς ἄλληλα 
συνόδῳ συμπληρουμένην καὶ πρὸς ἑαυτὴν νεύουσαν τῇ ὁλότητι τῆς ὑπάρξεως.” 
299 Cooper, The Body in St. Maximus the Confessor, 36-48, esp. 48 on the “three human beings” 




the body, for instance.300 But given Maximus’s christological account of the human 
person—where body and soul are at once essentially different and yet never concretely 
whole outside of the unifying positivity of a hypostasis—we must contend with two 
significant features of Christ’s Body. 
 First, hypostatic identity grounds and conditions whatever else we might say 
about elements within Christ’s Body. A person’s parts, even her essential parts (body and 
soul), do not exist at all or together as a real, existential whole except as her.301 Maximus 
distinguishes the “principle of becoming” from the “principle of essence” (Οὐχ ὁ αὐτὸς 
γὰρ γενέσεως καὶ οὐσίας λογός) to make just this point.302 The latter has to do with a 
thing’s natural “what” (τί) and “how” (πῶς), the former with its existential “when” (πότε) 
and “where” (ποῦ) and, most significantly, “its reciprocal relation” (πρὸς τί ἐστιν).303 
That’s to say, the logoi of various essences only generate their respective realities through 
particular individuals—the individual human being, say, who bears an entire complex of 
spatio-temporal-personal relations by birth. The consequent and concrete “coexistence” 
and “reciprocal relation” of a hypostasis’s natural parts is the logos that generates “the 
completion of a single human being.”304 In Christ’s Body, then, to the degree it is at least 
potentially the entire cosmos, we should contemplate the various relations among his 
members (every creature) as predicated upon his single hypostasis. He is the very logos 
                                                 
300 Amb 7.26 (which begins to say God will be to the soul what soul is to body, but finally says 
God will be wholly throughout soul and body alike); cp. Amb 10.48, and esp. QThal 2.2. 
301 Cf. Chapter 1, sec. 1.4, for the christological shape of this anthropology. 
302 Amb 7.42; Amb 42.25 (for the christological justification). 
303 Amb 7.42. 
304 Amb 42.10 (“Ἡ ψυχὴ τὸ εἶναι λαμβάνουσα κατὰ τὴν σύλληψιν ἅμα τῷ σώματι πρὸς ἑνὸς 




that unifies all things and grounds the reciprocal relation or basic symmetry between all 
Christ’s parts, even his created and uncreated natures.305 
 Second, all Christ’s parts will finally assume his own personal perichoretic mode 
of actual existence even while remaining distinct in their own logoi. Here Maximus 
sounds most Stoic. In Amb 17, for instance, he marvels at length at how the logoi can 
even “constitute a single world” at all. This consideration moves him forthwith to wonder 
at our own bodies, at “this complexion of opposites blended together in a synthesis,”306 
which  
brings things separated by nature into an amicable community, subduing, by 
virtue of the mean, the severities of the extremes, leading each to inhere within 
the other without the loss of integrity [καὶ χωρεῖν δι’ ἀλλήλων ἀλυμάντως], but 
rather preserving the elements of the synthesis, which is the perichoresis of one 
extreme in the other by virtue of the blending [τὴν τῶν ἄκρων κατὰ τὴν κρᾶσιν εἰς 
ἄλληλα περιχώρησιν].307 
 
Stoics evidently thought that a certain process of “mixture” (κρᾶσις) could allow two or 
more bodies to occupy the same physical space without obliterating any parts’ “own 
essence” or “proper hypostasis” or “qualities.”308 Maximus too, it seems, but only 
                                                 
305 If we were to pursue this insight, we would have to consider the possibility that the Word’s 
birth from Mary, just as much as his generation from the Father, is the “when” and “where” of the entire 
world.  
306 Amb 17.8, slightly modified: “ἡ τῶν ἐναντίων κατὰ τὴν κρᾶσιν διὰ συνθέσεως συμπλοκή.” 
307 Amb 17.8, slightly modified. 
308 Alexander of Aphrodisias, De mixt. 216.28-31: “τὴν γὰρ δύο ἢ καὶ πλειόνων τινῶν σωμάτων 
ὅλων ἀντιπαρεκτασιν ἀλλήλοις οὕτως, ὡς σώζειν ἕκαστον αὐτῶν ἐν τῇ μίξει τῇ τοιαύτῃ τήν τε οἰκείαν 
οὐσίαν καὶ τὰς ἐν αὐτῇ ποιότητας, λέγει κράσιν εἶναι μόνην τῶν μίξεων.” And a bit later at 217.32-36, he 
cites the body-soul “mixture” in a human being to show how even though the soul still “has its own 
hypostasis [τὴν ψυχὴν ἰδίαν ὑπόστασιν ἔχουσαν],” it “entirely pervades the body [δι’ ὅλου τοῦ σώματος 
διήκειν].” See Stemmer, “PERICHORESE,” 11-13. Obviously terms like “hypostasis” do not carry the 
exact meaning in early Stoics as they do in Maximus. Chrysippus here, in Alexander’s report, seems to use 
it to emphasize the soul’s superior existential stability; even though it receives the body, it bears its own 
essence (so that essence and hypostasis are still more or less equivalent). And yet the degree of 
terminological and conceptual convergence, especially here in Amb 17, between Maximus and Stoics is still 
impressive; so Harrison, “Perichoresis in the Greek Fathers,” 58. It’s worth asking why Maximus can repair 
back (wittingly or not) to more Stoic forms of thought even while denying essential Stoic tenets, say, divine 
corporeality. My study implies that the careful recognition and distinction of “hypostasis” from “essence” 




because something else—namely a hypostasis—relieves nature from having to achieve 
the kind of “whole” that would permit such perichoresis among the parts. And in Christ’s 
Body, which is one with itself and with all other entities exactly because his hypostasis is 
the identity of his parts, those parts can preserve their whole integrity and interpenetrate 
one another. Indeed, as they become both more themselves and more he who sustains 
them by subsisting as them, they must so pervade each other as they are “gathered 
together with their Head” and “become one flesh” (Col 1.18; Eph 5.30-1).309 
____________ 
 These two traits of Christ’s Body explain how “analogy” in the deific state retains 
its distinctly Pauline sense. That’s to say, according to the Christo-logic of our deific 
state, which is also the body-logic of Christ, analogy does not preclude hypostatic 
identity. The former presumes the latter. True, Maximus very often qualifies the process 
of deification by saying it occurs “analogously” or “in proportion” to the person deified. 
Many have read this to imply something like what “by grace” is supposed to imply—that 
our deification makes us still a bit less God than Christ is, even his own humanity.310 
                                                                                                                                                 
(hypostasis) might perform some similar existential funcations Stoics thought only some kind of underyling 
bodily-yet-divine substance could—which they too could call “Logos.” 
309 Myst. 24, CCSG 69, 59-60, slight modification: “Thus the holy church, as we said, is the figure 
and image of God inasmuch as through it he effects in his infinite power and wisdom an unconfused union 
from the various essences of beings, attaching them to himself as creator to their highest point, and 
this operates according to the grace of faith for the faithful, joining them all to each other in one form 
according to a single grace and calling of faith [Ἔστι μὲν οὖν ἡ ἁγία ἐκκληςία τύπος, ὡς εἴρηται, καὶ εἰκὼν 
τοῦ μὲν θεοῦ, διότι ἣν ἐργάζεται κατὰ τὴν ἄπειρον αὐτοῦ δύναμιν καὶ σοφίαν περὶ τὰς διαφόρους τῶν 
ὄντων οὐσίας ἀσυγχυτον ἕνωσιν, ὡς δημιουργὸς κατ’ ἄκρον ἑαυτῷ συνέχων, καὶ αὐτὴ κατὰ τὴν χάριν τῆς 
πίστεως εἰς τοὺς πιστοὺς ἀλλήλοις ἑνοειδῶς συνάπτουσα].” See too Amb 21.14, where Maximus coyly 
intimates that Gregory may have attributed John the Evangelist’s words to John the Baptist according “to a 
more mysterious” reason, namely that any saint can “exchange places” with another because the same 
Word comes to be in all the saints.  
310 E.g. Loosen, Logos und Pneuma im begnadeten Menschen bei Maximus Confessor (Münster: 




 Renzces and Ayroulet, for instance, suggest two ways the deified person’s union 
with God is analogous to Christ’s.311 There is “la divergence essentielle” between Christ 
and ourselves, and then “les différences entre les hommes dans leur mode personnel de 
collaboration à la réalisation de leur divinisation.”312 I return to the second shortly, which 
seems right to me. But the first falters. It does to the extent that we deduce from an 
absolute ontological difference between created and uncreated essences the impossibility 
of their concrete and real identity.313 In this way it rehearses the error of christological 
“asymmetry” familiar from Chapter 1, but from the opposite vantage.314 If Christ was 
there conceived as in some sense “more” divine than human, here we are thought more 
human than divine. This would of course make nonsense of Maximus’s claim that the 
identity wrought in our deific state is the very one achieved in the historical 
Incarnation—a conviction then crystalized and intensified in the tantum-quantum 
principle (sec. 3.2). It elides too the distinction between process and product or state, so 
that the necessity of our becoming God is misread as our perpetual failure to be him (sec. 
3.3). And, last, this sort of “analogical difference” also assumes that modal perichoresis 
amounts to the kind of “reciprocity” that might obtain, say, between two magnetic poles, 
one smaller (us) and one much bigger (God). But as I’ve stressed time and again, modal 
                                                 
311 Philip Gabriel Renczes, Agir de Dieu et liberté de l’homme: Recherches sur l’anthropologie 
théologique de saint Maxime le Confesseur (Paris, Cerf, 2003), 349-54; Ayroulet, De l’image à l’Image, 
285, 293-4. 
312 Ayroulet, De l’image à l’Image, 285. 
313 And to complicate matters, both authors deduce the ontological difference from the gnomic 
mode of a person’s natural volition; so Renczes, Agir de Dieu, 351: “Nous avons déjà envisagé la γνώμη 
comme circonstance d’une divergence essentielle de la divinisation de l’homme par rapport à celle de la 
nature humaine du Christ dans l’union hypostatique.” But as a mode destined to give way to the utterly 
natural and immediate willing of the lover for the beloved, the fact that Christ lacks a gnome (Pyr 85-7) 
indicates only a difference of process, not of essence (lest Christ not be personally human). I therefore 
follow Larchet, La divinisation de l’homme, 239-47, who rightly argues that the absence of a gnomic mode 
in Christ evinces only the completion of the deified state of his humanity. For a useful summary of the 
soteriological issues involved, see Blowers, Maximus the Confessor, 242-6. 




perichoresis finds its ground solely in hypostatic identity and so culminates in complete, 
actual symmetry (sec. 3.4).315 As Christo-logic dictates, there is no asymmetrical relation 
between created and uncreated natures for the obvious reason that they share no natural 
relation at all. And yet, by and as God’s grace, the Word becomes the hypostatic identity 
and essential symmetry in a single concrete reality, his Body. 
 We fare better with the second sense of “analogous” deification. Each person, 
each created hypostasis, does in fact differ from Christ and from one another in principle. 
Not essentially (as regards Christ’s humanity), but according to each’s individual logos of 
hypostasis. It’s significant that nearly every time Maximus speaks of “analogy” or 
“proportion” in deification, it’s “in proportion” to each individual deified.316 And yet an 
individual logos, we’ve seen, is the Logos too. Each person is a member of the Word’s 
                                                 
315 Renczes, Agir de Dieu, 353-4, speaks of “l’unité analogique de la périchorèse dans l’agir,” 
which he claims predominates even in Christ himself: “[Maximus’s mention in Amb 7 of] une seule 
opération ‘divine-humaine’ ne peut être conçue que de manière analogique: à la manière de la périchorèse 
de la nature divine et humaine dans le Christ, cette opération unique exprime le concours des deux 
opérations vers la même finalité dans la proportion qui convient sans que l’une signifie l’annihilation de 
l’autre” (his emphasis);—Balthasar, Cosmic Liturgy, 63-4, reduces Maximus’s great and ultimately costly 
christological tenacity to a defence of Christo-logic understood in terms of asymmetrical analogy: “From 
the moment that Chalcedon, in its sober and holy wisdom, elevated the adverbs ‘indivisibly’ (ἀδιαιρέτως) 
and ‘unconfusedly’ (ἀσυγχύτως) to a dogmatic formula, the image of a reciprocal indwelling of two distinct 
poles of being replaced the image of mixture. This mutual ontological presence (περιχώρησις) not only 
preserves the being particular to each element, to the divine and the human natures, but also brings each of 
them to its perfection in their very difference, even enhancing that difference. Love, which is the highest 
level of union, only takes root in the growing independence of the lovers; the union between God and the 
world reveals, in the very nearness it creates between these two poles of being, the ever-greater difference 
between created being and the essentially incomparable God. Maximus defended the formula of Chalcedon, 
even with his blood, out of a deep insight into this difference.”  
—Here “analogical” and “perichoretic” seem synonymous. But either “analogy” bears perichoretic 
logic—and so cannot be asymmetrical; or else perichoresis analogy’s—and so the “newness of modes” 
putatively achieved in Christ simply follows the standard logic of the relation between a natural cause and 
its effect (an asymmetrical relation, however greater the difference; see sec. 3.1 above)—the very thing 
Maximus consistently denied; so Pyr 192, PG 91, 345d-348a; Amb 5.1-2. So Jonathan Bieler, “Body and 
Soul Immovably Related: Considering an Aspect of Maximus the Confessor’s Concept of Analogy,” Studia 
Patristica 75 (2017): 223-35, appears to assume their synonymity in christology, anthropology, and 
trinitarian theology. He says, for instance, that the Father “expresses himself fully or analogically in the 
Son” (235). Unlike earlier scholars who also equate perichoresis and analogy, Bieler differs to the extent 
his reading privileges (wittlingly or not) the former over or in the latter. 
316 Qu. et dub. 102, CCSG 10.77: “κατὰ τὴν ἀναλόγως προσοῦσαν δύναμιν ἑκάστῳ”; Amb 10.85; 




Body. Analogy, the “logic of proportion,” therefore emerges as a body-logic.317 That was 
just how Paul used it,318 and others too.319 
 If that’s so, then analogy in deification, as in any body, actually demands both 
hypostatic identity (for no body subsists as a real whole except as a hypostasis) and a 
perichoretic symmetry among any and all its parts. That includes its “extremes,” created 
and uncreated natures. And so I recognize two senses of eschatological “analogy” in 
Maximus.  
 First, it means that I am and manifest the Word of God in my own personal way. 
This holds generally for every creature, actually.320 “Each person,” writes Maximus, 
                                                 
317 Luke Steven, “Deification and the Workings of the Body: The Logic of ‘Proportion’ in 
Maximus the Confessor,” Studia Patristica 75 (2017): 241: “in Maximus’ mind, the logic of proportion is 
not an abstract logic of reciprocity. Rather, it is most fundamentally a description of the mechanisms of a 
very concrete and lively reality: the body.” 
318 Cf. QThal 29.2, CCSG 7, 211, where Maximus quotes Rom. 12.6: “according to the proportion 
of one’s faith [κατὰ τὴν ἀναλογίαν τῆς πίστεως]”; see too Steven, “Deification and the Workings of the 
Body,” 243-6, on the Pauline tradition of “proportion” as it was transmitted through the Christian 
Alexandrian tradition (Clement, Origen, Gregory of Nyssa), and 249: “for Maximus deification works ‘in 
proportion’, which, following Paul, means that deification works like a body.” 
319 So Stefan Dienstbeck, Die Stoa der Stoa (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2015), 198-99, registers due 
caution about eliding the Stoic stress on the “identity” between individual entities (esp. the human being) 
and the universal essence to a relation of polarity: “Missverstanden wäre dieser Komplex, wollte man ihn 
als ein polares Verhältnis beschreiben, in dem das Eine seinem Teil bzw. insgesamt seinen Teilen 
gegenüberstände.” He continues: “Kosmisches Sein und Einzelnersein stehen in wesensmäßiger Identität, 
nicht weil sie strukturanalog wären, sondern weil sie tatsächlich als wesensidentisch zu bestimmen sind. 
Dem tut auch der individuelle Zuschnitt im Wesen der Einzelentitäten keinen Abbruch. Vielmehr bestätigt 
die Strukturidentität, dass Wesensidentität nicht durch Differenz in der Verfasstheit verlustig geht. Gerade 
als Einzelnes befindet sich das Einzelne mit der Struktur von allem in Wesensidentität” (my emphasis). 
Again, Maximus’s concept of “essence” obviously differs from the earlier Stoic one (and from many 
others). But the form or shape of the Stoic view of the God-world relation resonates rather strongly with 
Maximus’s. Replace “essence” with the Word’s “hypostasis,” and this becomes apparent enough. The Stoic 
Logos pervades every individual entity and thus sustains and unites all by being the universal, immanent 
bond of all, through procession. Stoics could even admit that so long as you concede that one Logos runs 
through all as the sole, concrete identity of the world, then yes, at that point you might admit that each 
individual thing is pervaded by (as tenor) and so manifests that Logos “to a greater” or “lesser degree (ἀλλ’ 
ἤδη δι’ ὧν μὲν μᾶλλον, δι’ ὧν δὲ ἧττον)—“just like the soul in us”; Diogenes Laertius, 7.138-9 = SVF 
2.634. Cp. for instance, Amb 35.2 and Amb 48.7, where the Logos “becomes the essence in concrete 
wholes.” 
320 QThal 51.8-15, canvasses an array of creatures—the Sun, eagle, deer, serpent, turtledove—in 
order to contemplate their own ways of exemplifying “the divine wisdom invisibly contained in created 
beings” (πᾶσαν ἐκκαλύπτων ἐν ἑαυτῷ κατὰ τὸν βίον τῆς ἐμπερομένης ἀοράτως τοῖς οὖσι θείας σοφίας τὴν 
μεγαλοπρέπειαν); Amb 51.15, CCSG 7, 403. So too Amb 33.2, where the Logos “is obliquely signified in 




“according to his own power, and according to the grace of the Spirit that is granted to 
him with respect of his worthiness—has Christ in him, and in proportion to him, leading 
him through increasing mortifications to ever more sublime ascents.”321 Just “as the soul 
reveals itself as active in the parts of the body according to the capacity underlying each 
part,” so too do I manifest the Word’s divine activity and person in me “analogously” to 
my power, my desire, my love, my passion.322 
 That last text points up a second sense of analogy. Again, I can only manifest the 
Word who has become all that I am in principle (all my logoi) because he has made every 
creature himself, his Body. Analogy is a two-way channel, a true symmetry. In fact, the 
Word becomes analogous to me.323 Since he can become in person what he is infinitely 
not by (divine) nature, the Word makes himself the hypostatic, concrete identity of every 
creature precisely as that creature (its natural and hypostatic modes—its entire finitude). 
So it is with a human hypostasis and its body: I am as much my finger as I am my hair, as 
I am my heart, as I am my eyes.324 My toe only is to the degree it is me. If, then, as we’ve 
                                                 
321 Amb 47.2: “ἕκαστος...κατὰ τὴν ἑαυτοῦ δύναμιν, καὶ τὴν κατ’ ἀξίαν χορηγουμένην αὐτῷ τοῦ 
Πνεύματος χάριν τὸν Χριστὸν ἔχων ἀναλόγως ἑαυτῷ τὰς ὑψηλὰς διὰ τῆς πρὸς πάντα νεκρώσεως 
ἀναβάσεις ποιούμενον”; cf. QThal 59.8, CCSG 22, 23; Amb 10.31 and 85; Myst 13, CCSG 69, 42; etc. 
322 QThal 61.14, CCSG 22, 103: “πᾶσι πάντα γινόμενος [1 Cor 9.22] κατὰ τὴν ἀναλογίαν τῆς 
δικαιοσύνης, μᾶλλον δὲ κατὰ τὸ μέτρον τῶν μετὰ γνώσεως ὑπὲρ δικαιοσύνης ἐνταῦθα παθημάτων ἑαυτὸν 
ἑκάστῳ δωρούμενος, καθάπερ ψυχὴ σώματος μέλεσι κατὰ τὴν ὑποκειμένην ἑκάστῳ μέλει δύναμιν ἑαυτὴν 
ἐνεργοῦσαν ἐκφαίνουσα.” The Body-cosmos logic can even portray eschatological judgment; see just 
before this, QThal 61.13, CCSG 22, 103. 
323 Amb 21.4: “Since the same Christ is flesh and spirit, He becomes the one or the other analogous 
to the form of knowledge [ἐπειδὴ γὰρ σὰρξ καὶ πνεῦμά ἐστιν ὁ αὐτὸς κατὰ τὴν ἑκάστῳ τῆς γνώσεως 
ἀναλογίαν τοῦτο ἢ ἐκεῖνο γινόμενος]; Amb 48.7: “He has made Himself edible and participable to all in 
proportion to the measure of each [καθ’ ἃς ἐδώδιμον ἑαυτὸν καὶ μεταληπτὸν ἀναλόγως ἑκάστῳ 
πεποίηκεν].” Even the Spirit (as wholly in the Son) exists in an analogous way in each of his gifts; so 
QThal 29.2, CCSG 7, 211: “[Isa 11.1-3] used the word ‘spirits’ to name the activities of one and the same 
Holy Spirit, because the actuating Holy Spirit exists proportionately in all of its activities whole and 
without diminishment [ἀλλ’ τὰς ἐνεργείας τοῦ ἑνὸς καὶ τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἁγίου πνεύματος πνεύματα καλέσας διὰ 
τὸ πάσῃ ἐνεργείᾳ ὅλον ἀνελλιπῶς ὑπάρχειν ἀναλόγως τὸ ἐνεργοῦν ἅγιον πνεῦμα].” 
324 Lop off an appendage—it’s still mine. It still bears a distinctive relation as proper to the 
hypostatic “whole” I am, the relation bore through the “principle of becoming” at my birth. The fact that I 
don’t need it to endure (i.e. it’s not an essential attribute) doesn’t mean it’s less mine or less me. To think 




seen, we are “members” of Christ’s Body, then it follows that he is us in just that way—
hypostatically. 
 Only thus, I submit, do Maximus’s extreme pronouncements on the God-world 
symmetry make any sense. God and man “are paradigms of each other”—we read that 
before.325 We can also read in Maximus that the Incarnate Word, because he is truly and 
really man, taught us in deed and even in word that a human person can become God’s 
own model: 
And for God he makes himself an example of virtue, if one can say this, and 
invites the inimitable to come imitate him by saying [καὶ τῷ θεῷ καθίστησιν 
ἑαυτὸν ἀρετῆς ἐξεμπλάριον, εἰ τοῦτο θέμις εἰπεῖν, πρὸς μίμησιν ἑαυτοῦ τὸν 
ἀμίμητον ἐλθεῖν ἐγκελευόμενος, λέγων], ‘Forgive us our trespasses as we forgive 
those who trespass against us.’ He summons God to be to him as he is to his 
neighbors.326 
 
The Word identifies himself with us and thus generates us. But his primal self-
identification with all creation and its every creature does not dissipate after awhile, but 
perdures into every mode and actuality—even, stunningly, in the very heart of finitude, 
our suffering. 
For the Word has shown that the one who is in need of having good done to him 
is God; for, he says to us, as long as you did it for one of these least ones, you did 
it for me—and God himself says this!—then, he will much more show that the 
one who can do good and who does it is truly God by grace and participation 
because he has taken on in happy imitation the energy and characteristic of his 
own doing good. And if the poor man is God, it is because of God’s 
condescension in becoming poor for us and in taking into himself the sufferings of 
                                                                                                                                                 
characteristics also name the primary ways wholes relate to parts (and the reverse). But in Maximus’s 
christology, and I dare say in any Chalcedonian christology, Christ’s hypostasis is itself the “whole” of the 
parts which are themselves essential wholes. This part-whole relation—that between the two natures and 
their hypostasis—cannot therefore follow any logic restricted to the logic of essences (as “accidents” and 
“essences” are). In other words, possession and identification must converge in Christo-logic. If Christ’s 
physical body is “simply” his body rather than him (as well), then I cannot see how “God died” retains 
anything like what Cyril and Neochalcedonism strive to uphold: the concrete (not natural) identity of that 
one who died and the thing that died—that humanity, that body-soul unity, that punctured flesh. So it is 
with God and the world, on my reading. 
325 Amb 10.9, cited in full at n. 110. 




each one sympathetically and “until the end of time,” always suffering mystically 
through goodness in proportion to each one’s suffering. All the more reason, 
then, will that one be God who by loving human beings in imitation of God heals 
by himself in a God-fitting way the sufferings of those who suffer and who shows 
that he has in his disposition, in due proportion, the same power of sustaining 
Providence that God has.327 
 
 Analogy in Christ’s Body means inconceivable symmetry. The Word becomes 
analogous to me—even suffering and dead me! It was exactly his own brutal death on the 
cross that finally revealed God’s ineffable modality as a trinity of hypostases in and as 
one divine essence (Christo-logic’s two logics). We saw that in Chapter 1.328 Discerning 
and following through the distinction between those logics has at length led us to this 
mystery, which is indeed the same:  
In accordance, then, with one of the aforementioned contemplations, whereby we 
are crucified with Christ [τῷ Χριστῷ συσταυρούμεθα], let us endeavor, for as 
long as we are in this world, to propitiate the Word who is crucified together with 
us [τὸν συσταυρούμενον ἡμῖν ἱλεώσασθαι Λόγον].329 
 
That’s Paul, of course (Gal 2.20; Col 1.24). 
 
3.6 – Conclusion 
This chapter has gone to great lengths to show that and how Maximian deification 
demonstrates the Christo-logic of the world. The Word of God has made his own person 
                                                 
327 Myst. 24, CCSG 69, 68-9, modified: “Εἰ γὰρ θεὸν ὁ Λόγος τὸν εὖ παθεῖν δεόμενον ἔδειξεν – 
ἐφ’ ὅσον γὰρ ἐποιήσατε, φησὶν, ἑνὶ τούτων τῶν ἐλαχίστων, ἐμοὶ ἐποιήσατε· θεὸς δὲ ὁ εἰπὼν, πολλῷ μᾶλλον 
τὸν εὖ ποιεῖν δυνάμενον καὶ ποιοῦντα, δείξειεν ἀληθῶς κατὰ χάριν καὶ μέθεξιν ὄντα θεὸν, ὡς τὴν αὐτοῦ 
τῆς εὐεργεσίας εὐμιμήτως ἀνειλημμένον ἐνέργειάν τε καὶ ἰδιότητα. Καὶ εἰ θεὸς ὁ πτωχὸς, διὰ τὴν τοῦ δι’ 
ἡμᾶς πτωχεύσαντος θεοῦ συγκατάβασιν καὶ εἰς ἑαυτὸν τὰ ἑκάστου συμπαθῶς ἀναδεχομένου πάθη καὶ 
μέχρι τῆς συντελείας τοῦ αἰῶνος κατὰ τὴν ἀναλογίαν τοῦ ἐν ἑκάστῳ πάθους ἀεὶ δι’ ἀγαθότητα πάσχοντος 
μυστικῶς, πλέον δηλονότι κατὰ τὸν εἰκότα λόγον ἔσται θεὸς ὁ κατὰ μίμησιν τοῦ θεοῦ διὰ φιλανθρωπίαν τὰ 
τῶν πασχόντων πάθη δι’ ἑαυτοῦ θεοπρεπῶς ἐξιώμενος καὶ τὴν αὐτὴν τῷ θεῷ κατ’ ἀναλογίαν τῆς σωστικῆς 
προνοίας κατὰ διάθεσιν ἔχων δεικνύμενος δύναμιν”; cf. Amb 4.9, where Maximus remarks that besides the 
need to cleanse humanity of sin, another motive for the Word’s Incarnation was that he wanted “to 
experience” our obedience (cp. QThal 61.6); and Cap. X, where Maximus notes the psychological benefit 
of knowing that God himself suffers with us—on which see, Portaru, “The Vocabulary of Participation,” 
307, who knows no ancient precedent for this idea. 
328 Sec. 1.6. 




the identity of the God and the world. That names the primordial principle and goal of 
creation (3.2). And that identity grounds and reduces to modal perichoresis between God 
and every creature, a total symmetry that makes what’s proper to God “improperly 
proper” to creation and the reverse (3.4).330 We thus become identical to God not just in 
principle, but in our eschatological, existential, concrete state. And so while we become 
God by an utterly supra-natural process—“by grace”—we along with the world prove no 
less God in fact (3.3). For we are his Body (3.5). 
 Just as the Lord’s particular body welcomed the “whole Father” and “the whole 
Spirit” into itself, which the Son had “actualized in himself”331 (κατ’ αὐτουργίαν)—so 
too will the whole world, his mystical Body, become and manifest the Trinity. 
One and the same logos will be seen in all things.... In this way, the grace that 
deifies all things will manifestly appear to have been realized—the grace of which 
God the Word, becoming man, says: “My father is still working, just as I am 
working” [Jn 5.17]. That is, the Father bestows His good pleasure on the work, 
the Son actualizes it in himself, and the Holy Spirit essentially completes in all 
things the good will of the former and the work of the latter, so that the one God 
in Trinity might be “through all things and in all things” [Eph 4:6], being wholly 
contemplated in proportion to each of those made worthy by grace, and wholly 
complete through the whole of them, in the same way that, in each and every 
member of the body, the soul exists naturally and without diminution.332 
 
There, in the Son’s one Body, not only will the Trinity be present to all things, as 
Dionysius said. All things will be, by grace, the Trinity. 
  
                                                 
330 See Conclusion below. 
331 QThal 60.7, CCSG 22, 79; Exp. Orat. Dom. 2, CCSG 23, 31-2; cf. Amb 61.2-3. 
332 QThal 2.2, CCSG 7, 51, slightly modified: “ἀλλ’ καὶ ὁ αὐτὸς ἐφ’ ὅλων θεωρηθήσεται 
λόγος...καὶ οὕτως ἐνεργουμένην τὴν ἐκθεωτικὴν τῶν ὅλων ἐπιδειξηται χάριν· δι’ ἣν γενόμενος ἄνθρωπος ὁ 
θεὸς καὶ λόγος φησὶν ὁ πατήρ μου ἕως ἂρτι ἐργάζεται, κἀγὼ ἐργάζομαι, ὁ μὲν εὐδοκῶν, ὁ δὲ αὐτουργῶν, καὶ 
τοῦ ἁγίου πνεύματος οὐσιωδῶς τήν τε τοῦ πατρὸς ἐπὶ πᾶσιν εὐδοκίαν καὶ τὴν αὐτουργίαν τοῦ υἱοῦ 
συμπληροῦντος, ἵνα γένηται διὰ πάντων καὶ ἐν πᾶσι εἷς ὁ ἐν τριάδι θεός, ἀναλόγως ὅλος ἑκάστῳ κατὰ 
χάριν τῶν ἀξιουμένων καὶ ὅλοις ἐνθεωρούμενος, ὡς ὅλῳ καὶ ἑκάστῳ μέλει τοῦ σώματος δίχα μειώσεως 






In this study I have tried to justify and to perform a literal interpretation of Maximus’s 
declaration that, “The Word of God, very God, wills that the mystery of his Incarnation 
be actualized always and in all things” (Amb 7.22). I admit that the justification lies 
mostly in the success of the performance. There is of course some prima facie warrant for 
this performance in the very fact that Maximus himself never qualifies this statement (or 
the many others I’ve documented and discussed throughout) in the way nearly all his later 
commentators do. Not once does Maximus say, for instance, that the “mystery” of the 
Word’s Incarnation into all the world differs from the mystery wrought in Jesus Christ. 
Maximus never says the Word is somehow more or differently immanent or present in 
Christ than he is in the logoi of every creature—even though many had and would after.1 
As far as my exegetical argument goes, that’s a negative point in my favor. 
 But I also pursued two positive and more substantive points. On the one hand I 
tried to show that Maximus thinks the logic of creation as the logic of Christ. On the 
other I showed how this identification accounts for and even necessitates many of the 
putatively hyperbolic or extreme aspects of Maximus’s thought (especially on 
deification). In the first instance, I can state my argument as three contentions. For 
Maximus, [1] God’s Incarnation in the middle of history bears a logic that differs from all 
                                                 
1 Some might adduce against this claim Amb 46.4, PG 91, 1357a-b: “He deigned to vary the modes 
of His presence so that the good things He planted in beings might ripen to full maturity, until the ages will 
have reached their appointed limit [συγκαταβατικῶς ἐφεῖναι τὰς ἀκτῖνας ἀνεχόμενος, ποικίλαι τοὺς 
τρόπους ἀξιώσας πρὸς τελεσφόρησιν ὧν τοῖς οὖσιν οἰκείων κατέσπειρεν ἀγαθῶν μέχρι τῆς πάντων 
ἀποπερατώσεως τῶν αἰώνων]. At that point He will gather together the fruits of His own sowing....” But 
my claim is that the Word must be fundamentally identical to what he is not by nature in order even to vary 
himself in and through that very nature. Again, Christ’s human flesh—considered according to its natural 
properties—presented his person in accordance with those properties. This doesn’t exclude his hypostatic 
identity to that very nature, which then, as it were, disclosed him. Hypostatic identity actually grounds 




other conceptions of vertical causality, especially Neoplatonism’s; call this “Christo-
logic” (Chapter 1); [2] the peculiarities of Christo-logic appear in and adequately describe 
creation’s peculiarities: its beginning ex nihilo (Chapter 2) and end in deification 
(Chapter 3); and [3] since, therefore, Christo-logic constitutes the literal meaning of 
“Incarnation,” and since that same logic is creation’s—then “creation is Incarnation” is 
literally true in Maximus. 
 As I made this somewhat rigidly linear case, I had numerous occasion to garner 
credibility for my interpretation by showing how it explains many basic anomalies in 
Maximus’s thought. If God, in and as the Word, can make himself hypostatically 
identical to what he infinitely differs from by nature; and if that basic element of Christo-
logic applies to the entire God-world relation—then this resolves the apparent 
contradiction between the assertion that while uncreated and created natures bear 
absolutely no common property, created nature proceeds from uncreated nature alone 
(secs. 2.3-6). This is precisely the lesson Eriugena learned from Maximus, however 
awkwardly he might have applied it. Again, if Maximus really conceives creation as 
Incarnation, then his famous tantum-quantum principle—which claims that in deification 
we become God to the same extent God became human—is not only audacious, but 
literally true (sec. 3.2). Or take his doctrine of grace. Maximus says that grace is at once a 
power whose act has no relation to our nature whatever, and yet innate to every created 
nature. But if that power is the very Word in creatures, the Word who makes himself 
identical to creatures even as he still bears his divine properties—and so becomes the 
supra-natural and sole medium between us and divinity—then the apparently nonsensical 






And yet, as I indicated in the Introduction, I suspect that most interpreters of Maximus 
shrink from reading him literally not so much from exegetical but from systematic or 
even dogmatic worry. So I terminate this study by raising two possible systematic 
objections to the exegetical thesis I’ve defended. Doubtless there linger many more. I’m 
surer still that what I say here will not fully meet even the two at hand. Nevertheless, it 
seems worthwhile at least to identify these objections, if only to expose their own 
unreflective presumptions. 
1. Your entire procedure has unfolded as if the historical event of the Incarnation 
were a mere specimen from which one might extract a more universal “logic” 
and apply willy-nilly any- and everywhere. Doesn’t this totally undermine the 
primacy of Christ? Have you not reduced Jesus to just one case among many 
others? Haven’t you rendered Christ an abstract principle? 
 
As the argument now stands, I concede. Chapter 1 isolated the three necessary elements 
of Christo-logic and Chapters 2 and 3 sought them at creation’s beginning and end. My 
presentation of Maximus’s Christo-logic runs rather like extracting the Pythagorean 
theorem from one right triangle: Christ merely illustrates what’s true of every other 
Incarnation. 
 But no: I deny that Christ is a formal principle applicable to other instances. 
“Christ,” we heard Maximus say, doesn’t name a genus. But neither does “Christ” name 
an “individual.”2 That is a crucial point, especially here. Maximus denies both genus and 
individual of Christ because both presume Christ can be adequately conceived according 
to the logic of substance or nature (which, it’s true, happens to predetermine the very 
form of basic predication: “X is Y,” where Y names some qualification of the subject qua 
                                                 




instance). If you say “Christ is a genus,” then you make the sheer fact of Christ an 
abstract principle or form. If you say “Christ is an individual,” where “individual” 
denotes a mere instance of some formal principle, then you do the same, oddly enough, 
but from the bottom-up. The fact of Christ reduces to a mere instance of some repeatable, 
higher principle. 
 Perhaps this is why many prefer to make Christ an exception to (rather than the 
rule of) creation.3 That, they think, is the best way to protect his primacy. Only as an 
exception is Christ exceptional. But that very judgment presumes some canon of 
“exceptionality,” doesn’t it? It appears to know the conditions that must obtain for Christ 
to be the exception he is. It presumes, for instance, that what is “exceptional” bears a 
contrary relation to what is repeatable, as a particular is particular precisely to the extent 
it is not universal. Thus it seems even to presume some kind of antagonism between 
particularity and universality, the unrepeatable and the repeatable, the primary and the 
rest. But when Maximus denies that Christ expresses either genus or individual, he means 
precisely to deny that any formal judgment adequately accounts for “the whole mystery 
of Christ.” Christ is no form or nature or essence, neither mere principle nor mere 
instance. That doesn’t mean he isn’t at least these: he obviously bears a form (two or 
three, depending on how you count) and is a particular instance (in first-century 
                                                 
3 Hans Urs von Balthasar, Theo-Logic: Theological Logical Theory: Volume II: Truth of God, 
transl. Adrian J. Walker (San Francisco: Ignatius, 2004 [1985]), 312, after asserting the uniqueness of the 
Christ event, continues: “Christology is not concerned with the general relationship between God and the 
creature distinguished by their immeasurable distance from each other”; and Cyril O’Regan, “Von 
Balthasar and Thick Retrieval: Post-Chalcedonian Symphonic Theology,” Gregorianum 77.2 (1996): 240-
1, simply asserts that the hypostatic union cannot apply to creatures because they are “constitutionally 
unable to replicate the hypostatic union,” so that “the difference between the human and the divine remains 
absolute.” The latter point is moot, since, of course, even in the historical Incarnation the difference 
between the human and the divine remains absolute—indeed hypostatic union generates this very 
difference, I observed (sec. 1.4). Why exactly, then, being created (a quality of nature) makes it 
“constitutionally” impossible to be uncreated too—to be God—remains far from clear, and actually seems 




Palestine). But his “is” entails more. It entails him, his hypostasis. Therefore Christ is 
neither mere individual nor mere genus because the genus-individual relation is purely 
formal, and Christ is more than either of his forms or natures. If, then, you assert that the 
mystery of Christ must be unrepeatable in order to be exceptional, that just means 
“exceptional” here still means particular. But particularity is a formal relation and thus 
not the final or even the main criterion of Christ’s exceptionality. Rather Christ is 
exceptional precisely because he can be both universal and particular in his own person. 
That really shouldn’t surprise. If his “composed hypostasis” is the identity “to a supreme 
degree” of the greatest imaginable “extremes”—of created and uncreated natures—then 
it’s not so remarkable that Christ is also the very identity of all merely created 
particularity and universality. He therefore does not need to be unrepeatable to be 
exceptional, and indeed his very exceptionality lies the fact that the very mystery he is is 
repeatable in a non-formal way in all creation. 
 Hence a fascinating possibility, one I only intimated in this study (cf. secs. 1.7 and 
2.2): that Christ’s conception in Mary is the very event of the world’s creation from 
nothing. Maximus says that the historical Incarnation is not just creation’s telos or 
purpose, but its very “ground” or metaphysical principle (ἀρχή).4 This raises the difficult 
question of how God’s creative act relates to time itself. That, of course, I must postpone 
for a future study of the relevant passages in Maximus.5 But I note here that it does not 
appear any more problematic to conceive the world’s metaphysical beginning (i.e. the 
                                                 
4 QThal 60.3-4. 
5 I have planned a chapter to succeed what is here Chapter 3, which I might tentatively call, “Jesus 
Christ: the Beginning, Middle, and End of the Ages.” Among the most relevant texts in Maximus’s corpus 
are Amb 42 (on Christ’s four “births” and their relations) and QThal 61 (on Adam’s introduction of 
“another birth” into human nature). Both texts struggle to articulate the relationship between God’s 
providence and judgment of the world—major Origenist themes—and indeed to subsume them into the 




event through which all events unfold) as grounded in Christ’s conception than it does to 
conceive it, say, in the nano-second the astrophysicist’s “singularity” was supposedly 
disrupted to ignite a Big Bang. In both cases the issue remains exactly how the infinite 
can produce the finite, the eternal the temporal. Yet only in the former instance, in 
Mary’s womb, are we dogmatically obligated to affirm precisely their hypostatic oneness. 
God’s creative activity is not bound to produce the world’s temporality from its temporal 
beginning. It’s at least worth considering whether it comes in and as Christ himself, in 
whom “all the ages and the beings existing within those ages received their beginning and 
end.”6 And, in fact, Catholics already confess strange things about time’s relation to the 
historical Incarnation. Anywhere and everywhere the Mass is celebrated the first-century, 
Jewish Body of our Lord appears for our consumption. Thus we participate here and now 
in the same sacrifice, the same historical event that transpired two-thousand years ago. Or 
recall Mary’s Immaculate Conception. It is an effect of a cause that wouldn’t take place 
for 46-49 years after it, namely by “the merits of Jesus Christ” won on the cross.7 If the 
ordo salutis wrought by the Incarnation need not respect chronological strictures, I 
cannot see why the ordo entis must. Surely both are the work of the Trinity. 
 If, therefore, the principle of creatio ex nihilo is manifest and actualized in the 
very event of the historical Incarnation, then Christ would prove so primary that the truth 
of his mystery would occur both particularly and universally—indeed, he would be the 
fundamental, concrete identity of every formal principle and every possible instance. A 
more exceptional reality is difficult to conceive. 
                                                 
6 QThal 60.4, CCSG 22, 75-77: “Διὰ γὰρ τὸν Χριστόν, ἤγουν τὸ κατὰ Χριστὸν μυστήριον, πάντες 
οἱ αἰῶνες καὶ τὰ ἐν αὐτοῖς τοῖς αἰῶσιν ἐν Χριστῷ τὴν ἀρχὴν τοῦ εἶναι καὶ τὸ τέλος εἰλήφασιν.” 





2. Doesn’t your position fundamentally contradict the Nicene-Constantinopolitan 
Creed? “Begotten, not made,” it says, and yet you say that the Word is identical 
to what is made and is thus made. Is your identity thesis just muddled thinking? 
Or is it a species of idolatrous pantheism? Or is it a furtively Platonic or 
Origenist theopanism, neither of which can abide the perdurance of creation’s 
integrity in the eschaton? Whichever, don’t you, like all these, finally elide the 
very ontological gap the Christian doctrine of creation (rooted in Nicaea) must 
maintain at all costs? 
 
No. I rather take my thesis to be the basic, straightforward sense of the Creed. The same 
“Unbegotten Son of God” who was “begotten, not made” also “was made man” 
(ἐνανθρωπήσαντα/homo factus est). If to be human is to be made, and if Christ was 
human, then Christ was obviously made.  
 The Word of God is both unmade and made. Being made or not are essential 
predicates. That is, “created” and “uncreated” qualify natures.8 They’re predicated of 
hypostases only to the extent that hypostases are really identical to the natures of which 
“created” and “uncreated” are predicated. And so the Word, the second person of the 
Trinity, “made himself man.”9 It’s clear that he is himself both subject and object, agent 
and recipient. If someone wished to “clarify” this statement by adding, say, a secundum 
humanitatem, that would be correct. But it would not be the whole truth of Christ. The 
whole Christ is the hypostasis that is both created and uncreated natures in a way no 
essential predicate can capture, since, of course, Christ’s hypostasis is the concrete 
identity of both natures. And if he is the “is” of both natures, then whatever logic forbids 
one nature’s abstract predicate from being properly predicated of the other nature cannot 
really and finally forbid this of Christ. It can indeed properly forbid it—but that’s of little 
consequence since Christ names a fact that exceeds what’s naturally proper. 
                                                 
8 Amb 41.2. 
9 Amb 42.11: “τὸ ἑαυτοῦ ἀνθρώπινον ἐδημιούργησεν, ἢ ἑαυτὸν ἀτρέπτως κατὰ πρόσληψιν σαρκὸς 





 Maximus’s Christo-logic—and arguably Chalcedon’s—actually requires what we 
might call “properly improper predication.” In John 20.17, for example, Christ speaks of 
“your God and my God, your Father and my Father.” Maximus knows that “when I 
contemplate the difference of the natures, and mentally conceptualize their distinction 
[τὴν αὐτῶν κατ’ ἐπίνοιαν ποιοῦμαι διάκρισιν],” Christ says these things improperly 
according to nature.10 For “the Father is neither the God of the Word nor the Father of the 
flesh.” And yet the “whole” hypostasis of the Word is both God and flesh. The fact of 
Christ demands a “reversal” or “inversion” “‘with respect to what may be properly said’ 
[κυρίως] and what may ‘not properly be said’ [οὐ κυρίως].”11 Abstract natures admit of 
what’s generally “proper” to predicate in a given case. But, Maximus affirms, it’s the 
“unconfused reality” (τὴν ἀσύγχυτον ὕπαρξιν) of the created and uncreated natures—
which the whole Christ is—that makes it proper to predicate improperly12; to say of one 
and the same reality, for instance, that it is both mortal and immortal, passible and 
impassible, created and uncreated. In principle the first predicate cannot be predicated of 
what the second is predicated of. But Christ’s truth is no mere principle—not even the 
principle of his Godhead. It’s not muddled thinking, then, to say that in Christ “God 
created himself” any more than it’s muddled to say “God died.” In fact, if all we said was 
“God created himself according to his human nature,” and said nothing much more, then 
we’d fall rather swiftly into muddled thinking of another sort. There is no such thing, 
after all, as an “according to human nature.” There is only the one God-man Jesus Christ. 
                                                 
10 Amb 27.3. 
11 Amb 27.3. The inner quotations come from Gregory of Nazianzus, Or 30.8, where Gregory 
discusses John 20.17. 




 So then, the only way it’s either idolatrous pantheism or Origenist theopanism to 
affirm the literal truth of “God is the world” is if it’s already assumed that creation is not 
Incarnation. For if creation is Incarnation—if, that is, creation’s logic is Christ’s—then 
what is naturally improper to predicate of the world says as little of the world’s whole 
truth as the fact that corpses do not rise from the dead tells us the truth of Christ’s 
resurrected flesh. In other words, overly quick and unreflective labels like “pantheist” or 
“theopanist” are just so many ways to assume that creation could never be Incarnation. 
But assumption is not argument, of course. 
 As for the supposed ontological “gap” wrought by fourth-century Nicene 
theology, much of what I’ve said should suffice. I add this: too many have concluded 
from the great labor Nicene theologians undertook first to make an absolute distinction 
between created and uncreated natures, and then to push the Son on the latter side of the 
divide, that Christianity’s profoundest genius was exactly to recognize this absolute 
natural difference between God and the world.13 This story misses the fairly evident 
reverse implication of firmly fixing the Son on the side of the uncreated: that same Son, 
very God, is also a creature. No truly Chalcedonian Christo-logic can fail to notice that 
the more you make Christ’s two natures differ, the more you must simultaneously admit 
the utterly new way God was identical to “being created.” Making the Son very God also 
makes very God a creature. Total symmetry in natural principle, utter identity in concrete 
                                                 
13 So Robert Sokolowski, The God of Faith and Reason: Foundations of Christian Theology 
(Notre Dame: UNDP, 1982), 18, 33, passim; and Lewis Ayres, Nicaea and Its Legacy: An Approach to 
Fourth-Century Trinitarian Theology (Oxford: OUP, 2004), 286-8. I don’t claim that individual Nicene 
theologians clearly emphasized this reverse implication of making the Son very God. Indeed, in the face of 
Eunomius’s theology, it’s likely they didn’t, or at least didn’t emphasize it too much. But I leave that for 
others to decide (especially about Gregory of Nyssa). Rather my claim is that someone like Maximus, who 
did his thinking on the far side of Nicaea, Chalcedon, and the highly developed Neochalcedonianism he 
himself perfected, could not avoid perceiving this, especially under Cyril of Alexandria’s great weight. My 




fact, modal and actual perichoresis in final condition—anything less is, by the canons of 
Christo-logic I’ve detailed in this study, one-sided to the point of distorting the truth of 
the matter. By my lights, Christianity’s genius is rather that it conceives the most absolute 
natural difference between God and the world only through their ineffable and hypostatic 
identity, such that neither created nor uncreated nature need forfeit anything of its own 
modal or essential integrity in the final union of all things, when “God is all in all” (1 Cor 
15.28). That is what Maximus finally teaches us: that God, precisely in order to “save” or 
“preserve” even the most apparently incidental attribute of every last created being, must 
really be all things. 
 “What is not assumed is not saved.” That principle does not apply simply to my 
abstract “nature.” It applies to me. How could I be saved unless he were I? To create at 
all, from beginning to end, God must become me, you, everyone and everything, the 





An Analytic Appendix 
 
Near the start of Maximus’s Dispute with Pyrrhus, once Patriarch of Constantinople and 
monenergist-monothelite proponent, Maximus inveighs against conceptual obscurity in 
christology. His recommendation is fairly intuitive: define your terms. 
 
To state something and not first to distinguish the different meanings of what is 
being said invites confusion, and ensures that what is under investigation remains 
obscure, which is foreign to a man of learning.1 
 
Maximus counseled his own habit. A number of his epistola and opuscula are mere lists 
of definitions: “Various definitions” (Opusc 14/Add. 21), “Definitions of Distinction” 
(Opusc 17), “Definitions of Union” (Opusc 18), “Definitions of the Will” (Opusc 
26b/Add. 24), “Definitions of Activity” (Opusc 27/Add. 25), “On Quality, Property, and 
Difference, to Theodore, Priest in Mazara” (Opusc 21)—and so forth. Often too Maximus 
inserts analytic definitions of crucial concepts in the course of extended dogmatic and 
polemical argumentation.2 So important were precise definitions for grasping Maximus’s 
thought that either he himself or some astute reader attached logical compendia to his 
corpus, short chapters on the ὅροι of Aristotelian categories and Porphyry’s quinque 
voces—sometimes even outfitted with diagrams mapping the subtle relations among 
them.3 
                                                 
1 Pyr. 11. 
2 At Ep 12; PG 91, 484a, for instance, Maximus offers a formal definition of “relational union” 
(σχετική ἕνωσις) as part of his polemical interpretation of Cyril’s “one nature of the Word Incarnate”—
namely, that this sort of union is what Cyril meant to forfend; cf. too Ep 15; PG 91, 561a, where appear 
definitions of “difference” (διαφορά) and “identity” (ταυτότης) concluding a dense section on Christ’s 
assumption of noetic flesh. 
3 Mossman Roueché, “Byzantine Philosophical Texts of the Seventh Century,” Jahrbuch der 
österreichischen Byzantinistik 23 (1974): 61-76; idem, “A Middle Byzantine Handbook of Logical 
Terminology,” Jahrbuch der österreichischen Byzantanistik 29 (1980): 71-98. Roueché doubts that even 
the two manuscripts explicitly attributed to Maximus are original to him, but still thinks it likely that these 
“were found among his papers after his death” (Roueché, “Byzantine Philosophical Texts,” 63). Tollefsen 
rightly thinks it also likely that later editors “considered these logical texts a useful tool in understanding 




 And so I furnish here a restricted list of significant terms, ones which my 
argument takes up again and again. The list derives mainly from Maximus’s own Opusc 
14, though I supplement it with a few other significant terms. It serves two purposes. 
First, it’s a reference guide the reader may find useful at various points throughout the 
argument. Chapters 1 and 2 especially rely on Maximus’s technical use of these terms, 
and so it seems helpful to be able to repair back to this list when things get dicey. Second, 
this list constitutes something like a general (not exhaustive) optics of Maximian 
metaphysics. Here you see the fundamental principles isolated and related in the form of 
an esquisse. This courts the liability, true, of extracting the principles from their native 
soil where they flourish organically (in christology proper, for instance). And yet doing 
so, I hope, also trains the reader’s eye to detect these principles when she comes upon 
them in their natural habitat—in the thick, often vexing density of christological and 
trinitarian metaphysics. Bones and flesh together make a living being. Here lie the bones; 
we saw them live earlier. 
 
Essence (οὐσία) or nature (φύσις). “The same thing.”4 Always in Maximus correlated to 
the “common” (κοινόν) and “universal” (καθόλου).5 These disclose “what” something is, 
rather than simply “that” or “how” or “who” it is. A specific “nature” or species is a 
genus (τὸ γενικόν) with differentiae (e.g. man or angel), and this specification has its own 
principle (logos) that makes it what it is and no other.6 In this Aristotelian and Porphyrian 
                                                 
4 Opusc 14, PG 91, 149b. 
5 Opusc 14, PG 91, 149b; Ep 15, PG 91, 545a, 548d; Ep 12, PG 91, 447a; Opusc 16, PG 91, 
197cd; passim. 




sense, an “essence” or “nature” is also a “form” (εἶδος).7 Though these are always in 
themselves “universal” or “common” or a “form”—which therefore must be known in 
several individuals8—Maximus does know “proper” or “individual” or even “particular” 
natures.9 But a nature is not particularized or individualized in itself. It must be so 
determined by another, positive, metaphysical principle—that of hypostasis. 
 
 
Hypostasis (ὑπόστασις) or person (πρόσωπον). “The same thing.”10 Always in Maximus 
correlated to the “particular” (μερικόν) and “proper”—or better, the “idiomatic” 
(ἴδιον)11—though not simply reducible to particularity or an individual assemblage of 
properties.12 These disclose first “that,” then “how,” and most fundamentally (for rational 
beings) “who” one is.13 A hypostasis is therefore the concrete existent, the existential fact 
of this or that single being; it bears no formal or essential content as such.14 Unlike 
nature, hypostasis “exists in itself.”15 In the singularity of hypostasis both particularity 
and concrete existence are a single fact. But the fact of a singular is not yet its principle 
(cf. “logoi” below). Hypostasis is not the principle of individuation, but the thing 
                                                 
7 Opusc 21, PG 91, 249a; Opusc 23, PG 91, 264b; Opusc 26, PG 91, 264b; Pyr 166-7; Amb 7.42. 
8 Opusc 14, PG 91, 149b: “in no degree ever defined by one sole person [μήποτε καθοτιοῦν ἑνὶ 
προσώπῳ περιοριζόμενα].” 
9 Tollefsen, Christocentric, 104-5. 
10 Opusc 14, PG 91, 152a; cf. the wealth of citations in Jean-Claude Larchet, “Hypostase, 
personne, et individu selon saint Maxime le Confesseur,” Revue d’histoire ecclésiastique 109.1-2 (2014): 
36-41. 
11 Opusc 14, PG 91, 152a; Ep 15, PG 91, 454a.  
12 Amb 17.5-6. 
13 Opusc 10, PG 91, 137a: “For each of us acts principally as what we are rather than as who—that 
is, [we act] as man. And as someone, say Paul or Peter, each gives expression to the mode of the activity 
[Ὡς γάρ τι ὢν προηγουμένως, ἀλλ’ οὺχ ὥς τις ἕκαστος ἡμῶν ἐνεργεῖ· τουτέστιν, ὡς ἄνθρωπος· ὡς δὲ τις, 
οἷον Παῦλος ἢ Πέτρος, τὸν τῆς ἐνεργείας σχηματίζει τρόπον]....”  
14 Opusc 14, PG 91, 152a; Opusc 26, PG 91, 264a. 
15 Opusc 26; PG 91, 264a; Ep 15, PG 91, 557d: “For a hypostasis is what subsists distinctively in 




individuated. A hypostasis stands “before” or “under,”16 as it were, any sign of its 
distinctive existence; indeed it just is this or that distinctive existence. Maximus presses 
this point with special vigor in christology, where predicating number of Christ (e.g. “two 
natures,” “one person”) reveals nothing about the thing numbered except that there’s 
something there to be numbered. The referent already is by some prior principle—
however and whatever it is—before it’s recognized: especially so for an singular existent, 
which is first there, then numbered.17 In sum, “hypostasis” as such bears at least five 
distinctive features: 
 
[1] It is always associated with the particular, proper, and idiomatic (as opposed 
to the common, universal, and generic). 
 
[2] It provides no formal, essential, or natural content; its content is not 
predicable.18 
 
[3] It is nevertheless a positive ontological and existential reality; it determines “to 
be” (τὸ εἶναι) and “nature/essence” as their irreducible, most singular 
determination.19 This determination itself betrays two properties: 
 
 [3.1] “Hypostasis” unifies realities that differ essentially. In this sense it’s 
 considered the concrete “whole,” a determinate unity of essentially distinct 
 realities.20 
                                                 
16 So Ep 12, PG 91, 477a, where “hypostasis” (the topic at hand here) stands synonymous to 
“underlying subject”: “So too every quantitative number of things differing, according to the logos of ‘how 
to be’ or of ‘how to subsist’ [κατὰ τὸν τοῦ πῶς εἶναι, ἢ τὸν τοῦ πῶς ὑφεστάναι λόγον], is [a number] that 
indicates the difference of the underlying subjects [τῶν ὑποκειμένων] and does not introduce relation.” As I 
indicate in Chapter 1, Maximus also distinguishes “hypostasis” (esp. Christ’s) from the Aristotelian 
“underlying subject”: “hypostasis” replaces the latter in Maximian metaphysics (cf. Amb 17.5). 
17 Ep 13, PG 91, 513b: Number does not make an individual; number merely “names” what comes 
only by “divine wisdom and power”—distinct, idiomatic entities. 
18 Ep 12, PG 91, 489d: “the particular [of Christ’s composed hypostasis] imparts nothing whatever 
to the generic [τοῦ δὲ ἰδίου τὸ σύνολον λόγου τῷ γενικῷ μεταδιδοῦνος οὐδέν]”; cf. Amb 17.4-5. 
19 This point emerges most plainly in christology, where the flesh of Christ receives both its 
concrete existence and particular way of being from the Son’s very hypostasis (Ep 12, PG 91, 468a; cf. Ch. 
1.3); but cf. too the more general pronouncement at Amb 10.91: “I will not address the fact that the very 
being of beings itself [αὐτὸ τὸ εἶναι τῶν ὄντων] does not exist simply or without qualities, but in a 
particular way [or: “has a how ‘to be’”], which constitutes its first form of delimitation.” Recall, in relation 
to this latter passage, that the “how” or mode of being ultimately derives from the hypostasis and its proper 
principle (cf. “mode” below). 





 [3.2] “Hypostasis” distinguishes an individual in concreto from every 
other. So  arises a typical definition of hypostasis, “an essence with 
idioms.”21 So it is, too,  that the “hypostatic principle” (not strictly the 
hypostasis itself) is the deepest  ground of absolute “difference.”22 
 
[4] It is the basic existential fact, but is not itself the principle of singular (or 
specific) facts. It has an eternal principle that makes it such.23 
 
[5] It never exists separate from an essence or nature, so that although it does not 
itself possess predicable or formal content (2), it is not actual except through and 
“in” some nature (see “in-natured” below); for nature bears the powers for 
actuality (e.g. Paul exists only as man, and as man he is actual only through the 
powers proper to his human nature—will, reason, sensation, etc.).  
 
*Together, “nature/essence” and “hypostasis/person” constitute the two most 
fundamental elements in Maximus’s metaphysics—from Trinity to Christ to human 
beings to the cosmos. In no case does an abstract nature or hypostasis as such exist, 
though each bears a principle as such. Every real thing is a tapestry woven with these two 
ontological threads. Concisely: though separate in principle, nature/essence and 
hypostasis/person are everywhere irreducible to, inseparable from, and indifferent with 
respect to each other. Irreducible, since their respective principles differ completely 
(nature = common; hypostasis = singular). Inseparable, since neither can exist without the 
other. Indifferent, since in their real inseparability (i.e. in a concrete unity) neither’s 
principle or consequent mode suffers any diminution whatever. All three features surface 
here as indicated: 
It is plain that a nature could never at any time be without a hypostasis, though 
nature is not hypostasis: that which is not without hypostasis is not itself 
contemplated as a hypostasis, since these are not convertible [irreducible]. For, on 
the one hand, the hypostasis is in every way also a nature, just like the figure is in 
                                                 
21 Ep 13, PG 91, 528a-b; Ep 15, PG 91, 557d. 
22 Opusc 21, PG 91, 249c. 
23 Opusc 23, PG 91, 264a: “ὅτι ἡ μὲν φύσις τὸν τοῦ εἶναι λόγον κοινὸν ἐπέχει, ἡ δὲ ὑπόστασις, καὶ 
τὸν τοῦ καθ’ ἑαυτὸ εἶναι.” Tollefsen rightly observes this distinction goes for both universals and 




every way a body. For a hypostasis cannot be perceived without a nature, just as, 
again, a figure or color [cannot be perceived] without a body [inseparable]. On the 
other hand, a nature is not in every way also a hypostasis. For the nature bears the 
principle of being common, but the hypostasis has also the principle of being in 
itself. And the nature bears only the principle of species, but the hypostasis 




Principle (λόγος) and Mode (τρόπος). General senses. Both terms carry a broad and 
plastic conceptual range. Logos can mean an “account”25 or (as in Plato) “definition,”26 
“word,” “discourse,” “reason,” “motive,” “immanent rationality,” “principle.”27 The latter 
especially pullulates in Maximus. His famous doctrine that all things are created by and 
bear their proper logoi quite clearly accents the causal or metaphysical sense.28 Note even 
here, though, the rather loose sense of “principle.” There is a “principle” for everything. 
Every creature is what it is through its essential or natural or formal principle, which is 
common to every member of that species. But there is also a principle of every hypostasis 
as such.29 In both cases an alteration of a thing’s principle spells its obliteration.30 A 
logos in this sense, then, is what grounds the unbroken identity or integrity of that for 
                                                 
24 Opusc 23, PG 91, 264ab: “Ὅτι φύσις μὲν οὐκ ἂν εἴη ποτὲ ἀνυπόστατος, οὐ μὴν ἡ φύσις 
ὑπόστασις· οὐδὲ τὸ μὴ ἀνυπόστατον εἰς ὑπόστασιν θεωρεῖται. Ἐπειδὴ οὐδὲ ἀντιστρέφει. Ἡ μὲν γὰρ 
ὑπόστασις, πάντως καὶ φύσις· ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ σχῆμα, πάντως σῶμα. Οὐκ ἔστι γὰρ ὑπόστασιν νοῆσαι ἄνευ 
φύσεως· οὐ δὲ πάλιν σχῆμα ἢ χρῶμα ἄνευ σώματος· ἡ δὲ φύσις, οὐ πάντως καὶ ὑπόστασις. Ὅτι ἡ μὲν 
φύσις, τὸν τοῦ εἶναι λόγον κοινὸν ἐπέχει, ἡ δὲ ὑπόστασις, καὶ τὸν τοῦ καθ’ ἑαυτὸ εἶναι. Ὅτι ἡ μὲν φύσις 
εἴδους λόγον μόνον ἐπέχει, ἡ δὲ ὑπόστασις καὶ τοῦ τινός ἐστι δηλωτική.” 
25 Ep 15, PG 91, 549c. 
26 Plato, Ep 7, 342b. 
27 Lampe, λόγος, s.v. 
28 Amb 7.16; cf. Ch. 2. 
29 Opusc 23 (n. 24 above); Opusc 14, PG 91, 152b (my emphasis): “And hypostatic difference hits 
upon a principle according to which the otherness of the assemblage of properties contemplated in the 
common essence—[an otherness] that divides one from another by number—makes the multitude of 
individuals [Ὑποστατικὴ δὲ διαφορὰ, τυγχάνει λόγος, καθ’ ὃν ἡ κατὰ τὸ ἄθροισμα τῶν ἐνθεωρουμένων 
ἰδιωμάτων τῷ κοινῷ τῆς οὐσίας ἑτερότης, τέμνουσα κατ’ ἀριθμὸν ἄλλον ἀπ’ ἄλλου, τὴν τῶν ἀτόμων 
ποιεῖται πληθύν].” 




which it is principle.31 In this sense too a logos is the immanent, logical structure that 
determines what’s possible for universal and particular being. Hence it appears in close 
relation to (or as determinative of) a thing’s power or even potency, that by which an 
agent first is and then acts.32 
 Tropos too stretches. It bends flexibly much like the English “way,” “manner,” or 
“mode.” A thing’s tropos is the way it is, how it exists in fact. Yet this “how” does not 
always refer to a concrete reality or to some dimension of it. Maximus can speak of the 
“five modes” of contemplation,33 the “modes” of divine providence and judgment,34 the 
“mode” of Christ’s union,35 the “mode of exchange” between His natures (not the same 
as the “mode of union”), and so on.36 The latter crystalizes the point well enough: though 
there is but one “unified mode of the Lord’s activities,” which itself manifests the 
hypostatic “mode of union,” each of Christ’s natures still retain the mode proper to its 
essential principle.37 Mode, like principle, receives conceptual determination solely from 
what it’s the mode of.  
 Two important relations. [1] Logos-tropos. Here we have an axiomatic pair in 
Maximus’s thought. Its likely provenance is Cappadocian-inspired trinitarian theology.38 
God is one by virtue of His λόγος οὐσίας (“principle of essence”), three by His τρόπος 
                                                 
31 Opusc 14, PG 91, 153b: “Identity is indistinguishability, according to which the principle of the 
thing signified possesses utter singularity, [which is] recognized to differ in no sense [Ταυτότης ἐστὶν 
ἀπαραλλαξία, καθ’ ἤν ὁ τοῦ σημαινομένου λόγος τὸ πάντη κέκτηται μοναδικὸν, μῃδενὶ τρόπῳ διαφορᾶς 
γνωριζόμενον].” 
32 Amb 2.5 (of Christ’s human agency); Amb 7.19 (preexistent logoi establish τὰ δυνάμει, which 
will by divine ordinance come into ἐνεργείᾳ). 
33 Amb 10.35-41. 
34 Amb 10.20. 
35 Amb 5.20; Ep 12, PG 91, 492a (“mode of economy”); 
36 Amb 5.24; Pyr 28-31, PG 91, 296c-297a; 192, PG 91, 345d-348a. 
37 Amb 5.11 (singular “mode”); 5.17 (plural “modes”). 




ὑπάρξεως.39 The former, principle, obviously signifies what is common to divinity. The 
latter, mode, especially to the extent that it connotes how divine person comes to be—its 
characteristic origin40—indicates the real distinction of hypostases in God.41 Notice the 
link to nature (=common, logos) and hypostasis (=proper, tropos). It therefore comes as 
no surprise that Maximus perceives this pair too, first manifest in God Himself, 
permeating all creation. So he insists that a miracle, for instance, does not innovate the 
natural principle of a thing lest that thing desist as what it essentially is. No, instead the 
mode corresponding to that nature alters, how it persists and acts in concrete existence.42 
Water did not mutate into wine, we might say, but the very water began to behave 
identically to wine, to take on a wine-mode (i.e. qualities like color and taste). Yet water 
it remained in principle, for God never destroys what He wills to be, and a thing’s logos 
is precisely God’s will for it.43 So too in christology: Christ preserves the principles 
proper to each of His natures, though their modes, now in hypostatic union with one 
another, are both natural and “supernatural.” 44 
 [2] Person-mode. Though person or hypostasis everywhere corresponds to what 
Skliris calls “the hypostatical order of particularity,”45 the order of individual modalities, 
                                                 
39 Gregory of Nyssa, C. Eun. III.6.14, is a locus classicus for this pairing. 
40 Sherwood, Earlier Ambigua, 161, notes that while Gregory Nyssen and Basil only applied 
τρόπος ὑπάρξεως to the Son and Spirit—for these persons, unlike the Father, have origin—subsequent 
theologians linked it to the Father too in a negative way: the “how” of His existence is precisely that, as 
“the unoriginated originator,” He receives no “how” from another. 
41 Amb 1.4; cf. Amb 10.39 and Sherwood, Earlier Ambigua, 164. And yet even here logos and 
tropos do not simply follow a rigid equation of logos=unity, tropos=trinity. Maximus calls the “principle” 
that constitutes the divine Monad “the principle of essence or of ‘to be’ [μονάδα μὲν κατὰ τὸν τῆς οὐσίας, 
ἤτοι τὸν τοῦ εἶναι λὸγον],” but also names a “principle” for the divine Trinity: “the principle of how to exist 
and subsist [τριάδα δὲ, κατὰ τὸν τοῦ πῶς ὑπάρχειν καὶ ὑφεστάναι λόγον]” (Myst 23, PG 91, 700d-701a; my 
translation). 
42 Amb 42.29. 
43 Amb 7.24; Amb 42.13-16. 
44 This is very much the operative principle in Maximus’s rebuttal of monenergism; cf. Pyr 192, 
PG 91, 345d-348a. See esp. Ch. 1.5. 




person and mode are not simply reducible to each other.46 Especially clear is Opusculum 
10. Here Maximus criticizes the idea that we should attribute Christ’s activity strictly and 
directly to His hypostasis: 
For he obscured and in a certain sense destroyed the principle for these things 
[hypostasis/person vs. essence/nature] by assigning to the person qua person the 
activity that characterizes the nature, rather than [assigning to the person] the 
‘how’ and the ‘what sort of mode’ of its [i.e. nature’s] fulfillment [οὐχὶ τὸν πῶς 
καὶ ὁποῖον τῆς κατ’ αὑτὴν ἐκβάσεως τρόπον], according to which one recognizes 
the difference between those acting and those being acted upon, possessing these 
with or against nature. For each of us acts principally as what we are rather than 
as who—that is, [we act] as man. And as someone, say Paul or Peter, he gives 
expression to the mode of the activity typified by him through impartation, 
perhaps, or by progress in this way or that according to his dispositive judgment 
[κατὰ γνώμην]. Hence, on the one hand, we recognize difference among persons 
in the way of conduct [ἐν μὲν τῷ τρόπῳ...κατὰ τὴν πρᾶξιν], and on the other, [we 
recognize] invariability in the logos of the natural activity. For one is not more or 
less endowed with activity or reason [ἐνεργὴς ἢ λογικός], but we all have the 
same logos and its natural activity.47 
  
*Summary. We can now discern several discrete (though really inseparable) 
metaphysical elements of a concrete person.48 This thumbnail presumes all the features 
detailed above. 
 [1] a principle of person is the immanent cause and ground of 
 [2] the concrete person (hypostasis), which itself must possess 
 [3] a universal essence/nature/species bearing its proper principle (hence power), 
and 
 [4] the person imbues this essence with the individual determination she is, which 
 [5] instances this universal essence in a singular mode of activity, and 
 [6] this activity is simultaneously universal (qua natural) and individual (qua 
personal) 
 
Nature and hypostasis, universal and particular, logos and tropos—these pairs must 
converge to establish any existent. And it’s not simply that each term of a pair must 
                                                 
46 Bathrellos, Byzantine Christ, 103. 
47 Opusc 10, PG 91, 136d-137a; cf. QThal, Introduction, PG 90, 249c (each person fulfills her own 
singular “mode” of the passions, for they exist only “in us,” i.e. in individual agents). 
48 I here deliberately bracket the controversy over whether there are grounds for detecting a 
modern “personalist” precedent in Maximus’s theological anthropology. This list, I repeat, treats only some 
important metaphysical principles, not—and I’m convinced this is where the debate should go—the 




couple, like two atoms in a covalent bond; each individual configuration (and indeed the 
whole cosmos) presupposes a bonding of the bond pairs themselves. It’s as if the pairs 
shared the same “electronegativity” (=divine will and power manifest as each thing’s 
constitutive logos) and that this very sameness just is the concrete, hypostatic “whole” of 
every being. The final two terms intimate this interpenetration of metaphysical binaries. 
 
En-hypostasized (τὸ ἐνυπόστατον). This is an essence or nature or species considered in 
the individual hypostasis as that hypostasis’s very own essence. In fact, Maximus openly 
states that essences only exist in this way: you never find an abstract nature floating 
about. And so he employs a couplet many have claimed never surfaces in the Fathers: 
“The fact that a nature is not without hypostasis [τὸ μὴ ἀνυπόστατον] does not make it a 
hypostasis, but in-hypostasized [ἐνυπόστατον].”49 An en-hypostasized reality is a nature 
or essence as it exists singularly in an individual, and, though it retains its universality50 
(all individuals that belong to it possess and perform its common properties), it exists in 
no other way. A concise definition: 
An enhypostasized reality is what is common according essence or form, which 
really subsists in the individuals under it and is not contemplated in mere thought. 
Or again, an enhypostasized reality is what, along with another reality that differs 
according to essence, co-constitues and co-subsists for the composition and 
                                                 
49 Opusc 16, PG 91, 205a: “τὸ μὴ ἀνυπόστατον, οὐχ ὑπόστασιν εἶναι τὴν φύσιν ποιεῖ, ἀλλ’ 
ἐνυπόστατον.” For many the alleged absence of the anhypostasis-enhypostasis couplet in the Fathers or at 
Constantinople II discredits the pedigree Barth claimed for the doctrine; so F. LeRon Shults, “A Dubious 
Christological Formula: From Leontius of Byzantium to Karl Barth,” Theological Studies 57 (1996): 431-
46. Riches, Ecce Homo, 110, though an adherent of the doctrine, still repeats the thesis that this “couplet 
appears nowhere in the Fathers.” That the noun form, enhypostasia or enhypostasis, never appears poses no 
real problem here, especially since the adjectives are frequently (as here) substantive; that is, they function 
grammatically as nouns. 
50 So Opusc 16, PG 91, 205b: the “enhypostasized reality,” since it is a nature in concreto (“the 




generation of one person and one hypostasis; and it is never recognized by itself.51  
 
 
En-essenced (τὸ ἐνουσίον). Conversely, no hypostasis really exists except as possessing 
and therefore actualizing itself in a nature. This is the “en-natured” or “en-essenced.” A 
hypostasis cannot be the individual instance of something—a “what” and “how”—unless 
it is the instance of a universal essence. Peter is not at all if he is not human by nature, 
while, to juxtapose the previous term, there is no real “human nature” that is not actually 
a Peter or Paul or Mary. If a nature manifests itself only in and through its immanent 
presence in individuals, a person subsists only as the subject that determines and 
expresses her nature in her proper, unrepeatable way.52 Another concise definition: 
An en-essenced reality is not only what is contemplated possessing in itself the 
assemblage of idioms, according to which it is known as something 
[distinguished] from another—but also what really possesses the common of the 
essence.53 
  
                                                 
51 Opusc 14, PG 91, 150b-c: “Ἐνυπόστατόν ἐστι, τὸ κατὰ τὴν οὐσίαν κοινὸν, ἤγουν τὸ εἶδος, τὸ ἐν 
τοῖς ὑπ’ αὐτὸ ἀτόμοις πραγματικῶς ὑφιστάμενον, καὶ οὐκ ἐπινοίᾳ ψιλῇ θεωρούμενον.” 
52 Opusc 16, PG, 91, 205b: “In this way too, the fact that hypostasis is not without essence does 
not make it [identical to] an essence, but proves it en-essenced, so that it is not identical to a mere property, 
but rather we know the property with the one [hypostasis that] is properly in it [i.e. in the nature];” Opusc 
23, PG 91, 261c: “For these [i.e. the “en-hypostasized” and “en-essenced”] do not possess existence in 
themselves, but are always contemplated around the hypostasis.” Cf. Opusc 16, quoted at n. 47. 
53 Opusc 14, PG 91, 152a: “Ἐνούσιόν ἐστι τὸ μὴ μόνον ἐνθεωρούμενου ἔχον ἐφ’ ἑαυτοῦ τὸ τῶν 
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